Artículo
Set-valued TU-games
Autor/es | Fernández García, Francisco Ramón
Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel Ángel Puerto Albandoz, Justo |
Departamento | Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa |
Fecha de publicación | 2004 |
Fecha de depósito | 2015-06-23 |
Publicado en |
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Resumen | The goal of this paper is to explore solution concepts for set-valued TU-games. Several stability conditions can be defined since one can have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework. ... The goal of this paper is to explore solution concepts for set-valued TU-games. Several stability conditions can be defined since one can have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework. We present two different core solution concepts and explore the relationships among them. These concepts generalize the classic core solution for scalar games and can be considered under different preference structures. We give characterizations for the non-emptiness of these core sets and apply the results to four multiobjective operational research games. |
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