Artículo
Bridging the Intellectualist Divide: A Reading of Stanley’s Ryle
Autor/es | Navarro Reyes, Jesús |
Departamento | Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Metafísica y Corrientes Actuales de la Filosofía, Ética y Filosofía Política |
Fecha de publicación | 2019 |
Fecha de depósito | 2019-11-20 |
Publicado en |
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Resumen | Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, ... Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice. |
Cita | Navarro Reyes, J. (2019). Bridging the Intellectualist Divide: A Reading of Stanley’s Ryle. Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 10 (3), 299-324. |
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