The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to establish a parallelism between the analyses in Keen (1987,1989.a) referred to indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied according to the destination principle and its counterpart when taxes are imposed on an origin basis. Using a simple two-country model of international trade it is argued that indirect tax harmonization under the origin principle, considered as a movement of domestic taxes towards an appropriately designed "average" tax structure, is potentially Pareto improving, in the sense that the welfare of a given country can be increased provided that the other country's welfare is kept unchanged with the aid of an international transfer. In the same vein, it is shown that if the initial position is a Nash equilibrium, there are situations under which the above-mentioned reform may generate an actual Pareto improvement, so that both countries improve their welfare without any need for a compensating international transfer. As stated above, the definitive system will be a mixed one, so that the pure origin case is not the most realistic framework from a policy point of view. However, it may be useful in yielding indications that, coupled with the results that have been obtained under the destination principle, provide insights on the effects of the definitive system.