Sistemas de cálculo como formas de Logicismo

Abstract

The logicism may be regarded like a fossil stone that has not utility nowadays. In this sense, logicism took care of the research about the foundations of mathematics but apparently its task arrived at its end many years ago because of some results that were established during the century. However it is not wholly right. Understanding logicism as an attempt to reduce classical mathematics to logic means we can distinguish: 1) the idea according to which mathematic is logic in some way, and 2) a metaphysical program of research to: a) define mathematical notions as logical notions, and b) show that the mathematical theorems are logical theorems. The failure (if so) concerned to 2), since 1) was assumed by many logicians. Recovering logicism is not easy and there may be several ways. One of them is the one followed by N.B. Cocchiarella whose systems (there are more than one) represent a form of logicism (Frege's or Russell's form). From those systems -though a bit changed from my own point of view- we can define a modal calcule that may have application in computer science, what would not be a stale work. From a common language we take in account two systems in order to show that Cocchiarella's modified system is as powerful deductively as that of Church modified functional second order calcule. We can obtain new systems that represent form of logicism and are more powerful than that of Church enlarging Cochiarella's modified system. These new systems, that becomes modal systems provided that one adds appropiate modal tools (then they may be used in computer science), may be useful to study logicism itself (as historical philosophy of logic and mathematics).