The cg-position value for games on fuzzy communication structures

Abstract

A cooperative game for a set of agents establishes a fair allocation of the profit obtained for their cooperation. The best known of these allocations is the Shapley value. A communication structure defines the feasible bilateral communication relationships among the agents in a cooperative situation. Some solutions incorporating this information have been defined from the Shapley value: the Myerson value, the position value, etc. Later fuzzy communication structures were introduced. In a fuzzy communication structure the membership of the players and the relations among them are leveled. Several ways of defining the Myerson value for games on fuzzy communication structure were proposed, one of them is the Choquet by graphs (cg) version. Now we study in this work the cg-position value and its calculation. The cg-position value is defined as a solution for games with fuzzy communication structure which considers the bilateral communications as players. So, the Shapley value is applied for a new game (the link game) over the fuzzy sets of links in the fuzzy communication structure and the profit obtained for each link is allocated between both players in the link. As we see in our examples and results the cg-position value is more concerned with the graphical position of the players and their communications than the other cg-values. In this paper we also introduce a procedure to compute exactly the position value, avoiding to calculate the characteristic function of the link game for all coalitions. This procedure is used to determine the cg-position value. Finally we compare the new value with other cg-values in an applied example about the power of the groups in the European Parliament. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.