A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references

Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel Ángel; Mármol Conde, Amparo María; Sánchez, F.

doi:10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4

Artículo

dc.creator	Hinojosa Ramos, Miguel Ángel	es
dc.creator	Mármol Conde, Amparo María	es
dc.creator	Sánchez, F.	es
dc.date.accessioned	2022-10-14T11:08:15Z
dc.date.available	2022-10-14T11:08:15Z
dc.date.issued	2012
dc.identifier.citation	Hinojosa Ramos, M.Á., Mármol Conde, A.M. y Sánchez, F. (2012). A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references. TOP, 20, 661-678. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4.
dc.identifier.issn	1863-8279	es
dc.identifier.issn	1134-5764	es
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11441/137913
dc.description.abstract	We consider an extension of the classic division problem with claims, division problems with multiple references. We show that the theory of cooperative games is able to provide a single-valued allocation rule for this class of problems. Moreover, this rule can be related with the Talmud rule for the classic division problem, as in Aumann and Maschler (J. Econ. Theory 36, 195–213, 1985). Finally, we establish the consistency and other basic properties of the rule	es
dc.format.extent	18 p.	es
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.publisher	Sociedad Española de Estadística e Investigación Operativa	es
dc.relation.ispartof	TOP, 20, 661-678.
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Division problems	es
dc.subject	Multiple references	es
dc.subject	Cooperative games	es
dc.subject	Talmud rule	es
dc.title	A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es
dcterms.identifier	https://ror.org/03yxnpp24
dc.type.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	es
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.contributor.affiliation	Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Economía Aplicada III	es
dc.relation.publisherversion	https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4.pdf	es
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s11750-010-0158-4	es
dc.journaltitle	TOP	es
dc.publication.issue	20	es
dc.publication.initialPage	661	es
dc.publication.endPage	678	es

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