Now showing items 1-18 of 18

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      A characterization of the Shapley value for cooperative games with fuzzy characteristic function 

      Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (Elsevier, 2020-11)
      The characteristic function of a cooperative game determines the payment that each coalition can obtain when the players ...
    • Article
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      A Game Theoretical Randomized Method for Large-Scale Systems Partitioning 

      Muros Ponce, Francisco Javier; Maestre Torreblanca, José María; Ocampo-Martínez, Carlos; Algaba Durán, Encarnación; Camacho, Eduardo F. (IEEE, 2018)
      In this paper, a game theory-based partitioning algorithm for large-scale systems (LSS) is proposed. More speci cally, a ...
    • Article
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      A real Shapley value for cooperative games with fuzzy characteristic function 

      Galindo Beleña, Hugo; Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (Elsevier, 2021-04)
      There are cooperative situations in which the players have only imprecise expectations about the profit that can be obtained ...
    • Article
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      A Shapley distance in graphs 

      Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Jiménez, María Nieves; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (Elsevier, 2018-03)
      A new distance in finite graphs is defined through a game-theoretic approach. This distance arises when solving the problem ...
    • Article
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      A Value for Games Restricted by Augmenting Systems 

      Algaba Durán, Encarnación; Bilbao Arrese, Jesús Mario; Slikker, M. (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2010)
      This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. There have been previous ...
    • Article
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      A Value for Graph-Restricted Games with Middlemen on Edges 

      Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos; Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (MDPI, 2022-05)
      In a cooperative game with a communication structure, a graph describes the communication possibilities of the players, ...
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      An application of the Shapley value to the analysis of co-expression networks 

      Cesari, Giulia; Algaba Durán, Encarnación; Moretti, Stefano; Nepomuceno Chamorro, Juan Antonio (Springer Nature, 2018-08-24)
      We study the problem of identifying relevant genes in a co-expression network using a (cooperative) game theoretic approach. ...
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      Cooperative games under augmenting systems 

      Bilbao Arrese, Jesús Mario (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2003)
      The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework inorder to analyze cooperative games inwhic h only ...
    • Report
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      Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core 

      Faigle, Ulrich; Grabisch, Michel; Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel (Elsevier, 2015)
      We introduce cooperative TU-games on concept lattices, where a concept is a pair (S, S′ ) with S being a subset of players ...
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      Games with fuzzy authorization structure: a Shapley value 

      Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Jiménez, María Nieves; Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Lebrón Rueda, Esperanza Angustias (Elsevier, 2015-08)
      A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function which determines the maximal gain or minimal ...
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      Games with fuzzy permission structure: A conjunctive approach 

      Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Jiménez Jiménez, María Nieves; Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Lebrón Rueda, Esperanza Angustias (Elsevier, 2014-09)
      A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function which determines the maximal gain or minimal ...
    • Chapter of Book
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      Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games 

      Algaba Durán, Encarnación; Brink, René van den (Birkhäuser, 2021)
      Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure. Two ...
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      El Potencial de Hart y Mas-Colell para Juegos Restringidos Por Grafos 

      Bilbao Arrese, Jesús Mario; López Vázquez, Jorge Jesús (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, 1996)
      This paper analyzes a model of formation of connected coalitions in a cooperative game. This model is a communication ...
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      Rough Shapley functions for games with a priori unions 

      Basallote Galván, Manuela; Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel; Hernández Mancera, Carmen; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (Taylor and Francis, 2023)
      A family of allocation rules for cooperative games with a priori unions is introduced in this paper. These allocation ...
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      Sharing profits in formal fuzzy contexts 

      Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel (Elsevier, 2023-08)
      Cooperative game theory is concerned with situations where a group of agents coordinate their actions to get a common ...
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      Soft cooperation systems and games 

      Fernández García, Julio R.; Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena; Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel (Taylor and Francis, 2018-04)
      A cooperative game for a set of agents establishes a fair allocation of the profit obtained for their cooperation. In order ...
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      The cg-average tree value for games on cycle-free fuzzy communication structures 

      Fernández García, Julio R.; Gallego Sánchez, Inés Magdalena; Jiménez Losada, Andrés; Ordóñez Sánchez, Manuel (Sociedad Española de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, 2019)
      The main goal in a cooperative game is to obtain a fair allocation of the profit due the cooperation of the involved ...
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      Two families of values for global cooperative games 

      Alonso Meijide, José María; Álvarez Mozos. Mikel; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria; Jiménez Losada, Andrés (Springer, 2024-04-03)
      A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition ...