Article
Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value
Author/s | Puerto Albandoz, Justo
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Fernández, F.R. Hinojosa Bergillos, Yolanda ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Department | Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa |
Publication Date | 2008-02 |
Deposit Date | 2022-11-03 |
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Abstract | In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes
values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: ... In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory. |
Citation | Puerto Albandoz, J., Fernández, F.R. y Hinojosa Bergillos, Y. (2008). Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value. Annals of operations research, 158 (1), 143-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9. |
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