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The Limits of Care in Heidegger: Self-Interest and The Well-Being of the World

Max Schaefer

University of Limerick

Abstract:

This paper seeks to establish the limits in Heidegger's account of how human beings are with one another in the world. Toward this end, we will examine Heidegger's finding that human beings exist in the world as care, as a finite movement that needs to seek the perseverance and growth of its being. We will be brought to find that, in Heidegger's thought, this finite movement is essentially worldly and holistic, and that this means that the essential formal structure of human relations is that of reciprocity. The form and limit of such relations of reciprocity will be pursued by examining Heidegger's account of how these relations are lived in inauthentic and authentic ways. In the case of the former, we will find that human relations abide by a logic of tit-for-tat. In the latter case, however, such relations of reciprocity will be seen to open onto and foster the growth of the well-being of the world as a whole. In closing, we will ask whether Heidegger's account of our finite movement in the world can accommodate relations of non-reciprocity.

Keywords:

Care; mineness; inauthenticity; authenticity; anxiety; conscience

I. Introduction: The meaning of Care

This paper seeks to establish the limits in Heidegger's account of how human beings are with one another in the world. Toward this end, we will examine Heidegger's finding that human beings exist in the world as care, as a finite movement that needs to seek the perseverance and growth of its being. We will be brought to find that, in Heidegger's thought, this finite movement is essentially worldly and holistic, and that this means that the essential formal structure of human relations is that of reciprocity. The form and limit of such relations of reciprocity will be pursued by examining Heidegger's account of how they are lived in inauthentic and authentic ways. In the case of the former, we will find that human relations abide by a logic of tit-for-tat. In the latter case, however, such relations of reciprocity will be seen to open onto and foster the growth of the well-being of the world as a whole. In closing, we will ask whether Heidegger's account of our finite movement in the world can accommodate relations of non-reciprocity.

For Heidegger, the matter of who *Dasein* is stands as an essential structural element to *Dasein's* way of being in the world. (Heidegger 1962, 149-153). *Dasein* is in the world with others as care, as a finite, insecure and uncertain presence, which is always at risk of falling away into nothing, and which therefore needs to continuously act for the sake of its own perseverance and growth. As a result, all of *Dasein's* actions serve as symptoms of its care for the perseverance of its own being¹. Who *Dasein* is, then, is what Heidegger calls a mineness -a finite (incomplete), *self-indexing* movement that is in the world with others (68, 78). *Dasein* is thrown into the world as this mineness, this finite, self-indexing movement, such that it has to be this mineness (78). Thus, because *Dasein* has to exist in such a way that all of its actions speak out who it is, *Dasein* is necessarily responsible for its existence. Mineness means that *Dasein* necessarily bears responsibility for the situation into which it has been thrown, and for how it takes up this situation in the future.

That being said, the concept of mineness is not a trace of egoism on Heidegger's part. Heidegger understands the essential condition of all appearing -the finite, temporal movement of being- and the beings that appear according to this phenomenality, as standing in a relation of mutual need. Heidegger understands the essential condition of all appearing presence -the finite, temporal movement of being- and the beings that appear according to this phenomenality, as standing in a relation of mutual need. Being needs beings in order to appear and, in turn, beings need being in order to become who they are. Given the reciprocal need between being and beings, *Dasein* also exists in a relation

1 For a discussion of the relation between incompleteness and movement in Heidegger, see BACKMAN 2005, 244-245; and CARTER 2014, 483-486.

of mutual need with those others with whom it shares certain contexts of meaning in the world. As a result, when *Dasein* undertakes this or that act for the sake of its own potentiality-for-being, it does not act merely, or even primarily, for itself. Because of the shared contexts of significance in which my potentiality-for-being is necessarily steeped, when I attend a public talk being given by a friend, for example, my act is neither merely for me -it is not egotistic- nor wholly for the other, but for our shared relation in the world -it is out of concern for the meaning of our shared existence in the world.

For Heidegger, then, the mineness of *Dasein* can be neither ego-centric, nor oriented around the other, but is worldly and holistic. As the presence of *Dasein's* mineness rests in the reciprocal relation of the world's manifestation in which it is caught, *Dasein's* mineness is itself caught, is itself nothing other than this reciprocal relation to the world. In its mineness, *Dasein* is not primarily oriented around itself or the other, but around the world, and, more specifically, around the particular worlds in whose contexts of significance it has been thrown, and which it must take up in its own way. As a result, in its mineness, *Dasein* necessarily suffers and enacts a reciprocal relation to all of those with whom it shares a context of significance.

Dasein's mineness is therefore a relation to those others with whom it shares a world. And this sharing of worlds happens as a reciprocal relation. As we will see, this does not mean that *Dasein* only relates to those who have done something advantageous for it, but it does mean that it can only relate to those who have the potential to suffer and enact the contexts of significance in which it has been thrown. As will come forward in more detail later, even though *Dasein's* mineness is not limited to a mere tit-for-tat, this mineness is not an immoderate or gratuitous relation or action, but remains one of reciprocity. For it follows from Heidegger's analysis of movement as the presence of *Dasein's* potentiality, as the reciprocal relation between its suffering and enacting that opens the world's ecstatic manifestation, that those *Dasein* with whom I share a context of significance, are already present, and have already done something for me, simply in their potentiality-for-being, before any objective effecting of this or that. Heidegger's account of *Dasein's* potentiality as the reciprocal relation between the suffering and enacting of its essential relation to being, means that *Dasein's* suffering, in its inner relation with enacting, is itself always already an action, which brings to presence the world's network of relations on which I myself depend for my self-perseverance and self-growth. The meaning of the finite movement of care, as begins to show itself here in the structural feature of *Dasein's* mineness, would need to be further specified as this finite movement of reciprocity. Finitude, then, would consist in suffering and enacting these reciprocal relations of the world.

2. Inauthentic Relations of Reciprocity

On account of this, our care discloses the world in a carefree manner. As we have seen, because the mineness in question is an essential and inescapable structural element of *Dasein's* finite way of being in the world, *Dasein* is bound to exist this mineness in one way or another -in an authentic (*eigentlich*) or inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) manner (68, 78). It is because this existence is always experienced as mine that I can either take up my existence (authenticity), or I can make an effort to neglect it, to fall away or take flight from it in an ever-ongoing series of distractions (inauthenticity) (68, 78). In either case, *Dasein* is present to itself (186, 220). The finite movement that structures this presence simply means that *Dasein* cannot be present to itself in a permanent and immobile manner; it means *Dasein* can only ever be present to itself by maintaining itself in its incomplete movement toward itself, by moving into its own finite potentiality.

The aforementioned loss of distance from the world as such means that *Dasein* forgets its own unique role and responsibility in disclosing entities, and simply lets itself be carried along by the anonymous and average, ready-made norms and attitudes into which it finds itself thrown in its everyday existence. It is because our care is not permanent and immobile, but is determined by the incomplete movement of being that *Dasein* tends to get absorbed in the objects of its care (HEIDEGGER 2005, 43). In so doing, *Dasein* covers over its mineness; it forgets its own role and responsibility in the way it goes about its existence, in the way it understands the world and the way it conducts itself therein (HEIDEGGER 1962, 60). Rather than acknowledge its responsibility for its existence, in an inauthentic way of existing, *Dasein* takes care to unload that responsibility onto the anonymous and average views and forms of conduct that it finds already at work in the situation into which it has been thrown (164-168).

As the incomplete movement of our concern happens as a thrown-projectedness, however, Heidegger does not view inauthenticity as a moral shortcoming or failure on the part of *Dasein*, but as an inevitable aspect of the essential structure of its being (68). The *they* is an existiale of *Dasein* (168). Inauthenticity is as inevitable as *Dasein's* thrownness and projectedness; and like them, for Heidegger, inauthenticity does not ever entirely go away, but, as we will see, can merely be modified (68). Thrown into a world not of its own choosing, *Dasein* necessarily begins its existence by assuming the beliefs and habits of those it all of a sudden finds itself surrounded by². What is important for Heidegger is not that *Dasein* simply falls in line with the watered down (levelled down)

² 164-165, 312. Frederick Olafson speaks to this point in an especially clear manner. See OLAFSON 1998, 38-39.

and generally accepted view of the time, but the sheer fact that one simply assumes, and gets absorbed in, this or that view (HEIDEGGER 1962, 164-165, 221-224, 312-313; OLAFSON 1998, 36). One could assume the views of one's parents, of the Christian tradition in which one is brought up, or the outlook of the bohemian artist, of the secular 'free thinker,' or of the anarchist -it matters not. So far as Heidegger's view of inauthenticity is concerned, what matters is that *Dasein* does not maintain a distance and measure with respect to these interpretations of the world from their basis in the finite movement of *Dasein's* being, and that *Dasein* does not therefore disclose them from its mineness, from its own unique situation, and so does not take responsibility for them.

On account of this our care discloses the world in a carefree manner. Forgetting the incomplete movement that distances and draws entities into relation, that gives them their proper measure, our care becomes carefree in that it becomes absorbed in the objects of its concern to such an extent that the views into which it has been thrown are understood as simply the way things are, as self-evident, secure, and certain (HEIDEGGER 1999, 80). This being the case, I find that I myself do not need to disclose things, but only to disclose things as someone of this particular understanding normally would. In this case, my disclosure of the world is not authentically carried out from me myself, but indirectly through the *they*. My disclosure of the world is not accomplished as I myself need to, but as 'one' would, as anyone and everyone would in this situation, according to what is generally accepted as normal or appropriate at the time (164-165).

The aforementioned loss of distance from the world as such, as we've seen, means that *Dasein* forgets its own unique role and responsibility in disclosing entities, and simply lets itself be carried along by the anonymous and average, ready-made norms and attitudes into which it finds itself thrown in its everyday existence. As a result of this loss of distance from the finite movement of the world, Heidegger maintains that *Dasein* finds itself dispersed in the relations between things in the world (HEIDEGGER, 2001, 90-91). Dispersed in the relations between things, as Heidegger notes, *Dasein* begins to determine who it is, and how it measures its self-growth, not according to the incomplete movement of its being, but in terms of its position and standing in relation to other beings and things in the world, as determined by the norms and attitudes of the *they* (HEIDEGGER 1962, 163-164). Heidegger refers to this inclination to care for and manage our distance from other entities within the world as our distanciality (164-166). In taking care of entities in the world, then, *Dasein* is concerned for its position and standing in relation to these entities, as dictated by the norms and attitudes of the crowd (163-165). *Dasein* here views its relations in the world with others in terms of success and failure, advantage and disadvantage, superiority and inferiority (HEIDEGGER, 2001, 75-78).

When *Dasein* relates to the world, itself, and others in an inauthentic manner, then, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one's own *Dasein* has lagged behind the *Others* and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's *Dasein* already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed (HEIDEGGER, 1962, 163-164).

In an inauthentic relation to the world, *Dasein* sees others and things merely in terms of how they can serve one's quest for success and superiority in the world. In inauthenticity, then, the finite movement of the reciprocal relation of the world would be articulated according to a logic of tit-for-tat. One would treat well and do things for those who it would be appropriate for one to treat well according to one's assumed station in existence: those who have in the past, or who in the future can possibly provide me with an advantage, who can aid me in my desire for success in this or that facet of my existence -in my desire to be an artist, to be of a certain social standing, etc. Those who are not normally seen as providing such potential benefits, those whose beliefs, values, and conducts do not align with our own, such that they do not appear to be of any potential use to one's desire for success, would not need to be treated with such favour.

As this inauthentic way of relating to others out of concern for the success of my potentiality-for-being occurs within *Dasein's* dispersal into the relations that obtain between things in the world, in the endless shifting of things in the referential relations in which they stand, this reciprocal tit-for-tat way of relating to others stands as an inauthentic temporalizing of *Dasein's* originary temporality. Heidegger regards this inauthentic temporality as the aforementioned objective (calendar) time, time as an anonymous series of discrete now-points (377). As such, this objective time involves covering over and eluding our familiarity with the finite movement of our being, in favour of an endless (infinite) attempt to solidify and guarantee the success of one's potentiality-for-being. The finite movement of reciprocal relations in the world, enacted in an inauthentic manner, therefore stands as an endless need for greater and greater success and superiority, a need for an ever-increasing strangle-hold over oneself, others, and the world, and so an ever-increasing instrumentalization of oneself, others, and the world at large. As this endlessly increasing instrumentalization of the world only serves to further the dispersal of *Dasein* that gives rise to it, however, the success of this instrumentalization, of this logic of tit-for-tat, is its failure, its inherent inability to satisfy itself in its relations in the world. In this sense, *Dasein's* relaxed, carefree relation to the world is not without its own inner torment. Based as it is in *Dasein's* attempt to disguise and evade the finite movement of its being, this mounting need for ever-new heights of success, and for the

instrumentalization of others, is itself a way in which *Dasein* attempts to distort and evade the incomplete movement of its being in the world.

The ontological condition for *Dasein's* modification of this inauthentic understanding of the way it is in the world lies in the incomplete movement of its being. It is because of the finite movement of being that beings are given to inevitably err and make mistakes in their respective interpretations of the world. And it is because of these (mis)interpretations, and because objects themselves can occasionally break down and falter, and so inevitably fail to live up to our interpretations at some point or other, that *Dasein* no longer feels so carefree and secure in its *dispersal* amidst things in the world, and so *Dasein* finds itself alerted to its being *as a whole*. By *Dasein's* being as a whole, of course, we mean the finite movement of *Dasein's* being, which distances and gathers beings into relation, into their true measure, with which they have been united from the beginning, from their first having been thrown into the world. When *Dasein* is in the world in an authentic way, as we will come to see, *Dasein* understands the incomplete and needy movement according to which it is in the world with others. In so doing, *Dasein* understands the historical situation into which it has been thrown from the irreducibly finite movement of its own being, and so *Dasein* comes to understand its historical situation as that for which it must assume responsibility.

3.Re-turning to Oneself and Others: Anxiety and The Call of Conscience

To be authentic, *Dasein* must first be alerted, it must first be attuned to authenticity as a possibility of its being. This occurs through a breakdown in the normal functioning of the objects that one uses, which sends *Dasein* to question how it itself must be in order for such breakdowns and instability to be possible (105). In *Being and Time*, the fundamental attunement or mood in which *Dasein* finds itself quite all of a sudden torn from its everyday dispersal in objects and sent back toward the finitude of its existence is that of anxiety (*Angst*). In anxiety, the referential relations of use fall away (232). Entities within the world, as a result, suddenly have no significance, which leaves *Dasein* all of a sudden feeling exposed, insecure, and unstable (232). In anxiety, *Dasein* is overcome by a feeling that, contrary to the prior comforts provided by its relations with things, it is in truth not at home in the world.

As anxiety is undergone in the collapse of the significance of objects in the world, Heidegger maintains that what one is anxious about is “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” (231). As Heidegger continues,

[t]he obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as

a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety*. The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the ‘nothing and nowhere’, does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within-the-world, the world in its world hood is all that still obtrudes itself (231).

In anxiety, the falling away of the world’s significance can be likened to a sudden turning off of the lights, to a darkening on account of which, as Heidegger notes, “there is emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, though the very world itself is *still* ‘there,’ and ‘there’ *more obtrusively*” (234). For Heidegger, then, “[w]hat oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the *possibility* of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself” (231). As the significance of entities within the world in terms of which we normally understand who we are falls away, anxiety sends *Dasein* back upon

its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes *Dasein* for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities... Anxiety makes manifest in *Dasein* its Being *towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being -that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings *Dasein* face to face with its *Being-free-for* (*propensio in...*) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is (*i.e.* 232).

For Heidegger, then, anxiety is experienced as a call, as a call of conscience. Since in anxiety *Dasein* finds itself forsaken by the significance of things and by the everyday chit-chat in which it found some comfort and distraction (322), this call calls in silence, as a silence that reminds *Dasein* of the finite movement of its being. The call of conscience is silent in that it does not say any-thing, but simply the transcendence of the finite temporality that gathers beings into relation with one another in the world³. In this way, the call of conscience simply says that beings are finite, that beings are by virtue of the finite, relational movement of their being, which determines their potentiality (69-70).

The call of conscience that calls the self is its own *Dasein*, our own “bare” thatness, our own inevitable feeling of anxiety and uncanniness at our realization that we have been inescapably abandoned to the relative nullity of the world (HEIDEGGER, 1962, 321). In this sense, the self calls itself. “*Dasein* is *at the same time* both the caller and the one to whom

3 For a more detailed study of the silent call of language, see WEBB 2009, 69-70.

the appeal is made" (320). But as "the call is precisely something which *we ourselves* have neither planned for nor voluntarily performed", Heidegger notes that the caller of the call is indeterminate - "[i]t' calls, as Heidegger says, and it calls "against our expectations and even against our will" (320). Ultimately, "[t]he call comes *from* me and yet *from beyond* me" (320). This can be understood from our analysis of our finite movement as the reciprocal relation of the world's ecstatic manifestation. My *Dasein*, this indeterminate caller, stands as my necessarily reciprocal relation with the relative nullity or alterity of my being. As per the movement of this reciprocal relation, the call comes from me and yet beyond, as the innermost nullity that opens me to my potentiality-for-being. The call is thus present to me as the finite movement of my *Dasein's* being.

Heidegger states that the "call reaches him who wants to be brought back" (316). In anxiety, then, the self finds itself calling itself back to the finite movement at the basis of its being. The call, in this sense, is the self's *Dasein* calling it back to its inherent understanding of the finite movement of its being, which makes possible all of its possibilities. The call brings the self back to the incomplete movement that it inevitably is, and that it cannot avoid being. This finite movement can be understood as what Heidegger regards as *Dasein's* inherent being-guilty. *Dasein* is guilty, not because of something it has done or failed to do according to inner or outer norms, but "simply in the way it is," as this inevitably incomplete movement. As Heidegger observes,

[t]he common sense of the 'they' knows only the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy them. It reckons up infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its ownmost Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making 'mistakes' (334).

The call calls the self back to its ownmost potentiality-for-being by calling it back to this finite movement, to this being-guilty, according to which the self necessarily forgets the null basis of the historical situation into which it has been thrown, and which it must take up in the future.

If we are to take seriously the incompleteness of this movement, then, with Heidegger, it must be noted that, when the self hears the call of conscience, the self cannot simply choose to have a conscience, as this would presume that the conscience in question is something that can be completely grasped and possessed as a property (334). In its potentiality, *Dasein* always already has a conscience in an incomplete way, and, in hearing and understanding that the silent call of its conscience is calling it back to the nullity of its facticity, the self can now want to have a conscience (334). That is, in understanding

the call of conscience, the self understands that, as per the incomplete movement of its care, it is necessarily guilty, that it has necessarily assumed the norms and habits of the historical tradition into which it has been thrown, and so has not chosen to take this tradition up from the nullity of its being. But in understanding the call of conscience, it can now want to make this choice, it can now choose to “make this choice,” to make possible its authentic potentiality. As Heidegger describes “*Dasein*’s most primordial potentiality as Being-guilty” (334), to be sure, this authentic understanding of the finite movement of *Dasein*’s being is not an overcoming or even mitigation of its guilt -it is not its salvation- but it does allow the self to understand rather flee this inevitable incompleteness, and so to avoid potential complications and hazards that can and do arise from attempting to overstep one’s limits and impose one’s will on one’s existence, from attempting to reduce it to ontic measures of success and failure, good and evil, in a vain and counter-productive attempt at control and security. As Heidegger writes, in wanting to take up the guilt into which one has been thrown, *Dasein* “is ready to be appealed to,” it is ready to suffer and enact its potentiality-for-being as it shows itself from itself, in its basis in the incomplete movement of our care (334).

In authentically wanting to have a conscience, in wanting to take up its heritage from its basis in the nullity of its being, Heidegger says that the self resolutely anticipates its end, and in this sense stands in an authentic being-toward-its-end (i.e. death). The nullity that speaks itself out in the call of conscience gives the self to understand that the basis of its possibilities rests in this non-being, in this, to use Heidegger’s tortured phrase, *possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all* on the part of its *Dasein* (307, 289, 293-294). Contrary to our everyday understanding, then, for the human self, death, the possibility of impossibility, is not first and foremost an actuality, something that will happen to one at some indeterminate point in the future, but is *Dasein*’s most essential possibility; it is that with which *Dasein* is united from the very beginning of its existence, that which opens its possibilities for being in the world, and so that to which it relates at every moment of its existence (294, 296). Death is “that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped [*unuberholdbare*]” (294). In authentically being towards its death, the self thus understands the heart of its potentiality-for-being, it understands its potentiality-for-being as a whole (303). In authentically being-towards-death, the self returns to its wholeness, not in the sense of grasping itself completely and perfectly, but in the sense of understanding its ownmost potentiality-for-being from its basis in the nullity of its being, from the incomplete movement of its being. *Dasein*’s being toward its death is not non-relational in that it completely negates *Dasein*’s relations to others altogether, but in that *Dasein* can authentically come to be who it is as a being in

the world with others only on its own, in its wanting to have a conscience.

Dasein's authentic being towards its death is thus a shift away from relating to others in terms of the they-self, in terms of the anonymous and average assumptions on the part of the crowd as to how one should relate to others -in terms of stereotypes, economic calculations- towards authentically relating toward others from the finite movement of its mineness -from the finite movement of my own self-responsibility. As Heidegger writes,

authentic disclosedness [in resolutely anticipating one's end] modifies with equal primordially both the way in which the 'world' is discovered...and the way in which the *Dasein-with* of *Others* is disclosed (344).

In keeping with this, Heidegger notes that

[f]ree for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the *end* and so are understood as finite [*endliche*], *Dasein* dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of *Others*, or rather that it may explain these possibilities wrongly and force them back upon its own, so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factual existence. As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes -but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which his not to be outstripped, it makes *Dasein*, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of others (308-309)

What this means is that, in authentically being towards its death, the self is freed from its everyday way of relating to others as they are seen by the they, as things that are viewed in terms of how they can benefit or not-benefit one's desire for success in effecting one's potentiality-for-being. By authentically anticipating one's end, and thereby breaking up this inauthentic relation to others via the they, *Dasein* "guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-for-being which it has understood. It guards itself against 'becoming too old for its victories' (Nietzsche)" (308). That is, by diminishing one's ties to the they, and its aspirations for success and superiority, one's resolute anticipation of one's end frees one up from becoming overly stuck in one's ways, in these presumably static ways of the they, which fail to take the specificity of each situation into consideration, and so leave one lingering too long in ways that, while successful in the past, have since fallen behind the finite movement of our existence. By resolutely anticipating one's end, however, the self is freed to no longer relate to others in such ways, and instead regards them as fellow world-constitutors, as fellow *Dasein* who are themselves in the world according to the finite movement of their care.

For Heidegger, then, it is the solitariness of anticipating one's end, in the sense of an action that can only be carried out by me myself, that allows the self to truly care for those others it finds itself amidst. (344). It is such anticipatory resoluteness that

first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality... Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another -not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternising in the 'they' and in what the 'they' want to undertake (344-345).

And it is from the spirit of this finding that we can understand what Heidegger means when he says that "[w]hen *Dasein* is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of *Others*" (344). *Dasein* here becomes the conscience of others, not in the sense of acting like an over-protective or domineering parent who stands over the other and tries to do things for them, but as one who, out of concern for the well-being of the others' concern, for the other's self-preservation and self-growth as a fellow world-constitutor, acts by holding herself back, and by practicing a certain self-restraint, so that the other might seize the opportunity to understand and take up the finite movement of her own being in an authentic way⁴.

4. Conclusion: The Limit of the World's Well-Being

Our study of *Dasein's* authentic way of being-with others has begun to show how the finite self's relations in the world are not always a matter of tit-for-tat. The self no longer regards the other merely in terms of what she can do or not do for my desire for success in the effecting of my potentiality. Rather, I now also see the other as she is, as a fellow *Dasein* who is concerned about her being and who forms the world from the finite, errant movement of her own potentiality-for-being.

Irene McMullin maintains that, in this concerned holding oneself back at the appropriate time and place, the self can serve as the silent call of conscience to another. (226) And indeed we can think of numerous situations where this occurs. For example, when a young girl is finishing up high-school and considering which university to attend, and looks to her mother for advice, or for some sense of what she herself believes she should do, or perhaps simply how she herself might feel were she to move far away, the thoughtful

⁴ McMullin makes this point in her study of the implications of Heidegger's thought on our everyday social relations. See MCMULLIN 2013, 226-230.

restraint displayed by the mother, which speaks without saying any-thing, which speaks in her pause, can alert the girl to the finite movement of her own care, as that to which she herself has been delivered over and which only she herself can responsibly take up into the future. The restraint shown by the mother in this case is not to be confused with indifference, surely, or even with an outlook on the world that strongly emphasizes so-called self-independence or self-autonomy. For the action on the part of the mother is taken at considerable pains to herself. The mother would, in a sense, undoubtedly like to interject and ensure that her daughter makes the best possible decision on the matter. And yet, drawing on her own experience, on her own knowledge of how we must exist in this world, she acts only by holding herself back in that pause, which alerts the daughter to her own responsibility for her existence more than any-thing that might explicitly be said thereafter.

Taking such a situation into consideration, McMullin argues that the authentic being-with the other at play here is not a reciprocal relation (225). For, continuing with our example, the daughter does not herself already stand in an authentic relation to her own care, and so does not reciprocate this authentic being-with her mother. Yet, as Heidegger's analysis of movement as the presence of *Dasein's* potentiality bears out, the self, in this case, the young girl, is already present, and has already done something for the other, in this case, the mother, qua her potentiality-for-being. In her potentiality-for-being, as the reciprocal relation between *Dasein's* suffering and enacting that opens the world's ecstatic manifestation, the daughter is already present, and already acts by holding open contexts of significance on which the mother depends for the self-perseverance and self-growth of her own care. What is more, this view of the finite movement of our being in terms of a horizontal context of significance would serve to limit our authentic being-with others to those others with whom we share such contexts. While it is true that the relation between the two in question is not an "exact symmetry" (225), in this basic way, it is a reciprocal relation for all that. The mother's authentic relation to her daughter, on Heidegger's account, is thus not a gratuitous relation. In her authentic relation to the finite movement of her mineness, the mother's way of relating to others remains a reciprocal relation.

Indeed, as Frederick Olafson maintains, and as our analysis of *Dasein's* mineness suggested earlier, in our authentic being-with others, the "distinction between self-interest and the general well-being will simply not be at all plausible" (OLAFSON 1998, 94). That is to say, by authentically understanding our care from its basis in the finite movement of our mineness, "self-interest here changes", such that my actions are not undertaken for the advantage of an independent I or you, but for the preservation and growth of the reciprocal presence of the world in which we both share in our own way

(92-93). My authentic relation to the other is thus determined by a reciprocity, but not by one that would be calculative or egotistical. Instead, in our authentic being-with others, our reciprocal relations with others expands to include the finite temporality that makes possible our shared contexts of meaning. Such reciprocal relations thus take on a more holistic character. Even from this more holistic perspective, however, our relations with others are limited to those with whom we share a context of significance. This finding prompts the question as to whether it is not the case that the finite movement of our existence can withstand an authentic relation to others that would exceed such parameters. Our finite experience in the world seems to suggest that we are capable of gratuitous or non-reciprocal acts of self-giving. It seems that, all of a sudden and quite unexpectedly, the look of a stranger who stands outside our contexts of significance can nevertheless be intelligible to us, and that we can in turn grow into who we are in the world with others by responding to such radical others by gratuitously giving ourselves to them in an act of compassion. Such experiences seem to stand outside the scope of Heidegger's analysis of the limits of care, and therefore call for further study of the essential conditions that determine how human beings are with one another in the world.

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