

THE FINAL LINE IN CALLIMACHUS' *HYMN TO APOLLO*

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Un examen del verso final del *Himno a Apolo* de Calímaco dentro del marco de las teorías poéticas calimaqueas lleva a la conclusión de que la lectura *Φθόνος* es genuina, mientras que la variante *φθόρος* es una trivialización.

An analysis of the final line of Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*, conducted within the framework of the poet's literary theories, shows that the reading *Φθόνος* is genuine, whereas the variant *φθόρος* is a trivialization.

The final line in Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* has been the subject of copious debate during the last centuries. Fortunately for us, most of the relevant material has been assembled by F. Williams, in his doctoral dissertation which was directed by me at my Classics Research Centre, University of London, so that I can now conveniently refer the readers to the monograph in question¹. As is well known, the problem consists in choosing between the variants *Φθόνος* or *φθόρος* in line 113. The *editiones veteres*, as Ernesti noted in his commentary *ad loc.*², read

χαίρει ἄναξ· ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἴν' ὁ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο

¹ F. Williams, *Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo* (Oxford 1978) 96 ff.

² Jo. Aug. Ernesti, *Callimachi Hymni, Epigrammata et Fragmenta* I (Lugduni Batavorum 1761) 65.

but the variant *Φθόνος* was rejected by Ernesti, who judged *φθόρος* to be the correct one. Accordingly, Ernesti, following Bergler (cf. *Thes. Gr. Ling.*, s. v. *φθόρος*) printed

χαίρει ἀναξ· ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὁ φθόρος, ἔνθα νέοιτο.

and explained the line as meaning “Salve, rex. Momus autem in malam rem abeat”. According to Ernesti, that is to say, Callimachus expressed the wish that *Μῶμος* (personification of the unfair criticism levelled at him by his envious rivals) might die (“intereat Momus”): if we were to replace “pro morte invidiam” in line 113, i. e. if we were to read, in the said line, *Φθόνος* instead of *φθόρος*, the sense would be stupid (“insulse admodum”). The same view was taken by Spanhem, in his commentary *ad loc.*³. According to him, *Μῶμος*, in line 113, was the same character (“idem”) as the personified *Φθόνος* whom we encounter in lines 105 ff. of the Hymn, where he is kicked away by Apollo. Therefore, so argued Spanhem, it would be tautological to write *ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὁ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο* in line 113: the correct variant, Spanhem maintained, in line 113 is *φθόρος* (not *Φθόνος*). In Spanhem's opinion, Callimachus' words in line 113 mean that he wishes *Μῶμος*, i. e. Envy (which, personified as *Φθόνος*, had already been kicked away by Apollo in lines 105 ff.) to “in perniciem abire”. Expressions involving phrases like *εἰς φθόρον*, *εἰς τὸν φθόρον*, *εἰς φθοράν* are used, in Greek, in order to wish someone dead (which notion subsumes the notion of becoming silent, insofar as the dead do not speak: material in Spanhem, *loc. cit.*, *σιγῶσα, ἀφωνος*). These considerations demonstrate “abunde”, Spanhem concluded, that the variant *Φθόνος* was introduced “absurde omnino” into the place of the correct reading *φθόρος* in line 113. Since 1870, editors have -correctly, as we shall see- accepted the variant *Φθόνος* in line 113, for reasons clearly indicated by Williams, *loc. cit.*

Two articles have recently appeared, in which the textual problem contained in line 113 is discussed anew. C. Meillier, in a paper full of brilliant insights⁴, does not reach a firm conclusion as to which of the two variants must be regarded as the genuine one. He correctly states (p. 80) that “rien dans l'état de la tradition ne permet...d'assurer qu'une leçon est meilleure que l'autre” (I shall revert to this point later); the criterion *utrum in alterum* which he accordingly tries to apply does not lead him to settle the question. On the one hand he writes that “la leçon *Φθόνος* offre un sens tout à fait satisfaisant” (p. 94), and that “le passage de *Φθόνος* à *φθόρος* peut se comprendre” as a trivialization, due to “la plume d'un Chrétien”, who identified “Phthoros” with the “Diable” (p. 93, n. 36), but on the other hand he wonders whether *φθόρος* might well be “la *lectio difficilior*” (p. 80”).

³ E. Spanhem(ius), *In Callimachi Hymnos Observationes* (Ultrajecti 1697) 119 ff.

⁴ “Callimaque, Hymne II, vers 113: *Φθόνος* ou *φθόρος*?”, *Studi Classici e Orientali* 40 (1990) 77 ff.

Meillier, in my opinion, is wrong when he invokes a “déplacement du rapport *Phthonos/Momos* en un nouveau rapport *Phthoros/Momos*” (p. 88) and when he, asserting that “*Phthonos* est réduit à *Phthoros*” (p. 90), postulates a “relation *Phthonos-Phthoros*” (p. 93): he is wrong because personified *Phthonos* and personified *Momos* are commonplace in the ancient world (cf. Roscher, *Lex. Mythol.*, s. v. *Personificationen*, 2167 s.), whereas, as far I know, the personification of *φθόρος* never existed in antiquity. In his own paper, J. Blomquist⁵, developing the arguments used by Spanhem, asserts that the reading *φθόρος* is the correct one, in line 113, whereas the variant *φθόνος* is to be rejected. I shall now try to show that Blomquist's thesis is wrong.

First of all: Blomquist, following unquestioningly in Pfeiffer's footsteps, thinks that the variant *φθόνος* “can be dismissed as a scribal correction”, because “the archetype had *φθόρος*” (p. 18). Such assertions by Blomquist are ungrounded, insofar as Dr. H. White and I have shown that Pfeiffer's views concerning the manuscript transmission of Callimachus' Hymns are devoid of any foundation (cf. lastly *CL* 6 [1990] 39 ff.). Since the reading *φθόνος* cannot be dismissed as a mere “scribal correction”, it follows that the criterion called *utrum in alterum* or *lectio difficilior* is the only one that can serve to establish which of the two rival readings is the genuine one. Blomquist himself, admitting that “the textual transmission cannot help us to choose between the two readings” (*ibid.*), uses this criterion, only he misapplies it.

Schneider (*Callimachea*, 194 f.), whom Wilamowitz followed⁶, correctly pointed out that the reading *φθόρος* is the result of a mistake made by someone (a scribe, or ancient critic) who wrongly thought that *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* were one and the same: if *Μῶμος* “were just another name for *Φθόνος*”⁷, of course it would be necessary to read *φθόρος*, in line 113. *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* are of course constantly associated with each other in ancient texts: this is why the scribe or critic who created the reading *φθόρος* in line 113 mistakenly thought that *Φθόνος*, in Callimachus' line under discussion, was merely another name for *Μῶμος*. The same mistake was made, as we have seen, by Spanhem, and was repeated by modern scholars such as Kambylis (Blomquist, *loc. cit.*). In reality, as Schneider, Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl and others have shown, *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* are not to be identified with each other, because they are the personifications of the two entirely different concepts. Wilamowitz' distinction between *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* is regarded as “basically sound” by certain critics (cf. Williams, p. 97). Blomquist, Köhnken and others (cf. Blomquist, pp. 19-22) reject the type of distinction made by Wilamowitz between *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος*, but the important, indeed crucial, point, which Blomquist of course cannot avoid accepting, is that ancient texts

⁵ “The Last Line of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo”, *Eranos* 88 (1990) 17 ff.

⁶ Cf. Williams, *loc. cit.*, for details concerning Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl, etc.

⁷ Cf. Blomquist, *art. cit.*, 17 f. n. 2.

(Agatharchides, Pindar, Bacchylides, Plutarch, Gregory, etc.) show that a clear difference existed between *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος*, as Schneider (*Callimachea*, I, 194) was the first to underline: *Φθόνος*, Envy, is the cause of *Μῶμος*, which latter can be best translated as "Tadelsucht"⁸, "Blame" (see the acute observations made by Meillier, *art. cit.*, 78). In other words: in antiquity, the relationship between *Φθόνος* and *Μῶμος* was supposed to be "one of cause and effect" (Blomquist, *art. cit.*, 22). That is to say: Envy, i. e. *Φθόνος*, causes envious people to produce that "Blame", i. e. *Μῶμος*. In other words: *Μῶμος* is the effect, the result of *Φθόνος*.

In the light of the crucial point just mentioned, the conclusion reached by Blomquist is mistaken. His objection to the reading *Φθόνος*, in line 113, is that this word would produce a "circular expression", because, according to him, the sense of the phrase *ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὃ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο* will be "may my critics go where my critics are". Having reached the conclusion that the variant *Φθόνος* would produce a "circular expression" - a conclusion which we shall see is entirely wrong - Blomquist sees himself compelled to accept, *faute de mieux*, the reading *φθόρος*, because this latter makes sense, whereas the reading *Φθόνος*, according to him, does not, insofar as it produces, as he believes, "a circular expression" which is "muddle-headed". In Blomquist's opinion, the variant *φθόρος* produces the meaning "may my critics turn silent" (*art. cit.*, 23), and indicates that Callimachus tells *Φθόνος* and "its representative *Μῶμος*, i. e. his critics, simply to go to hell" (*art. cit.*, 19).

Both these contentions made by Blomquist are erroneous. First of all, the reading *Φθόνος* produces a sense which is the opposite of a "circular expression", and which is in reality adroitly pointed and admirably cogent. *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος*, in line 113, do not both mean "my critics", as Blomquist asserts. Already Cahen⁹ has underlined that Callimachus, by writing *ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὃ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο*, makes a "distinction subtile" between "Critique" (*Μῶμος*) and "Envie" (*Φθόνος*). According to Cahen, this "distinction" made by Callimachus "brode sur une assertion platonicienne", i. e. rests on *Phdr.* 247 A, a passage already quoted in this connection by Schneider (*Callimachea* I, 194). In reality, as we shall see, the passage of Plato in question is not directly relevant to the distinction between *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* which Callimachus makes here, although it is relevant to Callimachus' argument to the effect that his poetry is valid.

In order to understand the sense not only of line 113, but also of the whole conclusion offered by the Hymn in its lines 105-113, it is necessary to examine

⁸ *Μῶμος* was "tadelsüchtig", because he was motivated by *Φθόνος* (Babrius 59, 1-18 Perry), and on account of his "Tadelsucht" (i. e. his desire to criticize what in reality does not deserve to be criticized) was punished by Zeus (Roscher, *Lex. Mythol.*, s. v. *Momos*, 3119): Zeus ejected him from Olympus, by way of punishment, because he unjustifiably criticized gods and goddesses, as we read in Aesop, 155 Hausr.=155 Halm, 100 Schn.: *καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς, ἀγανακτήσας κατ' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ, τοῦ Ὀλύμπου αὐτὸν ἐξέβαλεν.*

⁹ *Les Hymnes de Callimaque* (Paris 1930) 88.

the said conclusion within the framework of Callimachus' own "Poëtik" - a task which neither Meillier nor Blomquist has carried out. The fundamental principles of Callimachus' "Poëtik", as I have shown elsewhere in every possible detail¹⁰, are two: these two principles are enunciated by the poet, in an exactly parallel manner, in *Epigr.* 21 Pf., *Aitia* fr. 1.1 Pf., and in the conclusion of the *Hymn to Apollo*. The said principles are: a) Callimachus' poetry is valid, because it is approved of by the deities presiding over poetry, i. e. Apollo and the Muses; b) the criticism levelled at Callimachus' poetry by his rivals is not valid, because, instead of being objective, it is caused by envy. In *Epigr.* 21 Pf. Callimachus asserts that his poetry is valid, by calling to witness the fact that it is approved of by the Muses: the Muses, by approving of Callimachus' poetry and by protecting him insofar as he is a valid poet, have enabled him to triumph over the *Βασκανία*, Envy, nurtured against him by his rivals. In *Aitia* 1.1 Pf. Callimachus makes two assertions. First: his poetry is valid, witness the fact that Apollo (lines 21 ff.) and the Muses (lines 37 ff.) approve of it and support him as a poet. Second: the criticism brought against him by his rivals is not valid, because his rivals are the progeny of Envy (lines 17 ff.: *Βασκανίης ὄλοδν γένος*), i. e. they are motivated by Envy. His rivals are not only motivated by Envy, *Βασκανία*, and therefore unable to judge Callimachus' poetry impartially and objectively: they are, moreover, incompetent in matters of poetry, because they are equated by Callimachus with the *Τελχιῖνες*, malevolent *δαίμονες* (not gods), devoted to carping criticism, who, precisely because they are mere *δαίμονες*, cannot possibly be a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself. Callimachus invites his rivals, therefore, to overcome their incompetence concerning poetry, and to learn how to judge poetry by using the aesthetic canons promulgated by Apollo and followed, upon Apollo's instructions, by Callimachus (lines 17 ff. *αὐθι δὲ τέχνη κρίνετε, κτλ.*).

In sum: the criticism levelled at Callimachus by his rivals is said, in *Aitia* 1.1 Pf., to be doubly invalid, in that his rivals are motivated by envy and they are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo, who supports Callimachus. Exactly the same principles preached by Callimachus in *Aitia* 1.1 Pf. are applied by him in the conclusion of the *Hymn to Apollo*. Callimachus asserts that he has, thanks to the help of Apollo, who approves of Callimachus' poetry, triumphed over the envy which motivates his rivals: Apollo kicks *Φθόνος* away, and refutes him (*Hymn. Ap.* 105 ff.). In other words: The criticism aimed at Callimachus by his rivals is doubly invalid, because it is motivated by envy, *Φθόνος*, and because the god of poetry supports Callimachus. The presence of *Μῶμος* alongside *Φθόνος* in line 113 of the *Hymn* is demonstrated to be necessary by the overt parallelism with *Aitia*, fr. 1.1 Pf. Callimachus attacks not only the cause of the unfair criticism pointed at him, i. e. Envy (*Βασκανία Aitia* 1.1.17=*Φθόνος Hymn. Ap.* 105 ff.), but al-

¹⁰ "Das Dichten des Kallimachos...", in *Scripta Minora Alexandrina* I (Amsterdam 1980) 235 ff.; cf. also "Hellenistic *Topoi* in Ovid's *Amores*", in *op. cit.* IV, 515 ff.

so the unfair critics themselves. These critics are said to be the “progeny of Envy” (*Aitia* 1.1.17: *Βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος*: they are, that is, generated by, i. e. the effect of, Envy) and are equated with the malevolent non-gods called *Τελχίνες* (*Aitia* 1.1.7), just as the said critics are equated with the malevolent non-god called *Μῶμος* in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo. Since, in antiquity, the relationship between *Φθόνος* and *Μῶμος* was known to be one of cause and effect, as Blomquist himself says (*art. cit.*, 22), it follows that *Μῶμος*, personifying Callimachus' critics in *Hymn. Ap.* 113, is denounced by the poet as the effect of Envy. In sum: the malevolent non-gods *Τελχίνες* (in *Aitia*, fr. 1.1) and *Μῶμος* (*Hymn. Ap.*, 113), who personify his critics, are denounced by Callimachus as the product of Envy. Insofar as his critics are motivated by Envy, and therefore not fair, their judgement -this is the basis of Callimachus' argument- is not valid.

Not only are the *Τελχίνες*, insofar as motivated by Envy, incapable of judging poetry impartially: they are, for good measure, incompetent in matters of poetry, as I have already underlined. They are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself: this is why Callimachus exhorts them to overcome their incompetence by learning to judge poetry according to the canons which Apollo had issued and which Callimachus followed. In lines 17 ff. of *Aitia* 1.1, Callimachus writes:

ἔλλατε, Βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος· αὐθι δὲ τέχνη
κρίνετε, μὴ σχοίνῳ Περσίδι τὴν σοφίην·
μηδ' ἀπ' ἐμεῦ διφᾶτε μέγα ψοφέουσιν ἀοιδῆν
τίκτεσθαι· βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ Διός.

The sense is: “come now (*ἔλλατε*), you baneful race of Jealousy! Hereafter (*αὐθι*) judge poetry by the canons of art...” The adverb *αὐθι*, “hereafter”, means “now that you have heard from me the correct canons of art”. The structure of the Hymn is very clear: Callimachus first enunciates the correct canons of art (lines 7 ff.), then exhorts the *Τελχίνες* to follow these canons after they have heard them from him (*αὐθι*), and finally explains why such canons are correct: they are correct because (lines 21 ff.) they were issued to Callimachus by none other than Apollo, the god of poetry (lines 21 ff.: *καὶ γὰρ ὅτε κ.τ.λ.*). Since Eustathius quotes Callimachus as having written *ἔλλατε Βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος*, certain critics wanted to supplement *ἔλλατε Βασκανίης* in the papyrus fragment of *Aitia* 1.1.17. The word *ἔλλατε* was explained by Eustathius as being equivalent to *ἔρρετε*, “abite in malam rem”, but such a word presented two difficulties. First of all, the equivalence of *ἔλλατε* and *ἔρρετε* is phonetically impossible to explain, as was already pointed out by Ahrens (material in Schneider, *Callimachea* II, 513, fr. 292). Secondly: if Callimachus, in fr. 292=*Aitia* 1.1, line 17, had written *ἔλλατε*, a word equivalent to *ἔρρετε* and meaning “abite in malam rem”, i. e. “drop dead”, such a word would be contextually impossible, because Callimachus, in the passage under discussion, exhorts the *Τελχίνες* to do something, i. e. to judge poetry correctly (*κρίνετε...μηδὲ...διφᾶτε...*): dead people cannot do anything. Therefore

it was suggested that the correct word was ἔλλατε, which we find, in fact, attested in Callim. *Aitia* fr. 1.7.13 Pf.=fr. 121 Schn. The form ἔλλατε, in Callim. *Aitia* fr. 1.7.13 Pf., is followed by an imperative (ἐνιψήσαθε), and means “come now” (so, correctly, Trypanis, in his Loeb edition of Callimachus), “agedum”. The scholiast on *Aitia*, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., now confirms that Callimachus, in *Aitia* fr. 1.1.17 Pf. wrote precisely ἔλλατε: the word ἔλλατε is followed by imperatives (κρίνετε restored by the editors in line 18, and μηδέ...διφᾶτε, restored in line 19). In other words: in *Aitia*, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., Callimachus wrote ἔλλατε, which means “agedum”, “come now”. The reading ἔλλατε, in Callim. fr. 292 Schn., was evidently invented by some late grammarian who could not explain the form ἔλλατε etymologically (its etymology is debated to this day), and imagined that ἔλλατε could be equivalent to ἔρρετε. We shall now see that, just as the non-gods Τελχίνες are said by Callimachus to be incompetent in judging matters of poetry, because they are no match for the god of poetry himself, Apollo, as is Μῶμος (the malevolent non-god who personifies, in *Hymn. Ap.* 113, the rivals of Callimachus just as the Τελχίνες personify the same rivals in *Ait.* 1.1 Pf.) said by Callimachus to be no match for Apollo, and therefore to be incompetent in judging poetry. What is the exact meaning of the phrase ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔνθα Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο? Williams thinks that it is an ἀποπομπή or ἐπιπομπή (*op. cit.*, 97). According to him, line 113 means that Callimachus invited Φθόνος and Μῶμος to attack “each other”. Williams' hypothesis is not tenable, because both the ἀποπομπή and the ἐπιπομπή were prayers whereby a human invited one deity to attack persons other than the suppliant. As far as I know, neither in the ἀποπομπή nor in the ἐπιπομπή were two deities invited to attack each other, and in fact in the ἀποπομπή written by Leonidas, which Williams uses as the basis of his contention, Μῶμος is invited by Leonidas to attack other human beings, not to attack any other deity.

The correct answer to the question which I have asked, i. e. the question as to the precise meaning of the phrase ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔνθα Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο, can be arrived at if we establish where Φθόνος and Μῶμος were supposed to dwell. Φθόνος (Roscher, *Lex. Mythol. s. v. Phthonos*, 2474) was a would-be god who as such wanted to live in Heaven (οὐρανός, *Orph. Hymn.* 64.5 Quandt), whence he was constantly ejected by the real gods. Zeus (Plato, *Phdr.* 297 A) ejected him, and the same was done by the god Νόμος and the goddess Νέμεσις (material in Quandt, *Hymn. Orph.* 64.5, where it is underlined that Callimachus' ἤλασεν in *Hymn. Ap.* 107 corresponds exactly to ἐλαύνεις in *Hymn. Orph.* 64.5 and ἐλαύνει in Mesomed. 10.6). The present forms ἐλαύνεις and ἐλαύνει show that, when Zeus ejected Φθόνος from the circle of the gods, Φθόνος did not resign himself to his fate, and constantly tried to return amongst the gods, only to be kicked out of their circle again; Callimachus' λάθριος in *Hymn. Ap.* 105 underlines that Φθόνος tried furtively to remain within the circle of the gods. Μῶμος was another would-be deity (Roscher *s. v. Momos*, 3119), who, exactly like Φθόνος, was ejected by Zeus from Ὀλυμπος (“aus dem Olympus verbannt”) be-

cause of his "Tadelsucht" (Aesop. 155 Hausr.). In Artemidorus 4 *Prooim.* p. 307, as quoted in Roscher (*loc. cit.*), we read ἦν δέ τις ἄρα ἐν ἀνθρώποις Μῶμος ἀπεληλαμένος θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων οὐκ ἀγαθός. It will be noted that Artemidorus' ἀπεληλαμένος corresponds exactly to Callimachus' ἤλασεν, in *Hymn. Ap.* 107¹¹. Callimachus' final line of his Hymn to Apollo ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔν' ὁ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο, meaning as it does "may Μῶμος return where Φθόνος dwells" signifies that Μῶμος cannot aspire any more than Φθόνος to be considered a god inhabiting Olympus like the god of poetry, i. e. Apollo: Μῶμος, that is, is not a match for Apollo in judging poetry, and is just as incompetent to judge Callimachus' poetry as the *Τελλῆνες* are. Cahen's translation (*Les Hymnes de Callimaque*, Paris 1930, 281) is correct: "que Μῶμος aille rejoindre Φθόνος là précisément où l' a précipité le coup de pied d' Apollon". It is only necessary to add that "là précisément", as I have shown, means "away from the circle of the gods", in the sense that neither Φθόνος nor Μῶμος can aspire to be competent judges of poetry, such as real gods like Apollo and the Muses are.

The reading Φθόνος, in line 113, is, we may conclude, genuine: its presence in the line, far from creating a "circular expression", as Blomquist states, renders Callimachus' argumentation cogent and exactly parallel to the argumentation employed by Callimachus in the *Aitia*: both Μῶμος and Φθόνος do not dwell in Olympus, do not belong to the circle of real gods, and as such cannot be a match, when it comes to judging poetry, for real gods such as Apollo and the Muses, who preside over poetry.

The reading φθόρος, on the other hand, was created by someone who did not understand that Callimachus distinguishes between Φθόνος and Μῶμος: Μῶμος, that is, is the personification of his critics, and is the effect of Φθόνος, insofar as Callimachus' critics are the progeny of Envy, i. e. are motivated by Envy. The reading φθόρος produces a "platitude", as Cahen (*loc. cit.*) already noted. For Callimachus to send his critics "tout simplement à la male heure" (Cahen, *loc. cit.*) -this is the meaning which line 113 has, if we accept the reading φθόρος- would not constitute an argumentation capable of demonstrating that Callimachus' critics are incompetent to judge poetry: it would be a mere platitude, without any cogency. Things would be worse if we accept the reading φθόρος and understood the line to mean "may my critics turn silent", as Blomquist suggests. Callimachus' critics had already spoken (*Hymn. Ap.* 105-106, *Aitia* 1.1.1 ff.): since they have already spoken, Callimachus wants them not to become silent -their becoming silent after publicly criticizing Callimachus' poetry would not undo the damage they have done to Callimachus' reputation as a poet: what Callimachus wants them to do is not to become now silent -their silence would not cancel what they have said against Callimachus- but, logically enough, to recant and admit that Callimachus'

¹¹ The verb ἐλαίνω, in *Orph. Hymn.* 64.5, *Mesomed.* 10.6 and *Callim. Hymn. Apoll.* 107 means "verjagen", "eject" (Roscher s. v. *Phthonos*, 2474).

poetry is valid. That retraction, not silence on the part of his critics is what Callimachus wants is demonstrated not only by logic, but also by Callimachus' own words: in *Aitia* 1.1.17 ff. he calls upon his critics to learn how to properly judge his poetry¹², not to be silent.

Conclusion: if we examine line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo according both to logic and to Callimachus' own statements regarding his poetry which are contained in the *Aitia* and in *Epigr.* 21 Pf., the criterion called *utrum in alterum* or *lectio difficilior* demonstrates that the reading *Φθόνος* is genuine, whereas the variant *φθόρος* is a trivialization produced by someone who did not understand the distinction made by Callimachus between *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* and who, by introducing *φθόρος* into the place of the genuine reading *Φθόνος*, created a platitude.

For the convenience of the readers, I might as well summarize our results. Callimachus distinguishes sharply between Envy (*Βασκανία*, *Φθόνος*) and his critics, who were motivated by Envy. In *Aitia* 1.1, he distinguishes between *Βασκανία*, over which he triumphed thanks to the protection of the Muses (*Aitia* 1.1.37 ff.; the same motif is in *Epigr.* 21 Pf.: cf. *Scr. Min. Alex.* I, 246 ff.) and his critics, who, personified as the *Τελχίνες* (malevolent *δαίμονες*, not real gods) are said by him to be the progeny, the product of *Βασκανία* (*Βασκανίης* ὀλοὸν γένος: *Ait.* 1.1.17). In the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus distinguishes, in line 113, between Envy (*Φθόνος* over whom he triumphs thanks to the support of Apollo: lines 105 ff.) and his critics, personified by *Μῶμος*, a malevolent would-be god who was regarded, in antiquity, to be the product, the effect, the progeny of *Φθόνος*.

The parallelism of Callimachus' triumph over the *Τελχίνες* and over *Μῶμος* is just as elegant as it is complete. In *Aitia* 1.1.17 ff. the *Τελχίνες* are invited by Callimachus, insofar as they were known to be mere *δαίμονες* and not real gods, to learn how to correctly judge poetry according to the canons established by no less an authority than the god of poetry, Apollo, and adhered to by Callimachus. In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphs over *Μῶμος* no less elegantly and completely. It was known in antiquity (Plato, *Phdr.* 247 A) that *Φθόνος* ἐξῶ θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται: that is to say, *Φθόνος*, who was a mere "Dämon" (*RE*, s. v. "Phthonos", for details), tried to usurp a position amongst the gods, but they (Zeus, Nomos, Nemesis) kicked him away from their *χορός*, their circle. In the Hymn to Apollo, *Φθόνος* tries to usurp a position within the *χορός* of the gods, in that he tries to enunciate his own canons for judging poetry, which were contrary to those promulgated by the god of poetry, i. e. Apollo: but Apollo ejects *Φθόνος* from such a usurped position (cf. Herter, *RE, Supplem.* V, s. v. "Kallimachos", 440), by kicking him away (*Hymn. Ap.* 107). *Μῶμος*, by trying to criticize Callimachus' poetry, acted as *Φθόνος* did in the Hymn to Apollo, i. e. he tried to

¹² The adverb *αἴθι* "hereafter" which qualifies *κρίνετε* in *Ait.* 1.1.17 f. makes it clear that Callimachus expects his critics to retract their previous judgement of his poetry.

usurp a position as a peer amongst the gods, in that he, *Μῶμος*, wanted to oppose his own judgement concerning poetry to the poetic rules issued by the god of poetry himself, Apollo, but Callimachus tells *Μῶμος* to abandon such a usurped position and to return where *Μῶμος* really belongs, i. e. to the same place where *Φθόνος* belongs, that is to say, outside the circle of the gods. It was well known, in antiquity, as we have observed, that both *Φθόνος* and *Μῶμος* had been ejected from the ranks of the gods, whence it follows that neither *Φθόνος* nor *Μῶμος* can aspire to be a peer of Apollo, which latter, in his capacity as the god of poetry, approves of the poetry written by Callimachus.

Callimachus explicitly tells *Μῶμος*, in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo, to dwell precisely where *Φθόνος* resides: since both *Μῶμος* and *Φθόνος* dwelled, according to ancient authors, outside the circle of the gods, Callimachus' "allusion" to such authors (an allusion which Williams, *op. cit.*, 97, *a priori* excludes, without explaining why) could no be more overt. Such an allusion, as I hope to have demonstrated, throws full light on the meaning of line 113 of the Hymn.

In the light of what I have written Blomquist' error will, I trust, have become clear. He believes (*art. cit.*, 23) that the reading *Φθόνος*, in line 113, would produce a "circular expression", i. e. the sense "may my critics (= *Μῶμος*) go where my critics (= *Φθόνος*) are", because *Φθόνος*, in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo, motivates no other critics than those who are, in line 113, personified by *Μῶμος*. But Blomquist has overlooked the fact that, according to the ancient way of thinking, *Φθόνος* and *Βασκανία* were real mythological beings¹³ (no less real than Apollo and the Muses), who were distinct from the humans motivated by *Φθόνος* or *Βασκανία*. I have explained all this in *Scr. Min. Alex.* I, 235 ff. Callimachus' triumph is, in his Hymn to Apollo, a double one, as it is a double one in *Aitia* 1.1. In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphed, with the help of Apollo, over personified *Φθόνος* (lines 107 ff.), who motivated his critics, and over his critics, i. e. over *Μῶμος*; in *Aitia* 1.1, Callimachus triumphed over his critics, i. e. the *Τελχίνες*, who were motivated by personified *Βασκανία* (*βασκανίης ὀλοὸν γένος*, lines 17 ff.) and over personified *Βασκανία*, who rendered the *Τελχίνες* destructive: *Βασκανία*, the personified "Kraft" (*Scr. Min. Alex.* I, 245) who animated the *Τελχίνες*, could be defeated, as Callimachus makes it clear in *Epigr.* 21 Pf., lines 4-6, and in *Aitia* 1.1.37 f., by Callimachus only with the help of the Muses' benevolent eye (*Scr. Min. Alex.* I, 245-250).

¹³ In other words: Blomquist does not seem to have understand that personifications of abstract concepts (his *art.*, 19), i. e. "Personifikationen abstrakter Begriffe", to use Roscher's terminology (Roscher, *s. v.* "Personifikationen") were envisaged by the ancients as animated beings, living persons.