

30/2

revista do centro de estudos humanísticos

série filosofia e cultura

2016

diacrítica

Cosmopolitan Challenges
500 Anos de Utopia
Homenagem a René Girard

hhuus



Universidade do Minho
Centro de Estudos Humanísticos

Título: DIACRÍTICA (N.º 30/2–2016)
Série Filosofia e Cultura

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Edição: Centro de Estudos Humanísticos da Universidade do Minho em colaboração com Edições Húmus – V. N. Famalicão. *E-mail:* humus@humus.com.pt

Publicação subsidiada por FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia

ISSN: 0807-8967

Depósito Legal: 18084/87

Composição e impressão: Papelmunde – V. N. Famalicão

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THE CONCEPT OF *VOLK* IN HEIDEGGER AS AN EXPONENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF *MIT-SEIN*

O CONCEITO DE *VOLK* EM HEIDEGGER COMO EXPOENTE DA ESTRUTURA ONTOLÓGICA DO *MIT-SEIN*

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Our proposal is to develop a political theory from Martin Heidegger's thinking. In Heidegger's biography, the link that he has with politics passes through being a member of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) but in his philosophy he just makes a few explicit references to the question of community life. However, what we intend is that from concepts like *Volk* (people) and from the fundamental ontological structure of *Mit-sein* (Being-with) can be established a Heidegger's political philosophy, quite far from the political barbarism that entail the Nazism. For this we have to thresh Heideggerian terminology and clearly define what *Volk* is and its relation with *Dasein*, the particular individual, and the structure earlier indicated as *Mit-sein*. The general idea is that the collective, the community, is called *Volk* and it is that *Volk* which endow with Being that entity so particular called *Dasein*.

Keywords: Heidegger, *Volk* (people), community, tradition, spirit.

A nossa proposta consiste em desenvolver uma teoria política a partir da filosofia de Heidegger. No que diz respeito à sua biografia, a ligação de Heidegger à política consiste no facto de ter sido membro do Partido Nazi, mas na sua filosofia ele faz apenas algumas referências explícitas em relação à vida em comunidade. No entanto, aquilo que queremos mostrar é que a filosofia política de Heidegger pode ser determinada a partir de conceitos como *Volk* (povo) e da estrutura ontológica fundamental do *Mit-sein*. Ficará claro que esta teoria está bastante distante da barbárie política do nazismo. Para este fim, temos que abandonar a terminologia heideggeriana e definir claramente conceitos como *Volk*, a relação deste com o indivíduo particular ou *Dasein*, e também com a estrutura já referida do *Mit-sein*. A

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ideia geral é que o colectivo ou comunidade, é designada como *Volk*, e é este *Volk* que concede Ser à entidade particular a que chamamos *Dasein*.

Palavras-chave: Heidegger, *Volk* (povo), comunidade, tradição, espírito.

0. Introduction

When we talk about Heidegger and politics we must keep in mind the stigma that flies around the life and work of the thinker of Freiburg. In 1933, the first of May, the International Worker's Day, that the Nazis took from his socialist branch as the main party, Heidegger joined the NDSAP, the National-Socialist Party, and a little earlier, the 21th of April, he had been appointed rector of the University of Freiburg in the rise of Nazism (Xolocotzi, 2013).

What it was what Heidegger expected joining the Nazis still today continues to be a subject of debate. In 1987 was published the Victor Fariás' book *Heidegger et le nazisme* (Fariás, 1987), who revived a controversy that lay asleep since the late Fifties, with Heidegger rehabilitated in his cathedra and with the recognition of being a crucial thinker to the philosophy of the twentieth century. The publication of Farias is the beginning of that controversy. While Heidegger's accession to National-Socialism was always public, it is from the publication of this work, eleven years after the death of Heidegger, when the bibliography about the topic explodes, radicalizing the issue and facing two factions. On one hand are the anti-heideggerian followers of the theories launched in the book of Farias, that shows us a Heidegger participant in the horror of Nazism and even, as is the case of Faye, present him in some cases as placed under suspicion by the Nazi regime for wanting to take to the extreme Hitler's theories to link them with his own, which would make him more Nazi than the Nazis themselves (Faye, 2007). On the other hand are the heideggerians contrary to these theories, like Ángel Xolocotzi (Xolocotzi, 2013) or Marcel Conche (Conche, 2004), who intend to show a more human Heidegger, full of faults and mistakes, among those stand the fatal error of joining the NSDAP and the acceptance of the appointment as Rector, but they show that it was far from his intention to participate in the barbarity.

But we will not go into detail about it, because our purpose is different. There is already an extensive literature about Heidegger and the Nazism, from the works of the authors we have cited to other important books like the splendid biography of Heidegger written by Rüdiger Safranski (Safranski, 1994) or the work of the historian Hugo Ott about the period

of rectorship of Heidegger (Ott, 1988). But although we are not going into details, we cannot avoid, if we want to propose the development of a political philosophy from the thinking of Heidegger, allude to the question of the link that he had with Nazism for two reasons: The first is the proposed at the beginning of our work and is the stigma surrounding Heidegger because of his involvement in National-Socialism. The second is because the thoughts that serve as a basis for this work are developed by Heidegger since the late Twenties to the Thirties, a time marked by the rise of National-Socialism in Germany and that wasn't indifferent to Heidegger.

1. The period between the wars was a quite fruitful time in the cultural aspect. The horror of the Great War gave room to a reflection about what mankind does in the world, the modern reason had entered in wreck and was questioned practically from all fields of culture. Examples of this are the avant-garde art or existentialism in literature, so in vogue in those years^[1]. In the Golden Twenties was imposed in thought, art and culture a “metaphysical-poetical speech about the chaos” (Steiner, 1991), especially in Germany, who it had been quite affected both financially and spiritually after the First World War. Thus arise in Germany a series of works characterized, in addition to their volume, by the theory that starting from the chaos may arise a rebirth from that same decadence in which the German people are plunged. I quote a few: *Geist der Utopie* (Bloch, 1918), *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (Spengler, 1918), *Der Römerbrief I* (Barth, 1922), *Mein Kampf* (Hitler, 1924) and, of course, *Sein und Zeit* by Martin Heidegger. These books are also a point of inflection in the German language: they use a violent language, full of neologisms. The originality of *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger, 1927) is unquestionable, but it can only be understood within this constellation, it cannot be separated from its historical context (Steiner 1991: 14).

Sein und Zeit contributes the novelty to the philosophical scene that combines Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, to whom Heidegger considers himself a disciple and to whom the work is dedicated, with the study of selfness through *Angst* which it had begun to bloom with the Kierkegaard's existentialism. The question of Being is what guides all the work of Heidegger. But what happens when we are asking about Being? César Moreno well exposes that in his study about the phenomenologists:

1 I would like point out that although Heidegger is a thinker of existential cut, is far away from that existentialism in literature, typical of French thinkers and writers, like Camus and Sartre, since as by his own judgment he stands for a return to humanism proper of the Modernism. see *Brief über den Humanismus*, (Heidegger, 1946)

“Every philosopher must for once in life let challenge by the anguish that all abyss by being causes (that being who is finite, time, mortality), as an occasion it would be foolish to overlook: the lucid consciousness of existence, faced with the human drama” (Moreno, 2000). Being causes *Angst*. The tone of philosophy isn’t the astonishment, as the ancients said, isn’t the surprise, but it’s the startling. The *Angst* of existence is what has originated thinking, this *Angst* has mobilized all thought in the twentieth century from Heidegger on. Perhaps in Modernity there was no place for *Angst*, the important thing was the truth of science and taking this as a basis in order to look for a model that would allow the apprehension of reality. But the answer that the man, the philosopher, is looking for after the catastrophe has nothing to do with the objectual world, but with himself, with his existence. The problem is not in the alien world in which I live, but precisely in that resident that resides in a world of that he cannot break off; he cannot change the house because the house goes with him. Thus, the purpose of *Sein und Zeit* is a hermeneutic of itself; it is about self-care from *Angst*. All the work of Heidegger in the Twenties revolves around *Sein und Zeit* and therefore around this hermeneutics of itself, around this existential analysis.

But from the Thirties on occurs what has been called the *Kehre* in Heidegger’s thought. A turnaround on the road, a swerve to other possibilities of the question of being. In a first instance, in the period of *Sein und Zeit*, under the influence of phenomenology, Heidegger asks about selfness, that what in his philosophy can be called *Dasein*. But since *Sein und Zeit*, even at end of it this already shows (Heidegger 1927: par. 74), the question changes to a sort of collective *Dasein*. According to the analysis of *Dasein* that Heidegger makes in *Sein und Zeit*, this *Dasein* has been thrown into a world in which it is not alone, but it is with others, in a community. This community will then be the interest of Heidegger, the *Volk* (people, community, collective). So we could say that the interest of Heidegger passes from me-*Dasein* to us-*Volk*.

2. This concept of *Volk* clashes with the concept of cosmopolitanism. Heidegger nationalist trends are clear, moreover, his relationship with Nazism is given by their nationalist ideas. Heidegger thought, just as other German philosophers and intellectuals, including Hegel, that the German people was sort of chosen people who had inherited the Greek spirit, while the rest of Europa had adopted the legacy of Rome. Rome was the cosmopolis of Antiquity, who had forged an empire that encompassed different peoples under the same statute of justice, Roman law. The Greeks, mean-

while, were united in the polis following principles of synoecism, based on a local tradition. It's normal to see echoes of the Greek city-state in the spirit in which Heidegger wants to impregnate the German Volk.

Obviously, when Heidegger makes reference to *Volk*, he refers to the German people. *Volk* is a concept that can be translated as people or community. But in the thought of Heidegger the notion of *Volk* implies more than that. The German word *Volk* has its equivalent in English language in *folk*. *Folk* has connotations of people or nation, but in German this word has a meaning of community not as strong as in English. The English word *folk* has a further meaning of social class, group or even family (OED, 2015). Folk has derived internationally in a word that many languages have adopted, have taken over them, including German: *Folklore*. The Oxford English Dictionary defines folklore as “*The traditional beliefs, customs, and stories of a community, passed through the generations by word of mouth*” (OED, 2015). In a philological discussion, *Folklore* comes from *Folk* (People) and *Lore* (traditional knowledge), namely, a science of the traditions of people. Either way, we found a keyword in Heidegger's intentions: Tradition.

The idea of tradition is important for Heidegger. The link of Heidegger with the Nazism is given from extreme and staunch nationalism that he professed and rootedness to the land, the German land. And the land, the ground, the people, the *Volk*, is in conformity to tradition. This tradition is linked to the spirit of people. As happens with *Dasein*, the *Volk* is projected into a future but does not come from nothing, the *Volk*, somehow, already *is-in-the-world*. There are differences of course with the being-in-the-world of *Dasein*, partly because that *Volk* constitutes precisely that world where *Dasein* is, but we won't anticipate events.

The *Volk* is the ensemble of traditions in which the *Dasein* is immersed in, that shape its view of the world. The reason for the importance of the tradition in Heidegger is located in another concept that he uses continually in his texts of this time: spirit (*Geist*). The *Geist* is subject to the temporalization. It is not something that is inherited, although it may seem, but it is *Zeitgeist*, is spirit of the time. This has to be clarified in accordance with the modern binomial tradition-progress. The modern spirit has established this pairing as antithetical. According Modernity, the tradition would look back while the progressive would look to the future. Thus it can oppose an archeological philosophy against a teleological philosophy^[2]. The basis of this rule

2 An excellent work that opposes these two philosophical theories would be the essay of Paul Ricour about Freud, where he proposes that what the psychoanalyst does is a regression to the past in

of Modernity is shown in the differentiation made in the English parliamentarism (remember that the parliamentarism is one of the cornerstones on which rest Modernity) between Whigs, linked to progress, and Tories, linked to tradition; the two rival political groups (Kearney 1970; Toulmin 1990).

In Heidegger, the tradition is rather a where-we-come-from that serves to project a where-we-are-going-to. The tradition is inherited but the spirit is not. The spirit goes according to time and is the one who looks at and judges the tradition and based on that judgment he has issued, acts in one way or another. So the *Volk* who is immersed in tradition is first and foremost spirit, because the community is the one that judges its own tradition according to their own projective interests. It cannot deny the past but there are periods more critical than others with their own tradition and likewise there are periods that are looking at the past with nostalgia and they have the pretension to recover it.

3. The *Volk* stands on three aspects: tradition, spirit and language. We have already mentioned the tradition and the spirit but... What happens to the language? The language is what enables the relationship of the other two aspects. The language involves everything that encompasses the *Volk*. But to clarify the reason of the importance of language for the *Volk*, first it is necessary that we review the *Dasein* and the importance of the language in his constitution.

This is not at all the definitive work that shows like a revelation the meaning of *Dasein*. We will just point out what Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* says about it: *Dasein* is the entity to which the question of being has to be made to. Heidegger says: “*Welches Seiende innerhalb der Seinsfrage die vorzügliche Rolle übernimmt, wurde erörtert (Which being it is that takes over the major role within the question of being)*” (Heidegger 1927: 15). The interpretation of *Dasein* implies peculiar difficulties which are based on their way of being and their behavior. Heidegger says about it: “*Weil nun aber zum Dasein nicht nur Seinsverständnis gehört, sondern dieses sich mit der jeweiligen Seinsart des Daseins selbst ausbildet oder zerfällt, kann es über eine reiche Ausgelegtheit verfügen (Not only does an understanding of being belong to Dasein, but this understanding also develops or decays according to the actual manner of Being of Dasein any given time; for this reason it has a wealth of interpretations at its disposal)*” (Heidegger 1927: 16). As for

order to project to the future, against Hegel's philosophy, according to which everything done and to be done is made with the intention of future, represented by the Absolute (Ricoeur 1965).

the who of *Dasein*, Heidegger is precise: „*Das Seiende, dessen Analyse zur Aufgabe steht, sind wir je selbst. Das Sein dieses Seienden ist je meines (The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The Being of this being is always mine)*” (Heidegger 1927: 41). We have pointed out earlier that the studies of Heidegger in the twenties, among which is situated *Sein und Zeit*, are a hermeneutic of selfness and here’s the proof. Now, as we also had shown previously, if we understand the *Volk* as the plural of *Dasein*, the step from “me” to “us”, we have to show certain particularities of *Dasein* regarding that “us”. The basic particularities on which we will focus are the world and the language.

The *Dasein* has a kind of fundamental structures that are exposed by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* and in the conference of 1924 *Der Begriff der Zeit* (Heidegger, 1924). The first and most important of these features is *Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein)*. In the quoted conference, Heidegger says “*Das menschliche Leben ist nicht irgendein Subjekt, das irgendein Kunststück machen muss, um die Welt zu kommen (Human life is not something like a subject that has to do some skillful feat to reach the world)*” (Heidegger 1924: 112). We are thrown into the world, we are in the world, we had not to do anything to get there, not even birth because our birth and conception are not our work. Everyone has been found in the world, *is-in-the-world*. We are in a situation and we have to know to manage us in the same. Heidegger says it clearly in the same conference: “*Das In-der-Welt-sein ist charakterisiert als Besorgen (The Being-in-the-world is characterized as a care* “ (Heidegger 1924: 112). For this *Sorge*, for this care we can understand a make, a worry and a handle in the world. Within the philosophy of Heidegger, the *In-der-Welt-sein* can be considered the existence of *Dasein* itself and it is therefore that it is the primary structure. Every existence, every *Dasein*, is found in the world, *is-in-the-world*.

But the *In-der-Welt-sein* implies a variety of circumstantial categories in which the *Dasein* that is found thrown into the world, is located. These circumstances in which the *Dasein* is situated, are out of its control, of control of the *Dasein*. The existence and the circumstances in which it is given determine our own possibilities within the human. Every *Dasein* is made regarding the culture in which it lives, in which it exists. In these circumstances is where the *Volk* is important for the *Dasein*, because it configures these circumstances. We live thrown into a culture, a culture from which we learn all behaviors that make us to be *Dasein*. What everyone does is regulated in advance by his social environment, his culture, by the *Volk*. But each particular world of each specific *Dasein* is composed of many fac-

tors, the world of one *Dasein* is not same to the world of another *Dasein*, or should I say the world is the same, is shared, but the circumstances around that *In-der-Welt-sein*, causes that the vision that it has of its own, is different from one to another. The *Dasein* has possibilities in so far as it is-in-the-world, that is, it is in the world but at the same time “is” thanks to the world itself to which it belongs.

Let us return to the third fundamental aspect that we have indicated after the tradition and the spirit: the language. The language is a fundamental structure of *Dasein*, allows that the *Dasein* shares its world with others. Heidegger says textually at the conference *Der Begriff der Zeit*, conference that we have not detached: “*Im Sprechen spielt sich vorwiegend das In-der-Welt-sein des Menschen ab (Especially in the speaking stakes being-in-the-world of man)*” (Heidegger 1924: 113). This indicates the possibility that the language is allowing that the *Dasein* can establish itself as a focal point of the world that it inhabits because this language is the mode of interacting with this world. What I am saying is that establishing itself as a focal point does not imply that it is legitimately. In the thinking of Heidegger, the *Dasein* only has preeminence in so far as it is the entity for the question for being, but not that it is the center of the world in so far as human, just as understood by the anthropocentrism, being then the linguistic element the object that must be analyzed to clarify the relationship of *Dasein* with its world. And this language, as we have said, is configured by the *Volk*. And this is made through the common language. It may seem that we are considering the language as an instrument, a tool used by the *Dasein* to interact with the world in so far as it inhabits this world. But for Heidegger, talking is a fundamental structure of the *Dasein*, something inherent to itself, it is not an object that it can take or leave at will. The need of the use of the language is always inherent to *Dasein*, talking is something determined ontologically.

The language has, in a manner of speaking, two dimensions, the first linked to the *In-der-Welt-sein* in so far as it enables the self-understanding of the *Dasein* in so far as that it is in the world. Only to the extent that the *Dasein* interprets through language what happens in its own being, thus it is the way in which *Dasein* can become aware of itself. The second dimension is about the strict sense of the meaning of *Volk*, the others that surround us.

4. To explain the *Dasein* we have made a kind of abstraction and we have detached two fundamental structures from the rest in order to present the *Dasein* as an individual entity. We want to clarify that this is not possible because all fundamental structures of the *Dasein* are given jointly, they can-

not be separated one from another. Provide the *Dasein* with this individuality would cause it to fall into the error of solipsism, but it was advisable for us to do so in order to expose our interests. And these interests lay in the others. The others that surround us and are given as a group, together with ourselves constitute the *Volk*.

The fundamental structure of the *Dasein* that is having a radical interest to our research is the *Mit-sein*, the Being-with. Just since the *Dasein* is in a world, this *Dasein* interrelates with similars. Regarding this Heidegger shows: “*Das Dasein als dieses In-der-Welt-sein ist in eins damit Mit-einander-sein, mit Anderen sein (The Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is just a being-with, a being with others)*” (Heidegger 1924: 113). The term used by Heidegger in *Der Begriff der Zeit* is *Mit-einander-sein* while in *Sein und Zeit* is *Mit-sein*. In this paper, we will simply use both as *Mit-sein*, we use this term indistinctly, since all -with (*Mit-*) implies someone or something. Heidegger wants to highlight the Being with others, but these others are under the influence of the *Dasein* in the existential analysis, that is who “is” with them. But the -with has a reciprocal character, the other, although it may appear to have a secondary role, “is” also. For Heidegger, the meaning of this *Mit-einander-sein* is “*Mit Anderen dieselbe Welt dahaben, einander begegnen, miteinander sein der Weise des Für-einander-seins (Have with others the same world, meet each other, be with others in the mode of being-one-to-one)*” (Heidegger 1924: 113). Thus we realize that this *Mit-sein* contain inside what we might call a sharing. This sharing is very far away from the character of voluntariness, so in it is rather reflected the character of the *Dasein* in so far as thrown into the world. As was the case of the *In-der-Welt-sein*, the *Mit-sein* cannot choose this sharing but rather is lead to that sharing by the particular circumstances it shares. The sharing is a matter of necessity, is not voluntary. If the *Dasein* shares the world with others is not by sheer choice, but is the direct consequence of been thrown into the world.

In-der-Welt-sein and *Mit-sein* go hand in hand because the world in which we are, in which we are born or fallen, the world into which is thrown the *Dasein* is a populated world which already has others that interact with the *Dasein* throughout its life. These others aren’t there by and for the *Dasein*, but rather are with the *Dasein*, they have own entity and own identity. These others among which the *Dasein* has been thrown, establish the *Volk*. The paradox of the *Dasein* is that although the *Dasein* is unique each time, there doesn’t exist a unique *Dasein*, in that case we would fall into the trap of solipsism. There are other *Dasein* that contemplate the *Dasein* in the

same way that this *Dasein* contemplates them, that is, in the way that they are others. There is only one *Dasein* from the perspective of the *Dasein*, but the different *Daseins* coexist in the world.

Our link with the world passes through the others. The other, in opposite of the things, of the tools, is an entity that has the form of such *Dasein* and like it is-in-the-world, but appears worldly, that is, appears in the world of the *Dasein*. Heidegger, in paragraph 26 of *Sein und Zeit* (Heidegger, 1927), shows that dealing with the other is no being-there-with-others in a world, but rather the -with (*Mit-*) has the mode of being of the *Dasein*. The *In-der-Welt-sein* is determined by the *Mit-*, so the world is always what I share with the others. The world of the *Dasein* is a common world. The being-in is a being-with the others, the worldly being-in-selfness is the coexistence.

5. But nevertheless, the other does not appear in a apprehension of itself that starts distinguishing a subject from other subjects, as it could be interpreted from a theory of knowledge of Modernity. The others appear from the world in which the *Dasein* is, where the circumspection busy *Dasein* moves by its very essence. It is not that I identify myself first, I know my selfness, and later I know the others. First I see the others, identify them and later I question about me. The other as such isn't an object, isn't a tool, I can treat him as such but as we said also, somehow, is a *Dasein*. My doing is conditioned more to this than to other things, than to the tools, using the language of *Sein und Zeit*. However, my difference regarding the others does not prevent me of my own identification. I am not something previous, since I am thrown into a world. Before I understand myself, I have watched the others and it's from there how I establish what differentiates me from the rest, although they are truisms. The proper *Dasein* only can find itself if it ceases to look at his own life experiences, if it doesn't see them. The *Dasein* find itself in what it does. The determination as "me" has to be understood from the existential spatiality of the *Dasein*, that is, this "me", as we announced previously regarding non-preeminence of the *Dasein*, is not a privileged point in space, but is a Being-in. The *Dasein* understands itself from its world, that is, from the *Volk* that it has been thrown into. Thus, the co-existence with the other appears in multiple forms. The *Mit-sein* opens for the *Dasein* worldly and also for those others that coexist with it because the *Dasein* is in itself *Mit-sein*. The *Mit-sein* confirms that I'm not factually alone, but also are-there others of my own kind. The *Mit-sein* is not an existential determination but a condition that arises every time from the pres-

ence of the other. This *Mit-sein* determines the *Dasein* existentially even when there aren't others who are factually there and are perceived. In this way, in solitude there is also a *Mit-sein* because we are never alone, because we are determined by the others, in this case by absence of the others. We are determined both in the history of each other and in the projection. It is even more, even moving away from the similar, as happens in the case of the anchorite, he is conditioned by that other.

The *Mit-sein* and the cohabitation aren't only a mere encounter of various individuals. The *Mit-sein* characterizes the *Dasein* of the others in so far as that *Dasein* is set into liberty for a coexistence through the world. The proper *Dasein* only is coexistence as so far as it appears to others and therefore the coexistence must be interpreted from the care (*Sorge*). The others aren't a tool, but have also the features of the *Dasein*, as we have seen. In *Sein und Zeit*, is mentioned that the other is the subject of care (*Fürsorge*) (Heidegger 1927: par. 26). The care implies the other in so far as it helps him to make himself transparent in his care and free for it. For the care, the *Mit-sein* is based upon what rest the common occupation. What the common occupation is, we have already seen regarding the *Volk*: Tradition, spirit and language. Coexisting with others who are dedicated to the same thing often is nourished by distrust, but the common commitment to the same thing is decided from the existence assumed on purpose. The solidarity enables the meaning of things (Heidegger 1927: par. 26). Thus, the *Mit-sein* is the one allowing the release. This may be one of the bases for the future approach of left-winged Heideggerianism.

The world can free the others in the co-existence, in the *Mit-sein*. The *Dasein* in its *Mit-sein* is because of the others. In the *Mit-sein*, the others are already open in their *Dasein* (*daseinity*). That opening to the other implies that in the understanding of being of *Dasein* already is given the understanding of the other. The reciprocal knowledge is based on that coexistence. There is a relationship between the *Dasein* and the other that is constitutive of every *Dasein*. The *Mit-sein* turns into projection to other of the proper Being to itself.

In some texts of Heidegger from the Thirties, the character of the *Volk* is linked to common destiny. As an example of this see the speech of rectorship in 1933: *Die Selbsthauptung der deutschen Universität* (Heidegger, 1933). The destiny is the original event of the *Dasein* that takes place in the own resolution, where the *Dasein* surrenders to itself in an inherited possibility, that it also has chosen (Heidegger 1927: par 74). The *Dasein* is reached by the blows of fate because it is destiny in itself, existing in its

destiny it opens to host the circumstances. But if the destinal *Dasein* exists in its *Mit-sein*, its event is therefore a co-event, so it is determined as a common destiny, that is, the event of a community, of a folk (*Volk*). The common destiny is not the sum of individual destinies, but, coexisting, these individual destinies are guided in advance. The common destinal destiny of the *Dasein* in and with its generation is what constitutes the full and proper event of *Dasein*.

Conclusion

To finalize, the conclusions we extract from our research can be summarized in the title of the paper: The *Volk* is an exponent of the fundamental ontological structure of the *Dasein*. *Volk* is the plural of *Dasein*. In the Thirties, Heidegger pointed out that the *Volk* is *Dasein* in big (Heidegger, 1934). *Dasein* and *Volk* go hand in hand in so far as Heidegger exposes the fundamental structure of the *Mit-sein* as *Volk* in so far as others but also linked to the fundamental structure of the *In-der-Wel-sein* in so far as it constitutes the world that it has been thrown into. So we have a double base of the *Volk*: It is the world that I have been thrown into, but is also the others among which I have been thrown into.

Our work has threshed the notion of *Volk* in a triad that we believe is critical in order to understand this notion in Heidegger's thought in the first half of the Thirties, the years following to *Sein und Zeit*: tradition, spirit and language. The collective, the *Volk*, the people, has proved to be that who, somehow, endows being to that entity so particular that is the *Dasein*, in so far as it endows it of world and therefore of meaning to what "is" that *Dasein*. The *Dasein* has been thrown into the world and the world gains the appearance of *Volk*, of a community where the *Dasein* coexist with others that, choose it or not, teach it to deal with that world, even though this teaching is not a master, it's something that *Dasein* is endowed by the mere fact of being in the *Volk*. In the union of the previously mentioned triad, in the union of tradition, language and spirit, is where the *Dasein* coexist with the others, exhibiting the fundamental ontological structure of *Mit-sein*.

From this idea of *Mit-sein* in so far as *Volk* is where we believe that emerges the possibility of a political theory from Heidegger's thinking which causes a theory and a practice of community life away from the political barbarism that was Nazism.

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