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# THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION DETERMINANTS: THE CASE OF TURKISH MIGRATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 2008-2018

PhD Thesis

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**Resumen/ Abstract**

La decisión de emigrar de los trabajadores de un país a otro y la elección de destino están mayormente relacionadas con las diferencias de calidad y bienestar entre mercados de trabajo. Es algo que han confirmado múltiples autores de la literatura científica sobre migraciones laborales: que los trabajadores se ven principalmente atraídos por la oportunidad de mejores salarios y condiciones de trabajo del país receptor.

Pero ¿qué sucede cuando se acortan las distancias económicas entre los mercados de trabajo del país o territorio emisor y receptor de emigración? ¿Qué otros factores explican la continuidad de las migraciones, en tales casos? Que las migraciones continúen produciéndose abre el interés en profundizar en el conocimiento de cómo operan los factores del mercado de trabajo, así como el peso que pueden adquirir otros factores socioculturales y/o políticos en la decisión de emigrar y de elegir destino.

El objetivo de esta investigación es estudiar la evolución de las variables que inciden en la decisión de emigrar y de elegir destino migratorio, a través del estudio del caso de la emigración turca a la Unión Europea entre 2008 y 2018.

El caso de las migraciones laborales de Turquía y la U.E. es de especial interés para profundizar en la cuestión de investigación porque son migraciones con una trayectoria larga, que comienza en la década de 1960 y su evolución posterior a la crisis de 2008 esta poco estudiado. Además, Turquía solicitó en 1963 su adhesión a la entonces Comunidad Europea y desde 2005 está en negociaciones para cumplir los requisitos.

La hipótesis que se propone testar esta investigación es que las variables políticas y culturales han adquirido un protagonismo creciente en la decisión de emigrar, especialmente desde la crisis de 2008.

La investigación realizada se estructura en cinco partes: una introducción y marco teórico compuesta de los capítulos I y II; la metodología compuesta del capítulo III; los resultados compuestos de los capítulos IV a VIII; la discusión de resultados compuesta de los capítulos IX a XI y las conclusiones compuestas del capítulo XII. En total son cinco partes y doce capítulos.

La introducción y marco teórico contienen la revisión de la literatura científica sobre la temática de los mercados de trabajo y las emigraciones laborales y culmina en la elaboración de un modelo de las variables intervinientes en la decisión de emigrar o de la elección de destino migratorio. Las variables se clasifican en cuatro grandes grupos de variables determinantes involucradas: base-seguridad; económica/mercado laboral; social y geográfica.

La metodología es cuantitativa (estadístico descriptivo, correlaciones y análisis regresión), cualitativa (revisión bibliográfica y legislativa; además de análisis de contenidos), evolución histórica (de series estadísticas y acontecimientos) y de estudio metodología de caso (el caso de migración turca a la UE).

El primer capítulo de resultados, capítulo IV de la tesis, contiene el estudio descriptivo de la Unión Europea como organización de Estados miembros y como mercado de trabajo. Se aborda una breve historia de la Unión Europea como organización que se creó originalmente con un número reducido de países, otra denominación y pocas instituciones. Pero con los años se ha ido ampliando en distintas fases. Además de la historia de cambio institucional se revisan los planes de ampliación futura y los Criterios de Copenhague adoptados desde 1993 para regular las adhesiones. El capítulo se cierra con el análisis del caso de Turquía y su cumplimiento de los criterios de acceso a la UE en materia laboral.

En un segundo capítulo de la parte de resultados, capítulo V de la tesis, se revisa la legislación laboral, su proceso legislativo e instituciones tales como la Corte Europea de Justicia o los European Works Councils así como el cumplimiento por parte de los estados miembros de las políticas de la Unión. De manera específica se aborda la evolución de la legislación de la Unión Europea relativa a los inmigrantes. El capítulo

finaliza con un análisis histórico de las migraciones turcas a la Unión Europea, desde 1960 a 2018.

En un tercer capítulo de la parte de resultados, capítulo VI de la tesis, se analiza el mercado de trabajo de la UE posterior a 2008. El análisis se realiza en cuatro partes: los indicadores económicos, de calidad del empleo, del diálogo social y de la situación social de la Unión Europea.

En un cuarto capítulo de la parte de resultados, capítulo VII de la tesis, se presenta un estudio comparativo de las políticas laborales de una selección de países de la Unión Europea. Son cinco países los que se analizan: Dinamarca, Alemania, Reino Unido, España y Estonia. Y han sido seleccionados por representar a los distintos modelos de sistemas de bienestar social que se dan dentro de la Unión Europea.

El quinto capítulo de la parte de resultados, capítulo VIII de la tesis, presenta los resultados de un análisis de regresión sobre los determinantes de la elección del destino de la migración de los turcos en la UE. Después, continúa con los efectos de los ingresos laborales de la experiencia migratoria en el mercado laboral turco. Dado que los turcos emigran mayoritariamente a la UE, señala un activo de retorno o de migración de vuelta de Europa. Esta parte termina con la verificación de los efectos de los ingresos laborales de la experiencia migratoria en el mercado laboral turco, desde una perspectiva de género.

Los resultados del estudio han puesto de manifiesto todas las variables del modelo de decisiones de emigrar y elegir destino migratorio. Hay especialmente tres que son determinantes. El primero es el determinante de la economía y del mercado laboral, con todas sus variables específicas, que fue el determinante que se consideró hipotéticamente relevante desde un principio. El otro determinante es la seguridad, dentro de la cual destacan dos variables: el estatus legal del país de destino y la presión política del país de origen. Y el tercer determinante es el social, dentro del cual destaca la variable comunidad social inmigrante. Las comunidades sociales turcas se han formado en Europa a través de la reunificación familiar o la nueva inmigración desde la década de 1960.

**Palabras clave:** Unión Europea, trabajadores inmigrantes, políticas del mercado laboral, migración, Turquía.

**Abstract**

The decision of workers to migrate from one country to another and the choice of destination are mostly related to differences in quality and welfare between labour markets. This has been confirmed by multiple authors in the scientific literature on labour migration: that workers are mainly attracted by the opportunity of better wages and working conditions in the receiving country.

But what happens when the economic distance between the labour markets of the sending and receiving countries or territories shortens, and what other factors explain the continuity of migration in such cases? The fact that migrations continue to take place an interest in deepening our knowledge of how labour market factors operate, as well as the weight that other socio-cultural and/or political factors may have on the decision to emigrate and to choose a destination.

The aim of this research is to study the evolution of the variables that affect the decision to emigrate and to choose migration destination, through the study of the case of Turkish emigration to the European Union between 2008 and 2018.

The case of Turkish labour migration to the EU is of special interest to deepen the research question because they are migrations with a long trajectory, starting in the 1960s and their evolution after the 2008 crisis is little studied. Moreover, Turkey applied in 1963 for accession to the then European Community and since 2005 is in negotiations to meet the requirements.

The hypothesis that this research aims to test is that political and cultural variables have become increasingly important in the decision to emigrate, especially since the 2008 crisis.

The research conducted is structured in four parts: an introduction and theoretical framework composed of two chapters; the methodology composed of one chapter; the

results composed of five chapters; the discussion and conclusions. In total there are four parts and ten chapters.

The introduction and theoretical framework contain a review of the scientific literature on the subject of labour markets and labour emigration and culminates in the elaboration of a model of the variables involved in the decision to emigrate or the choice of migratory destination. The variables are classified into four large groups of determinant variables involved: Security based; Economic/Labour Market; Social and Geographical.

The methodology is quantitative (descriptive statistics, correlations, and regression analysis), qualitative (literature and legislative review; as well as document analysis), historical evolution (of statistical series and events) and case study (the case of Turkish migration to the EU).

The first chapter of results, Chapter IV of the thesis, contains the descriptive study of the European Union as an organization of member states and as a labour market. It deals with a brief history of the European Union as an organization that was originally created with a small number of countries, another name, and few institutions. But over the years it has expanded in different phases. In addition to the history of institutional change, plans for future enlargement and the Copenhagen Criteria adopted since 1993 to regulate accessions are reviewed. The chapter closes with an analysis of the case of Turkey and its compliance with the accession criteria in labour matters.

The second chapter of the results part, Chapter V of the thesis, reviews labour legislation, its legislative process, and institutions such as the European Court of Justice or the European Works Councils, as well as the compliance of the member states with the Union's policies. Specifically, the evolution of European Union legislation concerning immigrants is addressed. The chapter ends with a historical analysis of Turkish migrations to the European Union, from 1960 to 2018.

In a third chapter of the results part, Chapter VI of the thesis, the EU labour market after 2008 is analysed. The analysis is carried out in four parts: economic indicators,

quality of employment, social dialogue, and the social situation in the European Union.

In a fourth chapter of the results part, Chapter VII of the thesis, a comparative study of the labour market policies of a selection of EU countries is presented. Five countries are analysed: Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Estonia. They have been selected because they represent different models of social welfare systems within the European Union.

The fifth chapter of the results part, Chapter VIII of the thesis, presents the results of a regression analysis on the determinants of migration destination choices of Turkish people in the EU. After that, it continues with the labour income effects of migration experience on the Turkish labour market. Since the Turkish people mostly migrate to the EU, it points out an asset of a return of migration back from Europe. This part finishes with the testing of labour income effects on migration experience on the Turkish labour market from a gender perspective.

The study results have highlighted all the variables of the model of decisions to emigrate and choose a migratory destination. There are especially three that are decisive. The first is the determinant of the economy and labour market, with all its specific variables, which was the determinant that was considered hypothetically relevant from the beginning. The other determinant is security, within which two variables stand out: the legal status of the country of destination and the political pressure of the country of origin. And the third determinant is social, within which the immigrant social community variable stands out. Turkish social communities have been formed in Europe through family reunification or new immigration since the 1960s.

**Keywords:** European Union, immigrant workers, labour market policies, migration, Turkey

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**Abbreviations**

| | |
|---|---|
| ALMPs | Active Labour Market Policies |
| BusinessEurope | Confederation of European Business |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| Cedefop | European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training |
| DigComp | EU Digital Competence Framework |
| EAfA | European Alliance for Apprenticeship |
| EC | European Community |
| ECJ | European Court of Justice |
| CEEP | European Centre of Public Enterprises |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EES | European Employment Strategy |
| EESC | European Economic and Social Committee |
| EMS | European Monetary System |
| EntreComp | EU Entrepreneurship Competence Framework |
| ERP | Economic Reform Program |

| | |
|---|---|
| ESCO | European Classification of Skills/Competences, Qualifications and Occupations |
| ESJS | European Skills and Jobs Survey |
| ETUC | European Trades Union Confederation |
| EU | European Union |
| EURATOM | European Atomic Energy Community |
| Eurostat | Statistical Office of the European Union |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPA | Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance |
| ISCO | International Standard Classification of Occupations |
| ISKUR | Turkish Employment Agency |
| ITUC | International Trade Union Confederation |
| JSA | Jobseekers' Allowance |
| LMI | Labour Market Information |
| MIPEX | Migrant Integration Policy Index |
| NDYP | New Deal for Young People |
| PES | Public Information Services |

| | |
|---|---|
| PPS | Purchasing Power Standards |
| PREPARA | Professional Retraining Program in Spain |
| SEPE | Public Service of State Employment in Spain |
| SISPE | Information System for Public Employment Services in Spain |
| TEU | Treaty of the European Union |
| TFEU | Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| TurkStat | Turkish Statistical Institution |
| UEAPME | European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UNDESA | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs |

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# PART ONE- INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This part of the dissertation begins with the fundamental concepts about the labour market in general. Moreover, it consists of several concepts such as job quality, labour market imperfections and digitalization of labour. These concepts help us to understand the structure of the labour market. It continues with an informative part about the EU, including its history, accession process and work councils. Then, it handles the labour regulations of the EU. Thus, this part conceptualizes the EU labour market as a whole. This part concludes with theories and concepts on migration to ease the comprehension of the situation of immigrants in the EU labour market.

# I. THE CONCEPT OF LABOUR MARKET

The labour market is a complex structure where workers and employers meet to produce goods and services. Several terms like job quality, labour market imperfections and digitalization of labour help us characterize how the labour market works.

## I.A. LABOUR AND LABOUR MARKET

Hannah Arendt (1958) describes labour as a "bodily activity designed to ensure survival in which the results are consumed almost immediately" (Grint & Nixon, 2015, p. 7). The emphasis of Arendt (1958) for the concept of labour is about the industrialisation of the labour because, in industrial society, labour is a commodity that has an exchange value (Standing, 2009). The expected outputs of labour are shared before the labour. Therefore, labour has a contractual nature (Standing, 2009).

Labour is vital for all individuals because workers satisfy their fundamental needs in return for their labour. Labour is necessary because it is "purposeful human activity involving physical or mental exertion that is not undertaken solely for pleasure, and that has economic or symbolic value" (Budd, 2011, p. 2). Thus, everyone is a worker as well.

The labour market brings together the labour supply of households and labour demand of firms, and by extension, wages, employment, and income are determined. The labour market carries on different characteristics than the goods and services markets. The features of the labour market might be the following (Biçerli, 2016):

- Labour is not measured only by money. It is integrated with the employee's desire, ability, knowledge, and experience.
- There is a lack/asymmetry of information in terms of both employer and employer. It is difficult for the employer to estimate the productivity capacity of the worker. The worker does not know what she/he finds to suit himself exactly.
- The labour in the labour market is heterogeneous. Every worker has different motivations and abilities.
- There is a different labour market for each business/geographical region; there is no single labour market.
- There are many external factors, such as social and political factors, that affect the behaviour of the employer or the worker.
- The bargaining power of the worker is less than the employer. Workers have less influence in determining the employment conditions.

There are dependency and democratic deficits in terms of workers (Davidov, 2005). Workers work to earn a salary in return for their labour. Workers work under a work contract, which determines work conditions such as salary, working hours, holidays, benefits, way of work with means of production. Workers have a dependency on the conditions of the work contract. On the other hand, employers are individuals or firms that own the means of production. Employers determine what, where, when, with who and how work is done, and they seek workers who do the work under this contract. For a worker, accepting a job means accepting the terms and conditions of the work contract. However, employers have to provide minimum standards such as minimum wage and security conditions following the national labour law. After the work is done, workers earn a salary, and employers have the power over the final product. According to Marxism, the employer's gain is called 'surplus value' produced by workers after the cost of production is paid (see Table 1).

**Table 1:** Categories which Determines Who is Worker and Who is Employer

| **Categories** | **Workers** | **Employers** |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership of Means of Production | No | Yes |
| Having the Power on What, Where, When, With Who and How Work Is Done | No | Yes |
| Having the Power on What to Do about the Final Product | No | Yes |
| Gain after Work | Salary | Surplus Value |

**Source:** Elaborated by the author’s readings.

An employee works depending on a labour contract that depicts who, what, where, when, how, by what do the job under the employer's instructions or a representative of the employer. On the other hand, a self-employed (autonomous) person works depending on an agreement for work which indicates who, what and when do the job by focusing on the result of the work. A self-employed person may decide where and how she or he will work (Yıldız-Hakkakul, 2017).

Workers can claim their rights if employers do not provide minimum standards determined by the national labour law. For example, in Europe, according to the EU directives, the legal non-EU workers who have work permits have equal rights with the native EU workers. However, undocumented immigrants are vulnerable to labour exploitation; they are not covered by EU or national laws, but employers can be punished for hiring undocumented immigrants. Labour markets might be investigated at the regional and sectoral levels, and each labour market has distinctive actors, characteristics, difficulties, and policies.

### I.A.1. Job Quality of a Labour Market

The concept of job quality might be defined regarding different aspects. While job quality refers to wage level for economists, it refers to working conditions for sociologists or labour scientists (Erhel & Guergoat-Larivière, 2010). The dimensions that allow a description of job quality of a labour market are so called ‘Laeken

indicators' published in 2001 in Belgium (they were developed as indicators by the EU Lisbon Strategy between 2000 and 2010).

**Table 2:** Job Quality Indicators

| **Main Dimension** | **Sub-Dimensions** |
|---|---|
| Safety and ethics of employment | Safety at work<br>Child labour and forced labour<br>Fair treatment in employment |
| Income and benefits from employment | Income<br>Non-wage pecuniary benefits |
| Working time and work-life balance | Working hours<br>Working time arrangements<br>Work-life balance |
| Security of employment and social protection | Security of employment<br>Social protection |
| Social dialogue | |
| Skills development and training | |
| Employment-related relationships and work motivation | Employment-related relationships<br>Work motivation |

**Source:** United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2015).

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2015) determines seven main dimensions, which include all Leaken indicators: safety and ethics of employment, income, and benefits from employment, working time and work-life balance, security of employment and social protection, social dialogue, skills development and training, and employment-related relationships and work motivation (see Table 2).

## I.B. LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS OR MISADJUSTMENT

According to the research like Borjas (2013), the desirable situation of the labour market is that labour demand equals labour supply. In a desirable situation, workers prefer to be highly demanded, and companies prefer to have high availability of workers. In this situation, the labour market is in equilibrium. This situation could mean that marginal productivity became equal to labour cost (according to employers) or wage (according to workers), determining the wages and employment level. Theoretically, in a perfectly competitive labour market, there would be no unemployment because a competitive equilibrium would create efficiency in allocating labour resources in a single labour market (Borjas, 2013). In reality, a labour market may show a high rate of unemployment and at the same time being attractive for immigrant labour force to be hired in the agricultural sector like the case of Spain and Italy.

The labour market is far from being perfectly competitive. For example, due to geographical or industrial differences among the regions, wages and employment levels are different in each province or industry; people would like to move to another area or work for another industry to gain more. Labour demand does not always equal labour supply. Therefore, the labour market has some "imperfections" or misadjustment. As a result of these imperfections, the governments issue the labour market policies through taxes, subsidies, immigration policies, and other regulatory policies. Also, international organisations such as International Labour Organizations (ILO) and the EU launch the labour policy recommendations to governments. For example, the EU uses EURES the European job mobility portal, that was developed to help dismiss skills mismatch and increasing labour mobility in Europe.

Labour market imperfections or misadjustment consists of five main categories (Boeri & van Ours, 2008; Borjas, 2013): asymmetrical information, skill mismatch, monopsony, labour market discrimination, and labour migration. In the following pages, these factors are described as misadjustment. Since the main topic of this study is related to labour migration, it is investigated separately from the others and more detailed.

### I.B.1. Asymmetrical Information

The lack of knowledge or adequate information might cause a misadjustment in the labour market. George Akerlof (1970) gives an example of buying a car without having perfect knowledge about the vehicle. In the instance of Akerlof (1970), the seller would like to sell the vehicle with the maximum price, which it worthies, while the buyer would like to buy it with the minimum amount. Even though the buyer agrees with the seller's price, it is hard to trust the buyer that the car has a good quality. Therefore, buyer consults risk minimisation methods like insurance or government intervention.

In the labour market, an employer would like to hire a worker with productivity as high as possible and salary as low as possible. In contrast, a worker would like to get a job with a salary as high as possible. However, the employer cannot know how much productivity the worker has before hiring this worker. Therefore, the employer offers a salary as low as possible not only for-profit maximisation but also due to having a lack of information about the productivity level of the worker. This situation is an example of asymmetric information.

Asymmetric information causes inefficiencies in the labour market. Employers tend to fire low-ability workers (Greenwald, 1986; Gibbons & Katz, 1991) (cited in (Kahn, 2013)), and when a low-ability worker starts to search for a job again, other employers may not know that this worker left the job due to low ability. A high-ability worker also tends to leave the current job to find a better job (Kahn, 2013). Therefore, asymmetric information is also very related to skills mismatch imperfection in the labour market.

During the hiring process, the firms looked at the qualification level of workers (Akerlof, 1970). These qualifications taken from the public or private institutions by spending the effort and time are diploma, certificate or working experience. Since Becker (1964) divided general and specific skills, the firms might choose to give the training to gain the workers job-related specific skills which help to increase their productivities (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999). Although these efforts help workers gain

skills, they do not guarantee the high productivity of workers because of the personal characteristics of workers.

Another difficulty in asymmetric information is to measure the productivity of a worker. With a simple explanation, hiring a new worker is taken by the employer when the marginal productivity of the last hired worker is higher than the labour cost. However, the determinants of marginal productivity of a worker can be differed from a time to another time and from a condition to another condition.

### I.B.2. Skills Mismatch

Skills mismatch is another labour market imperfection described by Bartlett (2013) and refers to the inappropriate use of human capacity. The skills mismatch is the discrepancy between skills supply and skills demand in the labour market. Human resources are wasted due to the skills mismatch. Like other resources, human capital might use wrongly or waste through hiring under-skilled or over-skilled persons or becoming unemployed these persons, even if there are decent jobs in the labour market. The skills mismatch approach focuses on “the supply side of the labour market and does not fully consider the restructuring of the demand for labour” (Peck, 1999; McQuaid, Greig, & Adams, 2001) (cited in (Houston, 2005, p. 222)). However, skills mismatch might occur due to the mismatch between firms’ specific requirements and current workers’ skills; so, the firms are responsible for dealing with skills mismatch (Cedefop, 2010). This last type of mismatch is very specific of technological revolution period.

The skills mismatch is related to education level, skill shortages, skills gap, skills obsolescence and the combination and the duration of mismatch. Although education is not the only way of gaining skills, the skills are generally obtained by taking education that prepares people for the rest of their lives; so, the education level is highly related to finding a job.

The education level of workers may not fit their jobs. These workers are described as overeducated or undereducated. This situation is also considered a waste of human capacity (Bartlett, 2013).

### I.B.2.a. Skill Shortages and Skill Obsolescence

Skill shortages occur when there are not enough workers to fulfil the required skills for existing jobs (Cedefop, 2010). The skills gap is a mismatch situation between skills supply and skills demand: workers' skills exceed (over-skilling) or lag behind those employers seek (under-skilling). This might cause the waste of human potential such as unemployment, recruitment difficulties, skills becoming outdated and people doing jobs not using their potential (Cedefop, 2018; Bednarek, 2014; Cedefop, 2010; Handel, 2003). Terms like overeducation and undereducation are used when the education level might combine with skill-shortages or skill-gap in a short or long duration.

Skills obsolescence might occur when jobs cannot keep pace with rapid changes in technology. Basketry, quilting, wood carving, copperworking are some of the examples of almost extinct skills. This situation means that some skills might be at the risk of automation and job destruction, which means "jobs disappearing from firm closing down or reducing total employment" (Madsen P. K., 2003, p. 62).

For example, the EU faces with skills mismatch problem in the labour market. According to the study on the effects of education mismatch across 25 countries, analysing the European Social Survey, Galasi (2008) found out that 33% of workers were overeducated whereas 59% were undereducated (Cedefop, 2010). Another example of this kind of skill mismatch given by the results of the European Skills and Jobs Survey (ESJS) in 2014, which was made with 49 thousand Europeans across 28 EU Member States:

- 25% of Europeans were highly qualified young adult employees who were overqualified for their jobs,

- 42% of Europeans were employees with few opportunities to find a job matching their skills and qualifications,
- 53% of Europeans were employees whose tasks had become significantly more varied since they started their job,
- 22% of Europeans were employees whose skills had not developed since they began their job (skill stagnancy),
- 40% of Europeans were employees completing education and training involving some work-based learning,
- 62% of Europeans were employees in professional, scientific, or technical services and had completed studies with no work-based learning,
- 33% of Europeans were employees who needed only basic information and communication technologies (ICT) skills or no ICT skills at all to do their job,
- 27% of Europeans were employees in 'dead-end' jobs with skills higher than needed to do their job and limited potential to grow (Cedefop, 2014).

The survey shows us that the workers in the EU do not use their full labour potential even if they find a job. Are there enough jobs for everyone who would like to work? Even if there are enough jobs for everyone, are workers satisfied with their jobs? Can people who are not satisfied with their jobs work with full labour capacity? As a result of these questions, skills mismatch directs us to some topics: job creation and labour productivity related to the economic face of this problem, and job satisfaction and exclusion due to unemployment related to the social face of this problem.

#### I.B.2.b. Skills Mismatch and the Employment

The skills mismatch is an economic and social problem of the EU, which is still suffering from unemployment, which is the situation that all persons looking for jobs cannot find jobs. The rate of unemployment is an indicator of economic activities. For example, according to Arthur Okun (1962), each 1% increase in unemployment causes approximately 2.5% decrease in Gross National Product (GNP) (Biçerli, 2016); so, skills mismatch problem might cause a reduction in economic welfare in the countries.

The skills mismatch is considered as one of the most relevant explanations of unemployment. For example, although the skill-gap does not cause significant problems in the European countries which have no wide wage differentials, in Britain, skill mismatch explains a substantial part of the nearly 6-percentage-point increase in unemployment, between 28% and 45%, across different realistic levels of real-wage flexibility (Manacorda & Petrongolo, 1999).

For example, in the EU, the unemployment rate was 9.3% in April 2017; in 2016, 20.6 million people were "underemployed" (Eurostat, 2018). In other words, this means that 9.3% of the Europeans could not find a proper job in April 2017, and in 2016, 20.6 million underemployed people did not use the labour force with full capacity in the EU.

Skills mismatch is a common problem faced by immigrants in the labour market, especially in developing countries (Jestl, Landesmann, & Leitner, 2015; Aleksynska & Tritah, 2011). The authors Aleksynska and Tritah (2011) state three reasons which affect skills mismatch of immigrants: individual-specific reasons, origin country determinants and destination country determinants. The authors address that immigrants' human capital quality impacts her/his labour market outcomes in the destination country (Aleksynska & Tritah, 2011).

High-skilled migrants from specific regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Middle East are less likely to obtain skilled jobs; thus, brain waste occurs (Özden, 2006). In Europe, almost one in four immigrants work in low-skilled jobs. In 2012-2013, this proportion climbed up to 75% in Luxembourg and over 60% in Switzerland and Cyprus. Notwithstanding, one of three immigrants with a tertiary degree is overqualified for their jobs compared to four native workers. The overqualification gap has risen after the 2008 global economic crisis (OECD/EU, 2015).

Immigration many times causes "down-skilling", which "defines as working in a job with lower qualification than formally attained" (Kahanec, Zimmermann, Kureková, & Biavaschi, 2013, p. 120). The researchers (Kahanec, 2013; Kahanec, Zimmermann,

Kureková, & Biavaschi, 2013; Barbone, Kahanec, Kureková, & Zimmermann, 2013) address that poor or complicated recognition of qualification (homologation of education) is the key reason for down-skilling, so facilitating or standardisation the homologation of education by national authorities contributes to reduce down-skilling of immigrants.

#### I.B.2.c. Social Problems due to Skills Mismatch

Skills mismatch might cause social problems like low job satisfaction and exclusion due to unemployment. Vieira (2005) describes job satisfaction that measures "how people feel toward their jobs are not meaningless but rather, convey useful information on aspects of individual behaviour, such as job quits, absenteeism and productivity". Although the factors like the age of workers, comparative wage rate, level of education, employer size, union membership and working conditions might affect job satisfaction level, Battu et al. (1999) express that job satisfaction is inversely correlated to skills mismatch (Vieira, 2005). Since workers spend many hours in their workplaces, low job satisfaction might affect their well-being negatively.

Unemployed people are at risk of exclusion from society. Kronauer (1998) expresses that unemployed people face six different types of exclusion: labour market exclusion, economic exclusion, institutional exclusion, social isolation, cultural exclusion, and spatial exclusion (Kieselbach, 2003). The exclusion might render unemployed people more vulnerable. Unemployed people surrounded by exclusion might be more desperate and might give up looking for a job. These people might feel like useless persons and might need psychological and social support.

Labour productivity has a link with the skills mismatch. Although Hartog (2000) states that skills mismatch has no direct effects on labour productivity, there is an indirect link among wages, job satisfaction, and other productivity correlations. On the other hand, McGowen and Andrews (2015) conclude that skills mismatch and labour productivity have an inverse relationship.

### I.B.3. Monopsony

Besides skills mismatch and asymmetrical information, there is a category inside labour market imperfections which is called monopsony (Borjas, 2013). Monopsony is a situation where there is only one buyer for a given product or service of many sellers in the market (Manning, 2003; Robinson, 1969). Some authors describe monopsony as an excessive power of employers in the labour market (Boeri & van Ours, 2008; Geroski, Gregg, & Reenen, 1996). In the labour market, monopsony is that no other firm gives services in a sector; workers in that sector can only work for that firm. There is only one employer in a monopsony. This situation shows us that the labour market is non-competitive. For example, in Turkey, the only opera producer is the state; so, the state is a monopsonist from the point of opera artist who is willing to get a job in an opera house.

According to the hiring decision of the monopsonist, there are two types of monopsony: perfectly discriminating monopsony and non-discriminating monopsony. While a perfectly discriminating monopsonist can hire different workers at different wages, a non-discriminating monopsonist must hire all workers for the same wage regardless of the workers' reservation wage (Borjas, 2013). "Madden (1973) argues that this discriminatory monopsony power emerges from the monopsonist employer supremacy and the dominant male power in society" (Koçak, 1999, p. 21).

In modern times, pure monopsony in which there are no minimum wage and powerful collective bargaining institutions (Boeri, 2009) is rare in the labour market. Workers can move to find the same job to another part of the world or decide not to do the same job but a similar job in the same place. However, employers may have some degree of monopsony power (Boeri T. , 2009; Boeri & van Ours, 2008). Mobility to change the job is highly costly for workers, or workers are insistent on doing the same job in the same place. The degree of monopsony power addresses how much effectiveness monopsonist employers have on determining wages.

Monopsony is a labour market imperfection because an employer determines the wages and employment rate with more power than other employers in a competitive

market. In a monopsony, wages tend to be lower than the wages of a competitive market due to the monopsonic power of the employer on wages (Bachmann & Frings, 2016; Koçak, 1999; Blau & Jusenius, 1976).

Therefore, the minimum wage might be seen as a remedy for monopsony because minimum wage may provide a decent living condition for workers despite being a reason for decreasing labour demand (Bachmann & Frings, 2016; Boeri & van Ours, 2008). Another remedy might be the creation of powerful collective bargaining institutions for workers to get a decent wage in a monopsonic labour market for determining the wages bilaterally; in addition, job creation and reduced hiring cost regulations are also effective for decreasing the monopsonic power of the employer (Boeri & van Ours, 2008).

For example, in the European Community, there is no monopsony power of employers (Mercenier & Yeldan, 1997) because more than 70% of the EC private-sector employees work for small to medium-sized firms (Addison & Siebert, 1993) (cited in (Brown, Button, & Sessions, 1996)).

On the contrary, there is the example of Turkey. Some authors (Kayaoğlu Yılmaz, 2019; Güler, 2010) claim that there is monopsony in Turkey. Güler (2010) expresses that monopsony in Turkey occurs due to the hegemony of multinational corporations, which change the trade and production process contents. Kayaoğlu Yılmaz (2019) addresses that the multinational corporations, which have monopsony power, leads to the constriction in the employment of Turkey due to the decrease in wages caused by the multinational corporations.

### I.B.4. Labour Market Discrimination

The next category of labour market imperfections to be defined is labour market discriminations (Borjas, 2013). Discrimination is a huge block in front of accession to the labour market. Even among equally skilled workers, there might be some difficulties accessing the labour market due to the discrimination based on race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or other relevant characteristics (Borjas, 2013).

Labour market discrimination refers to "unequal treatment in terms and conditions of employment for groups of equally productive workers" (Sloane, 1985) (cited in (King J. E., 1990, p. 111)).

The economic model called taste-based discrimination by Becker (1971) shows that prejudices or dislikes of employers when hiring workers might harm economically. Due to taste-based discrimination, employers might pay higher wages to workers who have the employer's desired race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or other relevant characteristics. Also, taste-based discrimination might cause penalty payments or hiring workers who have lower productivity.

This is why, for example in the case of the EU, despite that the European Employment Strategy (EES) has an inclusive manner for increasing the employability of the disadvantaged groups, discrimination in the labour market may still exist and is hard to be observed. Below, different type of labour market discriminations are outlined: gender discrimination, discrimination against immigrants, discrimination based on sexual orientations, and discrimination against people with disabilities.

#### I.B.4.a. Gender Discrimination

One of the essential indicators for accession to the labour market is the labour force participation rate, which also data according to sex. The activist note is an index that measures the level of employment quotient between active population and the population of working age or over 16 years old. For example, in the EU, the labour force participation rate for both genders in 2018 with 73.2% was recorded as the highest. The highest rates for both sexes were in Sweden (82.6%), Germany (79.9%), the Czech Republic (79.9%), Estonia (79.5%) and the Netherlands (79.2%) in 2018. The labour participation rate for males in 2018 was 79%, while it was only 67.4% for females in the EU.

For males, the highest rates were observed in Malta (with 85.7%), Germany (83.9%), Sweden (84.7%), the Czech Republic (87.4%). For females, Sweden (80.4%), Germany (75.8%), Estonia (75.6%) and Lithuania (76.7%) had the highest rates

among the Member States. Turkey, with 55.6%, had the lowest labour force participation rate for both genders in 2018 among the Member States and the candidate countries. While the male labour force participation rate was 76% in the same year in Turkey, this rate for females with 35.2% was the lowest among the Member States and the candidate countries (Eurostat, 2019).

For the cases like Turkey, the situation is different. The labour force participation rate is low in Turkey due to women's little labour force participation rate. In Turkey, gender inequality, the structure of society and family, low education level, legislative regulations, socioeconomic factors and the formation of the labour market are the obstacles in the accession of women to the labour market (Kılıç & Öztürk, 2014; Karabıyık, 2012; Ayvaz Kızılgöl, 2012; Çakır, 2008). Due to the patriarchal family structure in Turkey, children and elder care services and housework still seem like women's duties, and this situation prevents the accession of women to the labour market. The determinants of the participation of the labour force for women in Turkey are considered to be education level, age, the number of children, marital status, living in an urban or rural area, the income level of partner (Er, 2013; Ayvaz Kızılgöl, 2012; Dayıoğlu & Kırdar, 2010).

For providing gender equality, there are three different approaches: (1) women and men are equal; so, women should be treated like men; (2) the contributions of women and men should be evaluated differently because women and men are different; and (3) existing social gender relationships like traditional gender roles at home should be transformed (Walby, 2005; Verloo, 2005; Rees, 1998) (in (Dedeoğlu, 2009)). Authors like Dedeoğlu (2009) consider that the EU institutions use these three approaches above at the same time.

Countries adopt their legislation to improve women’s opportunities. For example, Turkey made some strides in the perspective of gender equality, after requesting from the EU. In 2002, Turkey enacted a new code of civil law that abolished the concept of the head of the family, guaranteed the partners' equal rights and duties, and allowed the equitable division of properties gained in marriage. In 2003, with 4857 number

labour law, Turkey tried to adopt the EU directives which support gender equality in the labour market. In 2004, Turkey added an article to the constitution related to gender equality. However, Turkey is still suffering from low accession of women to the labour market due to gender inequality because the existing laws can not affect the daily life of women (Dedeoğlu, 2009).

Men register women's jobs in agriculture is another aspect to be mentioned to explain ways to tackle gender labour market discrimination. Turkey needs more regulations, including equitable children care among the state, employers, and parents (Dedeoğlu, 2009). Also, due to 60% of women working in the agricultural sector's family business and 40% of these women work unpaid (Dayıoğlu & Kırdar, 2010), Turkey needs regulations for tackling the informal labour market.

#### I.B.4.b. Discrimination against Immigrants

Migrant integration statistics give an idea about the degree of labour market discrimination against immigrants. According to the EU Zaragoza Integration Indicators determined in 2010: unemployment rate, employment rate, and activity rate, that are three leading indicators for measuring the employment of immigrants. For example, for the case of the EU, the foreign-born employment immigrants (67.1%) were lower than the natives (73%) in 2017. The employment participation gap between male (72.6%) and female (54.1%) non-EU born population was also high (Eurostat, 2018). This could be showing a much lower women immigrant employment than native women labour participation in the labour market.

Also, other studies referred to the case of the EU mention that some of the obstacles to getting a suitable job for immigrants in the EU are the lack of language skills, the lack of recognition of the qualifications, the citizenship or resident status, social background, religion, and other barriers (Eurostat, 2019). The highest proportion of immigrants' lack of language skills was measured in Finland (29.7%). In comparison, the highest percentage of the lack of recognition of the qualifications seemed in Italy (25.2%) in 2014. The proportion of citizenship or resident permits was the highest in Cyprus (11.2%) in the same year. The most significant ratio of the social background

was in Greece (13.8%) in 2014. A considerable percentage of immigrants listed other barriers to accession to the labour market in Slovenia (80.3%). Almost two of three immigrants expressed that they did not have obstacles in Bulgaria (68.7%) in 2014.

Not all countries have a full package of legislation for immigrant workers. For example, today the biggest immigrant group is in Turkey is Syrians. After the Syrian Civil War, which started in 2011, many Syrians immigrated to Turkey to protect their lives. Turkey opened the gates for Syrians due to humanitarian reasons. The status of Syrians in Turkey was 'guest' at the beginning. However, later, it changed with the 'temporary protection status' because there is no legal provision of the concept of the guest. Due to the lack of preparations before the gates were opened, Syrians have faced economic, political, and social problems in Turkey. The accession to the Turkish labour market is one of the crucial issues of Syrians in Turkey.

Syrians in Turkey have no work permits because temporary protection status does not include the work permit. They only work in the agricultural and livestock sector. Therefore, Syrians have to apply for a work permit if they fulfil the required conditions like having an identity card of temporary protection status, living in Turkey for at least six months, willing to work in the city in which they have a resident permit, and having advance fixing certificate (Aslantürk & Tunç, 2018; Duruel, 2017; Dönmez Kara, 2015). Because of these reasons, having a work permit is hard for Syrians in Turkey; so, only 20.966 (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services of Turkey, 2017) of 3.426.786 Syrians (Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, 2019) in Turkey had a work permit in 2017.

The difficulty of having a work permit causes that Syrians in Turkey generally work in the informal labour market with a lower salary than Turkish nationals and without social security (Canbey Özgüler, 2018; Çoban, 2018; Duruel, 2017; Koç, Görücü, & Akbıyık, 2015; Üstün, 2015). Therefore, Turkey has to move forward in order to bring work permit regulation for Syrians, which needs equitable working conditions.

#### I.B.4.c. Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation

In the world, in almost 80 countries, being gay or lesbian still is a crime punished by laws (Itaborahy & Zhu., 2013) (cited in (Drydakis, 2014)). In many states, discrimination based on sexual orientation is still prevalent, and it is a barrier for the accession to the labour market (Drydakis, 2009; Elmslie & Tebaldi, 2007; Özen Kutanis & Ulu, 2016; Doğan, 2012; Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 2014). For example, although some studies do not find a significant effect of sexual orientation on hiring rates probably due to the lack of measurement (Badgett, Sears, Lau, & Ho, 2009), a survey run by heterosexual political scientists showed that heterosexual academicians witnessed that between 11% and 14% of gay were exposed to discrimination during the hiring process (Committee on the Status of Lesbians and Gays in the Profession, 1995) (in (Badgett M. L., 2007)). Weichselbaumer (2003) found that having an open identity of lesbians reduced the hiring invitation rate by 12-13% in the Austrian labour market. This result was like the study of Adam (1981), which showed that having an open identity of lesbians reduced the hiring invitation rate by 11% in Toronto, Canada.

For the case of the EU, it is considered as one of the reliable protectors of sexual orientation rights (Drydakis, 2014), has a directive named the European Union's Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Directive 2000/78 which came into force in 2005. Despite this directive, discrimination based on sexual orientation is being observed in some Member States. For example, Drydakis (2009) presents substantial evidence showing discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Greek labour market.

In the case of countries like Turkey, many open identity LGBT people work in the informal labour market because of hiring discrimination, and the discrimination against LGBT people in Turkey force these people to become sex workers (Ozeren, 2014). Even though LGBT people do not express their sexual orientations during the hiring process, social media search of employees or job candidates poses a risk for the accession of the labour market for LGBT people in Turkey (Doğan, 2012).

#### I.B.4.d. Discrimination against People with Disability

Disabled or handicapped people are one of the most vulnerable groups of society. Disability includes "impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions, referring to the negative aspects of the interaction between an individual (with a health condition) and that individual's contextual factors (environmental and personal factors)" (Leonardi, Bickenbach, Ustun, Kostanjsek, & Chatterji, 2006) (cited in (WHO, 2011, p. 4)). It is estimated that over 1 billion people – around 15% of global population – have a disability (WHO, 2020).

According to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2011), there is not enough data about the accessibility of persons with disabilities to the labour market. Some indicators have been provided by Eurostat that surveyed the labour market participation rate of people with disabilities European-wide in 2011. The survey divided the employment rate of people with disabilities into four categories: (1) difficulties in basic activities – 47.3% in the EU and 41.1% in Turkey, (2) no difficulty in basic activities – 66.9% in the EU and 51% in Turkey, (3) limitation in work caused by a health condition or difficulty in basic activity – 38.1% in the EU ad 40.1% in Turkey, and (4) no limitation in work caused by a health condition or difficulty in basic activity – 67.7% in the EU and 51.1% in Turkey (Eurostat, 2020).

# II. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS ON LABOUR MIGRATION

This chapter consists of the theories and studies carried out about migration—especially labour migration. It contains three sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter is dedicated to the concept of labour migration, its economic effects, and the means for it to occur. The second sub-chapter gathers the theories which explains why migration takes place. Also, the concept of employability applied to immigrants is analysed, as well as aspects of the income level in the destination country and the importance of the language. In the third sub-chapter, the variables that affect the decision to emigrate are synthesized. A possible model that collects the determinants of the choice of destination proposed.

## II.A. LABOUR MIGRATION AS A CONCEPT

Labour migration refers to the move for seeking or taking up employment (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, & Bradley, 2017). Labour migration is an essential factor affecting the equilibrium in the labour market, including employers (like firms), workers, and other labour market actors (like governments or unions). Considering that labour market desires to reach a productive match among workers and employers, a flexible market and the promotion of migration can be a safeguard for sustained growth, prosperity, employment, and social security because many parameters are altering globally (Zimmermann, 2009). Allowing workers to move to more extended areas may bring a better and productive matching opportunity.

Decreasing unemployment in the EU is possible by supporting more labour migration and making more labour market regulations. Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) state that labour migration and the unemployment rate have an inverse relationship. Also,

labour migration is considered to be a useful element to increase Europe's competitiveness and growth (Oğuz, 2011).

Labour migration has economic and social perspectives. By improving the match between the available labour supply and the demand from employers, the free movement of labour serves for promoting labour market efficiency (European Commission, 2006). When people find a proper job pursuant to their skills, they can earn better salaries and be more productive. Also, a good match between employers and workers might affect a country's economic indicators: GDP (gross domestic products) growth rate, unemployment, poverty, and income distribution.

From a social perspective, labour mobility may affect the relations in the destination society and the origin country. The relationship between social groups can change because of the social consequences of labour mobility. Immigrated workers constitute minority groups in the receiving country, and this might cause some confrontations between natives and minority groups. In the origin country, migration flow causes changes in human capital (Favell & Recchi, 2009).

For the case of Europe, labour migration is not a new concept. After World War II, European economies began to recover, and there had been an enormous demand for labour. Germany could not satisfy this demand domestically, and under the guest-worker schemes, the German government signed some agreements with other governments: with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). These workers, who were named guest-workers, would work as long as there had jobs and return to their countries when demand dropped (Hansen, 2003). After the German economy slowed down, although some guest-workers returned to their home countries, many stayed in Germany. These workers and their families constitute a part of Germany's foreign population today.

The experience of the European countries which have colonial history was different from the German experience on labour migration. The United Kingdom (UK) and France were some of the great imperial powers in Europe. The UK allowed people

from ex-colonial countries like India and Pakistan to close the labour deficit from the early to mid-1950s. In the UK, within a decade, the number of labour migrants from these countries reached a million people. In the 1950s and 1960s, France accepted labour migrants from her ex-colonies: Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. (Hansen, 2003).

The labour demand of the European states in the 1950s and the 1960s caused the free mobility of labour in Europe before the free movement of capital, goods, and services. In 1957, the first step of free movement of workers was the Treaty of Rome which aims integration and economic growth through trade.

In 1968, the free flow of workers in Europe became possible with the directives which were "Directive 68/360 on free movement for workers within the then European Community (EC); and Regulation 1612/68 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the EC for workers of the Member States and their families" (UK Government, 2014, p. 14). The European Single Act completed the other passages in 1987, and the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 allowed free movement of capital, goods, and services (European Commission, 2006).

In the case of Europe, labour migration continues to be a dominant concept after World War II, and today it is still promoted inside the EU and from non-EU countries through the EU enlargement and market integration policies, which have effects on economic and social structure**.** Compared the United States (US), labour migration in the EU is lower (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009; Zimmermann, 2009; Bonin, et al., 2008; Ester & Krieger, 2008). According to the data published by European Commission (2006), between 2000 and 2005, while in the EU about 1 % of the working-age population moved to another EU state, in the US 2.8%-3.4% of the working-age population moved to another US' state (Ester & Krieger, 2008). In 2006, less than 2% of the EU working-age citizens lived in another EU state service (European Commission, 2006). However, it shares a tendency to increase, in 2013, it was only 3.3% the working-age population living in other EU state (European Commission, 2014).

"Lower mobility is also seen as resulting in higher equilibrium unemployment" (Layard, Nickell, & Jackman, 1991) (cited in (European Commission, 2010, p. 120)). In other words, for coping with a higher unemployment rate, increasing the labour migration rate is essential. For example, Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) claim that an increase in labour migration went along with the decrease of approximately 5 million unemployed between 1995 and 2007 (European Commission, 2010).

Labour migration might help the labour market with the difference between the demand for and the supply of workers in different regions, as pointed for the case of Europe (Ester & Krieger, 2008). Labour migration in the EU has been promoted by Lisbon Strategy since 2000. However, balanced labour migration is a preferable situation because some authors think too much mobility or too little mobility might negatively affect them. For example, Bonin et al. (2008, p. 12) express that "while it is clear that too little mobility may mean reduced adaptability, untapped employment opportunities and competitiveness, too much mobility may distort national labour markets and generate considerable social costs". Therefore, the labour market should find an optimum labour migration level with economic and social perspectives.

The optimum level of labour migration might be understood in the natural rate of unemployment eloped by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968). According to Friedman (1968), the structural characteristics of the labour market affect the natural unemployment rate. This hypothetical unemployment level includes frictional unemployment and unemployment due to competitive wage settings (Blanchard & Katz, 1997). However, getting close to the natural unemployment rate might be reached through the optimum level of labour mobility because, in the case of the optimum level of labour migration in the labour market, it is supposed that there are better matches between firms and workers, and workers are well-informed about job opportunities.

There are some general characteristics of immigrant workers related to family ties, age, education, and gender. Family ties can be a determinant factor to move to another country because the network in the destination country can be useful to find a better

job. Younger people are more willing to move, so age is also essential to decide to move. Persons who have a higher education level have more chances to get a better job. Also, although gender is also a key determinant to move, there is no huge gap between the employment rates of women and men in EU states. (European Commission, 2006).

The level of skills of workers might affect the migration destination. For example, according to Holland et al. (2011), high-skilled foreign workers prefer to move to Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland, and low-skilled workers prefer to go to Greece, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Finland (Kahanec, Labor Mobility in an Enlarged European Union, 2013). Geographic flows are a crucial determinant to understand the current situation of labour migration in a country or territory.

### II.A.1. The Case of Internal Labour Migration in the European Union

Internal labour migration in the EU, in general terms, refers to the mobility of workers inside the EU. Labour migration inside the EU is promoted by the regulations on the free movement of EU citizens. Fries-Tersch, Tugran, & Bradley (2017) describe intra-EU labour migration in three forms: (1) long-term labour migration symbolises that workers move to another country more than one country to work; (2) cross-border mobility refers that workers live in a country, but they work in another country passing borders regularly; and (3) posting workers are people who their employers send to a country for a limited period, but they regularly work in another country.

Return migration may be counted as another form of labour migration. “This can be seen as a type of long-term labour mobility, where EU movers return to their country of origin.” (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, & Bradley, 2017, p. 21). The difference between the posting of workers and return migration is the duration of working abroad. According to the European Commission (2015), in 2013 return migration reached to 25% at the EU level, especially in Eastern European countries like Poland, Lithuania,

Estonia and Latvia, return migration drew near over 50% of immigration (Fries-Tersch & Mabilia, 2015).

The data on intra-EU labour migration shows that labour migration inside the EU increased gradually. However, it is thought that labour migration inside the EU is still low. It is possible to say that the Eastern enlargement of the EU causes an increase in labour mobility. Cross-border mobility and posting labour migration still need some more facilitative regulations.

#### II.A.1.a. Long-term labour migration

It increased in Europe around the 1950s. After the first oil price shock in 1973, due to the oil crisis's economic impacts, the labour migration rate in Europe gradually slowed down (European Commission, 2006). This fall continued in the middle of the 1980s. From the 1990s to the first half of the 2000s, there was no significant change. The European Labour Force Survey (LFS) indicates that the number of mobile workers in the EU-15 increased by approximately 470.000 persons from 2000 to 2005; the UK was the most preferred destination (European Commission, 2006). It was observed that between 2008 and 2012, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Sweden were destination countries while Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain were seen as the origin countries which were migrated from (European Commission, 2013).

According to the European Commission (2013), from 2005 to 2012, the number of EU citizens who were working abroad increased by 2.3 million from 4.2 million to 6.5 million. This migration flow is mainly from low-wage new Member States towards higher wage old Member States, namely from the East to the West (European Commission, 2013). Earning a higher wage is an important aspect to move to another country.

Between 2009 and 2014, the largest increase of mobility in the EU was seen in Germany (+219%), Austria (+86%), the UK (+57%), Denmark (+54%) and Finland (+60%) (Fries-Tersch, Tugran, & Bradley, 2017). Therefore, we can say that these countries are five of the most favourite countries to move inside the EU. This data

shows that the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 impacted increasing labour migration. While the immigrant population from these new eight Member States in the EU was 0.9 million people at the end of 2003, this number increased by 1 million people at the end of 2007 (Baas, Brücker, & Hauptmann, 2010). Bulgaria and Romania became member states in 2007. The immigrant population in the EU from these two countries increased from 0.7 million people to 1.9 million people after 2007 (Eurostat, 2011).

#### II.A.1.b. Cross-border workers

They live (as residents) in an EU country and work in another EU country. For example, a resident in the Netherlands works in Belgium, or a resident in Belgium works in Luxembourg. In 2014, 1.6 million people were cross-border workers. France (364.000 workers), Germany (229.000 workers), Poland (138.000 workers), Slovakia (with 132.000 workers) and Belgium (100.000 workers) have the most significant populations of cross-border workers residents in the EU (Fries-Tersch & Mabilia, 2015, pp. 56-58). Although the amounts of cross-border workers are relatively higher in France and Germany, cross-border mobility rates of Germany and France are lower than 2% per country (Bonin, et al., 2008; Zimmermann, 2009). The studies show that "cross-border mobility in the EU-15 regarding the population of the receiving country is 0.1% annually, whereas regional mobility is 1%" (Zimmermann, 2009, p. 12). This percentage can be assessed as low. Cross-border mobility might be increased by "improving the transferability and tracking of supplementary pension rights, addressing concerns for taxation of cross-border pensions, improving the cross-border recognition of professional qualifications, tackling administrative obstacles for cross-border workers and their families and, finally, giving more support for language learning" (European Commission, 2014, pp. 23-24).

#### II.A.1.c. Posting of workers

Concerning the case of workers sent to another country by their employers, they work according to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Posted workers are contingent upon Portable Documents A1 (PD A1), a statement about social security

legislation. Also, active two or more member-states get into the act according to Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 contingent upon PD A1. In 2015, it was recorded that 2.05 million persons worked with PD A1. Poland (about 463.000 workers), Germany (about 240.000 workers) and France (about 140.000 workers) were the three countries that issued PD A1 most. Posting of workers is a temporary situation. The duration of workers with PD A1 is lower than one year (Pacolet & De Wispelaere, 2016).

#### II.A.2. The Case of Labour Migration from Outside the European Union

In the EU, immigrant populations from outside the EU show diversity; so, it can be examined in three sections for ease of review: foreign-born population, foreign population, and second-generation migrants.

1) Foreign-born population means persons who have "foreign citizenship and persons with the citizenship of their country of residence, either from birth or acquired later in life." (Eurostat, 2011, p. 6). In 2006 in Spain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and the UK the share of the foreign-born population is above 10%; and in Greece, Italy, and Portugal this share is about 8%; in addition, in Spain, the most massive increase was recorded (Bonin, et al., 2008). Luxembourg (with %32 of the total population), Estonia, Latvia, and Austria (with approximately 15% of whole people) were European countries which had the highest proportion of the foreign-born population in 2009 (Eurostat, 2011).
2) Europe is a continent that has a high foreign population. In Europe, although many countries are destination countries to which immigrants from mostly Africa and Asia would like to reach, "between 1990 and 2004, in most Member States the percentage of foreign nationals either did not change significantly or it increased" (European Commission, 2006, p. 211). The fact remains that in 2004, it was estimated that the total number of non-nationals in the EU was around 25 million people and France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK are

the countries that have the largest numbers of foreign residents (European Commission, 2006). Whereas EU-born foreign population signifies %3 of total unemployed, non-EU born foreign population represents 8% of total unemployed (European Commission, 2008).

3) Second-generation immigrants or people with a migration background refer to people who have foreign-born parents (Eurostat, 2011). "In relative terms, second-generation migrants (both with one parent and two parents born abroad) make up a substantial proportion of the population in Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and France, as well as in Switzerland" (Eurostat, 2011, p. 121).

Foreign-born population, foreign population and second-generation migrants are three different groups which are shown different characteristics. In some countries like Luxembourg, the UK, Spain, France, Belgium and Austria, the proportion of immigrant populations outside the EU is higher than in other countries.

### II.A.3. Economic Impact of Labour Migration

Labour migration might affect GDPs, unemployment rate, level of poverty, import/export rate or income distribution in the receiving and sending countries. All these concepts are related to the economy. Many studies below are referred to the case of the European Union labour migration experience.

European Commission (2008) states that migration had on average 21% positive contribution to the GDP growth in the EU-15 between 2000 and 2005. In addition to this contribution, the analysis of Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann (2010) on the impact of labour migration after the Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 shows that in the integrated areas, GDP increased approximately 2% (or 24 billion euros).

The consequences of labour migration on wages can seem in the short-term or the long-term. In the short term, wages of foreign workers affect negatively by 0.4%, while the unemployment rate increases by 0.2%. However, in the long-term, according to Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann (2010)'s simulation, wages remain stable. Labour mobility has a moderate impact on the distribution of wages (Baas, Brücker, &

Hauptmann, 2010). For example, the average pay level of Turkish workers in Germany is lower than the average pay level of German workers by 17% (Goldberg, Mourinho, & Kulke, 1995).

In 1995, a 10% increase in migration rate increased the imports of EU-15 by 1.6% and the export rate by 1.5% (European Commission, 2008). This data shows that labour mobility has a positive impact on international trade.

Labour migration affects income distribution. When there is a 10% increase in migration rate, European Commission (2008) finds that about 1.7% of GDP redistributes from native workers to capital owners. Some political considerations might think that the transaction from workers to capital owners is a negative impact.

The reasons for labour migration are not only economic or job-related. The personal reasons for labour migration may vary: "to live in a better climate, to discover new cultures and environments, to learn a new language, to live in better social condition, to earn a higher income, to work in better working conditions" (European Commission, 2006, p. 234). Whatever the reasons for labour migration, there are some social effects other than personal expectations.

Economic effects of labour market reverberate social impacts. Although some writers claim that native workers would lose their jobs due to worker surplus, and minimum wages would decrease because immigrant workers may have the willingness to get lower wages than native workers in order to find a job (Zimmermann, 2009), the others express there are no adverse economic effects in the long term (Baas, Brücker, & Hauptmann, 2010). The social exclusion of foreign workers might cause the wage decrease of native workers.

The thought of losing jobs of native workers due to immigrant workers might lead that native workers might think of labour immigrants as a threat. This thought might cause social exclusion of immigrant workers in the receiving countries. However, finding with many efforts a job or losing a job quickly has been forward to be related to workers' surplus in the labour market and to be associated with the match between

skill and employment. Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann (2010, p. 67) express that "migrants from the new member states are characterised by a similar skill structure compared to the population of the receiving countries and are only moderately better qualified than the population in the sending countries". According to Baas, Brücker and Hauptmann (2010), due to labour mobility, high-skilled or medium-skilled workers are not affected while only less-skilled workers affect slightly negatively in the short term (Baas, Brücker, & Hauptmann, 2010). This situation might mean that labour migration has no always adverse impacts in the receiving countries due to skill-mismatches.

The migration of high-skilled labour might be seen as a 'brain drain' in the sending countries. Brain drain refers to losing the high-skilled or educated human resources of a country due to migration. However, brain drain can be thought of as 'brain waste' if there is no proper job for high-skilled workers in the sending countries. Therefore, labour mobility is vital to prevent skill mismatches. Free movement of workers inside the EU might seem like a 'brain circulation'. Labour mobility might provide a more productive way to use human resources in the EU (Kahanec, Labor Mobility in an Enlarged European Union, 2013).

The trends of low skilled-foreign workers consist of working mostly in construction and service sectors and creating their ghettos in the suburb. Among both native and foreign workers, tendencies such as xenophobia are more likely to occur in lower classes because of strengthening competition over less qualified jobs (Rojo, 2002).

Labour mobility might affect EU integration positively. Living and working in another EU state symbolises EU integration and identity (Ester & Krieger, 2008). In general, increased mobility helps people to meet different cultures and to engage in different societies. Therefore, labour mobility is a tool that provides European economic integration, but it also helps to link different geographical parts, societies, and cultures. Intercultural dialogue through labour migration might reduce discrimination, ethnic violation, and xenophobia.

### II.A.4. Obstacles to Labour Migration

The barriers in front of labour mobility might be lack of language skills, lack of information for finding a job abroad, homologation of the education, differences among national labour standards, tax and health regulations and social insurance system from a country to another, and regulations for immigrant workers. The coordination of the tax and social insurance systems and the definition of a common language might improve the labour migration level (Puhani, 1999). These barriers can be dismissed by making more labour market regulations (Ester & Krieger, 2008). Also, for example, the concept of ‘flexicurity’ is one of the employment strategies in the EU to be able to increase labour migration.

The language barrier seems like one of the most critical obstacles in front of labour mobility (Fries-Tersch & Mabilia, 2015; Eurofound, 2014). For example, the survey of Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2010) gives information that 52% of the survey participants agree that lack of language skills is the most preeminent obstacle concerning working abroad. Policies at the EU level might encourage local administrations to open more free language courses for immigrant workers (Eurofound, 2014).

The lack of information for finding a job abroad is the second most preeminent obstacle about working abroad with 24% (Eurofound, 2014; European Commission, 2010). In the EU, the EURES is a job portal that aims to fill the deficiency of information on finding a job and facilitating job placement in the EU. As of the 4th of January 2018, the EURES contacted 10,688 companies and included 357,074 curriculum virtues and 1,314,380 vacancies (EURES, 2018).

National authorities provide homologation of the education level in the destination countries. People who want to get the homologation of education level needs to follow national procedures. For the case of the EU, “there is no automatic EU-wide recognition of academic diplomas” (Your Europe, 2017). This situation is another difficulty in front of labour mobility. An EU-wide recognition system of the education level's homologation might ease finding a job abroad.

The European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) is one of the crucial steps to increase labour mobility. For the case of the EU, the EHIC is a card that provides access to medical treatment in any country in the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The EHIC does not work as travel insurance or does not cover medical expenses freely. It provides to reach the treatment under the same conditions and at the same cost as nationals in the host country. It simplifies the payment and reimbursement procedures. (European Commission, 2017).

Providing better coordination of Social Security Scheme is another step to cope with legal barriers to mobility (European Commission, 2006). For the case of the EU, Social Security Coordination protects social security rights inside the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, but it does not replace the national security systems (European Commision, 2017). However, there are significant differences between the national social security systems of the EU member states, and the EU rules “only determine which country’s social security covers you when two or more countries are involved” (Your Europe, 2017). Since there is no common social security institution in the EU, this situation might cause the loss of social benefits (like sickness, invalidity, and retirement) of people working in their lifetime in different EU member states.

The Blue Card is a work permit that allows free movement of non-European workers. It is a regulation of the EU to stimulate economic development by making the EU a desirable destination for non-European workers. The policies of taxation, health insurance and social security benefits depend on the member state in which workers work (Blue Card, 2015). The Blue card is a regulation that encourages non-European people to work and reside in the EU. Labour mobility from outside of the EU might increase by spreading the Blue Card.

Flexicurity aims to combine flexibility and security in the labour market and was designed in the EU Lisbon Strategy in 2000. Madsen (2006) mentions four forms of flexibility and four forms of security: numerical flexibility, working time flexibility, functional flexibility, wage flexibility, job security, employment security, income

security and combination security. According to Madsen (2006), there are sixteen potential combinations to create a way of flexicurity. The principles of flexicurity are "employment prospect, social protection system, social inclusion, social partners, job transitions, social partners and allocation of resources" (Oğuz, 2011, p. 102). One of the best examples of flexicurity is the Danish Model, which combines "flexible hiring and firing rules for employers with income security for employees" (Andersen & Svarer, 2007, p. 389).

In Denmark, according to OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), the unemployment rate of Denmark has been lower than Europe's unemployment rate since the 1990s due to a series of reforms in the labour market. Danish Model gives income support and lowers tax payment when people are unemployed, but the labour force participation rate is still high because the welfare model of Denmark is employment-focused (Andersen & Svarer, 2007).

Madsen (2006) states that labour mobility is relatively high in the Danish Model when comparing international labour migration levels. Flexicurity seems like an essential step of the EU's labour policies, and labour mobility might increase by developing specific flexicurity models according to its understanding of welfare.

## II.B. THEORIES ON MIGRATION

This part consists of three sub-parts: employability of immigrants, income level of immigrants, and immigrants' integration to the EU labour market. Before these sub-parts, it shares a summary of labour migration theories.

Migration laws, pull-push factors model, neoclassical approach, human capital theory, segmented labour market theory, world-systems theory, and the new economics of migration are the junction points of labour market theories and migration theories; so, this study benefits from these junction theories.

One of the classical theories about migration and the labour market belongs to Ravenstein (1885), who explains migration by 'Migration Laws'. Although Ravenstein (1885) has five migration laws in his first article, there are two more in his

second article; and he discusses these seven laws all together: migration and distance, migration by stages, stream and counter-stream, urban-rural differences, the predominance of females among short distance immigrants, technology and migration, and dominance of economic motive. However, Ravenstein (1885) mainly focuses on economic reasons and expresses that the other reasons are weak (Dudu, 2018; Çağlayan, 2006).

In line with Ravenstein (1885), Lee (1965) expresses four factors that constitute 'Push-and-Pull Theory of Migration': factors associated with the area of origin, factors associated with the destination, intervening obstacles and personal factors. According to Lee (1965), these factors that focus on the gaining and losing areas determine in deciding migration, which is made by considering the relativity of the situations and persons. However, the immigrants do not always have full information about their destination (Dudu, 2018).

According to neoclassical theorists like Sjaastad (1962), the wage difference between the origin country and the destination country explains the causes of international migration, and the exceed labour force tends to shift from low-wage countries to high-wage countries (Massey, et al., 1993). Besides the wage differentials, Harris and Todaro (1975) model that expected income differentials between rural and urban areas are also the reason for migration from the rural to the urban areas in the case that the expected income in the urban is higher than the expected income in the rural. Neoclassical theorists mainly focus on wage or income differentials among the reasons for migration.

Segmented labour market theory— or dual labour market theory— addresses that the labour market is divided into separate segments (O'Donnell, 1984): open, guild and manorial markets (Kerr, 1954), central and peripheral organisations (Averitt, 1968), monopolistic, competitive and state sectors (O'Connor, 1973), primary and secondary sectors (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). The most well-known study belongs to Doeringer and Piore (1971). The authors (Doeringer & Piore, 1971) explain that the secondary sector includes low-wage, part-time, causal jobs with insecure work and poor working conditions (O'Donnell, 1984). Piore (1979) argues that international migration

responds to labour shortages and a need to fill the bottom position in the social hierarchy and meet the requirements of the secondary sector of a dual labour market.

The segmented labour market theory suggests that native workers and immigrants belong to two different segments in the labour market. Native workers are in the primary segment, in which there are more formal, high-skilled, and well-paid jobs, while immigrants are in the second segment, in which there are less formal, low-skilled, and not well-paid jobs. The transition between the two segments is rigid (Woltermann, 2004). The limitation of the reason is that Piore (1979) does not focus on the push-side of the migration while examining only the pull-side of international migration (Gurieva & Dzhioev, 2015). Also, Piore (1979) ignores the factors related to taking the migration decision (Massey, et al., 1993).

The human capital theory assumes that immigrants overcome labour market obstacles with their personal characteristics and by improving in job-related skills like participating in an educational institution in the host country (Constant & Massey, 2005; Mancinelli, Mazzanti, Piva, & Ponti, 2010) or learning the most-demanded language(s). Human capital theory upholds that the immigrants are less employable and earn less than native workers because of personal and job-specific traits such as insufficient knowledge in the language of the host country and the lack of recognition of their educational degrees. Human capital theorists argue that immigrants can find better jobs and earn more than their initial salaries in the host country as they improve their skills.

The world-systems theory of Wallerstein (2011) classifies the countries as core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries. The core countries are wealthy, capitalist, industrially developed and colonialist countries, while the periphery countries are developing countries that produce mainly raw materials. The core countries are productive, dominant in trade and finance, and have strong bourgeoise and working classes with stable central governments. The periphery countries are economically developing with relatively weak governments and have a small bourgeoisie and a large peasant class. The semi-periphery countries like Brazil, Russia, India, Israel are between core countries and periphery countries. These countries are relatively

developed but not dominant in international trade. Massey et al. (1993) summaries the hypothesises of the world-system theory about international migration: it is a consequence of a capitalist form of the market in core countries; capitalist investment is the cause of transnational movement; international migration creates linguistic, cultural and financial ties between core and peripheral countries; and, it is related to the global market economy.

The new economics of migration theory points out that migration is not always made by an isolated individual. The migration decision is generally taken by families or households, even if only one person migrates. Families or households share the expected costs and income of international migration; so, remittances are part of the arrangement (Stark & Bloom, 1985). The government policies and economic changes may affect this arrangement due to the income distribution policies (Massey, et al., 1993).

The common point of these theories is to put the economic determinants of migration related to the labour market in the centre of migration studies. Besides the labour market determinants of migration, some of them, such as the world-system theory and the new economics of migration theory, address the determinants which are highly related to social determinants like linguistic, cultural, and financial ties and collective decision of households. Therefore, this study takes advantage of all these theories.

#### II.B.1. Employability of Immigrants

Employability is the ability to obtain and keep a job by performing common tasks with job-specific skill sets (Williams A. M., 2009). It also includes readiness to work (Flubacher, Duchêne, & Coray, 2018). In short, employability as an interactive concept (Gazier, 1998) that refers to the sustainability of employment (Green, et al., 2013). Employability can be measured by job-offer and acceptance probability (Bloemen & Stancanelli, 2001). McQuaid and Lindsay (2005) propose three components of employability: individual factors (skills and attributes, demographic characteristics, health and well-being, job seeking, adaptability, and mobility),

personal circumstances (household circumstances, work culture, access to resources), and external factors (demand factors and enabling support factors).

For immigrants, one of the key factors is their legal status, which allows them to reside and work in the host country. Obviously, immigrants are more employable if they have work permits. Therefore, immigrant-friendly regulations of the host countries (Anderson & Huang, 2019; Carling, 2002), which are mostly affected by the political and historical context (Green, et al., 2013), help immigrants get a job. Moreover, immigrants benefit from migration networks in finding work (Beine, Docquier, & Özden, 2010). However, having good qualifications may be more important. For example, Mancinelli et al. (2010) found that a high-level education contributes to employability more than belonging to an ethnic network in Italy.

Another dimension which determines the employability of immigrants is the host country's unemployment level. Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) report that immigrant unemployment in Europe is lower in countries with abundant low-skilled jobs, dense immigrant population, and high GDP per capita than in countries where the unemployment rate of native workers is high. Immigrants from wealthier, more politically stable, and developed countries are also more likely to be employed (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010). In contrast, 'trailing immigrants', meaning accompanying persons like spouses, children, and elder relatives, are less likely to be employed (Williams A. M., 2009), probably because they lack work experience, a work permit, language skills, or qualifications (Green, et al., 2013).

Employability is also closely related to the reservation wage, which is the minimum wage offered to an individual to accept a particular job (Coen, Forrier, & Sels, 2010; Mortensen, 1986). More specifically, employability is negatively related to the reservation wage, which is affected by several factors. Ahn and García-Pérez (2002) found that it is increased by being older, having a working partner, having a high-level education, and living in an area of low unemployment with generous unemployment benefits. Wealth also slightly increases the reservation wage and reduces employability (Bloemen & Stancanelli, 2001). Another important factor is citizenship, as immigrants generally have a lower reservation wage than native workers (Nanos &

Schluter, 2014). Finally, the reservation wage of second-generation immigrants is higher than that of the first-generation (Constant, Krause, Rinne, & Zimmerman, 2016).

The intersectionality of employment and migration regulations create labour market flexibilities: numerical, functional, temporal, and wage-related. More specifically, immigrants may undertake more causal and seasonal jobs due to work permit or visa restrictions, hold more than one job at the same time with multitasking functionality, and accept low wages (Williams A. M., 2009). Immigrants also face obstacles in the labour market: more precarious working conditions than native workers (Bruno, 2015), asymmetric information about work experience between employers and employees (Akerlof, 1970; Bauer & Zimmermann, 1995), downskilling — working in a job requiring lower qualifications than the immigrant's formal education level due to poor recognition of equivalent qualifications (Barbone, Kahanec, Kureková, & Zimmermann, 2013; Kahanec, 2013; Kahanec, Zimmermann, Kureková, & Biavaschi, 2013), and labour-market discrimination (Bell, 1997; Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Constant & Massey, 2005; King, 1990), especially taste-based discrimination, when the immigrant does not match the employers' desired race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or other characteristics (Becker, 1971).

The employability of immigrants in the destination countries is a complicated topic related to the different characteristics of immigrants such as legal status, reservation wages, education level, work experiences; and destination countries such as unemployment rate and taste-based discrimination.

#### II.B.2. Income Level of Migrants

According to human capital theory, immigrants can overcome some of these obstacles, such as asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970; Bauer & Zimmermann, 1995) and downskilling (Barbone, Kahanec, Kureková, & Zimmermann, 2013; Kahanec, 2013; Kahanec, Zimmermann, Kureková, & Biavaschi, 2013) by gradually increasing their labour market experience through initially accepting mostly suboptimal jobs in the host country (Williams A. M., 2009). However, there are also

more rigid factors that affect their employability and labour income in the host country, such as characteristics related to taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971) and the income level of the immigrant's home country. In the US labour market, for example, Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden (2008) find that immigrants from low- and middle-income countries are not treated the same as immigrants from high-income countries despite having ostensibly identical educational qualifications because developing countries have poorer educational standards and there is often poor recognition of foreign educational qualifications in host countries. Dupleep and Dowhan (2008) also underline the importance of the income level of the immigrant's home country, which particularly affects their initial earnings due to its relationship with the home country's education quality and transferability of skills to the US. Finally, another key determinant of immigrant employability is employers' attitudes. Lucas et al. (2014), for example, report that liberal employers in the US are more positive about employing immigrant workers than conservative employers.

In the literature, the earnings of immigrants are usually studied by comparing them with them with those of native workers. These studies confirm that immigrant workers generally earn less than native workers (Anderson & Huang, 2019; Barrett & McCarthy, 2007; Barrett, McGuinness, & O'Brien, 2012; Chiswick, 1978; Constant & Massey, 2005), although Chiswick (1978) found that immigrant earnings may eventually match those of native workers after 10 to 15 years in the host country. Several factors influence immigrants' labour income: education level and work experience (Anderson & Huang, 2019; Constant & Massey, 2005), proficiency in the host country's language(s) (Adserà & Pytliková, 2016; Barrett & McCarthy, 2007; Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Chiswick, 2008; Chiswick & Miller, 2015; Dustmann & Fabbri, 2007), English proficiency in countries where the dominant language is not English (Chiswick, 1998), immigrant-friendly policies in the host country (Anderson & Huang, 2019; Carling, 2002), length of stay in the host country (Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Chiswick & Miller, 2015; Constant & Massey, 2005), age at migration (Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 2008), and citizenship status (Anderson & Huang, 2019; Bauder, 2006).

Regarding earnings differences among immigrants in the host country rather than between them and native workers, two key factors are the income level of their home country and being multi-lingual. More specifically, immigrants from high-income countries tend to earn more than immigrants from low-income countries (Borjas, 1987; Duleep & Dowhan, 2008; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1985; Johnston, Khattab, & Manley, 2015; Phythian, Walters, & Anisef, 2011). While some studies indicate that home-country income level is important for immigrant earnings in the US and UK (Borjas, 1987; Duleep & Dowhan, 2008; Johnston, Khattab, & Manley, 2015; Mattoo, Neagu, & Özden, 2008), Phythian, Walters and Anisef (2011) report that the earnings of immigrants in Canada are only slightly affected by home-country income level. Moreover, Duleep and Regets (2002) found that, in the US, earnings growth for immigrants from developing countries is higher than that for immigrants from developed countries. Finally, Borjas (1987) reported that the initial earnings of immigrants, based on their entry year to the US, declined from 1970 to 1980.

Immigrants mostly speak different languages at home and outside. Immigrants who speaking the host country's language(s) have a great advantage in the labour market (Adserà & Pytliková, 2016; Barrett & McCarthy, 2007; Bellante & Kogut, 1998; Chiswick & Miller, 2015; Dustmann & Fabbri, 2007; Hwang, Xi, & Cao, 2010). Moreover, some studies show that immigrants who speak other languages than that of the host country earn more (Chiswick & Miller, 2018; Robinson-Cimpian, 2014; Williams, 2011). For example, Williams D. R. (2011) found that the positive return varies by 8-30% in several European countries. Similarly, Moore et al. (2014) found that non-US workers in the US who are English-Spanish bilinguals earn more and are more employable than monolingual Spanish speakers. On the other hand, Robinson-Cimpian (2014) studied US citizens who are either Spanish speakers with very good English or monolingual English speakers and found that Spanish-speaking males earn slightly less than monolingual males. Chiswick and Miller (2018) reported similar findings for US-born English-Spanish bilinguals. However, they also found that US-born bilinguals in other languages, such as West European languages (e.g., Dutch, Italian, Greek), Hebrew, and East Asian languages (e.g., Chinese, Korean), had higher earnings. This indicates that these particular languages contribute more to the US

economy and finance. In contrast, Carliner (1981) and Fry and Lowell (2003) found no significant effects on the earnings of immigrants of knowing any language other than the host country's language.

The reserve army of the labour theory of Marxism and the study of Piore (1979) are considered two explanations of why immigrants work predominantly in precarious employment (Wills, et al., 2010). The idea of the reserve army of labour is based on the concept of the unemployed surplus population of Engels (1845). The competition among the bourgeois and economic crisis causes the fluctuation of wages, and as a result, workers' livelihood is getting more precarious (Marx, 1996). On the other hand, Piore (1979) explains international migration with employment rate differences between the home country and destination country. However, an immigrant who is willing to earn more might experience mostly precarious works in the host country because, according to Piore (1979), immigrants have limited access to the welfare benefits in the destination country; so, they accept the jobs which native workers decline (Wills, et al., 2010). In addition to these two reasons, labour market discrimination against immigrants (Pradella & Cillo, 2015), the lack of recognition of qualifications (homologation of education) and poor skill in speaking the destination country's language are other reasons.

To sum up, immigrant workers tend to earn less than native workers due to several reasons related to immigrants' characteristics such as proficiency level of the destination's language, education level, work experience and the destination's characteristics such as discrimination rate against immigrants. Therefore, these reasons are more or less similar to the reasons that affect the employability of immigrants.

### II.B.3. Immigrants' Integration: The Case of the European Union

The International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2012) defines migrants' integration "as the process of mutual adaptation between the host society and the migrants themselves, both as individuals and as groups." The IOM (2012) agrees that integration includes an engagement socio-economically, politically, and culturally in

the host society and migrants' access to the labour market, and social services related to education and health.

Berry (2011) suggests that integration may be at three level— macro (societal) level, meso (household or group) level, and micro (individual) level— and immigrants have four strategies to live together with the host society:

- Assimilation: Immigrants are assimilated when they adopt the cultural identity of the host society and do not maintain their own cultural identity.
- Separation: Immigrants are separated from the host society when do not show any interest of the cultural identity of the host society and only maintain their own cultural identity.
- Marginalization: Immigrants are marginalized when they do not interact with other people and do not have an interest for cultural maintenance.
- Integration: Immigrants are integrated when they show the characteristics of the cultural identity of the host society and maintain their own culture at the same time.

The main criticism against the definitions of Berry (2011) might be that these concepts are not always white and black. For example, for a Muslim, drinking alcohol and eating pork are banned by Islam. A Turkish Muslim immigrant may adopt drinking alcohol while may not adopt eating pork in Germany. That is to say, it is possible that the identity of the host country and the identity of the origin country of the immigrants may be poles apart for a particular topic. This type of conflicts may cause a challenge for immigrants about their identity.

Integration is vital for not only living together in a harmony in terms of social peace but also important for the economy. Danzer and Ulku (2008, p. 28) investigated the correlation between integration and economic success and found out following findings:

- "Education raises the chances to become integrated into the host country purely by opening up a wider array of options and enabling people to efficiently collect and process information.
- Deeper integration leads to higher levels of economic success.

- The integration and network channel of income generation differs across different levels of unobserved ability.
- Local familial networks foster economic success indicating that ethnic niches may be economically advantageous and may partly substitute for missing integration."

It is very hard to measure the integration of immigrants because it has many social, economic, and legal aspect. On the other hand, OECD and the EU (OECD/EU, 2015) measures jointly the integration of immigrants benefiting from the following indicators:

- Socio-demographic characteristics of immigrant populations like age and gender,
- Defining characteristics of immigrant populations like duration of stay, home country, and the language of the home country,
- Characteristics of immigrant households such as the number of people in the household,
- Labour market outcomes of immigrants such as employment rate, unemployment rate, and risk of labour market exclusion,
- Quality of immigrant jobs such as type of contracts, working hours, job skills, overqualification, self- employment, and employment in public services sector,
- Cognitive skills and training of immigrant adults like level of educational attainment, adult literacy, access to adult education and training, and work-related training for adults,
- Income of immigrant households like household income distribution, poverty, in-work poverty, and financial exclusion,
- Housing like housing tenure, overcrowded housing, housing conditions, and housing cost overburden,
- Immigrants' health status and their health care such as self-reported health status and health care,
- Civic engagement of immigrants such as acquisition of nationality and voter participation,
- Social cohesion like perceived discrimination and host society attitudes toward immigrants,

- Young people with a migration background like regions of parental origin, endogamy, child/youth poverty, and mixed marriages.

These indicators help us to understand where immigrants stand in the society and how can we increase their contribution to the society. These indicators differ from a country to another, even a region to another. Following tables shows several indicators of immigrant integration for the EU, Turkey, and the selected Member States (Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia).

**Table 3:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for the European Union, Turkey, and the Member States

| | **Indicators** | **Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017** | **Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017** | **2006-2017 change for foreign-born population** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **European Union** | Employment | 64.3 | -3.5 | 1.4 |
| | Unemployment | 11.7 | 4.3 | 0.4 |
| | Long-Term Unemployment | 48.4 | 0.1 | 7.1 |
| | Labour Market Participation | 72.9 | -0.4 | 1.9 |
| | Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 20.1 | 12.3 | 0 |
| | Overqualified Workers | 34 | 13 | 1 |
| | Self Employed | 12.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| | Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 66 | - | - |
| | Relative Poverty | 30 | 13 | 5 |
| | Self-Reported Health Status | 68.1 | 1 | 2.1 |
| | Unmet Medical Needs | 5 | 0 | -2 |
| | Living in Crowded Housing | 17 | 6 | 2 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 24.5 | 5.2 | - |
| Voter Participation | 73.7 | -5 | -0.2 |
| Acquisition of Nationality | 58.6 | - | -8.8 |
| Perceived Discrimination | 13.8 | - | -2.2 |
| Sense of Belonging | 88.1 | 0.2 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

As these tables show, the employment rates of immigrants and native population have a gap in all selected countries and the EU in detriment of immigrants. The unemployment rates of immigrants and native population are consistent with these employment rates. Surprisingly, long term unemployment rate gap is very high in Denmark with 12.2% and significantly high in Estonia with 3.9% while this gap is lower in other countries. Therefore, in some countries like Estonia and Denmark, the unemployment of immigrants is structural. One of the reasons may be that the advanced host country language proficiency rate is so low in Estonia and Denmark comparing with the others. Parallel to this characteristic, the acquisition of nationality rate is lower in Estonia and Denmark than in the others. Interestingly, the sense of belonging of immigrants to the countries where they live is very high. In all of them, it is above 80%, including Estonia and Denmark. As a result, immigrants' voter participation is very high, with above 70% in all countries.

**Table 4:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for Denmark

| **Denmark** | **Indicators** | **Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017** | **Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017** | **2006-2017 change for foreign-born population** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Employment | 64.9 | -10.9 | 1 |
| | Unemployment | 9.9 | 4.8 | 1.9 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Long-Term Unemployment | 33.8 | 12.2 | 13.7 |
| Labour Market Participation | 72 | -7.8 | 2.6 |
| Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 23.4 | 15.6 | 5.3 |
| Overqualified Workers | 28.6 | 17.4 | 3.5 |
| Self Employed | 7.8 | 1 | -1.7 |
| Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 22.1 | 9.5 | -2.5 |
| Relative Poverty | 60.4 | -8.2 | -0.8 |
| Self-Reported Health Status | 12.6 | 4.4 | 10.4 |
| Unmet Medical Needs | 12.6 | 4.4 | 10.4 |
| Living in Crowded Housing | 11.2 | 5 | -7.2 |
| Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 22 | 3.3 | - |
| Voter Participation | 90.9 | -3.9 | 7.6 |
| Acquisition of Nationality | 45.9 | - | -18.4 |
| Perceived Discrimination | 14.7 | - | 0.4 |
| Sense of Belonging | 93.2 | -2.9 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

Germany has the Member State, which has the lowest rate of perceived discrimination against immigrants with 10.9%, compared to other selected Member States (see Table 5). Germany has been a host country for immigrants since the 1960s due to its labour demands. This long-term experience may be helpful to Germany to have a low rate of perceived discrimination against immigrants.

**Table 5:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for Germany

| | Indicators | Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017 | Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017 | 2006-2017 change for foreign-born population |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | Employment | 67.3 | -8.7 | 7.9 |
| | Unemployment | 6.9 | 3.2 | -8.6 |
| | Long-Term Unemployment | 57.7 | -0.3 | 1.0 |
| | Labour Market Participation | 72.3 | -6.6 | 2.0 |
| | Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 19.3 | 13.8 | 2.9 |
| | Overqualified Workers | 31.4 | 15.2 | 0.6 |
| | Self Employed | 9.3 | 0.4 | -0.3 |
| | Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 58.3 | - | - |
| | Relative Poverty | 21.7 | 5.3 | 0.2 |
| | Self-Reported Health Status | 62.8 | -4.0 | 3.1 |
| | Unmet Medical Needs | 1.9 | 0.8 | -8.3 |
| | Living in Crowded Housing | 12.8 | 6.9 | 4.7 |
| | Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 15.5 | 0.9 | - |
| | Voter Participation | 73.5 | -12.2 | 1.5 |
| | Acquisition of Nationality | 61.1 | - | -9.4 |
| | Perceived Discrimination | 10.9 | - | -4.4 |
| | Sense of Belonging | 83.3 | -2.4 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

Since English is one of the most learned languages as a second language, it is not surprising that the rate of being proficient in the host country's language among immigrants in the UK is higher than the other selected Member States (see Table 6).

**Table 6:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for the UK

| | Indicators | Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017 | Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017 | 2006-2017 change for foreign-born population |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The UK** | Employment | 73 | -2.6 | 6.8 |
| | Unemployment | 5.2 | 0.8 | -2.5 |
| | Long-Term Unemployment | 24.1 | -5 | 0.1 |
| | Labour Market Participation | 77 | -2 | 5.3 |
| | Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 13.1 | 5.6 | -0.9 |
| | Overqualified Workers | 31.6 | 8.2 | 8.6 |
| | Self Employed | 16.7 | 4 | 2.6 |
| | Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 67.7 | - | - |
| | Relative Poverty | 21.8 | 4.5 | -4.9 |
| | Self-Reported Health Status | 71.7 | 4.5 | -2.7 |
| | Unmet Medical Needs | 4.1 | 0.9 | -0.4 |
| | Living in Crowded Housing | 14.3 | 11.7 | 7.3 |
| | Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 27 | 9.1 | - |
| | Voter Participation | 72 | -1.9 | -0.3 |
| | Acquisition of Nationality | 58.1 | - | -10 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perceived Discrimination | 13.9 | - | -1.3 |
| Sense of Belonging | 88.1 | 10.6 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

Another interesting data on the Table 7 is that the overqualified workers' rate in Spain is very high (with 53.7%). More than half of immigrants are overqualified in Spain. Although half of the immigrants are overqualified in Spain, their long-term unemployment rate is almost 50%. However, when we look at the gap between immigrants and the native population's unemployment rates, this gap is relatively small (with 7.3%). Therefore, it is possible to interpret that the high long-term unemployment rate of immigrants results from the high unemployment rate of Spain in general.

**Table 7:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for Spain

| | **Indicators** | **Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017** | **Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017** | **2006-2017 change for foreign-born population** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Spain** | Employment | 59.6 | -1.7 | -10.6 |
| | Unemployment | 23.4 | 7.3 | 12.7 |
| | Long-Term Unemployment | 48.2 | -0.3 | 36.3 |
| | Labour Market Participation | 77.9 | 4.7 | -0.8 |
| | Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 30.3 | 19.7 | -2.7 |
| | Overqualified Workers | 53.7 | 16.8 | -6.3 |
| | Self Employed | 15.3 | 0.7 | 5.1 |
| | Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 76.0 | - | - |
| | Relative Poverty | 42.9 | 23.1 | 17.1 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self-Reported Health Status | 71.2 | -0.4 | 2.2 |
| Unmet Medical Needs | 1.4 | -0.3 | -1.3 |
| Living in Crowded Housing | 7.9 | 6.1 | -1.8 |
| Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 24.5 | 7.2 | - |
| Voter Participation | 68.8 | -13.5 | 10.9 |
| Acquisition of Nationality | 63.4 | - | 28.4 |
| Perceived Discrimination | 14.9 | - | -7.8 |
| Sense of Belonging | 91.8 | 4.6 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

The health is another important aspect of immigrant integration. In Denmark and Estonia, the unmet medical needs are higher than the others, respectively 12.6% and 24.8%. However, in Denmark, the self-reported health status is also low (with 12.6%) compared to Estonia (with 48.2%). Therefore, it is understandable that this problem might arise the low rate of self-reported health status in Denmark.

**Table 8:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for Estonia

| | **Indicators** | **Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017** | **Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017** | **2006-2017 change for foreign-born population** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Estonia** | Employment | 71.6 | -2.8 | -1.4 |
| | Unemployment | 6.4 | 0.6 | -0.4 |
| | Long-Term Unemployment | 38.3 | 3.9 | -20.5 |
| | Labour Market Participation | 76.5 | -2.5 | -1.8 |
| | Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 14.1 | 5.9 | -0.8 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Overqualified Workers | 37.9 | 17.6 | -1.7 |
| Self Employed | 10 | 1.2 | 1 |
| Advanced Host Country Language Proficiency | 21.1 | - | - |
| Relative Poverty | 32.2 | 10.5 | 5.4 |
| Self-Reported Health Status | 48.2 | -9.8 | -3.4 |
| Unmet Medical Needs | 24.8 | 9.9 | 6.9 |
| Living in Crowded Housing | 7.5 | -0.8 | -31.7 |
| Living in Substandard Housing Conditions | 18.2 | -5 | - |
| Voter Participation | 75.2 | 1.9 | 9 |
| Acquisition of Nationality | 37 | - | -14.9 |
| Perceived Discrimination | 15.6 | - | -2 |
| Sense of Belonging | 80 | -9.4 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

As an EU candidate country, Turkey has a low employment rate among the foreign-born population, which is consistent with the low labour market participation, high unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate (see Table 9).

**Table 9:** OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration for Turkey

| | **Indicators** | **Current outcomes for foreign-born population, 2017** | **Foreign-born vs. native-born populations, 2017** | **2006-2017 change for foreign-born population** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Turkey** | Employment | 46.2 | -5.5 | - |
| | Unemployment | 12.0 | 0.8 | - |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Long-Term Unemployment | 21.9 | -2.5 | - |
| Labour Market Participation | 52.4 | -5.7 | - |
| Working in Low-Skilled Jobs | 18.5 | 2.7 | - |
| Overqualified Workers | 29.7 | -2.5 | - |
| Self Employed | 8.9 | -1.7 | - |

**Source:** OECD (2021).

Another important index about immigrant integration is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which measures policies to integrate migrants across five continents in 52 countries, including all EU Member States (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020). The MIPEX includes the policies on access to nationality, anti-discrimination, education, family reunion, health, labour market mobility, permanent residence, and political participation. The values of the MIPEX changes between 0 and 100, with no standards and higher standards, respectively.

**Graph 1:** Migrant Integration Index Total Score for the Selected Member States, 2010-2019




**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

Graph 1 shares the total MIPEX score for the selected Member States— Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia. During the period between 2010 and 2019, while the migrant integration policies in Germany and Spain remained almost the same, Denmark fluctuated in the migrant integration policies (see Table 10, Table 11, and Table 13). In 2010, the most favourable policies were in the UK compared to the other given countries, while Estonia had the least favourable policies for immigrants. Between 2010 and 2012, the total score of the UK fell sharply from 65 to 53 and then remained stable until 2019 (see Table 12). Meanwhile, Estonia began to improve the policies for immigrants in 2015 and caught up with the UK in 2019 (see Table 14).

Although Denmark improved the strands of family reunification, education, political participation, and citizenship, it was not enough to keep its total MIPEX score up with the same in the given period because of the decreases in the strands of the labour market and permanent residence (see Table 10).

**Table 10:** Migrant Integration Policy Index for Denmark, 2011-2019

| Country | Indicator | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | Labour Market Mobility Strand | 70.3 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 70.3 | 64.8 | 64.8 | 64.8 | 64.8 | 64.8 |
| | Family Reunification Strand | 16.7 | 25.2 | 26.3 | 26.3 | 26.3 | 26.3 | 26.3 | 25.2 | 25.2 |
| | Education Strand | 38.1 | 38.1 | 38.1 | 38.1 | 38.1 | 45.3 | 45.3 | 45.3 | 45.3 |
| | Political Participation Strand | 50 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| | Permanent Residence Strand | 66.7 | 60.4 | 60.4 | 60.4 | 41.7 | 41.7 | 41.7 | 41.7 | 41.7 |
| | Citizenship Strand | 28.1 | 28.1 | 36.4 | 48.9 | 48.9 | 48.9 | 40.6 | 40.6 | 40.6 |
| | Anti- Discrimination Strand | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 | 50.7 |

**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

Although there were not so many improvements in migrant integration policies in Germany, it was the most favourable country for migrant integration policies in the given period. Germany was the most favourable country for immigrants, specifically on labour market integration (see Table 11). As we mentioned above, the mass labour migration to Germany in the 1960s may contribute to the improvement of migration policies in Germany because of its historical experiences.

**Table 11:** Migrant Integration Policy Index for Germany, 2011-2019

| Country | Indicator | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Labour Market Mobility Strand | 75.9 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 | 81.4 |
| | Family Reunification Strand | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 | 41.5 |
| | Education Strand | 45.2 | 45.2 | 47.6 | 47.6 | 54.7 | 54.7 | 54.7 | 54.7 | 54.7 |
| **Germany** | Political Participation Strand | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| | Permanent Residence Strand | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 | 54.2 |
| | Citizenship Strand | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 |
| | Anti- Discrimination Strand | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 | 70.5 |

**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

While the UK's migrant integration policies worsened in family reunification, citizenship, and permanent residence, the UK was the most favourable country in anti-discrimination (see Table 12). Compared to the others, the UK has a long migration history as a host country because of its ex-colonies such as India and Pakistan. It might be the most probable reason why the UK was so successful on anti-discrimination.

**Table 12**: Migrant Integration Policy Index for the UK, 2011-2019

| Country | Indicator | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| the UK | Labour Market Mobility Strand | 53.7 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 | 48.1 |
| | Family Reunification Strand | 54.7 | 34.3 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 |
| | Education Strand | 42.8 | 33.2 | 42.8 | 42.8 | 40.4 | 40.4 | 40.4 | 40.4 | 40.4 |
| | Political Participation Strand | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| | Permanent Residence Strand | 77.1 | 64.6 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.3 |
| | Citizenship Strand | 73.0 | 73.0 | 60.5 | 60.5 | 60.5 | 60.5 | 60.5 | 60.5 | 60.5 |
| | Anti- Discrimination Strand | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 | 93.8 |

**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

Spain's migrant integration policies remained stable between 2011 and 2019 in general (see Table 13). While Spain improved migration policies in favour of the citizenship strand and anti-discrimination strand, it did not try enough to improve the political participation and education of immigrants.

**Table 13:** Migrant Integration Policy Index for Spain, 2011-2019

| Country | Indicator | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | Labour Market Mobility Strand | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 |
| | Family Reunification Strand | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 68.5 |
| | Education Strand | 50 | 50 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 |
| | Political Participation | 65 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 |

| | Strand | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Permanent Residence Strand | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| | Citizenship Strand | 20.8 | 20.8 | 20.8 | 20.8 | 30.1 | 30.1 | 30.1 | 30.1 | 30.1 |
| | Anti- Discrimination Strand | 51 | 51 | 51 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.4 | 59.4 |

**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

Estonia greatly improved migrant integration policies, especially family reunification and permanent residence (see Table 14). These improvements affect positively to its total MIPEX score. Other strands remained the same for Estonia in the given period.

**Table 14:** Migrant Integration Policy Index for Estonia, 2011-2019

| Country | Indicator | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Labour Market Mobility Strand | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 68.6 |
| | Family Reunification Strand | 48.2 | 48.2 | 48.2 | 48.2 | 48.2 | 59.3 | 75.9 | 75.9 | 75.9 |
| | Education Strand | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 | 69 |
| **Estonia** | Political Participation Strand | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| | Permanent Residence Strand | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 75.0 | 75.0 | 75.0 |
| | Citizenship Strand | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 15.6 |
| | Anti- Discrimination Strand | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 | 48.3 |

**Source:** Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

The indexes like the MIPEX and the OECD indicators are useful to analyse the immigrants' socioeconomic conditions in the destination countries. In this way, intergovernmental organisations and governments may develop better policies favouring immigrants.

## II.C. MODELLING MIGRATION AND MIGRATION VARIABLES

The following pages are dedicated to compiling the synthesis of the author's contribution on migration modelling in the first place and synthesis of migration variables classified in this part related to taking migration decisions; these relevant in choosing migration destinations, and these affecting the returned immigrants' salaries.

This part presents the literature review of the methodology, which is divided into two main parts: migration modelling and migration variables. While migration modelling directs us which methods or techniques we can use when we analyse migration, migration variables are a synthesis elaborated based on migration literature.

### II.C.1. Migration Modelling Contribution

This subchapter presents outstanding migration background modelling contribution strengthening thesis so, i.e., migration decision, choosing a migration decision, the methodology on migration destination decision, data, and relevant findings. Rogers (2006) classified four techniques for modelling migration: spatial choice models, Markov chain models, matrix population models, and linear regression models.

Migration modelling uses the data about migration destinations even if they do not specifically examine the migration destinations. Only studies that research specifically migration destinations consider the determinants of choosing a migration destination. The rest takes migration into account without regarding the distinction between the determinants of taking the migration decision and the determinants choosing a migration destination.

Spatial choice models used in some of the studies on migration destinations (Poot, Alimi, Cameron, & Maré, 2016; Kim & Cohen, 2010; Ortega & Peri, 2009; Mello-Sampayo, 2009; Ishikawa, 1987) consider the destination choices of immigrants who

are assumed to want to improve the level of utility based on the random utility theory of Manski (1977) beside regional and personal characteristics (Pellegrini & Fotheringham, 2002). There are several sub-models: discrete choice models, which model the selection of one option among a discrete set of alternatives (Pellegrini & Fotheringham, 2002), gravity model, which describes the relationship between the observed interaction pattern and the distance, competing destinations models which is gravity model's another version that reflects the competition between destinations for interactions— the accessibility of a destination (Fotheringham, 1983). Spatial choice models seek an answer to the question of 'which destination'. Thus, the focus of these studies is the location decision.

Markov chain models refer to "a sequence of random values, whose probabilities at a time interval depend upon the value of the number in the previous time" (Papoulis, 1984) (cited in (Constant & Zimmermann, 2012, p. 366)). Since the Markov chain has two states which are 0 and 1, Markov chain models are used to determine the 'stay' or 'move' decision (Constant & Zimmermann, 2012; Chi & Voss, 2005). Therefore, the focus of these studies is closer to studies on taking the migration decision.

Matrix population models are used for modelling the dynamics of a population. These models benefit from birth, death, emigration, and immigration data. The studies which use these models are mainly about population growth and its distribution in a region. (Rogers, 2006).

Winter (2019) examined the determinants of migration and targeted 195 countries from 1998 to 2016. Winter (2019) concluded that economic factors outweigh political factors.

Dedeoğlu and Genç (2017) focus on the migration determinants by handling Turkey as an origin country and 31 European states as the destination countries and takes advantage of the gravity model, which claims the importance of the distance over migration. Their research revealed four results (1) better economic conditions have a positive effect on Turkish nationals' migration choice; (2) populations in the home and destination countries positively affect migration stock; (3) Turkish migration

stock in Europe has a significance on the Turkish nationals' migration choice; and (4) "volume of immigration decreases with distance and conversely increases with contiguity." (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017, p. 14).

Nica (2015) surveyed 2619 adults from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia in 2014. Nica (2015) asked about the most significant drive to migrate for labour in another country. Nica (2015) found that the cost of living, income opportunities, and the unemployment rate were the most significant determinants of labour migration.

Tabor, Milfont, and Ward (2015) conducted interviews with 46 pre-departure and post-arrival high-skilled migrants from the UK, Ireland, India, and South Africa to New Zealand in 2011. The authors found that quality of life, safety, environment, cultural similarity, job opportunities, and the perception of the embrace of migrants are significant factors for choosing New Zealand as a destination.

Geis, Uebelmesser, and Werding (2015) merged and analysed microdata from the official surveys of Germany, France, the UK, and the USA in 2005. Their findings verified that wages, unemployment rates, networks, good education, and health system attract migrants.

Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) benefited from the Nepal Living Standards Surveys of 1995/96 and 2002/03 and the population census of 2001. The authors discovered that the differentials in average income across districts and differentials in consumption expenditures are statistically significant.

Pânzaru (2013) investigates the determinants of international migration by a blended panel data between 2000 and 2010 from several sources, including business regulation index, labour market regulations index, judicial independence index, and integrity of legal system index for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Pânzaru (2013) discovered that none of those variables affects international migration.

Mayda (2010) studied the determinants (economic, geographic, cultural, and demographic) of migration inflows in 14 countries by country of origin between 1980 and 1995. Mayda (2010) revealed that income opportunities in the destination countries increased the size of the emigration rate.

Van Der Gaag and Van Wissen (2008) compared the economic determinants of internal migration in Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and Sweden in 1972-1998. The findings show that GDP per capita is the most significant determinant affecting the migration rate.

Jennissen (2003) examined the influence of economic determinants of migration in European countries without a communist past in 1960-1998. Jennissen (2003) estimated that GDP per capita positively affects migration, while unemployment negatively affects migration.

Funkhouser and Ramos (1993, p. 552) investigated "the choice of destination for immigrants from the Dominican Republic and Cuba for whom Puerto Rico provides a third combination of culture and earnings." They found that Dominican Republican and Cuban immigrants had a similar pattern of destination choice.

### II.C.2. Classifying the Dimensions and Variables of Migration

In this subchapter, a classification of migration variables is made in the different groups: variables involved in migration decision, variables involved in choosing migration destinations, and variables involved in the returned immigrants' salaries.

#### II.C.2.a. Variables involved in Migration Decision

Those who migrate change the residence permanently, semi-permanently (Lee, 1965) or temporarily far away from the origin place. The motivations of taking migration decisions are various because this is highly related to personal satisfaction. Instead, the decision to migrate, as well as destination choice, can be measured by the fact of migrating itself as an objective variable. The building of a migration decision model takes also into account different structural factors that may play a determining role in encouraging or discouraging from physical mobility from one labour market to

another. There are different reasons for taking migration decision which also determine migration destination. Most previously reviewed authors found that the individuals take the migration decision to reach a better life; so, the migration might mean moving for increasing life-satisfaction because the idea of the increasing well-being in the destination is the leading force of the migration decision.

**Figure 1:** Determinants of Taking the Migration Decision




**Source:** Adopted from Dudu (2018).

International migration has many dimensions like duration, distance and the number of people involved. According to George (1970), by referring to push-and-pull factors (De Jong & Fawcett, 1981; Lee, 1965), international migration, which is associated with a permanent (Cedefop, 1998), semi-permanent (Lee, 1965) or temporary duration, has two main reasons: migration caused by obligations (Sun, 2019; Bakewell, 2010; De Jong & Fawcett, 1981) and migration by needs (Haug, 2008; De Jong & Fawcett, 1981) (see Figure 1).

Migration decision by obligations is classified as the security reason dimensions and include physical security, social security, and political security (see Figure 1). Providing physical security is one of the strongest reasons for migration (Castles,

2003). Some people decide to leave their countries due to public or private actions (like war conditions, slavery, human trafficking, economic crisis) or environmental problems (like natural disasters) (Sell, 1983). Climate change is also thought of as a part of physical security reason because it has an impact on "extreme weather events (storms, floods, heat waves) and changes in mean temperatures" (Tacoli, 2009), which encourage migration.

On the other hand, some people decide to leave their countries due to insecurity related to social pressure. Society has its norms, rules, and moral codes. Being out of the norms may create some minority groups like religious groups (George, 1970) (cited in (Adhikari, 1996)) which are tended to become marginalized, and this brings a social pressure on the individuals (Abrahamson, 1995) and repression over which looms as an explicit or implicit threat (Starr et al., 2008). So, those individuals tend to decide to migrate to live in an environment which has less social pressure. Also, the pressure on different political ideas (George, 1970) (cited in (Adhikari, 1996)) in the origin country may be a reason for migration to another country, in which it is regulated that individuals are freer to express their political ideas. Therefore, people migrate to live in an environment with less political pressure (Cedefop, 1998) (see Figure 1).

In the case of migration caused by obligations, the duration might be longer, the number of people involved may be higher, and the distance may vary according to the political, social, and physical security conditions to where people migrated. So, some authors call it as the macro-level migration since "the sum of individual decisions results in a macro outcome" (Schelling, 1978) (cited in (Haug, 2008, p. 586)); Faist, 2000). Others call this as forced migration (Sun, 2019; Bakewell, 2010; Moore & Shellman, 2004; Castles, 2003; Sell, 1983) considering the mass characteristics which might be mobilized by the state (Sun, 2019).

Migration decision by needs is also called voluntary migration (Moore & Shellman, 2004; Faist, 2000) or 'Subjective Expected Utility Model' of De Jong and Fawcett (1981) (cited in (Krieger, 2004)), which depends on the utility such as "wealth, social

status, stimulation, comfort, autonomy, social integration, morality and health" (Krieger, 2004, p. 94), so it involves economic, social and geographic reasons.

The economic reasons are specially related to the economic situation of the destination countries (i.e. preference-dominated mobility (Sell, 1983)) like low unemployment rate (Cedefop, 1998), higher wages (European Commission, 2006, 2013; Cedefop, 1998), lower cost of living (Cedefop, 1998), and better working conditions (see Figure 1). One of the strongest determining factors behind voluntary migration is the labour migration to seek or take up employment, i.e., economic reasons (King, 2012). The economic reasons are considered so powerful that some authors (Mayda, 2005; Borjas, 1989) classify economic and non-economic determinants of migration.

The social reasons carry on the aim of studying (De Jong & Gardner, 1981), learning a new language (European Commission, 2006), gaining new experiences (European Commission, 2006), staying with friends, relatives or partners due to reasons like marriage, divorce, separation, the death of a spouse (Haug, 2008; Sell, 1983) (see Figure 1). The desire of living in a better climate (Thompson, 2017; European Commission, 2006; De Jong & Fawcett, 1981; Lee, 1965) appears to be the main the geographic reason for the migration.

Migration decision by needs is based on the needs of individuals (Haug, 2008; Hagen-Zanker, 2008), which may be divided into two levels: household-level (Massey, 1990; DaVanzo, 1976) or meso-level (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Faist, 2000) or imposed mobility (Sell, 1983), which means that people move with their families, or related to social ties, and individual-level or micro-level migration (Haug, 2008; Faist, 2000), which means that people get the decision of migration by their own as a rational choice. Another aspect of deciding for migration is that migration is not a cost-free activity, and there is always a risk that the expectations of migrants might not be accomplished in the destination (Cedefop, 1998).

Regarding the security-based determinants in the migration decision, some studies (Sirkeci, et al., 2018; Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016; Sirkeci, 2009) evaluated the migration decision as a condition of human insecurity. Sirkeci (2009) emphasised the tendency

to move from the insecure conditions (physical, economic, social, political) to the secure conditions (physical, economic, social, political) with a continuum from violence to cooperation, which might realize in three levels: macro, mezzo, and micro. Therefore, Sirkeci, Eroğlu Utku and Yüceşahin (2018) highlighted that migration is a function of the conflict by grounding on the Conflict and Migration Model (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011), and the migration as generated from the developmental deficit, democratic deficit and demographic deficit in the origin country. According to Sirkeci, Eroğlu Utku and Yüceşahin (2018), migration is almost inevitable because people may suffer from the anxiety and pressure related to these deficits. However, although there are the same conditions for all people who live in the same country, everybody does not migrate. Sirkeci, Eroğlu Utku, and Yüceşahin (2018) mentioned that people who have physical capital, financial capital, information capital and human capital can or might migrate in the circumstances above.

The migration decision is also highly related to demographic factors. Age, gender, education level, occupation and origin country of the immigrant are demographic factors that affect the migration decision making. Younger people are more willing to move (European Commission, 2006). Some migration reasons are particular to women, such as the violation against women, social pressure on women due to patriarchal structure, gender inequality, gender apartheid (Buz, 2007), although economic reasons are in the lead for the migration of women (Buz, 2007; De Jong, 2000); so, gender is one of the key determinants to migrate (European Commission, 2006; De Jong, 2000).

Education level is an important factor because higher education levels have more chances to get a better job in the destination country (European Commission, 2006). Higher education also means higher information capital and human capital that were found above to be relevant for decision to migrate when related to development and democracy deficits in the country of origin. Education is perceived as the main tool of occupation (De Jong & Fawcett, 1981), which is also highly related to economic aspects of the migration because earnings from education are considered individual's returns (Quinn & Rubb, 2005).

The synthesis of the revised theories on the factors or dimensions and influencing variables or determinants in the decision to emigrate is presented in Figure 1. As has been observed, the determinants are more hidden in the country of origin than in the country of destination, or the comparison between the characteristics presented by the above theories, countries or labour markets, that of origin and destination.

### II.C.2.b. Variables for Choosing a Migration Destination

The factors and determinants of emigration are reviewed below, more specifically related to the choice of the country, territory, or labour market in the destination.

The same classification of groups of factors is used, but the variables are different in some cases because the choice of destination falls within the "pull factors" and differs from the characteristics of the place of destination, such as the existence of a host community or legal facilities in the country of destination.

**Figure 2:** Determinants of Migration Destination Choice




**Source:** Adopted from Dudu (2018).

Regarding the security-based determinants of migration destination, a potential immigrant requests a valid legal residence status as a security measure (Eurostat,

2011) to cease the fear of deportation (Fasani, 2014). Gaining a legal residence document is more accessible in destination countries with an “open border immigration policy” (Velasco, 2016; Bartram, 2010). Therefore, potential immigrants might choose a destination country as another often considering their different migration policies. One example of open borders immigration policy is the EU, where the citizens of the Member States can move freely from one country to another. If this residence status also contains a work permit, the immigrant can take advantage of the benefits of working (Fasani, 2014; Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2000) such as unemployment benefits (Fasani, 2014) and bargaining power on wages and working conditions (Fasani, 2014; Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Bailey, 1987).

Often, the choice of migration destination and the motivation to take the migration decision might depend on the similar complementary reason. For example, running away from social and/or political pressure is a strong security reason that encourages the migration decision for living with less social or/and political pressure. That is to say, an LGBTQ+ person might decide to leave his/her home country due to the social pressure against LGBTQ+ people, and this person might choose a country with broader democratic rights, including LGBTQ+ rights, in destination country. Some minority groups might face social exclusion related to their differences from the majority, and social exclusion may restrict their participations in daily social and economic activities (Chakravarty & D'Ambrosio, 2006). Social exclusion “refers to both individuals and societies, and disadvantage, alienation and lack of freedom” (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997, p. 415). Social exclusion is highly related to social coercion, which means the constraint of people’s attitudes and opinions, even if it seems like a voluntary act (De Crespigny, 1964; Aseh, 1955). For example, if most society members treat with contempt a minority group, the group co-members may hide their identities not to be socially excluded. These people may tend to move to another country where they hope not to face social exclusion (Abrahamson, 1995), even if this situation means being a minority multiple times (for example, being an immigrant LGBTQ+) in the destination country.

The same idea is valid for politically oppressed people. Sometimes, making a migration decision is also the motivation for choosing a more democratic destination country. Political oppression is "a tyrannical exercise of political power, by one or more persons, resulting in cruel or unjust constraints on an individual or group, which deny them their political rights" (Lawson, 1991, p. 336). When a state does not provide the requirements of the democracy – the right to be protected, the right to participate in the political process and the right to equal status (Lawson, 1991) – the politically oppressed minority might tend to migrate to another country (Winter, 2019; Cedefop, 1998) that is more democratic than the origin country. Besides security reasons, migrating due to running away from social coercion and political oppression is related to identity (Benson & O'Reilly, 2016) because the potential immigrants want to express themselves freely.

Regarding labour market as economic determinants: more employment opportunities, higher wages, better working conditions, and lower cost of living are the main labour market determinants of choosing a migration destination. The labour market determinants over choosing a migration destination are main system of variables pointed out by the oldest migration theories (Ravenstein, 1885). Some studies (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015) also found that high employment opportunities in a destination significantly determine migration destination choice.

Jensissen (2003) states that the classical Keynesian economic theory (Keynes, 1930) explains international migration with the employment rate differences (Piore, 1979) while the neo-classical economic theory (Sjaastad, 1962) explains it as the consequence of wage differences, which lead to income differences (Harris & Todaro, 1975). Therefore, more employment opportunities (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015) and higher average wages (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013) are powerful explanations for choosing a migration destination. Also, better working conditions, such as lower daily working hours (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015), are crucial for the migration destination choice. Lower cost of living (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Nica, 2015) is another relevant determinant of

migration destination choice because a person might prefer to move to a place with a lower cost of living, even if that means earning an approximately similar wage.

Social determinants of choosing a migration destination categorise as having cultural proximity with the destination, speaking already local language, and having a network in the possible destination (see Figure 2).

Cultural similarities are being observed to be a powerful reason for choosing a destination. For example, interviewed persons who migrated from the UK to New Zealand expressed that the cultural similarities affected the choice of the migration destination because living in New Zealand was like living in the UK due to the cultural similarities, but better than the UK (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015).

Speaking the language of the destination country (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015) or having linguistic proximity between two languages is another advantage for easy adaptation; thus, people might prefer to immigrate to a state where they will not face a language barrier (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Eurostat, 2009; Cedefop, 1998). Also, the high number of immigrants coming from the same origin country in the destination country indicates that the destination country's language is more likely to be spoken in that country. Especially when newcomers cannot speak the destination's primary language, these newcomers generally work in the enterprises of foregoer immigrants from the same region. Thus, the newcomer may integrate faster into society with the help of migration networks (Dudu, 2018).

Having kinships or cultural ties of the family created the migration networks (Guilmoto & Sandron, 2001) (cited in (Hagen-Zanker, 2008)) or diasporas come into existence. The migration networks facilitate the adaptation of newcomers by acting with solidarity for jobs, housing, education, and various cultural issues (Beine, Docquier, & Özden, 2010). The remittances from the destination to the origin country are the sign of the migration networks (Day & İçduygu, 1999). The remittances may also be sign of the intention to return. For example, a study related to remittances of Turkish immigrants who live in Berlin concluded that "comparison of migrant groups who do and do not intend to return to Turkey shows that those intending to return

remit mostly for self-interest and remit larger amounts, while those with no such intention remit mainly due to implicit loan agreement within the family" (Ulku, 2012, p. 3139). Migration networks provide information to newcomers before coming to the destination (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Cedefop, 1998; Roseman, 1983). Newcomers get integrated faster into society through the help of migration networks (Dudu, 2018).

In related to geographic determinants, the desire of living in a moderate/mild climate is the geographical determinant of choosing a migration destination (Thompson, 2017; Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; European Commission, 2006; De Jong & Fawcett, 1981; Lee, 1965). Environmental quality (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Berger & Blomquist, 1992), including climate and landscape, are the relevant variables of the geographical determinant. Additionally, the retirement migration— which means migration from powerful economies to the countries with modest climate for reducing the risks of living with low retirement income (Özerim, 2012; Südaş, 2008; Karakaya & Turan, 2006; Williams, King, & Warnes, 1997)— is included in this determinant.

Regarding the retirement migration, geographic determinant includes lifestyle migration, which refers to migration for a more fulfilling lifestyle (Torkington, 2010). For example, UK citizens who live in Algarve in Portugal migrated attached the lifestyle, including mild climate, a slower pace of life; a better, healthier diet; a more social culture; and more leisure opportunities (Torkington, 2010). Besides, interestingly, in the 21st century, Turkish migration stock in the Mediterranean-European countries like Italy, Spain, and Portugal— presumably attracted due to their moderate climate among other reasons— has been increasing slowly but steadily in recent years (UNDESA, 2017).

The distance between the origin country and the destination country is considered to be relevant for choosing the destination (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017) because of its effect on the travel cost, the duration of travel, and the variety of means of transportation. As the distance increases, the travel cost increases. Also, in a short distance, the length of the travel is less than in the long-distance; thus, moving to a destination close to the home country might be attractive for relative closeness to the home country. In

addition to the airway, a potential immigrant might have an opportunity to travel by land, railway, or seaway in a short distance; thus, even if an immigrant cannot travel by seaway due to a storm, still there is a possibility to travel by railway or land in the short distance. For easier travel, a potential immigrant might prefer a country that is closer to the destination.

#### II.C.2.c. Variables Affected Returned Immigrants' Salaries

As it was mentioned in the subchapter II.C.2.a. (variables for taking migration decision), there is permanent migration and temporary migration. As for temporary migration, for example, migrants search to gain experience and have increased their skills by working or studying in the host country. The literature shows that migration experience increases the income of migrants returning to their home countries (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Bijwaard, 2015; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013). Bijwaard (2015) states that returnees fall into the upper levels of income distribution in the home country.

Learning through experience of work or "on-the-job training", through interactions and interpersonal communication, increases the skills of workers indirectly, who "observ[e] different or better ways of doing, or of exchanging ideas and experiences with other employees" (Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013, p. 6). On-the-job training in a developed country increases the earnings of the returnees according to the following factors: individual characteristics (Bijwaard, 2015; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013), the promotion of upskilling in the host country (Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013), the duration of stay in the host country (Reinhold & Thom, 2009; Lacuesta, 2006), the applicability of the skills gained in the host country to entrepreneurship in the home country (Bijwaard, 2015; Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001; Martin & Radu, 2012), the advanced technological working knowledge of the host country (Iara, 2006; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003), the increase in productivity upon return (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996), and the network ties in the labour market of the home country (Martin & Radu, 2012).

Study abroad is another way to increase skills directly (Iara, 2006). Güngör and Tansel (2006) state that higher salaries, longer duration of stay, and the lifestyle in North America and England decrease the probability of Turkish students returning. Elveren and Toksöz (2019) further highlight that women students and professionals are more likely to remain abroad due to the gender gap in Turkey. The decision of highly skilled individuals not to return may cause a reduction in remittances for Turkey. However, Niimi, Ozden, and Schiff (2008) contend that high-skilled immigrants remit less than low-skilled immigrants. Therefore, the decision of high-skilled immigrants to remain in the host country means a 'brain drain' for the home country because these individuals do not contribute to the economic growth of the home country (Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003). Conversely, economic growth and the promotion of social freedoms in Turkey strengthen the motivation of immigrants to return (Sirkeci, Cohen, & Yazgan, 2012).

Other studies (Barcevicius, 2016; Mezger Kveder & Flahaux, 2013; Stark, 1995), however, have found that migrants may face difficulties in entering the labour market in the home country when they return. Asymmetric information concerning the returnee's skill level between potential employers in the home country and the returnee may result in the returnee not finding employment appropriate for her or his skill level in the home country. Returnees are, therefore, more likely to be involuntarily self-employed.

Regarding earnings on self-employed returnees, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) analysed, for the case of Turkey, choice of economic activity of Turkish returnees, based on surveys initiated by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in 1984, 1986, and 1988. In line with Mezger, Kveder and Flahaux (2013) as well as with Martin and Radu (2012), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) concluded that many returnees choose to be self-employed in the home country. Thus, Turkish returnees become entrepreneurs in Turkey. However, migration returnees with higher levels of education may choose to be salaried employees because they expect higher wages in the home country.

In a recent study, Yetkin Aker and Görmüş (2018) examined the work status of Turkish returnees by using the Household Labour Force Survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) in 2014. The authors selected for the sample survey participants who had lived abroad for 12 months or more. The dependent variable was employment status, and the independent variables comprised age, gender, education, informal employment, workplace characteristics, and flexibility of work. The authors concluded that highly educated returnees find employment easily in Turkey, while lower educated returnees face some difficulties.

# PART TWO- OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Part II of the thesis research is dedicated to specifying the objectives of the research as well as the methods and techniques applied, and the materials used.

In the Part I of the thesis, the introduction and theoretical framework, a review of the scientific literature was carried out to answer the question of what the main determinants of the decision are to migrate between labour markets and/or to choose a destination in labour migration. Based on previous studies and research reviewed, explanatory terms of labour markets and migration were identified and conceptualized, establishing a model or system of explanatory variables of the decision to emigrate and to choose a destination in labour migration.

# III. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

In the subchapter of the thesis' objectives, the main objective and several specific objectives are stated; and the hypotheses, if any, are also enunciated. As for the methodology, it consists of detailing the stages in which the research is developed and the materials, methods and techniques used in each stage, in general terms. In each chapter of the results section, additional information on methodology and data is added when it is considered necessary to specify further details.

## III.A. OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the thesis research is to study the evolution of the variables that affect the decision to emigrate between labour markets and/or to choose a migratory destination in labour migration and it is going to studied through the case study of Turkish emigration to the European Union between 2008 and 2018 and on the basis of theoretical model elaborated about the system of variables determining decision of migration and destination choice.

The main hypothesis is to be collaborated in international migration, when economic convergence between labour markets of origin and destination increases, political and social variables gain relevance, in the decision to emigrate and/or to choose a migratory destination.

The specific objectives are broken down below:

- The first specific objective focuses on the period 2008 to 2018 and on characterizing the European Union labour market by perspectives of Turkish migration. The economic/labour market determinants are to be analysed for

both the EU and Turkey and find out the level of economic convergence over years. It is considered that the 2008 crisis may have lowered the level of well-being and attractiveness of the European Union compared to the past trend.

- The second specific objective seeks to analyse security-based determinants of the migration decision and destination choice. For that purpose, the configuration of the current legislative and institutional framework of the European Union in labour and migratory matters is studied. In such a way that it can be related to the history of Turkish migrations to the European Union. The objective therefore focuses on assessing the weight of legislative determinants in labour migration from Turkey to the European Union. This specific objective is also to examine the various representative cases of European Union countries and their differences in terms of labour and migration policies. It would explain the strongest attraction of Turkish immigrants to a specific destination, including in the case that there are differences in the legal arrangements for immigrants.
- The third specific objective consists of describing the characteristics of the European Union as a multinational territory and main destination of Turkish labour migrations since the 1960s and the relations between both territories; Turkey being a country in the processes of accession. Moreover, this objective is to study the correlation of the different determinant variables in the Turkish migration flow to the European Union, between 2008 to 2018 in order to test the main hypothesis of the research.
- The fourth specific objective is to investigate the effects of return migration on the Turkish labour market. Since the majority of Turkish citizens migrate to the EU countries, this objective is highly related to Turkish migration in the EU for understanding what they gain after their migration experience (mostly) in the EU.
- The fifth specific objective is to examine the effects of return migration on the Turkish labour market from gender perspective. Since migration experience comes with upskilling, the hypothesis related to this object is that migration experience mitigates the gender pay gap in favour of women.

## III.B. METHODOLOGY AND MATERIALS

The methodology applied in the thesis is very varied in terms of qualitative and quantitative research techniques. The theoretical part is been elaborated (see Chapter 1) through literature review and the research design is organized around an in-depth case study, that of Turkish labour migrations to the European Union in the period 2008 to 2018.

This case study is conducted in five stages with their respective research materials and techniques, as outlined below.

The first stage corresponds to the first specific objective and consists of: describing the European Union as an organization of member states and as a labour market as well as reconstructing a brief history of the European Union. As an organization, it was originally created with a small number of countries, a different name and few institutions. But over the years it has expanded in different phases. In addition to the history of institutional change, the plans for future enlargement and the Copenhagen Criteria adopted since 1993 to regulate accessions are reviewed. This stage includes an analysis of the case of Turkey and its compliance with the accession criteria on labour issues.

Materials used came from the official websites of the EU institutions like the European Commission, EUR-Lex, and Eurofound.

The second stage in the methodological procedure followed corresponds to the second objective of the research and consists of reviewing how the labour and migration legislation of the current European Union has evolved, as well as the institutions that oversee its compliance. The history of Turkish migrations to the territory of the European Union is also reconstructed.

The materials used in this stage are legislative documentation and statistical material. Labour policies and legislative measures are studied through legislative analysis and statistical analysis. The policies of the European Union are analysed from the Directives that since the establishment of the EU to 2019 have been promulgated in

relation to immigrants. To identify these directives, we have consulted academics and experts and reports and legal documents of the EU institutions like the European Commission, EUR-Lex, and Eurofound by searching by keywords. The text of the directives for their study and summary has been obtained from the websites of these EU institutions.

The data for the analysis of the history of migrations is obtained from several books and the official website of the EU. In addition, it uses the secondary statistical data collected by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), Eurofound, the European Commission, International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Turkish Statistical Institution (TurkStat).

The third stage of the methodological procedure corresponds to the third specific objective of the thesis and analyses the European Union labour market after 2008, through different kinds of indicators: economic, quality of employment, social dialogue, and the social situation of the European Union.

The materials used for this analysis come from the European Commission, EUR-Lex, and Eurofound.

The fourth stage of the methodological procedure corresponds to the fourth specific objective and consists of a comparative analysis of the labour policies of a selection of European Union countries and Turkey.

The materials used the analysis of the labour market in Turkey have been obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat).

The analysis focuses on the active labour market policies (ALMPs) of five cases of countries—Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia—considered representative of the diversity of welfare models that characterize the countries of the E.U. This classification of welfare models has been adopted from Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996, 1999). The labour market policies and strategies of these Member States are analysed separately with the active labour policies of these selected Member States

specifically intended for immigrants. Thus, the labour market policies faced by Turkish immigrants in the EU are analysed.

The welfare state is defined as basically that the state has a responsibility "for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens" (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 18-19). With the wider definition, the welfare state is a state which presents preconcerted social services to all citizens regardless of their socioeconomic status in order to prevent the social risks (Günal, 2009) (cited in (Dudu, 2016)) which might be caused by natural, social, economic, administrative, environmental or life-cycle causes such as illness, unemployment, natural disasters, terrorism, and pollution. The welfare state takes the cautions to provide social protection at the individual and national levels. The understanding of the welfare state examines the state's role (Esping-Andersen, 1990) to provide welfare to all citizens.

> "A welfare system has seven potential 'functions' -poverty relief, poverty prevention, provision of social security, income redistribution, preservation of social solidarity, promotion of (labour) mobility, and promotion of economic and labour market restructuring and productivity" (Standing, 1996, p. 226).

According to welfare states models, in the EU, each Member State has different ideas about the state's role; so, they have different welfare understandings. However, it is possible to classify them.

For Europe, the most well-known classification of the welfare models was made by Esping-Andersen (1990), who classified three different models: The Social Democratic Model (for example, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway), the Liberal Model (for example, the UK, the USA, and Australia), the Corporatists Model (for example, Austria, Germany, and France). Then, the Southern European Model (for example, Spain and Italy) (Esping-Andersen, 1999) is added into the classification, and the Eastern European Model (for example, Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus) is mentioned (Esping-Andersen, 1996).

Esping-Andersen (1990) describes the social democratic model or Northern European regime with the dominant strategy of justice, freedom, solidarity, equality, and

socialism. The emphasis of the workers' requirements like education, health and social resources are influential in the model. Social policies are emancipatory and preconditions for economic efficiency. Among the models, the social-democratic model or Scandinavian model has the highest decommodification level, which means the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market. This model is based on powerful working-class movements. Benefits are universal, which means everyone can take advantage of social benefits; so, the participation of women in the labour market is more neutral than other models.

The liberal model or Anglo-Saxon model, or the Beveridge model, has the lowest decommodification level. Having the lowest decommodification level refers that workers are entirely market-dependent. Therefore, the power of employers is high, and it is hard to make labour movement formation in this model. Only very low-income groups can take advantage of social benefits, which are very limited. Since liberal-ethic norms are very effective, private welfare plans are common through tax subsidies (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

In the corporatists model or continental European model, social benefits are only for workers. This situation refers to only people who have a job or employment take advantage of social contributions like family benefits. Therefore, workers at home, like homemakers, cannot take advantage of social benefits. The church is very effective in this model, so preserving the traditional family is crucial. Men seem like breadwinners. This situation discourages women from enrolling in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

The Southern European model, or Mediterranean model, is effective where the black-market employment is high (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The family ties and churches are powerful; so, this situation influences the labour market. Gaining social benefits depends on the cooperation among the state, family, and the Church. Also, religious institutions and charity organizations provide social aids for families. There is no clear evidence that this situation affects the labour-force participation of women. However, seeing young adults living with families until age 30 is common due to the economic

supports of families, whom they see as a familial obligation (Esping-Andersen, 1999). In the Danish Ministry of Finance report in 2004, the labour market policies were summarised in the EU-15 (Hendeliowitz, 2008) (see Table 15).

**Table 15:** Comparison of Labour Market Policies of Four Models

| **Northern European Regime** | **Anglo-Saxon Regime** | **Central European Regime** | **Southern European Regime** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployment benefits are high | Unemployment benefits are low | Unemployment benefits vary | Unemployment benefits are close to the EU average |
| Spending for ALMPs is generous | Spending for ALMPs varies | ALMPs are predominantly passive | ALMPs are passive |

**Source:** Hendeliowitz, J. (2008).

The Eastern Europe model is a hybrid of the Soviet Union's welfare understanding and the corporatists model. Andersen (1996) thought that this model was at the developmental stage. This thought might be related to the timing because he developed his classification in the 1990s. In 2004, the Eastern European countries became members of the EU. Therefore, after 2004, the welfare regime of Eastern Europe became a hot topic for the welfare classifications. More recent studies (Lauzadyte-Tutliene, Balezentis, & Goculenko, 2018; Soede, Vrooman, Ferraresi, & Segre, 2004) describe the Eastern Europe model. Lauzadyte-Tutliene et al. (2018) mention that the income inequality ratio is high between the 20% of the richest and the 20% of the poorest in these countries, and the government expenditures are low.

This study chooses a Member State which represents each model:

- For the Social Democratic Model, Denmark
- For the Liberal Model, the UK[1]
- For the Corporatists Model, Germany

[1] Since the UK was still a Member State of the EU while this study was being written in 2019, this study includes the UK as a Member State.

- For the Southern European Model, Spain
- For the Eastern European Model, Estonia.

The fifth and last stage of the methodological procedure corresponds to the fifth specific objective of the research. A correlation analysis is carried out for the period 2008-2018 of the different determinant variables of labour migrations. The technical and material details used in this stage are specified in the corresponding chapter in the third part of the Results.

# PART THREE- RESULTS

The first chapter of results, Chapter IV of the thesis, contains the descriptive study of the European Union as an organization of member states and as a labour market. It deals with a brief history of the European Union as an organization that was originally created with a small number of countries, another name, and few institutions. But over the years it has expanded in different phases. In addition to the history of institutional change, plans for future enlargement and the Copenhagen Criteria adopted since 1993 to regulate accessions are reviewed. The chapter closes with an analysis of the case of Turkey and its compliance with the accession criteria in labour matters.

The second chapter of the results part, Chapter V of the thesis, reviews labour legislation, its legislative process, and institutions such as the European Court of Justice or the European Works Councils, as well as the compliance of the member states with the Union's policies. Specifically, the evolution of European Union legislation concerning immigrants is addressed. The chapter ends with a historical analysis of Turkish migrations to the European Union, from 1960 to 2018.

In a third chapter of the results part, Chapter VI of the thesis, the EU labour market after 2008 is analysed. The analysis is carried out in four parts: economic indicators, quality of employment, social dialogue, and the social situation in the European Union.

In a fourth chapter of the results part, Chapter VII of the thesis, a comparative study of the labour market policies of a selection of EU countries is presented. Five countries are analysed: Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Estonia. They

have been selected because they represent different models of social welfare systems within the European Union.

The fifth chapter of the results part, Chapter VIII of the thesis, presents the results of a regression analysis on the determinants of migration destination choices of Turkish people in the EU. After that, it continues with the labour income effects of migration experience on the Turkish labour market. Since the Turkish people mostly migrate to the EU, it points out an asset of a return of migration back from Europe. This part finishes with the testing of labour income effects on migration experience on the Turkish labour market from a gender perspective.

# IV. EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ORGANIZATION

The European Union (EU) is an international organization that has its own principles, laws, regulations, institutions, and implementations, but also which has own historical experience which cannot be limited by economic and political developments (Koray, 2005), and which consists of member states that each one has a different sense of rule than the other. Therefore, the EU has common values like respecting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minorities by esteeming each Member States' sense of the government.

The current situation of the EU lies behind its history, which still has power on today's policies, and of course, today's labour market policies. Although the idea of the origin of the EU is an old topic, the establishment of the EU shows that it was founded based on economic unity and political necessity. According to Milward (1992), in order to heal the wounds of World War II, European countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and French needed to trade with West Germany and to buy raw materials such as coal and steel from it, and in addition, they had to find an answer how to fix Germany securely in Europe (Dedman, 1996).

The adventure started with the foundation of the ECSC, which aimed to raise the standard of living and increase the employment rate through the common market for coal and steel. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany was signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Thus, the first international organization was founded on the way of establishing the EU. However, this was not enough for the empowerment of the European economy. Due to the need for a

common market and customs union, these six countries signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Thus, the EEC was established. These two treaties were primarily commercial (Milward, 1992) (cited in (Dedman, 1996)).

The origin of the EU is based on economic interests, which come with social concerns because all economic activities are rooted in human activities. For example, although for the first time, in 1968, the free movement of workers in Europe became possible with the Directive 68/360 and Regulation 1612/68, people from all around the world had started to move to Europe from the early to mid-1950s to satisfy the labour demand in West Germany, France and the UK. However, these foreign workers had social needs. One of the best summaries of the situation was Max Frisch's quote: "We asked for workers, but we got people instead."

### IV.A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The starting point of the EU came to light after World War II (1939-1945), suffered by Europe. In 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed the idea of the neutralisation of the competition to prevent further war between France and Germany to control the raw materials of the Ruhr region. The control of raw materials like coal and steel was an essential matter for other countries too, which would like to keep their industrial production at an adequate level. Thus, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris to create a common market for coal and steel, besides the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Besides, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as a part of the ECSC, was founded to be a judicial body and establish the rule of law (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). This process was the first step of the EU.

This first step was not adequate for economic strength and prosperity because the barriers among these countries prevented an increase in production (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). In 1957, these six members founded the European Economic Community (EEC), as the first stage of the Economic and Monetary Union, by the Treaty of Rome to generate a common market and a customs union. These three

institutions gathered under the same roof in 1965 by the Merger Treaty. In 1993, this community renamed the European Community (EC), and in 2009, after the foundation of the EU, its institutions were incorporated into the EU.

Regarding the labour market policies, the Council of the EEC is the voice of the member governments, adopting laws and coordinating policies by the participation of the Government ministers from each Member States. Each Member State holds the presidency on a 6-month rotating basis. It was founded in 1958, and then, it was named the Council.

The ECSC needed an assembly for taking the consultation. This assembly was called a common assembly but did not have legislative power. Since the budget spending control was hard by six separate parliaments, this body changed to 'European Parliament' in 1962, and later in 1970, it granted the power over the areas of the budget. The European Parliament has legislative, supervisory, and budgetary responsibilities with 751 MEPs (Members of the European Parliament). The number of members from each country is determined according to the population of the Member States.

In 1965, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was constituted to implement a system of agriculture subsidies for integrated agriculture policy and rural development. The CAP carries the importance to be one of the first integrated policies in the community.

Another important process is the First Enlargement of the EEC, which realised with the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK in 1973. This enlargement is the sign of the international success of the community.

**Table 16:** Chronology of Selected Important Events in the History of the European Union

| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1951 | European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); European Court of Justice (ECJ) |

| | |
|---|---|
| 1957 | European Economic Community (EEC) |
| 1958 | Council of the EEC |
| 1962 | European Parliament |
| 1965 | European Community (EC)— rename of the EEC; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); Act on Foreigners |
| 1969 | Law on the EEC Residence |
| 1973 | First Enlargement with the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK |
| 1974 | European Council |
| 1979 | European Monetary System (EMS) |
| 1981 | Second Enlargement with the accession of Greece, Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986) |
| 1985 | Schengen Agreement |
| 1986 | Single European Act |
| 1997 | European Monetary Institute (functioning between 1994 and 1997) |
| 1995 | Third Enlargement with the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden |
| 1998 | European Central Bank— replaced with the European Monetary Institute |
| 2004 | Fourth Enlargement with the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus |
| 2007 | European Union— rename of the EC |
| 2009 | Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC |
| 2013 | Fifth Enlargement with the accession of Croatia |

**Source:** Author's own contribution.

In 1965, the Act on Foreigners obligated every foreigner to get a residence permit. Also, granted asylum seekers had a right to obtain a residence permit. In 1969, the Law on the EEC Residence was implemented regarding freedom of movement for workers from the EEC Member States. The EEC citizens could reside, reunify their

families and work in another EEC Member State for five years. This duration could be expended five years more in the case that the worker was still employed. (Gesley, 2017).

The European Council, which was established in 1974 as an informal forum (in 1992 as a formal forum, and 2009, as an official EU institution), defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union by consensus through summit meetings among the heads of state or government of the Member States, the European Commission President, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy including a permanent president.

In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) as a system of exchange-rate stabilisation was arranged. With this system, the European Currency Unit, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund were designed.

In 1981, the Second Enlargement was started with the accession of Greece. It continued with the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Therefore, this enlargement is also called Mediterranean Enlargement. In 1987, Morocco and Turkey applied for membership. Morocco's application was turned down because it is not in Europe.

Turkey's application was eligible because of the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which was the first agreement between Turkey and the EEC and aimed to build cooperation. Turkey received the candidate status in 1999, and the negotiations for the accession started in 2005. For Turkey, the process of accession still continues.

In 1985, the Schengen Agreement gave freedom to cross borders. The Schengen Area stands for a mutual border and a common visa policy. Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland are the countries which were signed the Schengen Agreement but are not the Member States. That is to say, the citizens of all countries which were signed the Schengen Agreement can travel freely inside the Schengen Area. In addition, the microstates (Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican City) also include in the Schengen Area.

In 1986, the Single European Act was signed, and the single market was constructed. The fields of environment, technological research, social policies related to employment, cohesion and foreign policy cooperation came to the forefront with the Single European Act (Pinder & Usherwood, 2013). In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, and it is one of two treaties that forms the constitutional basis of the community. Later, this treaty got the name of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). This treaty was an important step to create a union.

In 1994, the European Monetary Institute (functioning between 1994 and 1997) was founded as the second stage for creating monetary union. This institute handled the process of the adaption of a common currency (Euro) and prepared the European System of Central Banks. In 1995, the Third Enlargement, also called the Post-Cold War Enlargement, realised with the participation of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, and the Member States agreed to devolve some powers like legislating on immigration, adopting civil and criminal laws, and enacting foreign and security policy to European Parliament. The European Central Bank, established by the Treaty of Amsterdam and replaced with the European Monetary Institute in 1998, is the central bank for the euro and monetary policies.

The Fourth Enlargement, also called the Eastern Enlargement, was the well-attended accession with ten countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus in 2004. After three years, in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria were accessed. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon— renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and remunerated— the other treaty that forms the constitutional basis of the community, was signed. The community got the name of the EU.

In 2009, the Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC entered into force in the EU. The directive is for regulating the residence conditions of high-skilled non-EU workers. The requirements of applying for the Blue Card are having a minimum one-year job contract with 1.5 times the average national salary, a valid travel document, health

insurance, and the documents that show the qualifications. The Blue Card holders have the same rights as the EU nationals regarding working conditions, education, recognition of qualifications, social security, and freedom of association. There may be some restrictions regarding educational grants and loans in some Member States (Blue Card, 2015).

The Fifth Enlargement, also called Western Balkan Enlargement, realised with the accession of Croatia in 2013. This process continues with the official candidacy of Albania and North Macedonia and the potential candidacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

### IV.B. FUTURE ENLARGEMENT AND ACCESSION

For the future enlargement of the EU, Albania (official candidate), Bosnia and Herzegovina (potential candidate), Kosovo (potential candidate), Montenegro (official candidate and negotiating), North Macedonia (official candidate), Serbia (official candidate and negotiating) and Turkey (official candidate and negotiating) are on the list. Among these countries, the oldest application for being a member owns Turkey, which has covered a long distance since 1999 in which it got the candidacy.

The adaptation of candidates to the EU processes through two main documents: the Treaty of Maastricht and the Declaration of the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen. In the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, adopting common values like promoting economic and social progress, developing cooperation on justice and home affairs, protecting the rights is the core issue for the accession. The first thing the EU looks at the State which would like to be a member is to meet these shared values of the EU written in Article 2 and Article B of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.

In the following year of the Treaty of Maastricht, a more detailed pathway for accession was revealed through the Copenhagen Criteria, which defines whether a country is eligible to be an EU member. The June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen in Denmark announced the criteria, including geographical criteria, political criteria, economic criteria, and legislative alignment. The candidate member before the accession should meet these criteria. Since the clear and basic pathway for

the formal accession to the EU is Copenhagen Criteria (Maresceau, 2003; Nicolaides, 2003), this study focuses on Copenhagen Criteria.

The candidate country has to make the adaptations for the accession through implementing the conditionalities of the EU. The process of the adaptation of the EU policies for being a member is called ‘pre-accession. This term was used for the first time in the Essen European Council of December 1994 (Maresceau, 2003). Since 1994, the pre-accession process has had a dominant role in accession.

The procedure of the pre-accession has five steps: application for the membership, Commission opinion, negotiations, instrument of accession and final stages (Tatham, 2009). The membership application is the first step for the State to show a willingness to participate in the EU through an application. In the second step, after the Council of Ministers gets the application, the European Commission gives an opinion about the applicant’s capacity. The Member States may block the proceeding in this step.

In the negotiation step, the EU from the candidate country expects to adopt, implement, and enforce the EU legislation, which accumulates under the name of Acquis Communautaire of the EU with 35 chapters (Iceland, Turkey, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia— joined in 2013). There are specific chapters related to the adaptation of the labour market: freedom of movement for workers and social policy and employment. During the negotiations, the candidate may get support through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) which consists of assistance for transition and institution building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources, and rural development (European Commission, n.d.).

The instrument of accession has three documents: the treaty of accession, the act of accession and the final act. The treaty of accession refers to end the negotiations and put the details of the terms and arrangements of the membership. Act of accession is a document that shows that the candidate accepts the EU legislation and the level of representation at the different EU institutions. The final act is the supplement of the

treaty of accession and the act of accession (Elsuwege, 2005). The final stages of the accession progress consist of the ratification of these three documents.

## IV.C. TURKEY'S COMPLIENCE WITH ACCESS CRITERIA

Turkey's labour market regulations and progress made under the accession process it has been undergoing since 2005 to comply with Copenhagen Criteria have been obtained. Labour market conditionalities has three dimensions: political criteria related to the labour market, economic criteria, and legal alignment. These three dimensions regulate the relations among the labour market actors during the process of accession.

The political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria are the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (European Commission, 2016). Freedom of association is highly related to democracy and human rights.

"Turkey needs to create one million additional jobs per year to absorb the increase in the working-age population due to large youth cohorts and increasing female labour market participation" (European Commission, 2017). Therefore, Turkey launched a programme for employment mobilisation in 2016. The programme aims to create two million jobs by covering employers' share of social security contributions and encouraging registration. However, official data about this programme has not been announced yet (as of 2019). Another data about employment is the low labour force participation rates of women (38% in 2018, 23% of these women worked as unpaid workers in agriculture), high unemployment rate (11% in 2018) and high youth unemployment rate (20% in 2018) along with significant gender inequalities and the difficulties of the disabled people to enter the labour market. (European Commission, 2019).

The preparations for using the European Social Fund in Turkey are at a good level. The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services manages the preparations that

cover employment, education, lifelong learning, and social inclusion (European Commission, 2019).

Poverty in Turkey affects the quality of the public and social services of social protection in Turkey negatively. Income inequality in Turkey, measured by the Gini coefficient, is the highest (with 0.426) among all the Member States (European Commission, 2019). Therefore, the public and social services provided to more than 3.9 million refugees (predominantly Syrian nationals) under 'temporal protection' are negatively affected by the services supplied to Turkish citizens. In addition, Turkey has limited legislation against discrimination. "A survey revealed that more than 80% of young Syrian migrants perceive discrimination in the labour market" (European Commission, 2019). Therefore, immigrants cannot reach equal opportunities with Turkish nationals for access to the labour market.

### IV.C.1. Copenhagen Criteria Related to Labour Market

Labour market conditionalities has three dimensions: political criteria related to the labour market, economic criteria, and legal alignment. These three dimensions regulate the relations among the labour market actors during the process of accession.

#### IV.C.1.a. Political Criteria Related to Labour Market: Free Trade Unions

The political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria are the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (European Commission, 2016). Freedom of association is highly related to democracy and human rights.

Trade unions are the important actors of the social dialogue and labour market of the EU. Since trade union rights are related to the labour market, these rights get involved in both political and economic criteria. Although the Screening Report Turkey (European Commission, 2006) mentions that trade union rights are covered by the chapter of social policy and employment, in this study, from the viewpoint of workers to underline the importance of being a member of trade unions, these rights are

studied under human rights, which is in the political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria. That is to say, trade union rights are fundamental rights not only due to their nature but also according to the EU. Besides, on the Turkey Report of the Commission Staff Working Document (European Commission, 2019), the trade union rights are evaluated under the judiciary and fundamental rights chapter.

Trade unionisation is relatively new in Turkey. The first trade union law in Turkey came into force in 1947 with many limitations. However, in 1952, the Confederation of the Turkish Trade Union (Türk-İş) was established with members predominately from the public sector. The trade unions became independent only after 1960 with some democratic rights like the right to strike and collective bargaining under the constitution's protection. This period was representative of the rise of trade unionisation in Turkey. In 1963, this development led to establishing the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) with the trade unions, which were separated from the Türk-İş. The main reason for this separation was that the DİSK was the leftist by adopting the class struggle while the government controlled the Türk-İş (Koç, 2010; Aydoğanoğlu, 2007; Baydar, 1998).

After the 1960s, the right to trade unionisation was interrupted by the military interventions of 1971 and 1980. After the first intervention, in 1976, the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş), by having an Islamic view, was established as ideological opposition to the DİSK. Meanwhile, in 1962, the Confederation of Employer Associations of Turkey (TİSK), which is the only confederation of employer associations in Turkey, was established. (Koç, 2010; Aydoğanoğlu, 2007; Baydar, 1998).

In the 1980s, public labourers, which consisted of white-collar employees and blue-collar employees, started to establish unions and confederations (Baydar, 1998). The division between workers (blue collars) and public labourers (white collars) is critical in Turkish industrial relations. Although the distinction was born in the 20th century, this distinction is still blurred. Blue-collar employees are defined as workers who work by brute strength with manual work, while white-collar employees are defined as workers who work by intellectual capacity (Bain & Price, 1972) in administrative,

design, analysis, planning, managerial and commercial jobs (Croner, 1928) (cited in (Bain & Price, 1972)). White-collar employees are workers, professional occupational members, or office employees refers to white-collar employees in Turkey (Erdayı, 2012). However, because both white-collar and blue-collar employees are workers according to industrial relations, this study does not make this kind of division.

After the second intervention, in the 1990s, unionisation decreased; so, trade unions lost many members. Many trade unions had to stop their activities. Public labourers (white-collars) regained barely the right to trade unionisation after 1995. Then, the Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions (KESK), which has the same mentality as the DİSK, the Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (Memur-Sen), which has the same mentality as the Hak-İş and the Confederation of Civil Servants Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye Kamu-Sen) which has the same mentality with the Türk-İş were established (Koç, 2010; Baydar, 1998).

Nowadays Turkey has been faced to the low density of membership for trade unions (almost 13% of all workers in 2018) (DİSK Araştırma Dairesi, 2019; European Commission, 2019; Resmi Gazete, 2019), which are due to the lack of trust to trade unions (Adaman, et al., 2018; Mütevellioğlu, 2013; Uçkan & Kağnıcıoğlu, 2009; Urhan & Selamoğlu, 2008), the anti-democratic characteristics of the laws which may conclude the loss of jobs of workers (Adaman, et al., 2018; Mütevellioğlu, 2013; Uçkan & Kağnıcıoğlu, 2009; Adaman, Buğra, & İnsel, 2008; Urhan & Selamoğlu, 2008), and ineffective and unmodern unionists and their policies (Adaman, et al., 2018; Kumaş, 2011; Uçkan & Kağnıcıoğlu, 2009; Adaman, Buğra, & İnsel, 2008; Urhan & Selamoğlu, 2008).

Some studies (European Commission, 2019) reported that trade union rights in Turkey are under pressure; so, there are still some problems for applying several ILO conventions (Faucompret & Konings, 2008). International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC, 2018, 2016) listed Turkey among the 10 worst countries for workers in the world in 2016 and 2018 by mentioning that some unionists are systematically arrested. For the accession to the EU, Turkey must remove the legal obstacles which limit the trade union rights and increase the density of membership for trade unions.

#### IV.C.1.b. Economic Criteria: Economic Reform Program

The Economic Reform Program (ERP), which has been on the agenda of accession negotiations of Turkey with the EU since 2015, consists of three medium-term frameworks: (1) macroeconomic framework, (2) fiscal framework, and (3) structural reforms. Employment and labour markets are the areas that are covered under structural reforms (European Commission, 2019).

The requirements of the ERP for the employment and labour market are as follows (European Commission, 2018):

- the quality employment,
- equal opportunities,
- access to the labour market
- fair working conditions,
- boosting demand for labour,
- promoting productivity and employability through enhancing the functioning of the labour markets,
- active support for employment,
- effective public employment services,
- social dialogue,
- labour inspection with effective enforcement of labour rules across the entire territory,
- tackling high unemployment and inactivity, in particular of young people, women and long-term unemployed.

Each candidate country has a particular ERP jointly adopted by the EU and the candidate country; so, every year for each candidate country, the European Commission declares the progress report, which shows whether the candidate country meets the requirements or not.

The European Commission (2019; 2017) states that the economy in Turkey is well advanced, but still there are backslidings due to the macroeconomic imbalances, a

high unemployment rate and the lack of independence and efficiency of the judicial system. The political pressure on the judges and prosecutors, the tendency to increase state control in the economic sphere and the dependency on capital inflows and vulnerability of external shocks raise concerns over the Turkish economy, which is suffering from high inflation and the depreciation of the Turkish Lira. Therefore, for supporting long-term economic growth in Turkey, it is urgent to provide the following:

- “macroeconomic balance by promoting domestic savings,
- a more inclusive labour market, increasing flexibility and reducing informality,
- improved the business environment, including strengthening the rule of law and judiciary” (European Commission, 2019, p. 37).

For the achievement of these three urgencies, the European Commission (2019; 2017) recommends:

- to raise the quality of the education system because the Turkish students’ performance fell science, mathematics and reading in the most recent (in 2015) PISA test (OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment),
- to improve qualifications for low-skilled workers through training because there is a mismatch between the requirements of the labour market and skills produced by the education system in Turkey,
- to increase research and development capacity.

The Pre-Accession Economic Program of 2019-2021 of the Republic of Turkey (2019) states that macroeconomic policies focus on eliminating the risks of inflation and current account deficit in 2019 to rebalance the economy.

One of the prominent critics by the European Commission (2019; 2017) is the Turkish education system, which does not satisfy the needs of the labour market and cannot provide a qualified education to the Turkish students for higher performance in the PISA test. Turkey focuses on improving the physical conditions of educational environments on the Pre-Accession Economic Program of 2019-2021 (The Republic

of Turkey, 2019). The only mention for satisfying the labour market needs through education on the program is to update the curriculum according to the information and communication technologies (The Republic of Turkey, 2019).

The Pre-Accession Economic Program of 2019-2021 of the Republic of Turkey (2019) addresses that the intense job creation process through the ALMPs gives priority for the disadvantaged groups; hence, the labour market, which is benefited from the ALMPs, functions well by taking the social inclusion into account.

#### IV.C.1.c. Legislative Alignment: Acquis Communautaire

During the pre-accession period, the EU expects the candidate countries to adopt, apply, and enforce the EU law's policies and practices, so-called Acquis Communautaire (Grabbe, 2002). The candidate countries should give credible commitments through knowledge, ability and willingness. The implementation of these commitments is controlled by several methods like the transposition of directives, surveys, contact points, legal proceedings, evaluation of the European Commission and peer view of outsiders. (Nicolaides, 2003).

There are 35 chapters of Acquis Communautaire. There are two assessment steps for each chapter screening process and opening benchmarks (Erdinç & Visier, 2017). Free trade union organisations, which are studied as the political criteria related to the labour market in this study, rank among Chapter 23, the judiciary, and fundamental rights. Freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 2) and social policy and employment (Chapter 19) are the other two labour market-related negotiation chapters examined under the legal alignment in this study. For Chapter 2 and Chapter 23, the negotiations have been frozen since 2009, and Chapter 19 has been ready for the negotiations with the opening benchmarks since 2006 after the screening process (as of 2019).

*Freedom of Movement for Workers and Turkish Immigrants*

The freedom movement of workers, which is Chapter 2 of Acquis Communautaire, means the free circulation of workers with the EU's borders like other economic

factors by including seeking employment, residing with the family members in another state (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2017; Kahanec, Pytlikova, & Zimmermann, 2014).

The free movement of workers, the so-called *lex loci laboris* principle, has been one of the oldest basic provisions since 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, and this principle means that discrimination on the grounds of nationality is forbidden for pay and working conditions. This situation brings the coordination of the national social security schemes based on a worker is subject to only one Member State's social security scheme (Cremers, 2016).

In the EU, the freedom of movement for workers leads to social dumping (Cremers, 2016; Bernaciak, 2015; Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) due to the lack of minimum social standards, which are valid in every Member States and binding for all the EU countries (Weiss, 2017). In the EU, there are the Member States which have high wages and benefits like the Northern countries, and there are the Member States which have low wages and benefits like the Eastern countries. The unfair competition among the Northern countries and the Eastern countries due to the differences in labour costs forces the reduces wages and benefits in the Northern countries because both take part in the Single Market. This strain in Northern countries is called social dumping (International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept., 1997). As Wiess (2017) underlines, the EU needs the labour standards to implement better the freedom of movement for workers by eliminating social dumping.

The freedom of movement for Turkish workers in the EU is based on the Ankara Agreement, signed in 1963 between the European Economic Community and Turkey. Also, an Association Council was established by the Ankara Agreement for making binding decisions. The additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which was signed in 1970 containing more detailed provisions on the rights of Turkish workers, has never entered into force due to several economic and political obstacles, including German concerns about the increasing number of Turkish immigrants. However, Turkish nationals have more extended rights than the other third-country nationals due to the Ankara Agreement, but these rights are still limited (Cesarz, 2015; Yalincak,

2013; Oğuz, 2012; Düzenli Halat, 2010). Only the UK, since 1973, has implemented the Ankara Agreement by giving a one-year work visa (extendable for three more years) to Turkish nationals. Each year thousands of Turkish citizens apply for this visa, and 77,220 such visas have been granted from the UK since 1997 (Migrants' Rights Network, 2018).

The Association Council conferred some three acts (Decisions 2/76, 1/80 and 3/80), which allows Turkish citizens the following rights:

- A Turkish citizen shall renew the work permit in one of the Member States after one year of legal employment for the same employer,
- A Turkish citizen shall respond to another offer of employment after three-year legal employment in the same Member State for the same occupation,
- A Turkish citizen shall enjoy free access in the same Member State after four-year legal employment (Cesarz, 2015; Düzenli Halat, 2010).

Some major law cases related to family reunification (Sevince, 1990; Demirel, 1987), renewal of residency with legal employment more than four years (Kuş, 1992), and social security rights, including widows' pension (Taflan-Met, 1996), have been lighted the process of freedom of movement for Turkish workers.

Although they have some limited free movement rights in the EU, Turkish workers still have to apply for the Schengen visa after obtaining the job offer from a Member State. Applying for a work permit includes keeping ready documents like a job offer, application form, educational certificates. The process of applying for a visa, including a work permit, might take months.

The administrative requirement of the freedom of movement for workers depends on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (Nicolaides, 2003). However, the European Commission (2019; 2017) mentions that Turkey's quality of education is not high. This situation is a block in front of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and getting a job offer from a European employer willing to deal with the work permit process for Turkish workers.

Besides the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, Turkish citizens also face other barriers that some EU nationals also face. As mentioned before, these barriers are lack of language skills, lack of information for finding a job abroad, differences among national labour standards, tax and health regulations and social insurance system from a country to another, and regulations for non-European workers.

The free movement of Turkish workers in the EU, although related to the labour market, comes with discussions on Islamisation and Europeanisation, which are highly related to political matters since 2001, terrorist massive killing events in the United States and European countries. As most Turkish workers are Muslims, Turkish labour mobility inside the EU makes the relation between the European identity and Islam a current issue (Oğuz, 2012).

Turkey has still endeavour on the freedom of movement for Turkish workers, although the negotiations have been frozen since 2009. As a result, this chapter is still in the early stage. This endeavour shows itself as Technical Assistance Project 'Capacity Building on European Health Insurance Card (EHIC)', launched in 2014 and completed in 2015 (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2017).

*Social Policy, Employment and Turkey*

Social policy and employment, which is Chapter 19 of Acquis Communautaire, includes minimum labour standards. There are nine areas dealt with in this chapter: (1) labour law, (2) health and safety at work, (3) social dialogue, (4) employment policy, (5) the European Social Fund (ESF), (6) social inclusion, (7) social protection, (8) anti-discrimination and (9) equal opportunities. (European Commission, 2019, 2006).

The 2019 Assessment Report (European Commission, 2019) states that a high proportion of workers, who work in agriculture and forestry workplaces with fewer than 50 employees, is not protected by the labour law. The report (European Commission, 2019) highlights the lack of official data on combating child labour, although the national programme for eliminating child labour 2017-2023 has been launched.

On the health and safety at work, Turkey does not satisfy the requirements of the EU because occupational accidents with the fatalities increased from 2016 (from 1405) to 2017 (to 1636). In addition, migrant children are one of the most vulnerable groups in these accidents. Due to the low level of trade union density, high level of informality and extensive subcontracting in the private sector, the risks at work increase in Turkey (European Commission, 2019).

Trade union rights directly link with social dialogue. The European Commission (2019) suggests Turkey for removing the obstacles of being a trade union member and making strikes. Two strike actions were postponed (and de-facto banned) in the private sector in 2018, and also the metal sector strikes have been postponed since 2015 by the decision of the Constitutional Court on the grounds of national security (European Commission, 2019). Besides, the proportion of collective bargaining coverage in Turkey was one of the lowest percentages in 2016 (with 7%) compared with the Member States (OECD, 2018).

# V. LABOUR REGULATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MEMBER STATES AND HISTORY OF TURKISH MIGRATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU generates legislation on labour matters that Member States may be obliged or only accompanied to adapt as legislative measures of the countries. Therefore, labour laws may differ between different Member States.

European Union Labour Law is an aggregate of the European Union norms to regulate labour relations between all labour and create labour rights and duties utilizing coordination and unification of the Member States' national legislation norms (Kashkin & Kalinitchenko, 2005). However, it is also described as a "heterogeneous, unstable combination of interventions, tools, measures, sources through which the EU directly or indirectly impacts on the normative and functional frameworks of individual and collective labour law systems of the Member States in a relationship of mutual interference and interaction" (Giubboni, 2018, p. 9). It might be interpreted that the EU has no common labour law, although the EU has some common norms related to labour relations.

Below a brief history of European Labour Law, its legislative process, and the institutions, as the European Court of Justice and the European Work Council are summarized. As well as the typology of compliance by Member States, one specific sub-chapter is dedicated to analysing the EU legislation for immigrants and another sub-chapter is dedicated to the history of Turkish migration to the EU.

## V.A. HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW

In 1951, by the Treaty of Paris, the ECSC focused on active labour market policies and labour involved in regulation (Bercusson, 2009, p. 102). Then, the foundations of the construction of a single market of the EU were drawn by the EEC created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Weiss, 2017).

In the 1950s, meanwhile, some countries in Europe like Germany, France, and the UK needed more workers to satisfy labour demand. While France and the UK got some regulations for bringing workers from their ex-colonies, Germany created a 'guest labour scheme' to satisfy labour demand. Therefore, the need for free movement of workers came out. For the first time, in 1968, the free movement of workers in Europe became possible with the directives which were "Directive 68/360 on free movement for workers within the then European Community (EC); and Regulation 1612/68 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the EC for workers of the Member States and their families" (UK Government, 2014, p. 14).

The demand for labour in Europe had continued until the 1973 Oil Crisis, which exposed high unemployment and recession in the industry. However, because a strategy of neo-liberal laissez-faire was put into practice in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, during the crisis, there had been a lack of social policy and labour law provision that increased the incoordination of the labour market. Therefore, in 1974, this strategy was changed radically, and the Social Action Programme was adopted (Bercusson, 2009).

In the 1970s, some more steps about labour law were taken through Directives which were related to equal pay for men and women, comprehensive equal treatment of men and women in employment, and protection of workers in case of collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings, and insolvency of the employer (Weiss, 2017). In 1985, the European social dialogue was launched (Bercusson, 2009).

In 1987, European Economic Community (EEC) was empowered about labour law in a very limited area by the Single European Act. Through the Maastricht Treaty in

1992 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998, labour law was significantly expanded for the first time (Weiss, 2017, pp. 15-17).

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of the Lisbon Treaty in 2000, which includes the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, the right to fair and just working conditions, and the right to collective bargaining and collective action, as well as the right of either workers or their representatives, to information and consultation, became legally binding now. (Weiss, 2017; Bercusson, 2009).

The critical attempt was started to elevate European labour law strategies to the level of constitutional status in 2004. However, France and the Netherlands rejected this by referendum. Therefore, it was proposed a more modest provision in the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, although 18 Member States was already approved. However, the attempts are still proceeding (Bercusson, 2009).

The necessity for labour law in the EU had fallen slowly again until the Global Economic Crisis of 2008, which caused a great recession. However, due to the social consequences of the economic crisis, the need for labour law was revived. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy were the most affected Member States which needed effective reforms in labour law (Giubboni, 2018).

#### V.A.1. Source of European Labour Law

The sources of European Labour Law consist of the sources of European Union Law, which are primary law, secondary law, and supplementary sources of law.

The primary law of the EU is the supreme source of law. The primary law of the EU was derived from founding treaties like the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Maastricht, amending treaties like the Single European Act, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon, accession treaties related to the enlargement of the EU and supplementary agreements like Merger Treaty (EUR-Lex, 2018).

The secondary law of the EU, as known as legal acts, can be legislative or non-legislative. There are five legal acts: regulation, directive, decision, recommendation,

and opinion. Regulation, directives, and decisions are binding (hard law), while recommendations and opinions are not binding (soft law). In addition, the European Commission enabled to adopt implementing acts (that set conditions to ensure the application of the EU laws) and delegated acts (that allow the Commission to have the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application that supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act) (EUR-Lex, 2015).

The supplementary sources of law of the EU are case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), international law that is written law, custom and usage, and general principles of law, which are unwritten sources developed by case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (EUR-Lex, 2017).

### V.A.2. Adopting and Applying European Labour Law

Adopting a European Labour Law has the same process as adopting an EU law. The EU Parliament and the Council of the EU have key roles in adopting a law. Both has an equal say. The legislative proposal submitted by the European Commission is sent to the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU; then, these two institutions review and amend the text. If both agree on these reviews and amendments, the law is adopted. Unless both does not agree on it, it is realized a second reading. Afterwards, if there is still no agreement, a conciliation committee is set up by equal numbers of representatives from both institutions. This committee does reviews and sends them to the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU. If there is an agreement, the law is adopted. If there is no agreement, it is not adopted (European Commission, 2018).

In certain cases, as a special legislative procedure, the Council of the EU can adopt alone the law with the consent or consultancy of the EU Parliament, and the EU Parliament can adopt alone legal acts more rarely. National parliaments act as the 'subsidiarity control mechanism' by reacting to the proposals with the opinions (European Commission, 2018).

The implementing acts and delegated acts give the responsibility to the European Commission to ensure to implement EU laws. In the case of the detection of the

abeyance of EU law by a Member State, the European Commission may refer the case to the CJEU.

### V.A.2.a. Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) was established in 1952. It is in Luxembourg. The CJEU takes decisions on cases brought before, which are generally related to interpreting the law, enforcing the law, annulling EU legal acts, and ensuring that the EU takes action and sanctioning EU institutions. The CJEU is divided into two parts: the Court of Justice, which consists of one judge from each Member States plus 11 advocates general, and the General Court, which consists of 47 judges (in 2019, it will increase to 56 judges). While the Court of Justice deals with the cases from national courts, General Court deals with cases related to individuals, companies, and EU governments. The CJEU works in two stages: the written stage and the oral stage. In the written stage, the CJEU takes written statements and summarize them; and, in the oral stage, both sides can be questioned by judges and the advocate general (in some cases, it is not needed the advocate general). (European Union, 2018).

According to the European Commission (2017) report on labour law, in 2017, the most focused issues by legislative initiatives and case law were collective redundancies, dismissal protection, information and consultation rights, working time, and private rights. While the CJEU must protect socio-economic rights, including labour rights, it is responsible for guaranteeing market freedoms (Weiss, 2017).

### V.A.2.b. European Work Council

European Works Council represents employees in the labour market at the EU level. It was founded in 1994 by the EU Directive (94/45/EC). It was extended twice: the UK by the EU Directive (97/74/EC) and Romania and Bulgaria by the EU Directive (2006/109/EC). In the EU and the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) countries, workers can establish a European Works Council in the companies with at least 1000 workers, including at least 150 workers from two Member States. (European Commission, 2018).

One of the first initiatives of founding a European Works Council was at Volkswagen company in France in 1992 because the European Works Council was born due to a need for representing employees' rights in multinational companies. The ETUC was one of the supporters of the process of establishing the European Works Council. However, the European Works Council has a limited area activity which is to inform and to consult. (Rehfeldt, 1998).

The European Works Council is an active legal body that workers intend to establish for supporting their rights. However, workers confront some challenges to establish it. Three cases were brought to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling to establish a new European Works Council: C-62/99 Bofrost, C-400/00 Kühne & Nagel and C-349/01 ADS GMbH (European Commission, 2018).

In addition to the European Work Council, with a voluntary basis, a global works council might be established in a transnational company by a multinational agreement or a decision by the employer to create social dialogue in the company; but, there is no legal standard to establish it at European level like the EU Directive (94/45/EC) of the European Work Council (Eurofound, 2019).

## V.B. COMPLIANCE OF MEMBER STATES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES

The EU, as we mentioned before, intends to develop a harmony between the right to govern of the Member States and the implementation of shared values of the EU. That is to say that the EU demands the Member States to comply with the EU-related duties while the EU respects the right to govern of the Member States. Many legislative instruments are binding, and the Member States implement very well the legislative process; but the compliance process is not impressive since the EU leaves the Member States how these legislative instruments are implemented (Mastenbroek, 2005). Therefore, each Member State has its own way to handle the duty of complying with the EU law. Falkner et al. (2005) made a typology by discerning ideal-typical patterns of the EU-15 Member States: a world of law observance, a world of domestic politics and a world of neglect (see Table 17).

**Table 17:** Law Abidingness of Administrative and Political System of Three Worlds (the EU-15)

| EU-Law abidingness dominant in… | World of Law Observance | World of Domestic Politics | World of Neglect |
|---|---|---|---|
| the Member States | Denmark, Sweden, Finland | the UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany | Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, Italy |
| … administrative system | + | + | - |
| … political system | + | - | - |

**Source:** Falkner et al. (2005).

In the world of law observance, transposition of the EU directives is usually both in time and correct despite the conflicts with national policies. These countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) are supposed to implement well the requirements and adapt the EU laws very well. In domestic politics, the transposition of the EU directives is likely to be in time and correct if there is no dominance of domestic interests. In the condition of being a powerful conflict with domestic interests, are supposed to be these countries (the UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Germany), the politicians or interest groups in such countries may call for disobedience to the EU duties. In the world of neglect, whether there is a great conflict with domestic interests or not, the politicians or interest groups in these countries may call more often than the world of domestic politics for disobedience to the EU duties. That is supposed to be the case of these countries like Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, France, Ireland, and Italy. Generally, compliance obligations of soft law are not recognised. (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, & Leiber, 2005).

After the enlargement of the EU with four more countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia), the typology of the compliance of the Member States changed. Falkner and Treib (2008) developed the study of Falkner et al. (2005) by mentioning four worlds: the world of law observance, the world of domestic politics, the world of dead letters and the world of transposition neglect (see Table

18). In this main typology with 19 countries, the world of law observance and the world of domestic politics stayed the same.

**Table 18:** Four Worlds of Compliance. Typology of European Countries

| | **World of Law Observance** | **World of Domestic Politics** | **World of Dead Letters** | **World of Transposition Neglect** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Process pattern at transposition** | + | 0 | 0 | - |
| **Process pattern at practical implementation** | + | + | - | +/- |
| **Countries** | Denmark, Sweden, Finland | the UK, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Germany | Ireland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia | France, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal |

**Source:** Falkner and Treib (2008).

The world of transposition neglect is a slightly reformulated version of the world of neglect. The EU-related duties are inactive in the world of transposition neglect (France, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal). Only after the intervention of the European Commission, the transposition process may be active extremely fast. In the world of dead letters (Ireland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia), the EU directives may be transposed contingent on the political constellation among domestic actors. However, later, these countries do not comply with them in the monitoring and enforcement stages (Falkner & Treib, 2008).

The studies of Falkner et al. (2005) and Falkner and Treib (2008) show that the EU has some challenges about the compliance of soft law. This challenge is also called ‘implementation deficit’, which is hard to determine its actual size due to the lack of available and adequate data (Hartlapp & Falkner, 2009; Mastenbroek, 2005; Börzel, 2001).

## V.C. EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION FOR IMMIGRANTS

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights highlights the right to feel safe for everyone. However, unless the immigrant has a valid visa, staying in another country brings the immigrant status as an unwanted person. When the authorities have an inkling about this status, the immigrant faces deportation. That is why having a legal document (a valid visa) to stay in another country is important. Without a valid visa, the immigrant does not feel safe.

Being a legal immigrant in the EU for the non-EU nationals might be in several ways: being a worker, reunifying with a family member, studying, or researching, being sent as a worker by an international company, and then being a long-term resident the long run. Since Turkey has not been a Member State yet, these ways are valid for Turkish nationals as well.

### V.C.1. Right to Work of Immigrants in the European Union

As mentioned previously in the part II.C.2.a., One of the strongest reasons behind voluntary migration is the labour migration to seek or take up employment, i.e., economic factors (King, 2012). The economic reasons are so powerful that some authors (Mayda, 2005; Borjas, 1989) classify determinants of migration as economic and non-economic. The economic reasons for taking the migration decision and choosing a migration destination are to seek a job, to live in a city with a lower cost of living, and to take up a job with a better wage or the better working conditions with the benefits like job security, unemployment benefits. All economic factors have a link to the labour market, thereby the unemployment rate.

Historically, Turkish nationals started to immigrate to Europe in the 1960s after the labour demand increased in modern times. Turkey signed labour force agreements with some European countries: Germany (in 1961), France (in 1965), Austria (in 1964), the Netherlands (in 1964), Belgium (in 1964) and Sweden (in 1967). Many immigrants preferred to immigrate to Germany. In 1970, the Turkish migration stock

increased more than 16 times compared to 1960 (from 27,000 to 442,000) in Germany (World Bank, 2011).

In the early years of the labour force agreement in Germany, Turkish nationals worked under the 'guest-worker scheme' that excluded fundamental rights such as the right to family life (family reunification). The reason is that the labour force agreement provided only a one-year work permit intending to make a rotation among Turkish workers. However, this rotation had never been applied. Although there was a regression in the German economy in the second half of the 1960s, Turkish nationals achieved to take back their jobs after the regression. In the 1970s, Turkish workers became permanent in Germany. (Abadan-Unat, 2017). Today, Turkish citizens continue to immigrate to the Member States, predominantly to Germany.

In 1965, the Act on Foreigners obligated every foreigner to get a residence permit, and in 1969, the Law on the EEC Residence was implemented regarding freedom of movement for workers from the EEC Member States (Gesley, 2017).

#### V.C.1.a. Directives about the Labour Migration for the Non-EU Members

There are several directives to allow being a legal resident for the non-EU nationals who would like to move to a Member State with the purpose of work: the EU Blue Card Directive, the directive on seasonal workers, the directive on intra-corporate transfers and the Single Permit Directive.

In 2009, the EU Blue Card Directive started to be implemented. Blue Card allows highly skilled non-EU nationals to work and reside in a Member State. A binding job offer, a qualification and a certain salary level (a least three times the level of the existing national minimum wage) are common requirements for getting a Blue Card. Generally, Blue Card is issued for two years, and the holder can enter, re-enter or stay in the Member State. During this period, the holder might be unemployed for three months and seek and take up a job. After these two years, the holder can move to another Member State.

In order get a long-term residence status, the holder has to fulfil the main conditions of the long-term residence status, besides staying in a minimum 5-year in the EU. (European Commission, 2020; International Organization for Migration, 2009).

Each year, more than 100,000 non-EU seasonal workers come to the EU for working mostly in agriculture, horticulture, and tourism. Many of them may face many problems, including labour exploitation or working conditions that risk their health and safety. Some of them are undocumented (irregular) immigrants. For combating these problems, the directive on seasonal workers was adopted in 2014. The maximum duration of stay is limited by five to nine months. For the extension of the period, the authorities take the labour market situation into account. (European Commission, 2020).

The directive on intra-corporate transfers was adopted in 2014 for managers, specialists and trainee employees of multinationals who are temporarily relocated to other company units. It is based on a common definition and harmonised criteria for a combined work and residence permit. (European Commission, 2020).

The Single Permit Directive adopted in 2011 is a single application procedure for work and residence permits. It is related to the right to equal treatment for the non-EU nationals in the following areas: "working conditions, freedom of association and joining organisations representing workers, education and vocational training, recognition of diplomas, social security, tax benefits, access to goods and services including procedures for housing and employment advice services" (European Commission, 2020).

### V.C.2. Family Reunification in the European Union

At the beginning of the 1970s, the countries that signed the labour force agreements had accepted that Turkish citizens were permanent workers. Thus, Turkish workers could reunify with their families. Also, the countries signed some social rights agreements for Turkish workers, including social insurance in the case of health care, industrial accident, disability and death, social benefits for families and children,

pension rights and redundancy rights. After this period, the Turkish migration stock in Europe kept increasing by family reunification (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

The fundamental right to family life that the European Convention on Human Rights underlines is exercised by the directive on family reunification. “It is an important instrument that aims to protect the human rights and dignity of people who emigrate for economic or labour reasons around the world, codifying in a comprehensive and universal way the rights of immigrant workers and their families over the basis of the principle of equal treatment” (Cortés Martín, 2004, p. 29).The directive on the right to family reunification adopted in 2014 with the last version determines the standard criteria about the rights for the family members who are non-EU nationals. The sponsor has to have and provide adequate accommodation, enough sources and health insurance. In reunifying with the partner (or husband/wife), polygamy is not recognised, and the application might be refused if the partner is not an adult. There might be additional rules if the family member has a special condition like being a refugee. The applications are investigated studiously to prevent the abuse of the family reunification such as sham marriage or fraud. This directive does not include the UK, Ireland, and Denmark. Also, each Member State might have country-specific requirements for family reunification. For example, the applicant should reside more than 12 months in Spain, then can apply for family reunification (European Commission, 2020; Ertuna Lagrand, 2010; International Organization for Migration, 2009).

The family reunification is related to the recognition of this right as a contribution to the achievement of the Single Market, as a respect for family life which seems to predominate as a result of the status of citizenship of the EU, and as a guarantee against the deprivation of the fundamental rights conferred by this statute even if the citizen has not yet exercised his right of free movement (Cortés Martín, 2012)

### V.C.3. Legislation for Study and Research in the European Union

The EU aims to promote Europe as the main centre of education globally, so bringing more students and researchers as possible serves this aim. Also, it enriches cultural diversity and allows Europeans to meet more cultures.

The directive on the conditions of entry and residence of non-EU nationals for research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange, schemes or educational projects and au pairing is called shortly the Directive on Study and Research. It was adopted in 2016. The directive promotes the acquisition of knowledge and skills through the generations for increasing the Union's competitiveness while contributing the job creation and GDP growth. It also aims to strengthen cultural links and enhance cultural diversity. (European Commission, 2020).

### V.C.4. Initiatives for Integration to the Labour Market of the European Union

Although there is not a specific directive for integration of immigrants in the European Union, the activities for integrating the labour market for the non-EU nationals are very wide; so, this study gives a few examples. The Action Plan on the Integration for the Third-Country Nationals, which was adopted in 2016, is one of the key policies that provide comprehensive strategies for integrating non-EU nationals about access to education, employment, housing, and active participation. Another example is the initiative 'Employers Together for Integration', which was launched in 2017. It provides visibility of the support of employers for the integration of immigrants into the labour market. The initiative aims to improve the performance of the labour market by providing apprenticeships for immigrants and refugees. (European Commission, 2020).

### V.C.5. Legislation for Long-Term Residents

Many immigrants would like to stay in Europe for a long time. The long-term residents are more integrated into the European lifestyle and culture. Therefore, the EU grants them a set of uniform rights.

The directive on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term residents was adopted in 2003. The status is taken after living legally uninterrupted five years period in a Member State. The applicant should have a stable and regular income and health insurance and should not threaten public security. The holder enjoys the same treatments and rights as nationals, such as access to employment, education, social protection and public goods and services. As the holder meets the conditions, it is renewable. (European Commission, 2020).

### V.D. HISTORY OF TURKISH MIGRATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Europe has been a popular migration destination for Turkish nationals since the 1960s. Except for the 2000s, the tendency of migration flow from Turkey to Europe has always increased (see Graph 3).

**Graph 2:** Turkish Migration Stock in the EU-28




**Source:** (The data for 1960, 1970 and 1980) World Bank. (2011, June 28).
(The data for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017) UNDESA. (2017, December).

In the modern era, the migration flow pattern from Turkey to the EU may be initially divided into four periods: (1) mass labour migration in the 1960s and the 1970s, (2) the refugees who came due to the political conflicts of the 1970s and the military coup in 1980, (3) the asylum seekers who are ethnic minorities or left-wing political people in the 1980s and the 1990s, (4) a stagnation period in the 2000s, and (5) the increase of migrants who live outside Turkey due to seeking freedom since the 2010s.

### V.D.1. Mass Labour Migration from Turkey to Europe in the 1960s and the 1970s

Economic concerns mostly characterise the migration from Turkey. The mass migration from Turkey to the European countries started in the 1960s towards Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Abadan-Unat, 2017; Martin, 2012). Between 1950 and 1973 are called 'Golden Age' for the European economy, and there was a huge labour demand. The economic growth in this period was based on cheap technology, effective labour and abundant raw materials (Boltho, 1982) (cited in (Crafts & Toniolo, 1996)). Besides, total factor productivity, export-led growth, and reallocation of labour from agriculture to the industry are alternative explanations of the Golden Age (Crafts & Toniolo, 1996).

In the 1950s meanwhile, national income in Turkey had been decreasing due to the nationalist economic policy of the Democrat Party government. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested that Turkey took precautions against devaluation and liberating foreign trade. However, the government followed the inflationist policies. As a result, the export volume of Turkey regressed. Therefore, the economic growth in Turkey was dependent on agriculture in the 1950s. These policies continued in the 1960s. However, in the 1960s, the demand for export goods increased with televisions, cars, domestic appliances like washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and fridges. While investment goods had been expanding, intermediate goods had not grown. Therefore, the export deficit in Turkey increased, and the economy went down. (Boratav, 2005).

In the 1960s, the demand for the labour force in Europe and the economic instability of Turkey played a key role in signing labour force agreements between Turkey and several European countries: with Germany in 1961, with France in 1965, with Austria in 1964, with the Netherlands in 1964, with Belgium in 1964 and with Sweden in 1967. Besides these agreements, in 1963, Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement, which allows Turkish citizens to be employed legally in the countries of the European Economic Committee. However, the agreement has never entered into force due to several economic and political obstacles, including German concerns about the

increasing number of Turkish immigrants. Only the UK has implemented this right for Turkish nationals. Therefore, we can consider that the UK has a labour force agreement with Turkey. These agreements contributed to the increase of the Turkish migration stock in Europe (see Table 19).

**Table 19:** Turkish Migration Stock by Years in Selected European Countries, 1960-2000

| **Countries** | **1960** | **1970** | **1980** | **1990** | **2000** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Belgium | 3,414 | 20,782 | 68,368 | 87,317 | 58,404 |
| France | 45,348 | 4,534 | 126,356 | 173,732 | 76,505 |
| Germany | 26,986 | 442,229 | 1,653,805 | 1,460,465 | 2,008,979 |
| Austria | 7,923 | 32,618 | 151,624 | 183,825 | 179,638 |
| Netherlands | 11 | 18,665 | 51,658 | 148,878 | 176,306 |
| Sweden | 199 | 3,698 | 14,310 | 29,524 | 31,545 |
| United Kingdom | 4,574 | 1,255 | 12,131 | 32,126 | 12,709 |

**Source:** World Bank. (2011, June 28).

The majority of Turkish immigrants in the 1960s went to Germany (World Bank, 2011) (see Table 19). As it was mentioned above, Germany accepted them under the 'Gastarbeiter' (guest worker) scheme, which foresaw that Turkish immigrants would be there only one year without any social security rights. Then they would rotate, but this rotation has never happened. (Abadan-Unat, 2017). For Turkey, the labour force agreement was an opportunity to increase the skilled labour force by training them in Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2017) and to raise the income of the remittance (Martin, 2012) (in (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017)). Since Turkish workers were guests, the German government did not care much about Turkish workers and appointed a German Social Democrat Party branch to inform Turkish workers. Then, the solidarity among Turkish workers strengthens, and Türk-Danış (Turkish workers' organization) was established in the 1960s. However, the labour demand decreased in the 1970s, and a

significant number of Turkish nationals preferred to stay in these European countries. (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

### V.D.2. Turkish Refugees in Europe due to the Political Conflicts of the 1970s and the Military Coup in 1980

After the oil crisis of 1973, European states stopped new foreign workers recruitment and recommended existing foreign workers to return to their home countries, but they did not. The European governments understood that Turkish workers are not guests; they are permanent; so, the European states signed social security agreements, which accords the rights such as child benefits, unemployment benefits, social insurance. Also, European states allowed Turkish workers family reunification. Thus, the Turkish migration stock in Europe kept increasing by the family reunifications. However, the foreign worker recruitments slowed down. Therefore, Turkish nationals continued to immigrate by using a tourist visa without a work permit. Later, an amnesty was declared, and working permits were given to these workers (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

In the 1970s, to deal with economic instabilities like the oil crisis of 1973 and the high inflation rate, the Turkish government prepared a formula by the support of the IMF regulations: "(1) labour costs had to decrease to reduce inflation; (2) some measures regarding the rights of workers, such as concerning strikes and lockouts, needed to be taken in order to prevent higher production costs; and (3) there had to be measured against 'social crises' and 'anarchy', which deepen the economic crisis" (Ozan, 2012) (cited in (Karacan, 2016, p. 79)). This formula meant to force workers in Turkey to work with lower wages in the precarious working conditions and the anti-democratic working environment.

The political environment of the 1970s in Turkey caused massive conflicts, and on the 15th and 16th of June in 1970, Turkey witnessed that almost 150,000 workers held a public demonstration against a labour law which was planned to enact and was opposed to workers' rights (Aydoğanoğlu, 2001). After this public demonstration, the political polarization (left-right wing) was spread quickly to people from all social

strata. The physical violence between the left and right-wing had been escalated for many years.

**Graph 3:** Asylum Applicants from Turkey to the EU-15 between 1980 and 1999




**Source:** UNHRC. (2001).

The May 1 Worker's Day in 1976, throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of the DISK for the first time in Turkey, with about two hundred thousand people, was celebrated in the Taksim Square in Istanbul. A year later, close to the calendar showing May 1, 1977, the DISK made extensive preparations for a more massive celebration. The celebration started in Taksim Square, where about five hundred thousand people gathered. People who lurked in buildings around the rally area poured bullets with automatic weapons on hundreds of thousands of people. Panzers were attacked with the barrage fire. The sound bombs and the fire of automatic weapons quickly turned the rally into the battlefield. A huge panic started. Thousands of people were laid on the ground; a large number of people who tried to run and escape died by being squeezed in the corners, crushed under a panzer, and shot. Thirty-four people were killed in the celebration area. The 1st of May of 1977 is called the 'Bloody 1st of May' in Turkey. (Dudu, 2017; Erdoğan, 2016; Karacan, 2016).

In 1980, Turkey faced a military coup and experienced being ruled by a militaristic government until 1983. At least 460 people were arrested in the first 11 days after the army seized power. Around 8,000 people were imprisoned all over the country, and

this was much higher if they were taken into custody, beaten, threatened, and released without trial during the 90-day. Torture, which was previously practised, has become more widespread and systematic this time. Many people who were taken into custody happened suspiciously. The regime never denied the existence of torture. The government claimed that this was not a policy; it was the job of untrained cops, the allegations were investigated, and the criminals were punished (Ahmad, 2007).

In the military coup period, the new government-issued decrees that suspended the constitution disbanded the parliament, closed political parties, arrested party leaders, and suspended trade union confederations with almost all professional organizations (Ahmad, 2007). In 1980, almost 60,000 people applied for asylum to the EU-15 (UNHRC, 2001). Between 1981 and 1983, some authors (Erkiner, 2000) estimates that 30 thousand people, most of whom are left-sighted, are political immigrants, while the UNHRC (2001) reported that around 16,000 people applied for asylum to the EU-15 (in 1981, 1982 and 1983) (Graph 3).

### V.D.3. Asylum Seekers from Turkey in Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s

Keeping physical security is an important reason for migrating (Schmid, 2016), and people who face terrorism might force to emigrate by choosing a migration destination abroad. In the mid-1980s, the war with the separatist militant Kurdish Workers' Party began due to the demands for self-administration or cultural autonomy, and the war affected the Kurdish civilian population in Turkey. “The depopulation of the rural areas in which the Kurdish Workers' Party operates is carried out by forced evacuations, deportations and bombardments of villages and settlements, accompanied by the destruction of nature” (Gürbey, 1996, p. 16). In the 1980s and the 1990s, it is estimated that 30,00-35,000 Turkish citizens were killed during the continuous terrorist attacks (Rodoplu, Arnold, & Ersoy, 2003). The escalation of violence caused an increase in the migration of Kurdish people. The UNHRC (2001) data shows that the number of applicants for asylum to the EU escalated from the mid-1980s, and it continued this trend until the mid-1990s. Between 1980 and 1999, more than half a million Turkish nationals (514,892 individuals) applied for asylum to the EU-15

(UNHRC, 2001) (Graph 4). Turkish diaspora in Europe facilitated these asylum seekers not only for the settlement in Europe but also for continuing their political activities (Argun, 2003) (cited in (Jacobs, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2006)).

According to the data of UNDESA (2017), the migration stock from Turkey— Turkish citizens— was dominantly in Western European countries like Germany, France, and the Netherlands in the 1990s. The main reason for this situation might be due to the labour force agreements between Turkey and these countries signed in the 1960s. The accumulated Turkish backgrounded people in these countries may create migration networks for Turkish newcomers. Turkish immigrants showed little interest to move to the other parts of Europe. In the 1990s, there were no Turkish citizens living in some countries such as Croatia and Estonia (see Table 21).

**Table 20:** Evolution of Turkish Migration Stock in the EU Countries, 1990-1995

| Year | Region/Country | Turkish Migration Stock |
|---|---|---|
| **1990** | **EU-28** | **2,252,667** |
| **1990** | **Eastern Europe** | **2,712** |
| 1990 | Bulgaria | 743 |
| 1990 | Czechia | 55 |
| 1990 | Hungary | 385 |
| 1990 | Poland | 641 |
| 1990 | Romania | 878 |
| 1990 | Slovakia | 10 |
| **1990** | **Northern Europe** | **71,087** |
| 1990 | Denmark | 19,476 |
| 1990 | Estonia | .. |
| 1990 | Finland | 457 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1990 | Ireland | 94 |
| 1990 | Latvia | 12 |
| 1990 | Lithuania | 40 |
| 1990 | Sweden | 25,061 |
| 1990 | United Kingdom | 25,947 |
| **1990** | **Southern Europe** | **42,798** |
| 1990 | Croatia | .. |
| 1990 | Greece | 34,502 |
| 1990 | Italy | 7,575 |
| 1990 | Malta | 79 |
| 1990 | Portugal | 31 |
| 1990 | Slovenia | 5 |
| 1990 | Spain | 454 |
| 1990 | Cyprus | 152 |
| **1990** | **Western Europe** | **2,136,070** |
| 1990 | Austria | 88,108 |
| 1990 | Belgium | 80,005 |
| 1990 | France | 241,148 |
| 1990 | Germany | 1,586,121 |
| 1990 | Luxembourg | 194 |
| 1990 | Netherlands | 140,494 |
| **1995** | **EU-28** | **2,354,411** |
| **1995** | **Eastern Europe** | **4,828** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Bulgaria | 1,377 |
| 1995 | Czechia | 82 |
| 1995 | Hungary | 919 |
| 1995 | Poland | 548 |
| 1995 | Romania | 1,810 |
| 1995 | Slovakia | 92 |
| **1995** | **Northern Europe** | **94,774** |
| 1995 | Denmark | 24,783 |
| 1995 | Estonia | .. |
| 1995 | Finland | 1,133 |
| 1995 | Ireland | 260 |
| 1995 | Latvia | 18 |
| 1995 | Lithuania | 45 |
| 1995 | Sweden | 29,740 |
| 1995 | United Kingdom | 38,795 |
| **1995** | **Southern Europe** | **64,312** |
| 1995 | Croatia | .. |
| 1995 | Greece | 54,741 |
| 1995 | Italy | 8,597 |
| 1995 | Malta | 93 |
| 1995 | Portugal | 66 |
| 1995 | Slovenia | 10 |
| 1995 | Spain | 590 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 | Cyprus | 215 |
| **1995** | **Western Europe** | **2,190,497** |
| 1995 | Austria | 99,359 |
| 1995 | Belgium | 68,285 |
| 1995 | France | 248,944 |
| 1995 | Germany | 1,617,880 |
| 1995 | Luxembourg | 184 |
| 1995 | Netherlands | 155,845 |

**Source:** UNDESA (2017).

Moreover, in the 1980s, some European countries like Germany encouraged the immigrants, including Turkish immigrants, to return to their home countries under the law enacted on the 28th of November 1983. According to this law, if the immigrants had returned to their home countries between the 31st of October 1983 and the 30th of June 1984, Germany would have given monetary benefits to the immigrants. This law caused a decrease in the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany because approximately 250,000 Turkish immigrants (5.4% of all Turkish immigrants in Germany) returned to Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

#### V.D.4. Stagnation Period of Turkish Migration Flow in the 2000s

In the 2000s, Turkey reached the turning point in the economy, which affected the number of emigrants increasing since the 1960s (UNDESA, 2017; World Bank, 2011). The AKP (the Justice and Development Party) came into power with a democratic Islamic identity (Yavuz, 2006) in 2002, just after the 2001 Turkish Economic Crisis. The AKP also gained the general elections of 2007, 2011 and 2015. As of May 2020, the AKP is still the ruling party of Turkey. The coalition government that ruled Turkey before the AKP government had already started some major macroeconomic reforms due to the crisis. These reforms gave results under the early

ruling years of the AKP, and the economy of Turkey gained stability in the 2000s. (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). During the years in which there was economic stability, it was observed to decrease the Turkish migration stock in the EU-28. (Table 2).

Besides economic reforms, Turkey entered the democratic initiative process for ethnic minority rights in this period. In the second half of the 2000s, the AKP government leaned towards Kurdish language education, and for the first time in the history of Turkey, an official Kurdish TV channel opened. Also, the AKP government supported the South-Eastern Anatolia Project, which was started before the AKP ruling era for the economic development of the region in which mostly ethnic Kurdish citizens live (Alptekin & Köse, 2018).

In 2009, the democratic initiative process was declared officially. The main idea behind this democratic initiative process was to stop the terrorist activities of the separatist militant Kurdish Workers' Party (Alptekin & Köse, 2018) and to constitute social peace in the society. The AKP government adopted the understanding of 'deliberative democracy' (Alptekin & Köse, 2018). However, the process finished in 2015 due to the continuation of terrorist activities of the Kurdish Workers' Party. In the short run, the democratic initiative process positively affected the decrease in the terrorist activities of the Kurdish Workers' Party significantly; but this effect was lost in the long run (Çınar, 2017).

**Table 21:** Turkish Migration Stock in Europe, 2000-2005

| Year | Region/Country | Turkish Migration Stock |
|---|---|---|
| **2000** | **EU-28** | **2,428,961** |
| **2000** | **Eastern Europe** | **6,886** |
| 2000 | Bulgaria | 2,010 |
| 2000 | Czechia | 109 |
| 2000 | Hungary | 1,452 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | Poland | 469 |
| 2000 | Romania | 2,645 |
| 2000 | Slovakia | 201 |
| **2000** | **Northern Europe** | **86,628** |
| 2000 | Denmark | 30,089 |
| 2000 | Estonia | .. |
| 2000 | Finland | 1,808 |
| 2000 | Ireland | 570 |
| 2000 | Latvia | 25 |
| 2000 | Lithuania | 35 |
| 2000 | Sweden | 31,894 |
| 2000 | United Kingdom | 52,296 |
| **2000** | **Southern Europe** | **86,995** |
| 2000 | Croatia | .. |
| 2000 | Greece | 75,879 |
| 2000 | Italy | 9,618 |
| 2000 | Malta | 117 |
| 2000 | Portugal | 105 |
| 2000 | Slovenia | 17 |
| 2000 | Spain | 981 |
| 2000 | Cyprus | 278 |
| **2000** | **Western Europe** | **2,248,452** |
| 2000 | Austria | 110,695 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | Belgium | 54,587 |
| 2000 | France | 256,739 |
| 2000 | Germany | 1,649,639 |
| 2000 | Luxembourg | 177 |
| 2000 | Netherlands | 176,615 |
| **2005** | **EU-28** | **2,305,658** |
| **2005** | **Eastern Europe** | **9,124** |
| 2005 | Bulgaria | 2,963 |
| 2005 | Czechia | 539 |
| 2005 | Hungary | 1,793 |
| 2005 | Poland | 676 |
| 2005 | Romania | 2,927 |
| 2005 | Slovakia | 226 |
| **2005** | **Northern Europe** | **140,369** |
| 2005 | Denmark | 31,925 |
| 2005 | Estonia | .. |
| 2005 | Finland | 3,594 |
| 2005 | Ireland | 572 |
| 2005 | Latvia | 66 |
| 2005 | Lithuania | 59 |
| 2005 | Sweden | 35,853 |
| 2005 | United Kingdom | 68,300 |
| **2005** | **Southern Europe** | **72,803** |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2005 | Croatia | 43 |
| 2005 | Greece | 55,051 |
| 2005 | Italy | 15,053 |
| 2005 | Malta | 139 |
| 2005 | Portugal | 200 |
| 2005 | Slovenia | 39 |
| 2005 | Spain | 1,871 |
| 2005 | Cypus | 407 |
| **2005** | **Western Europe** | **2,083,362** |
| 2005 | Austria | 134,325 |
| 2005 | Belgium | 39,669 |
| 2005 | France | 229,714 |
| 2005 | Germany | 1,483,727 |
| 2005 | Luxembourg | 153 |
| 2005 | Netherlands | 195,774 |

**Source:** UNDESA (2017).

Although this era was a stagnation period for Turkish migration in Europe, the data of UNDESA (2017) suggests that there was a slow increase in Turkish migration stock in Europe. It is possible to see that Turkish migration stock came into existence in some countries like Croatia. In many European countries, although the number of Turkish migration stock was small, the increase was consistent in the 2000s (see Table 10).

After the 2000s, the need for high-skilled labour has been increasing in Europe. Some countries like Germany, the USA, the UK, Australia (Constant & Tien, 2011), Latvia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic (Rutkowski, 2007) eased the recruitment of high-skilled workers. For example, in 2005 in Germany, the Migration Act entered into

force to place on long-term residency for immigrants, especially high skilled immigrants (Gesley, 2017). In 2009, the Blue Card Directive came into force for easing to have a resident permit for high-skilled non-EU workers (Blue Card, 2015).

### V.D.5. Turkish Immigrants as Freedom Seekers in the 2010s

In the 2010s, the number of migrants from Turkey to the EU increased and security determinants such as political pressure could be involved related to events such as: (1) the antidemocratic implementations of the AKP government, (2) the loss of economic stability, and (3) the instability due to the terrorist attacks and the effects of the Syrian war on Turkey. In particular, high-skilled Turkish citizens emigrated ties was forward to be related to the increased state interference in antidemocratic policies (Sánchez-Montijano, Kaya, & Sökmen, 2018).

High-skilled immigrants are an umbrella term that refers to an individual who holds a tertiary degree and lives outside of their home country. Several studies (Aydin, 2012; Elveren, 2018; Elveren & Toksöz, 2019; Görgün, 2018; Güngör & Tansel, 2006; Köşer Akcapar, 2007; Okumuş, 2020; Ozcurumez & Yetkin Aker, 2016; Sánchez-Montijano, Kaya, & Sökmen, 2018; Sunata, 2010; Yanasmayan, 2019; Yigitturk Ekiyor, 2018) investigated high-skilled migration from Turkey to the developed regions like the EU countries, the USA and Canada in the 2000s and 2010s through in-depth interviews and online surveys, and agree that other drivers except for labor market drivers such as social networks, familial consideration, quality-of-life explanations, the social-cultural-political context in the destination country and demand for better governance and civic society also impact the individuals' migration destination choices. One of elements of decision to migrate of high skilled Turkish immigrants is to live in a place with freedom of thought and lifestyle because the interventions to the lifestyle and antidemocratic implementations in Turkey increased in recent years (World Bank, 2019).

In the 2010s, the Turkish migration stock in Europe came close to 3 million people (see Table 11). The data of UNDESA (2017) suggests that Turkish immigrants started to show a great interest to move to some Southern European countries such as Spain

and Portugal, which are not historical migration destination for Turkish immigrants. The Turkish migration stock also increased all around Europe.

**Table 22:** Turkish Migration Stock in Europe, 2010-2017

| Region/Country | 2010 | 2015 | 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **EU-28** | **2,251,682** | **2,372,887** | **2,668,826** |
| **Eastern Europe** | **11,486** | **19,008** | **22,429** |
| Bulgaria | 3,791 | 8,584 | 9,867 |
| Czechia | 924 | 965 | 1,004 |
| Hungary | 2,134 | 2,218 | 2,331 |
| Poland | 906 | 874 | 915 |
| Romania | 3,478 | 6,059 | 7,992 |
| Slovakia | 253 | 308 | 320 |
| **Northern Europe** | **170,670** | **162,401** | **171,016** |
| Denmark | 33,760 | 35,781 | 39,533 |
| Estonia | 87 | 77 | 76 |
| Finland | 5,379 | 7,367 | 8,039 |
| Ireland | 479 | 489 | 525 |
| Latvia | 106 | 88 | 85 |
| Lithuania | 75 | 64 | 58 |
| Sweden | 40,919 | 46,435 | 46,909 |
| United Kingdom | 89,865 | 72,100 | 75,791 |
| **Southern Europe** | **59,970** | **59,316** | **59,128** |
| Croatia | 85 | 86 | 83 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greece | 35,608 | 33,489 | 32,881 |
| Italy | 20,487 | 20,491 | 20,851 |
| Malta | 214 | 268 | 287 |
| Portugal | 262 | 296 | 301 |
| Slovenia | 38 | 52 | 65 |
| Spain | 3,276 | 3,969 | 4,006 |
| Cyprus | 653 | 665 | 654 |
| **Western Europe** | **2,009,556** | **2,132,162** | **2,416,253** |
| Austria | 158,045 | 184,847 | 203,550 |
| Belgium | 39,354 | 44,034 | 44,597 |
| France | 274,965 | 302,547 | 301,950 |
| Germany | 1,339,773 | 1,395,973 | 1,661,588 |
| Luxembourg | 200 | 210 | 212 |
| Netherlands | 197,219 | 204,551 | 204,356 |

**Source:** UNDESA (2017).

In 2010, the result of the constitutional referendum in Turkey caused that the executive concentrated the power, and the independence of the judiciary was undermined (Özbudun, 2015) (cited in (Yabancı, 2016)).

In 2013, the Gezi Protests, which were against the government's antidemocratic implementations, was a breaking point for the mass who demand more freedoms. The protesters demanded "democracy, accountability, transparency, freedom of speech, the rule of law and the values which the EU was strongly believed to have" (Kaya, 2017, pp. 3-4). It is estimated that there were around 3.5 million protesters (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Kurumu, 2014). The Gezi Protests were mainly active in the biggest cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul and Ankara, for around five months, although there were

some protests in small cities. The protests lasted for a very short period because there are two reasons: (1) the police used disproportionate violence against the protesters, and (2) the rural population of Turkey did not support the Gezi Protests.

The Gezi protests were quelled with eight fatalities (six civilians and two policemen) and thousands of people injured (Korap Özel & Deniz, 2015). Soon after the Gezi Protests, some people were taken into custody; later, they were released. In 2017, some opponents faced another lawsuit about financing the Gezi Protests. However, all defendants acquitted in 2020. Nils Muižnieks (2013), who was the commissioner for human rights of the Council of Europe, reported that the disproportionate violence against the protesters by the police posed a threat to human rights. In 2017, thousands of public servants received discharges from their jobs by statutory decrees due to the allegations of participating in the Gezi Protests. As of 2020, many of them have not given back to duty, and their reemployment lawsuits are still under judgement.

The Gezi Protests did not happen in small towns and villages because the rural population of Turkey did not support the Gezi Protests (Öztürk, 2015). The rural population was 22.7%, while the urban population was 77.3% in 2012 (Yılmaz, 2015). One of the main motivations of the migration from the rural to the urban in Turkey is to get an education because the educational opportunities in the rural are limited; so, the education level of the rural is lower than the education level of the urban (Aydemir, 2013; Gülümser, Baycan Levent, & Nijkamp, 2010). Although the rural population was one-third of the urban population, it is still a significant number of the total population. Also, it is considered that all urban population did not participate in the protests, only around 3.5 million people within more than 75 million in Turkey. According to the report of KONDA (2014), more than 55% of the protesters held a tertiary degree of education; that is to say, they were a high-skilled population. Since some studies (Okumuş, 2020; Sánchez-Montijano, Kaya, & Sökmen, 2018) indicate that Turkish high skilled immigrants in the EU have increased after the Gezi Protests, and there was a significant connection between the demand for the democracy of high skilled labour and the increase in the number of Turkish migrants in the EU after the Gezi Protests.

The terrorist attacks such as the Suruç Bombing (in 2015), Atatürk Airport Attack (in 2016), 15 July coup d'état attempt (in 2016), and the Reina Nightclub Shooting (in 2017) are also effective in searching for a more secure destination for Turkish citizens. The citizens might have questioned the perception of security in Turkey through these attacks.

After the bright early years of the AKP government, the economic stability has gone away with severe disequilibrium and increased external debt burdens in the second half of the 2010s, and the economic policies fell behind creating new jobs. In August 2018, the Turkish national currency (Turkish Lira) significantly lost value. (Orhangazi & Yeldan, 2020; Yeldan & Ünüvar, 2016). The economic stagnation with the high unemployment rate increases the tendency of moving abroad of Turkish nationals.

#### V.D.6. Today Demographic Characteristics of the Turkish-Origin People in Europe

Today Turkish nationals and Turkish background citizens (because more than 800,000 Turkish nationals became citizens of the destination country in Europe between 1991 and 2002 (Kirişçi, 2007) constitute the significant number of the European population. More than 500,000 people applied for asylum from Turkey to the Member States between 1980 and 1999 (UNHRC, 2001). The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Turkey declared the Turkish population as 4,933,598 (including 2,544,141 dual citizens) in 14 Member States (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Greece, Spain, and Poland) (DİYİH, 2015). In contrast, the UNDESA (2017) declared that the Turkish migration stock in the EU-28 was 2,372,222 persons in 2015. Both the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Turkey and the UNDESA do not count the naturalised Turkish-origin people in Europe.

Throughout the years, many Turkish citizens have naturalised in European countries. However, there is no clear public statistical data about naturalised Turkish immigrants. It is estimated that a considerable amount of Turkish backgrounded individuals lives in Europe if we regard the second and third generations.

One of the examples for the lack of data about the naturalised Turkish-origin population is from Germany. In 1992 in Germany, the Act for Foreigners of 1990 entered to force. This act allows the naturalisation of the young foreigners if they fulfil several conditions: giving up old citizenship, not being convicted of a crime, being a legal residence for eight years in Germany and being gone to school for six years (Gesley, 2017). Then, young foreigners can apply for naturalisation. However, since the German census does not collect data on ethnicity, the population of the Turkish-speaker community in Germany is estimated. Curtis (2013) estimated that the population of Turkish-origin people in Germany is predicted between three and four million, approximately 5% of the population of Germany. However, the Federal Statistical Office (2018) declares that there were about 1.5 million Turkish citizens who live in Germany in 2013; so, the estimation of Curtis (2013) about the population of Turkish-origin people is thought as low considering the naturalised Turkish-origin people who do not have dual citizenship or Turkish passport.

Another example is from the UK. Although it is considered that almost all immigrants from Turkey live in London (Uysal, 2016), there is no certain information on the exact number of the Turkish-speaking population in London due to the lack of specific questions in the Census of 2011. Therefore, Sirkeci and Esipova (2013) estimated that the UK residents born in Turkey were between 140,000 and 180,000 by the end of 2011.

Since these people bridge between Turkey and the Member States, it can be supposed that the Europeanisation process of Turkey started with this population.

### V.E. TURKISH DIASPORA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Sheffer (2003) defines diaspora as the population who live outside the home country and adhere to the same ethnonationalism and similar ideology. Thus, the Turkish population and Turkish-origin population who live in Europe constitute the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

The Turkish migration network abroad is important in enabling low-skilled Turkish newcomers to find a job. More established Turkey-born business owners and entrepreneurs employ Turks who have recently immigrated to meet the demand for Turkish products and services among the Turkey-born community. Thus, the Turkey-born community abroad has strengthened its own business over time and created their ethnic economy. Some of these workplaces, such as restaurants, bookstores, and coffee houses, are also public spaces that keep Turkish culture alive. The formation of districts with a strong concentration of businesses run by Turkey-born entrepreneurs may signal a degree of ghettoization (Kaya, 2009).

Turkish migrant associations abroad help newcomers at the micro (individual) level by functioning as professional groups and some organize English language courses (Köşer Akçapar, 2009), which strengthen the social capital of the immigrants (Yigitturk Ekiyor, 2018) and thereby their participation in the labour market of the host country. Therefore, they create a solidarity network in their own minority group.

After the 2010s, in the AKP government era in Turkey, the diplomacy and the perception of Turkish immigrants has been a transformation. In the past, diplomacy was the intergovernmental communication way; however, today, non-state actors also play a vital role in diplomacy and involving the non-state actors in diplomacy is called 'public diplomacy' (Köşer Akçapar & Bayraktar Aksel, 2017).

### V.E.1. Institutions that Support Turkish Diaspora

Turkey considers Turkish immigrants concerning migration management and transnationalism through several institutions such as ministries, government centres/offices and official organizations (Bilgili & Siegel, 2010).

1) **Ministries:**
    - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey: The ministry provides official services such as birth certificates, passports, marriage certificates, and death certificates through the consulates. Also, the consulates work

actively in the areas of integration and participation in society in the destination country.

- Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services: This ministry focuses on_the rights of immigrant workers abroad through social security agreements. Besides, the ministry has several consultancy offices outside Turkey.
- Ministry of Internal Affairs: The Ministry reaches Turkish immigrants through its directorates and offices abroad.

2) **Government Centres/Offices:**
   - Foreign Relations General Directorate: This directorate works to improve Turkish immigrants' employment conditions under the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services.
   - Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities: The presidency organizes social and cultural activities abroad for Turkish immigrants, gives scholarships to Turkish students abroad and coordinates international students who live in Turkey. It works under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
   - Presidency of Religious Affairs: It is the Turkish national bureaucracy of religious affairs under the President Office. The presidency regulates the religious activities of Turkish immigrants. It creates a network among religious Turkish immigrants abroad and provides religious services.
3) **Official Organizations:** These are the registered NGOs that have offices abroad. Some of them are the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association and the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association.

Some NGOs were established abroad by Turkish immigrants. Some of them are the North-Rhine Westphalia Turkish Teachers Association, The North-Rhine Westphalia Turkish Journalists Union, the Federation of Alevi Unions in Germany, European Association of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists, Bochum Turkish Academicians Association, London Turkish Gazette, Bizim FM in London, London

Turkish Radio, London Turkish Film Festival, T-Vine Magazine in London, Arcola Theatre in London.

### V.E.2. Policies related to Turkish Diaspora

The steps for the politicisation of Turkish communities abroad came forward in the 1980s. The dual citizenship of Turkish nationals was accepted in 1982. For the first time, in 1983-1984, special attention was paid to Turkish immigrants in Europe by the Turkish government. In those years, the Turkish government contacted Turkish immigrants through religious activities such as supporting the construction of the mosques in Europe and establishing the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs in the countries where Turkish-origin were most populated. In the era of the AKP government, the significance of Turkish nationals abroad grew because it was observed that the votes from abroad might affect the results of the general elections in Turkey. The AKP government made a stride for teaching the Turkish language through the new institution- Yunus Emre Institutes- similar to Goethe Institute, Cervantes Institute, French Cultural Centre (Ünver, 2013).

Today two areas are closely associated with the Turkish community abroad:

1) Citizenship: Turkey allows Turkish citizens to have dual citizenship in the case of getting a 'permission document' from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Bilgili & Siegel, 2010).
2) Rights and Obligations: Every Turkish citizen has equal rights regardless of where they live. Turkish citizens vote for general elections in consulates, or national exit points 30 days before the election. Turkish men have to do compulsory military service regardless of where they live. Dual citizens who live in Turkey are taxpayers in Turkey.

The Turkish government also follow closely the discriminatory events against Turkish abroad. For example, in Germany, between 2000 and 2007, an underground Neo-Nazi terrorist group killed eight people (eight Turks, one Greek and one German policewoman). Since the victims were mostly döner-kebab vendors and had Turkish

or Kurdish origin, the murders were called ‘Bosphorus Serial Murders’ and ‘Kebab Murders’ by the media. The murderers were caught in 2011. The Turkish authorities and diaspora observed the trials closely.

The Turkish government continues to produce new policies for Turkish nationals abroad since there is a change in the perception of Turkish immigrants. This transformation in the perception of Turkish immigrants was realised from the source of the remittance to a soft power abroad through public diplomacy.

### V.E.3. Turkish Diaspora Today: Brain Drain versus Soft Power

In the 2000s, the need for high-skilled labour in the European countries increased; thus, the recruitment of high-skilled labour began (Constant & Tien, 2011; Rutkowski, 2007). Although the Turkish migration flow to the EU entered a stagnation period in the 2000s, Turkish immigrants' flow grew again in the 2010s (UNDESA, 2017).

In the past, the perception of the Turkish immigrants was seen as a brain drain (in the case of being high-skilled) or as a source of remittance. According to the perception of ‘brain drain’, as a contrast, after the 2010s, the Turkish immigrants are perceived as 'soft power' of the state today (Köşer Akçapar & Bayraktar Aksel, 2017).

Is the increase in the number of Turkish high-skilled immigrants a loss or a gain for Turkey? This part discusses that the Turkish high-skilled immigrants are a loss for Turkey under the concept of the ‘brain drain’ and a benefit in the context of the Turkish diaspora.

#### V.E.3.a. Brain Drain

Brain drain is described as the migration of high-skilled workers to another country. It has negative consequences for the home country. The absence of high-skilled people who can spread technology and information to the country reduces the economy's productivity. The citizens cannot get adequate basic services like health and education services; thus, the quality of life decreases in the long run (Elveren, 2018).

Since the 1960s, Turkey has made five-year development plans. The concept of ‘brain drain’ entered the agenda for the first time in Turkey's Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1977). Then, aspects in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983) and the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan (2001-2005) mentioned a negative aspect that should be prevented. In the Tenth Five-Year Development Plan (2014-2018), for the first time, it was suggested that Turkey should encourage high-skilled foreign workers to immigrate to Turkey. (Elveren, 2018).

Güngör and Tansel (2006) investigated Turkish students' return intention by surveying 906 students in the first half of 2002. The authors (Güngör & Tansel, 2006) found that higher salaries, lifestyle, long duration of stay in the destination country are effective for not returning to the home country; on the other hand, the compulsory service requirement in the home country after studying and the membership of Turkish student associations increase the intention of returning. Another study by Güngör and Tansel (2011) examined the return intention of Turkish professionals residing abroad by surveying more than 1000 people in the first half of 2002. Güngör and Tansel (2011) concluded that the economic instability of Turkey, prior intentions to stay abroad, and work experience in Turkey reduce the intention for returning. Also, Güngör and Tansel (2011) and Elveren and Toksöz (2019) found that female immigrants are less willing to return to Turkey.

The findings of the studies of Güngör and Tansel (2006, 2011) show that economic and social factors in home and destination countries are effective on the return intention of Turkish high-skilled immigrants. If Turkish high-skilled immigrants do not show the intention of returning, Turkey is losing the human intellectual capital.

In parallel with these studies, European countries have demanded high-skilled labour since the 2000s. Germany, the USA, the UK, Australia (Constant & Tien, 2011), Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic (Rutkowski, 2007) eased the recruitment of high-skilled workers. This demand also makes Europe an attractive migration destination for Turkish citizens.

#### V.E.3b. Soft Power

In the 2010s, the AKP government in Turkey declared that the Turkish diaspora is the soft power of Turkey. Through Turkish immigrants, the AKP government makes diplomacy in Europe. The AKP government needs the Turkish diaspora in Europe to refurbish Turkey's image as a European country in accession to the EU (Köşer Akçapar & Bayraktar Aksel, 2017).

Turkish diaspora may act as a pressure group for making policies in the destination country. Being an effective actor in the policy-making process in the destination country shows the power of the diaspora. The Turkish diaspora may intervene on time and against the destination countries’ policies that do not support Turkey's interests. For example, in December 2011, in the front of French National Assembly in Paris, Turkish nationals organized a demonstration against the legal proposal to recognise the Armenian genocide in 1915 (Ünver, 2013).

Turkish diaspora is highly supportive of the EU accession of Turkey. Küçükcan (2007) investigated the Turkish Diaspora by surveying the civil society organizations about the identity perception of Turkish-origin people in the Netherlands and their views on the full membership of Turkey. Küçükcan (2007) showed that many organizations declared themselves as only Turkish organizations, Turkish-Dutch organizations, and Turkish-Dutch-Muslim organizations. Besides, many organizations supported Turkey's EU membership and thought that Turks in Europe is a bridge between Turkey and the EU. However, Küçükcan (2007) also concluded that the power of Turkish civil society organizations in Europe was not utilized effectively in the EU negotiations for membership.

### V.F. EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY

The Treaty of Amsterdam and Luxembourg Submit in 1997 got started on the European Employment Strategy (EES), which shapes the labour market policies at the EU level by establishing common objectives and targets for employment policy. The creation of more and better jobs throughout the EU is its primary aim (European

Commission, 2020) because the countries that "introduce more regulations on conditions of employment and wages achieve higher levels of productivity" (Kılıçaslan & Taymaz, 2008, p. 477).

The first guideline in 1997 focused on four pillars: employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability, and equal opportunities. For improving employability, within six months of unemployment (one year for countries with high unemployment rates), the Member States offer training, retraining, work experience, or participation in an employment scheme. Entrepreneurship is about easing to start up and run a business. The adaptability is related to establish social dialogue for modernizing work organization. Equal opportunities aim for gender equality in the labour market (Goetschy, 1999).

In 2000 in the Nice Council, the employment quality came forward, and its indicators were defined in the Leaken Summit in the following year. In 2003, full employment, employment quality, productivity, social inclusion, and social cohesion entered the agenda. Employment quality contains intrinsic job quality, life-long learning, gender equality, health and safety at work, flexibility and security, access to the labour market, work-life balance, social dialogue, non-discrimination, and economic productivity (Davoine & Erhel, 2006).

The strategy (2020) involves four steps:

1) *Employment Guidelines*: It was adopted in 2017. It involves the scope and direction for Member States' policy coordination and country-specific recommendations. It targets boosting demand for labour, enhanced labour and skills supply, better functioning of the labour markets and fairness, combating poverty, promoting equal opportunities.
2) *Joint Employment Report*: It is "based on (a) the assessment of the employment situation in Europe, (b) the implementation of the Employment Guidelines, and (c) an assessment of the Scoreboard of key employment and social indicators" (European Commission, 2020).
3) *National Reform Programmes*: The coordination of economic policies allows the Member States to discuss their economic and budget plans.

4) *Country Reports*: It reports the countries' economic situations and includes country-specific recommendations.

The main tool of the EU policymaking process, which covers the EES, is Open Method Coordination (Zeitlin, 2005) that involves:

> - "fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
> - establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice;
> - translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences;
> - periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes" (European Council, 2000).

Mailand (2008) mentions three mechanisms that make more effective EES over national policies:

1) *Peer Pressure*: It is a pressure that the Member States compress each other to reach common goals.
2) *Strategic Use*: It allows national governments to legitimate unpopular measures or reforms for the labour market.
3) *Socialization/Discourse Formation and Learning*: It creates a common discursive frame of reference for national employment policies by civil servants.

Some authors (Raveaud, 2007; Davoine & Erhel, 2006) criticize that the EES does not pay attention enough to employment quality. While the employment rate is rising in the EU, the quality of employment is decreasing. For example, the employment rate had been increasing in the EU-28 from 2009 to 2019. The numbers of persons employed part-time and the employees with a contract of limited duration had also been rising during the same period (Eurostat, 2020). In addition, the EES is not binding (Bazzani, 2017).

For the candidate countries, the accession to the EU depends on adopting political, economic and legal conditionalities of the EU, which the Copenhagen Criteria determined in 1993. The criteria are a pathway of reaching the labour market related common values of the EU. The labour market-related conditionalities are the free trade union organisations as political criteria, the Economic Reform Program (ERP) (the expended version of the previous Pre-Accession Economic Programmes) as economic criteria, freedom of movement for workers, social policy, and employment as legislative alignment.

Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963 with the EEC. The significance of the Ankara Agreement is that European states recognised Turkey as a European country and allowed Turkish citizens to find a job through a one-year work visa (extendable for three more years). It has never entered into force due to several economic and political obstacles, but the UK implements a one-year work visa for Turkish nationals. After long negotiations, Turkey received candidate status in 1999 from the EU, and the negotiations for the accession started in 2005.

As a candidate country, Turkey has been suffering some problems like the high unemployment rate, skills mismatch due to the issues at the education system, high inflation, the depreciation of the Turkish Lira and the dependency of the judicial system due to the political pressure over the judges and prosecutors.

The Europeanisation is the first step for showing the demand of being a Member State; so, it is a process that starts before being an EU country. This chapter aims to investigate the Europeanisation process of Turkey in the context of the Turkish labour market and (potential) immigrants from Turkey in the EU. Therefore, it includes the labour market conditionalities, the European legislation for immigrants, and Turkey's Europeanisation and the status of immigrants from Turkey in the EU.

# VI. EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR MARKET AFTER THE 2008 CRISIS

The following analysis explains the influence of the economic determinants in the emigration decision of the Turkish workers towards the EU. In the first place, the advantages of the labour market of the European Union with respect to that of Turkey are analysed through statistical analysis. The hypothesis is that the 2008 crisis has lowered the standards of the quality of the job market of the European Union and diminished the economic interest of Turkish immigrants. However, the data on the political events in Turkey and the increase of Turkish migration by 2009 indicates that political and social factors in the 2010's migration were becoming as relevant as economic factors were in the 1960s.

## VI.A. ECONOMIC INDICATORS

The EU is one of the biggest economies in the world with 28 Member states (as of 2019), which have approximately 511 million total population (Eurostat, 2018); so, the EU has a large labour market which had been affected by the Global Economic Crisis 2008. Blanchard (2017) mentions that unemployment in the EU was nearly twice higher than in the USA in 2015.

Unemployment, inflation, industrial production, GDP, government deficit/surplus, government debt, and labour costs and wages are the main economic indicators of the EU (Eurostat, 2020). Therefore, in this part, it is given general information about these economic indicators of the EU. The statistics for non-EU and foreign-born immigrants are also added.

### VI.A.1. Unemployment, Underemployment, and Informal Employment

The unemployment rate is "the proportion of workers in the economy who are not employed and are looking for a job" (Blanchard, Macroeconomics, 2017, p. 27). The data (Eurostat, 2018) shows that the unemployment rate had increased gradually from 2008 to 2013 from 7% to 10.9% (see Graph 1), and at the same period, the employment rate had decreased from 70.8% to 68.4%. The recovery process had started after 2013, but it is slow (Dimian, Begu, & Jablonsky, 2017). The employment rate in the EU had increased from 68.4% to 72.2% from 2013 to 2017, and the total unemployment rate had decreased from 10.9% to 7.6% from 2013 to 2017 (Eurostat, 2018). It might be interpreted as that the labour force participation rate increased after 2013. However, the targeted employment rate was 75% in 2017 (Eurostat, 2017); so, the employment rate in the EU was still low, with 72.2% in 2017, although it has had the highest rate since 2006.

**Graph 4:** Unemployment Rate in the EU from 2008 to 2018 by Country of Birth[2]




**Source:** Eurostat. (2018, April 11).

[2] Non-EU represents people who do not have the EU citizenship. Foreign born refers to people who were born outside the EU.

The unemployment rates of Member States of the EU are significantly different from each other. For example, in 2017, the unemployment rate in Greece (21.5%) was almost six-fold higher than the unemployment rate in Germany (3.8%). Similarly, whereas the unemployment rates of Germany, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdoms were below 5%, for Greece, Spain, Croatia, and Cyprus, it was above 10% (Eurostat, 2018).

In some EU Member States such as Romania, Malta, and Poland, although the unemployment rates were below 5%, the employment rates were below the average employment rate of the EU too in 2017 (Eurostat, 2018). That might mean that there were people who quitted to seek a job in these countries.

In the Member States, there are differences in the employment rates among the Northern and Southern countries. In the Northern countries such as Germany, Sweden, Estonia, and Denmark, the employment rates were higher than the average of the EU in 2017, while the employment rates in the Southern countries such as Greece, Croatia, Italy were lower than the average of the EU. This difference is inversely the same for the unemployment rate (Eurostat, 2018).

As a candidate country, Turkey needs to drag down the unemployment rate, which has been higher 2%-4% than the average unemployment rate of the EU-28 between 2008 and 2018. From 2009 to 2018, the unemployment rate in Turkey had gone upwards of 10.9% (Eurostat, 2018).

The unemployment rate of foreign-born and non-EU immigrants had been higher than the natives in the Member States (see Table). Non-EU immigrants have the highest unemployment rate among the others and almost twice higher than the total unemployment rate (Eurostat, 2018).

The youth unemployment rate in the EU is historically high and increasingly long-term (Hernanz & Jimeno, 2017; Banerji, Saksonovs, Lin, & Blavy, 2014). Young people are divided into three different population groups: 15-24 aged, 24-29 aged and over 30 aged, and in all population groups, the youth unemployment rate in the EU had been higher than the US between 1981 and 2015 (Hernanz & Jimeno, 2017).

Between 1983 and 2016, the youth unemployment rate had been higher than the total unemployment rate in almost all the EU countries (Eurostat, 2017). Although there was no detailed data on the unemployment rate of 24-29 aged and over 30 aged young people, the unemployment rate of 15-24 age group was 10.9% in 2017 in the EU (Eurostat, 2018). In this case, unemployed young people in the 15-24 age group are not in education or training because students are not included in the labour force. Therefore, these young people are neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET). In some Member States like Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, and Romania, the NEET rates were above 15% (Eurostat, 2018).

Youth unemployment is an important issue because the long-term high youth employment rate might cause to erode social cohesion and institutions, foster crime and lead to a scarring lower probability of future jobs and lower wages (Banerji, Saksonovs, Lin, & Blavy, 2014); in addition, they are under the risk of old-age poverty (Oesingmann, 2017). The characteristics of youth unemployment might be examined in the context of labour mobility, skills mismatch (Oesingmann, 2017; O'Reilly, et al., 2015), the flexibility of the labour market (O'Reilly, et al., 2015; Banerji, Saksonovs, Lin, & Blavy, 2014), family legacy and the EU dimension (O'Reilly, et al., 2015). Although young people are more willing to move to other countries to seek a job than adults, sometimes they might not move easily due to family ties. Another reason might be upbringing, which is related to how families shape their children's lifestyles. Young people are suffering from being lower-skilled or less experienced than adults; so, they are also ready to work with temporary job contracts or without job security too. This dilemma might continue till they get work experiences that might also be provided by the EU programs like Europe 2020 or Youth in Action.

In addition to the unemployment problem, in the EU, there is an underemployment problem. Underemployed people are part-time workers, jobless persons seeking a job but not immediately available for work, and finally, jobless persons available for work but not seeking it. Underemployment is the underutilization of labour (Wilkins & Wooden, 2011).

Underemployment is an alternative for not being unemployed. Underemployment may be observed easily or not. Observable underemployment is related to statistical data, and it can be detected through labour force surveys. Unobservable underemployment is related to the mismatch among the level of skills, productivity, and salary (Görmüş, 2019).

In 2017, 7.9% of the total active population in the EU-28 was underemployed part-time workers, persons seeking work but not immediately available and persons available to work but not seeking. In Turkey, this proportion was 6.5% for the same year (Eurostat, 2020).

In Turkey, men are more likely underemployed than women. Old age people are likely underemployed than young adults. University graduates are more likely to underemployed than non-university graduates. Informally employed people are more likely underemployed than formally employed people (Görmüş, 2019; Acun & Güneş, 2014).

Working in the informal economy is another problem related to unemployment. Informal employment refers to working without paying social insurance contributions and income taxes; that is to say, working out of the control of the state. Three reasons are listed why we should be worried about informal employment: (1) problems of individuals - the lack of health insurance, unemployment benefits, old-age benefits, and child benefits, (2) problems of firms - paying more taxes due to tax evasion of individuals, and (3) problems of society- paying more the costs of public goods and services. Immigrant workers who do not work permits are more likely employed informally (Packard, Koettl, & Montenegro, 2012).

Migrants are one of the vulnerable groups who are employed more likely informally. Migrants are more likely willing to work without any rights. There are several possible reasons for the lack of language skills, labour market discrimination, lack of homologation skills, and lack of work permit. Informally employed immigrant workers who do not have a resident permit and work permit work with the fear of deportation and without any rights; so, they face labour exploitation frequently.

Julià, Belvis, Vives and Tarafa (2018) analysed the 5th European Working Conditions Survey of 2010, which included 27,245 participants from the EU-27 and found that 4.5% were informally employed (4.1% among men and 5.1% among women). In Turkey, in 2010, the study of Mahiroğulları (2017) shows that the proportion of informal employment was 30%, and this proportion decreased to 25% in 2015.

### VI.A.2. Inflation

Inflation is a sustained increase in the price level of goods and services in an economy (Blanchard, 2017; Biçerli, 2016). Inflation is measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which measures the changes in the price level of goods and services over time (Blanchard, 2017). The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is a harmonised version of the CPI for the EU. The HICP is valid in the Eurozone, which consists of the Member States that adopted the euro as the currency. Below 2% of the inflation is defined as stable by the European Central Bank (ECB) (Scheller, 2006).

The inflation in the EU had increased from 2006 to 2008, from 2.3% to 3.7%. Although it decreased to 1% in 2009, the increase had continued to 3.1% in 2011. From 2012 to 2015, it decreased gradually from 2.6% to 0%. In 2016 the inflation measured 03%, while it increased again to 1.7% in 2017 (Eurostat, 2018).

The main components of euro area inflation consist of four groups: 1) food, alcohol, and tobacco, 2) energy, 3) non-energy industrial goods, and 4) services. In June 2018, the inflation rates of non-energy industrial goods (0.4%) and services (1.3%) were below 2%, while the inflation rates of food, alcohol, and tobacco (2.8%) and energy (8%) were above the 2% (Eurostat, 2018).

In June 2018, the estimated HICP was declared 2% in general (Eurostat, 2018). The 2% of the inflation is considered low by the ECB. For the inflation rate, the target of the ECB is too close to 2% for an adequate margin to avoid the risks of deflation (Scheller, 2006); so, it is possible to say that the inflation rate is generally stable in the EU.

As a candidate country, Turkey has a huge inflation rate (CPI- Consumer Price Index) compared with the EU-28. Annual inflation of December 2018 was declared more than 16% in general (Inflation.eu, 2020). Since the CPI is an average price of a basket of commonly used goods and services relative to some based period, it is used to measure purchasing power.

### VI.A.3. Industrial Production

The industrial production of the EU was affected significantly by the global economic crisis of 2008. The value generated from the industrial production of the EU decreased sharply by almost 20% after the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. Between 2009 and 2011, it increased by 10%. The production of the EU recovered fully in 2016. (Eurostat, 2017).

Industrial production has been increasing since 2014 in the Euro Area and Turkey. In 2017, according to the Industrial Production Index (2010=100), the production of the industry had increased from 101.2 to 108.6 from 2014 to 2017 in the Euro Area. The production of the manufacturing and the construction also has been growing in the Euro Area. In the same period, in the Euro Area, the manufacturing production increased from 103.2 to 111.5, and the production of the construction increased from 91.8 to 96. For Turkey, between 2014 and 2017, the production of industry (from 135.8 to 162.3), the production of the manufacturing (from 138.9 to 166.9) and the production of the construction (from 124.7 to 130.4) had been increasing. (OECD, 2018).

Germany is the motor force of the industrial production of the EU. In 2016, Germany produced the highest value in the EU with 22%, equal to EUR 1090 billion. Italy (13%), France (10%), the UK (7%) and Spain (6%) followed Germany in the same year. Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers had been three top manufacturing productions between 2008 and 2016. In 2016, these three products consisted of almost two-thirds of the industrial production with EUR 500 billion (Eurostat, 2017).

### VI.A.4. Gross Domestic Products

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the measure of the aggregate output (final goods and services) of a country during a given period (Blanchard, 2017). The growth of GDP in the world affected by the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. In 2009, the GDP decreased sharply worldwide, and in the EU-28, the real GDP decreased by 4.4%. In Japan, this decrease closed to 6% while it closed to around 3% in the USA. The recovery process started in 2010. However, in 2011 it decreased slightly. After 2012, the recovery process started again, and the real GDP has increased gradually (Eurostat, 2017).

The five largest economies of the EU (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain) produced 67.1% of the EU-28's GDP in 2016. The highest growth rates of GDP in the EU had been recorded in Malta (3.7%), Poland (3.5%) and Slovakia (3.1%) between 2006 and 2016, and the growth rates of GDP had been recorded negative in Greece, Italy, Croatia, and Portugal during the same period. "Turkey recorded its eighth consecutive positive annual rate of change in 2017" (Eurostat, 2017) with a 7.4% GDP growth rate (World Bank, 2019).

Purchasing power is an income in terms of goods, while Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is a method that allows us to make a comparison of GDPs (Blanchard, 2017). In 2017, by approving the PPS of the EU as 100, in some countries like Luxembourg (253), Ireland (184), the Netherlands (128), Austria (128), Germany (123) and Denmark (125), the PPS were so higher than the other Member States like Bulgaria (49), Croatia (61), Latvia (67), Hungary (68) and Greece (67), and Turkey had similar PPS with Greece (Eurostat, 2018). That signals a huge gap in PPS among the Member States.

### VI.A.5. Government Deficit/Surplus

"The general government deficit/surplus is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as general government net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) according to the European System of Accounts" (EU Open Data Portal, 2018). The percentage of GDP measures the government deficit/surplus. The negative value means 'deficit' while the positive value

means 'surplus'. According to the Maastricht criteria, the countries in the Euro area should avoid making the government deficit more than 3% of the GDP.

In 2006, the government deficit of the EU-28 was -1.6% of total GDP, and the highest surplus belonged to Finland (3.9%) while the lowest deficit belonged to Hungary (-9.3%). In 2009, due to the Global Economic Crisis of 2008, all countries of the EU-28 had deficits. While Greece (-15.1%) and Spain (-11%) had the highest deficit in 2009, Ireland (-13.8%) was among the countries which had the highest deficits in the EU. The deficit of Ireland broke a record with -32.1% for the following year. The deficits started to decrease after 2010. In 2017, the deficit of the EU-28 was -1%. While Spain (-3.1%) had the highest deficit in 2017, Malta (3.9%) had the highest surplus. (Eurostat, 2018). The government deficit of Turkey was also high (-2.77%) in 2017 (OECD, 2018), but it was still under the limit of the Maastricht criteria.

### VI.A.6. Government Debts

The gross government debt, defined in the Maastricht Treaty, covers currency, deposits, debt securities, loans of the organizations like the central government, state government, local government, social security funds. According to one of the Maastricht criteria, the countries should keep the government debt ratio under 60% of the GDP unless the ratios are decreasing continuously.

For the EU and some Member States, in 2014, the government debts climbed the top point. In the EU-28, general government gross debt was 91.9% of GDP in 2014. For the Member States like Belgium (107%), Italy (131.8%), Spain (with 100.4%), Cyrus (107.5%) and Portugal (130.6%), in 2014, general gross debts were the highest between 2006 and 2014. In 2017, the gross government debt of Estonia (9%) was the lowest, while the gross government debt of Greece (178.6%) was the highest. In the same year, the gross government debt of the EU-28 was 81.6%. (Eurostat, 2018). Turkey's government debt (35%) was under the limit of the Maastricht criteria in 2017 (OECD, 2018).

#### VI.A.7. Labour Costs and Wages

In the EU, the labour costs are compared through quarterly Labour Cost Index (LCI), which is a Euro indicator which is related to hourly labour costs that cover 'wages and salaries' and 'employers' social security contributions plus taxes paid minus subsidies received by the employer' (Eurostat, 2020).

The labour cost of the EU per hour changed 2.5% on the previous period in 2017. Bulgaria (12.2%), Romania (18%), Hungary (9.9%), Lithuania (9%) and Czech Republic (8.1%) had the biggest changes while Italy (0.8%), Belgium (1.4%), Spain (0.5%) and Finland (-1.5%) had the lowest changes in 2017. The change was 4.9% for Turkey in 2017 (Eurostat, 2020).

From 2004 to 2017, in many Member States of the EU, the minimum wages had increased so slightly in general, although there was no information for countries like Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Austria, Finland and Sweden. In 2017, the highest minimum hourly wages were in Luxembourg (11.9), Belgium (EUR 10.5), Germany (EUR 11.1), France (EUR 11.6) and the Netherlands (EUR 10.4), while the lowest minimum wages were in Latvia (EUR 3.9), Slovakia (EUR 3.4) and Lithuania (EUR 4.7). In Turkey, the minimum hourly wage was EUR 6.2 (OECD, 2020).

### VI.B. JOB QUALITY INDICATORS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Job quality indicators below are here analysed for the EU.

#### VI.B.1. Safety and Ethics of Employment

Safety and ethics of employment have three sub-dimensions: safety at work, child labour and forced labour, and fair treatment in employment (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015).

Safety at work is measured by the rate of fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 employed persons, the rate of nonfatal occupational injuries per 100,000 employed persons, the percentage of employed persons who are exposed to physical health risk factors at work, and the percentage of employed persons who are exposed to mental

well-being risk factors at work (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015).

In 2015, the rate of fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 employed persons in Germany, the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands was less than 1, and this rate was higher than 3.5 in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Portugal while the average of was 1.83 in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2018). The number of fatal injuries in the EU-28 in 2015 was 3876 persons (Eurostat, 2018), while this number was very close to 5000 persons in the USA in the same year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017).

The rate of nonfatal occupational accidents per 100,000 employed persons was less than 100 accidents in Romania and Bulgaria, while this rate broke the record in France with 3160 accidents in 2015 (Eurostat, 2018). The average of nonfatal occupational accidents per 100,000 employed persons in the EU in 2015 was 1513 accidents (Eurostat, 2018), while this was 2900 accidents per 100,000 employed persons in the USA in 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017).

### VI.B.2. Employment Relationship and Work Motivation

Employment-related relationships and work motivation are related to the quality of employment. Many people spend approximately eight hours during a working day at their workplaces; so, the relationships at work and working motivation play a vital role in the well-being of individuals.

Employment-related relationships contain the vertical and horizontal relationships among individuals who work in the same workplace. The vertical relationships are between employees and supervisors, while the horizontal relationships are among colleges and co-workers. At the workplace, physical, sexual, and psychological violence might have occurred. National laws of the Member States, besides the EU law, are effective to protect the rights of workers against violence and harassment at work. The European Social Partners' 2007 Framework Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work and the 2000 Equal Treatment Directive are two essential documents against violence and harassment at the EU level. In the papers, violence and harassment are defined as unacceptable behaviours which might happen in many

different forms. Violence at work is an assault in the circumstances related to work. Harassment is repeatedly and deliberately abuse, threaten or humiliation in the circumstances related to work (Eurofound, 2015).

Work motivation is one of the key factors for happiness at work. Also, it is a factor that may increase productivity at work. The main indicators of work motivation are job autonomy, feedback from supervisors, intrinsic rewards, work intensity and organisational participation (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015). According to these indicators, one of the best ways to measure work motivation is to use qualitative methods because it is hard to measure work motivation without taking the workers' remarks.

In 2013, the highest percentages of employed persons exposed to physical health risk factors at work were in Sweden and Finland (more than 20%). The lowest percentages of employed persons who are exposed to physical health risk factors at work were in Romania and Ireland (less than 2%), while the average percentage of employed persons who are exposed to physical health risk factors at work in the EU-28 was 7.9% (Eurostat, 2018).

In 2013, the highest percentages of employed persons who are exposed to mental well-being risk factors at work were in Luxembourg (53.6%), and France (60.5%), and the lowest percentages of employed persons who are exposed to mental well-being risk factors at work was in Bulgaria (12.9%) while the average percentage of employed persons who are exposed to mental well-being risk factors at work was 28% in the EU-28 (Eurostat, 2018).

Immigrants are more likely to work in risky jobs than native workers with poor working conditions, as measured by injury and fatality rates (Sterud, et al., 2018; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009). Some studies (Sterud, et al., 2018; Civan & Gökalp, 2011; Yılmaz, 2009) show that a higher risk of fatal and non-fatal accidents in immigrants was reported in European states like Greece, Spain, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy. For example, "the injury rates in immigrants ranged from 109.1 to 271.8 per 1000 non-EU illegally employed people compared with 65 per 1000 for the

general working population in Italy in 2004" (Sterud, et al., 2018). Many accidents are not reported in Turkey, and the fatal accident numbers for 100,000 workers are almost three times more than in any European country (Ceylan, 2011). According to the Health and Safety Labour Watch (ISIG) (2018), in Turkey, at least 506 immigrant workers died at their workplace between 2013 and 2019.

Child labour and forced labour are two aspects related to each other. The victims might be the children aged 5 to 17 years who are engaged in child labour, the children aged 5 to 17 years who are engaged in hazardous child labour, the children aged 5 to 17 years who are engaged in the worst forms of child labour other than hazardous work, the persons who are in forced labour, and the returned labour migrants who were in forced labour (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015).

There is no sufficient data about child labour for the many Member States. Only Portugal and Romania provided data about child labour. Between 2010 and 2016, the percentage of children 5–17 years old involved in child labour had been 3% in Poland and 1% in Romania (UNICEF, 2017).

The Council Directive 94/33/EC of the 22nd of June of 1994 bans the employment of children except for some special circumstances. The directive pays to regard the health and safety of young people, including the regulations on working time.

In Turkey, approximately 320,000 children (6-14 ages-old, almost 3% of the children population) worked in 2018 (ILO, 2018). Children are working on the streets by selling small items or collecting recyclables in the agricultural industry as seasonal workers and other industries, mostly the textile industry (Akpınar, 2017; Değirmencioğlu, Acar, & Baykara Acar, 2008). After the 2011 Syrian Civil War, many Syrians immigrated to Turkey. Almost 3 million Syrians are officially registered in Turkey as of 2017 (Akpınar, 2017), and it is estimated that there are almost 1.4 million Syrian children in Turkey (Yalçın, 2016). Child labour in Turkey is considered to worsen, and an estimation could not have done due to the lack of official data about child labour for Syrian immigrant children (Yalçın, 2016).

Six indicators define forced labour: 1) “threats of or actual physical or sexual violence; (2) restriction of movement of the worker; (3) debt bondage/bonded labour; (4) withholding wages or refusing to pay the worker; (5) retention of passports and identity documents; and (6) the threat of denunciation to the authorities” (ILO, 2005, pp. 20-21) (cited in (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015)).

In 2012, 880.000 people were in the forced labour in the EU, while 20.9 million persons were victims of forced labour globally. Almost 1.8 persons per 1000 habitants were in forced labour in the EU. More than half of the victims (58%) was women. It was estimated that almost one to third people (30%) were victims of sexual exploitations while almost two to third people (70%) were victims of labour exploitations. It is confirmed that many of the victims involved in illicit or informal activities such as forced begging. It is found that many people in forced labour worked in domestic works, manufacturing, agriculture, and construction sectors (ILO, 2012).

Pay gap, access to managerial occupations and discrimination at work are three dimensions of fair treatment in employment (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015). All three of them are realised between different subpopulations groups such as gender, immigrant status.

In the EU, in 2016, women's earnings were 16.2% lower than men's earnings. In 2016, the lowest gender gap was in Romania (5.2%), while the highest gender gap was in Estonia (25.3%). The gender pay gap is also considered from the perspective of part-time or full-time jobs. In 2016, the gender pay gap for part-time workers was -0.5% in Germany, while the gender pay gap for part-time workers was 26.7% in Portugal. Besides, the gender pay gap has age and sectoral dimensions. In 2016, the highest gender pay gap for workers above 65 years old was in Cyprus (51.9%), while this gap was the lowest in Slovenia (0%) for the same age group. In the many Member States, in 2016, the gender pay gap in the private sector was higher than in the public sector (Eurostat, 2018).

Some studies (Anderson, 2015; Smith J. P., 2005) show that many immigrants earn less than native workers, and there might be a wage gap among different immigrant

groups like documented immigrants and undocumented immigrants (Smith J. P., 2005).

Access to managerial occupations implies the percentage of employed persons in population subgroups in managerial occupations. One of the most observed unbalance situations to access managerial occupations belongs to the gender differences. According to a European survey data on working conditions in 2000, although thirds of clerical, and service and sales workers were women, more than 60% of the legislative and managerial occupations were occupied by men by rising to over 70% in the sub-categories of corporate managers and senior government officials (Fagan & Burchell, 2002).

Workers might face discrimination at work due to gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, migration status or sexual orientation. Although discrimination at work might be measured by the number of employed persons who have been victims of discrimination at work, it is hard to determine workers who are subject to discrimination because discrimination is not always obvious. People might be avoided to declare the discrimination confronted. The European Employment Strategy (EES) of the EU plays a role against discrimination at work for putting a specific goal to promote equal treatment for everyone at work.

### VI.B.3. Income and Benefits from Employment

Income and benefits from employment are vital for workers to earn their living due to the indicators of material well-being.

Case, Fair and Oster (2012, p. 54) defines income as "the sum of all a household's wages, salaries, profits, interest payments, rents, and other forms of earnings in a given period". Direct wages and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities, and other payments come from employment.

The range of minimum wages in the EU changed from 286 euros in Bulgaria to 2071 euros in Luxembourg in January 2019. The Eurostat (2019) divided the Member States into three groups according to their minimum wages level: national minimum

wages lower than 500 euros like Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Hungary, national minimum wages higher than 500 euros but lower than 1000 euros like Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Greece, Portugal, Malta and Slovenia, and national minimum wages higher than 1000 euros like Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg. With 442 euros, Turkey as a candidate member included in the group with national minimum wages lower than 500 euros. (Eurostat, 2019).

The Eurostat (2019) made a similar division for minimum wages according to Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), which is an indicator of the price level across countries: national minimum wages lower than PPS 800 like Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Czechia, Slovakia, Croatia and Hungary, national minimum wages higher than PPS 800 but lower than PPS 1000 like Greece, Portugal, Lithuania, Romania, Malta, Spain and Poland, and national minimum wages higher than PPS 1000 like Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg in January 2019. With PPS 1177, Turkey included in the first group (Eurostat, 2019).

Turkey has a lower minimum wage and higher PPS than the others. This situation means that the prices and the cost of living in Turkey are smaller than the others.

Native workers of EU-28 earn more income than foreign-born workers. From 2009 to 2018, the income gap between native and foreign-born workers increased gradually from PPS 2000 to PPS 2900. Interestingly, there is no wage gap between native workers and foreign-born workers in Turkey (Eurostat, 2020).

Non-wage pecuniary benefits are defined as any non-monetary benefits provided by the employer or state. Paid sick leave or paid annual leave are examples of non-wage pecuniary benefits. Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), established in 1990, provides information about the Member States' comparative data on social protection. (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015).

Each Member State gives different amounts of non-wage pecuniary benefits than the other. Also, the type of non-wage pecuniary benefits might change. For example, according to the MISSOC (2018) database in July 2018, while all Member States had child benefits in different conditions and amounts, parental leave benefits were not applicable in The Netherlands, Spain (unpaid), Malta, Ireland, Greece, and Cyprus.

#### VI.B.4. Working Time and Work-Life Balance

Working time is related to job quality and life quality because workers need to spend time on their private life for a healthy life. For constructing a balance between work life and private life, workers need to have a fair working duration.

The average weekly working hours in the EU was 40.2 in both 2017 and 2018. Some Member States like Belgium (39.1), Ireland (39.3), Denmark (with 37.8), Spain (39.7), France (39.1), Finland (39.4), Sweden (with 39.9) and Norway (38.5) had the average weekly working hours lower than 40 hours in 2018. Turkey had the average weekly working hours highest among European states, although the average weekly working hours decreased from 2016 to 2018 from 49.4 to 48.5 (Eurostat, 2019).

Some studies (Mercan & Karakas, 2019; Pérez, et al., 2012) state that Immigrants and native workers have almost the same average working hours, but these studies do not mention the willingness of immigrants to work more hours. On the contrary, other studies (OECD/EU, 2015) indicate that more foreign-born workers are willing to work more hours after the 2008 global economic crisis, 6% for women and 9% for men.

There are two legal documents for arranging working time in the EU: The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Working Time Directive. The Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is related to Article 31 of the Council of the EU in 2012. This article declared that “every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity, and the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave” (Eurofound, 2016). The Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC establishes the minimum standards for working

hours like a maximum of 48 hours weekly, including overtime and a minimum of four weeks paid leave per year.

Work-life balance refers to a balance between work life and private life. Work-life balance includes paternity leave, parental leave, carers' leave and flexible working arrangements. Since July 2019, there is a directive for minimum standards for paternity leave, parental leave allowance/payment and carers' leave at the EU level. According to this directive, parents have parental at least four months per parent. Besides, parents have the right to request reduced and flexible working hours or part-time work. Nowadays, it is expected that a new directive will offer ten paid working days for paternity leave, two non-transferable paid months for parental leave, which compensate, and five days for carers' leave per year (European Commission, 2019).

### VI.B.5. Security of Employment and Social Protection

Security of employment and social protection are the indicators of decent work, which covers " a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men" (ILO, 2019).

Security of employment means how likely workers are close to losing their jobs. Therefore, the degree of permanence of the job plays an important role to describe how much that job is secure. The indicators of security of employment are fixed-term contracts, job tenure, own-account workers, self-employed with one client, perceived job security, temporary employment agency workers, lack of a formal contract, precarious employment rate and informal employment rate. (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015).

The temporary employment rate in the EU in 2018 was 14.2%. Among the Member States, the highest temporary employment rate belonged to Spain (26.9%) and Poland (24.3%), Portugal (22%) in the same year. In Turkey, this rate was 12.5% in 2018 (Eurostat, 2019).

Comparing with native-born workers, the percentage of immigrant workers who work with the temporary contract is higher in the EU (16% versus 11% in 2012 and 2013, 15% versus 12% in 2018). Low educated women immigrants are most likely to work with a temporary contract. Similarly, the percentage of immigrant workers working in a part-time job is approximately 5%-10% higher than that of native-born workers. In addition, involuntary part-time working is prevalent for immigrant workers. (OECD/EU, 2015, 2018).

Social protection refers to take precautions in the case of some risks of employment such as the financial crisis, diseases, old age, conflicts at the workplace. It includes unemployment benefits, pensions, and health benefits. One of the critical indicators of social protection is the expenditures for these benefits, which are in-cash or kind.

Worldwide, in 2011, it is estimated that 75%-80% of workers do not have any social protection. One of the most vulnerable groups is immigrant workers. (ILO, 2013).

For the average of the EU, expenditure on social protection denominated the percentage of the GDP was 28.1% in 2016. Among the Member States, the highest rates of expenditure on social protection belonged to France (34.3%), Finland (31.8%) and Denmark (31.6%) in the same year. In 2015, the lowest rate belonged to Turkey with 12%. (Eurostat, 2018). Many immigrant workers, particularly women, are inadequately covered or not covered by social protection in neither destination country nor origin country (van Ginneken, 2013).

In Turkey, the share of informal economy— the share of people who work without social protection— has been decreasing since 2003. While almost half of working people worked without social protection coverage in 2003, this rate was around 30% in 2020 (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu, 2016).

### IV.B.6. Employment-Related Relationships and Work Motivation

Employment-related relationships and work motivation are related to the quality of employment. Many people spend approximately eight hours during a working day at

their workplaces; so, the relationships at work and working motivation play a vital role in the well-being of individuals.

Employment-related relationships contain the vertical and horizontal relationships among individuals who work in the same workplace. The vertical relationships are between employees and the supervisors while the horizontal relationships are among colleges and co-workers. At the workplace, physical, sexual and psychological violence might have occurred. National laws of the Member States, besides the EU law, are effective to protect the rights of workers against violence and harassment at work.

The European Social Partners' 2007 Framework Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work and 2000 Equal Treatment Directive are two essential documents against violence and harassment at the EU level. On the papers, violence and harassment are defined as unacceptable behaviours which might happen in many different forms. Violence at work is an assault in circumstances related to work. Harassment is repeatedly and deliberately abuse, threaten or humiliation in circumstances related to work. (Eurofound, 2015).

Work motivation is one of the key factors for happiness at work. Also, it is a factor which may increase productivity at work. The main indicators of work motivation are job autonomy, feedback from supervisor, intrinsic rewards, work intensity and organisational participation (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2015). One of the best ways to measure the work motivation in accordance with these indicators is to use the qualitative methods because it is hard to measure work motivation without taking the remarks of workers.

### IV.B.7. Job Quality of Turkish Immigrants in the European Union

Many immigrants have mostly experienced precarious work in the particular sectors such as construction, cleaning, care, hospitality, food etc. (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015; Wills, et al., 2010). Rodgers (1989) investigates precarious employment by four dimensions: (1) the degree of certainty of continuing work- the risk of job loss, (2) the aspect of control over work- working conditions, (3) the degree

of protection- social protection and protection against unfair dismissal and unacceptable working practices including discrimination, and (4) income - protection against poverty. Therefore, precarious employment implies "instability, lack of protection, insecurity and social or economic vulnerability" (Rodgers, 1989) at work, and it is poor, insecure, vulnerable, uncertain, instable labour condition. Since the rise of precarity comes along with the neoliberal globalisation, precarious work is a key explanatory framework for workplace exploitation (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015).

According to the dimensions which are stated by Rodgers (1989), if a worker has a risk to lose her/his job, has little or no control over work, works without protection and earn a low income, this worker has precarious employment. Therefore, precarious work includes in-work poverty (Pradella & Cillo, 2015).

The term of precarious work is mostly used in the European countries while the scholars in the UK prefer to use the term of 'vulnerable work' (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015). Since precarious work is used in the majority of the EU countries, this study uses the term of precarity.

Some studies (Arnholtz & Hansen, 2012; Pérez, et al., 2012) confirm that the working conditions of immigrant workers are worse than native workers' working conditions. For example, Arnholtz and Hansen (2012) find that Polish immigrants earn 5%-34% (changing by sectors) less than Danish workers in Denmark while Polish immigrants' working hours are more than the native workers. While the average working hours are almost same for the both (Mercan & Karakas, 2019; Pérez, et al., 2012), immigrants work with higher speed, in the noisier atmosphere, mostly by walking or standing, in a more painful position, by breathing fumes or dust and more likely without a contract (Pérez, et al., 2012). The migrants in a labour market are evaluated as a disadvantaged group due to the barriers such as language, networking, skills mismatch, the indulgence of working with lower wages.

The working conditions are getting better for the longer immigrants reside in a destination country. It is more likely that immigrants who live in a destination country

more than ten years can work no more with temporary contracts. However, immigrant workers still earn less, work long hours and are overqualified than their native colleagues. The 2008 global economic crisis had affected negatively to immigrants' average working hours, especially immigrant women. (OECD/EU, 2015).

For the job quality of the Turkish immigrants in Europe, we can give two examples from: Germany and the UK. Due to the historical and demographic reasons, it is expected that the Turkish-speaking community is an important part of the labour market in Germany, and one of the most integrated communities in the German labour market. The labour market integration implies on working in a labour market with harmony, including legal, economic and social aspects. However, Euwals et al. (2007) conclude that in the labour market the position of Turkish-speaking community is less favourable than the position of German workers although Turkish-speaking community outperforms comparing with German counterparts in terms of the (standardized) job prestige score. Also, the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2017) declares that the ethnic background had continued to be a disadvantage to integrated into labour market participation between 2005 and 2016.

In Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia region which is one of the most populated regions of Germany has a significant population of Turkish-speaking community. Due to the fact that German census does not collect data on ethnicity, it is estimated that more than 850,000 people was included Turkish population in North Rhine-Westphalia. However, the labour force participation rate of Turkish population is considered as low. The State of North Rhine- Westphalia (2010) states by basing on the nationality in the perspective of having a citizenship that while the labour force participation rate of Germans was 73.5%, the labour force participation rate of Turkish population was only 55% as the lowest participation rate.

In the UK, the Turkish-speaking immigrants is one of the minority groups who face similar problems. Also, although there was no specific statistics on the unemployment rate of Turkish-speaking immigrants, the unemployment rate of ethnic minorities had been almost twice higher than the unemployment rate of total population since 2002 to

2015 in the UK (UK Government, 2016). Therefore, it is considered that Turkish-speaking immigrants face problems in integrating to the labour market in the UK.

#### IV.B.7.a. Why Do Many Immigrants Have Predominantly Precarious Employment?

The reserve army of the labour theory of Marxism and the study of Piore (1979) are considered as two of the explanations of why immigrants work predominantly in precarious employment (Wills, et al., 2010). The idea of the reserve army of labour is based on the concept of the unemployed surplus population of Engels (1845). The competition among the bourgeois and economic crisis causes the fluctuation of wages, and as a result, workers' livelihood is getting more precarious (Marx, 1996). On the other hand, Piore (1979) explains the reasons for international migration with employment rate differences between the home country and destination country. However, an immigrant who is willing to earn more might experience mostly precarious works in the destination country because, according to Piore (1979), immigrants have limited access to the welfare benefits in the destination country; so, they accept the jobs which native workers decline (Wills, et al., 2010). In addition to these two reasons, labour market discrimination against immigrants (Pradella & Cillo, 2015), the lack of the recognition of qualifications (homologation of education) and having poor skill in speaking the language of the destination country are other reasons.

#### IV.B.7.b. Digitalisation of Labour and Digital Labour of Immigrant Workers

Since 2010 to present (as of 2020), the effects of artificial intelligence (AI), nanotechnology, robotics, biotechnology, smartphones, 3D printing, Blockchain have been increasing; so, this era is called the Fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0 (Larsson, 2020). Meanwhile, the work is digitalised in accordance with these technologies. Nowadays, many new products are produced with the collaboration of human experiences, human creativity, digital media and speech in this way, the work

transforms into the digital work, and the valorisation of digital work is called digital labour (Fuchs & Sevignani, 2013).

The gig economy is the product of the transformation of work from the analogue to the digital. The gig economy is based on crowd-working (service providers and clients meet through online platforms on the Internet) and working on-demand (even though the execution of work is traditional, the quality of the work is controlled by the online platform/firm) (Blix, 2017; De Stefano, 2016). Jobs in the gig economy are generally non-standard (Blix, 2017), freelance (Blix, 2017; Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne, & Tobsch, 2016) and/or with a short-term contract (Gomez-Herrera, Martens, & Muller-Langer, 2017; Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne, & Tobsch, 2016) and/or task-based works (De Stefano, 2016) and many times with multiple jobs (Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne, & Tobsch, 2016).

Working in the digital labour market is attractive because digital labour market has three advantages: (1) small entry or exist barriers, (2) little sunk costs and (3) access to same level of technology (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982) (cited in (Blix, 2017)). Thus, everyone who can access to the digital platforms might be a worker. That means the digitalisation is a good tool for job creation.

Digitalisation brings some benefits and disadvantages to the labour market. Digitalisation may increase the number of jobs while decreasing the quality of employment. Also, the digitalisation might save time and create a demand for new products and jobs (Zarubei, Kuybida, Kozhyna, Vdovichena, & Varenia, 2020). The digitalisation of work provides an advantage to the state while collecting taxes. Since it is harder to avoid detection, digitalisation weakens shadow economy and decrease corruption (Blix, 2017).

By gender perspective, although it is considered that women prefer more occupations that allow human interaction (Sáinz, et al., 2020), some authors (e.g., Krieger-Boden & Sorgner, 2018) state that new job opportunities for women might come with the digitalisation of employment. According to, Krieger-Boden and Sorgner (2018), the digitalisation helps women for accessing new markets, working flexibly and distantly,

acquiring new customers, improving financial autonomy, accessing finance, and reducing discrimination against women in the labour market.

The others (e.g., Gomez-Herrera, et al., 2017) argue that the working conditions in the gig economy are poor conditions which are far away from the rights of the employee such as pension rights, medical insurance, paid holidays, and unemployment insurance. Wage dumping, which includes high-quality work with a low wage, is also frequent in the gig economy (Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne, & Tobsch, 2016). Since the digitalisation allows the work to be done in anywhere for the other corner of the world, there is a direct consequence on the collective bargaining and the social security system. Today, the social security system of the gig economy is not strong. However, in the future, the digitalisation of the work might lead to the creation of a universal social security system (Eichhorst, Hinte, Rinne, & Tobsch, 2016). Moreover, digitalisation of work may transform the work culture due to its powerful effects on changing norms (Díez Nicolás, 2019)

Digitalisation causes deskilling or job destruction. Since digitalisation automates some jobs, there is no need for some skills. For example, automatic espresso machine replaces barista. Therefore, digitalisation prompts workers to gain new skills. Since the speed of digitalisation is fast, workers convert to life-long learners (Blix, 2017).

Some authors (e.g., Blix, 2017) states that digitalisation eases the accession to the labour market for the immigrants. Blix (2017) mentions that the easiness of the entrance to the labour market might help immigrants to reduce the risk of discrimination while accessing the labour market.

### VI.C. SOCIAL DIALOGUE

Social dialogue as a democratic management approach (Cam, 2019) is a consensus tool that can influence government decisions by lobbying in accordance with the partners' interests. Social dialogue has two main aims: to democratise economic and social policy-making and to reduce social conflicts. However, social dialogue needs strong representatives who can uphold different interests. Also, the implementation of

the results of social dialogue is hard due to the need of being legally binding (ILO, 2012).

Social dialogue is all types of negotiation related to economic and social policy among the representatives of workers and employers. At the national level, workers along with the trade unions and employers along with employers' associations are described as social partners. The interaction of these social partners with the public authorities are also called social dialogue. At the EU level, social dialogue is realised in two main levels: bipartite by the participation of social partners and tripartite by the participation of social partners and the EU institutions (ILO, 2012; European Commission, 2012).

The social dialogue also might be realised at the cross-industry level and sectoral level. At the cross-industry level, trade unions are represented by European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). In contrast, the Confederation of European Business (BusinessEurope) represents employers, the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP) and The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME). At the sectoral level, national unions and employers' associations come together in a particular industry across Europe. (ILO, 2012; European Commission, 2012).

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is another advisory body for representing workers' and employers' organisations and other interest groups. The committee was established in 1957. The committee ensures the implementation of EU laws by the consensus from all parties, promoting the participatory dialogue and the EU values (European Union, 2019).

Social dialogue is a consensus tool that can influence government decisions by lobbying in accordance with the partners' interests. Social dialogue has two main aims: to democratize economic and social policy-making and to reduce social conflicts. However, social dialogue needs strong representatives who can uphold different interests. Also, the implementation of the results of social dialogue is hard due to a need of being legally binding (ILO, 2012).

The EU develops social dialogue like collective bargaining between employers' associations and trade unions to determine wages and employment conditions in concert with the governments. This dialogue serves for employment security and a desirable distribution of income. For example, unlike the USA, workers have some ownership of jobs and voices at the workplace in the EU. The employer cannot replace or re-employ strikers during the strike, and the strikers can return their jobs after the strike. Also, workers send their representatives to the work councils for developing dialogue. In this way, they find an opportunity to discuss their needs with the employers (Freeman, 2006).

The Treaty of Maastricht 1992 institutionalized social dialogue for the first time. Today, European social dialogue functions through four main tools: (1) agreements following Article 155 of the Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU) such as council decisions and autonomous agreements, (2) process-oriented texts like frameworks of action, guidelines, policy orientations, (3) joint actions and tools such as joint opinions, declarations, tools, (4) procedural texts. European social partners act as the consultatory and assistant boards to implement social dialogue through these main tools. National social partners have the principal role in implementing social dialogue (Keller & Weber, 2011).

As a candidate member, Turkey is expected to develop the social dialogue among trade unions, employers' associations, and other interest groups. However, there are some constrictions against social dialogue due to the structure of Turkish industrial relations, which involves "restrictive labour laws, employer hostility to unionisation, a large informal economy and labour market and strong state intervention" (Yildirim & Calis, 2008, p. 214).

There are two main actors as social partners in the labour market: workers represented by trade unions and firms represented by employers' associations. In addition to these two actors, the government is also an effective actor in the labour market as a lawmaker.

In the EU, there are trade unions and employers’ associations. While the governments of the Member States are active actors at the national level, the EU takes the lawmaker role of governments at the international level. The European Works Council represents workers at the EU level. Trade unions, employers’ associations and the European Works Council are essential for developing social dialogue in the EU. Non-EU immigrants can be considered as labour market actors.

### VI.C.1. Trade Unions in the European Union and Turkey

The trade unions as voluntary organisations are the representatives of workers to provide the security of the agreed working practice and compensation schemes, to take part in jurisdiction about collective bargaining and to promote regular interaction with their governments and national political parties in support of economic, social, and political goals (Busch, 1983). Trade unions represent “the interests of workers at the workplace” (Castles, 1990, p. 6). The benefits of being a member of a trade union are to increase workers' bargaining power, provide a more equitable wage structure, develop job and income security, and provide some public goods like the rotation speed of assembly line (Biçerli, 2016). Therefore, trade unions are vital to protect and develop workers’ rights and being a member of a trade union is a democratic right. However, there are some costs of being a member of a trade union: strike costs, the possibility to lose the job, the loss of individualism and job flexibility, the fear of punishment by the employer (Biçerli, 2016).

Collective labour agreements and strikes are two of the most popular struggle tools of trade unions. The collective labour agreement is a type of agreement between workers and employers to guarantee workers' socio-economic rights and reorganise the terms of the production within the frame of law. Making a collective labour agreement is a process of bargaining with employers. During this bargaining, employers endeavour to reduce the wages to the lowest level possible, and workers endeavour to increase wages to the highest level possible. In other words, for the different conditions too, each group puts pressure on the other for its own best interests. The strike is to stop or slow down the production collectively. Each strike has its own purpose: the warning strike, the strike for interests, the strike for rights, the solidarity strike, the general

strike, and the political strike. The principal power of the strike comes from high participation because it is a collective event. The other struggle tools are public meetings, parades, press briefing, boycotts of consumers, protests, and campaigns (Aydoğanoğlu, 2007).

The power of trade unions might be related to the number of membership because it shows obvious support of the members, the legitimacy of the union and bargaining power of the union. In addition, the survival of trade unions depends on the fees which members give (Eurofound, 2010).

#### VI.C.2. Trade Union Membership in the European Union and Turkey

In Europe, the end of World War II was a turning point for the development of trade unions to a more democratic way because it was also the end of anti-democratic regimes in the countries like Germany and Italy. Although the focus of the trade unions is universal, like a fairer distribution of the final products produced by labour, higher living standards, and more employment security, trade unions' orientations and historical developments differ from one country to another (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000).

Nowadays, trade unions face multiple challenges such as “membership erosion due to structural changes in the economy and society; unfavourable political and institutional conditions that make organising even more difficult; and attempts to attract and represent new social groups remain insufficient” (Ebbinghaus, 2002, p. 465). These challenges weaken the power of trade unions in Europe. European Trades Union Confederation (ETUC), established in 1973, is an active trade union confederation to make collective bargaining at the European level (Buschak & Kallenbach, 1998). The focus of the ETUC is to strengthen social dialogue in Europe regarding a balance between the economic and social life of the citizens. Therefore, ETUC also deals with the challenges of trade unions in the EU.

Throughout the EU, according to the European Trade Union Institute (2016), only one-fourth of employees (23%) were members of the unions. While the highest

proportions of trade union membership were in Finland (74% in 2009), Sweden (70% in 2015) and Denmark (67% in 2010), this proportion was low in the UK (26% in 2014), Spain (19% in 2010), Germany (18% in 2012) and Estonia (10% in 1996) (European Trade Union Institute, 2016).

#### VI.C.2.a. Trade Unions and Other Professional Organizations in Turkey

There are three types of professional organizations structures in Turkey (Candan, 2012):

(1) NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are established by the free will of citizens. The membership, activities and finance of NGOs are volunteer-based—for example, associations and trade unions.
(2) Public-Professional Organizations: These organizations are founded by law and have a public legal personality. The membership is obligatory, and contributions of members provide finance— for example, bar associations.
(3) Professional Organizations: These organizations are founded by law or the free will of citizens and do not have a public legal personality. The membership, activities and finance of NGOs are volunteer-based or obligatory— for example, Intellectual and Artistic Works Owners' Professional Associations and Federations.

*Challenges of Professional Organizations in Turkey*

Membership density is low in organizations that do not have an obligation to be a member. The membership density has been decreasing since the 1990s all around the World, and the density had decreased around 20% to 9.2% in 1999-2019 in Turkey (OECD, 2019). The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services data in Turkey shows that only 13.86% of workers were members of a trade union in January 2019 (Resmi Gazete, 2019). However, in recent years, trade union membership has increased gradually. From January 2013 to January 2019, the number of trade union members had risen from 1,001,671 persons to 1,859,038 (DISKAR, 2019). This data

means that the trade unions gained around half of their power of being a pressure group over the decision-making process in Turkey.

Some studies (European Commission, 2019) reported that trade union rights in Turkey are under pressure; so, there are still some problems for applying several ILO conventions (Faucompret & Konings, 2008). The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (2018; 2016) listed Turkey among the ten worst countries for workers in the world in 2016 and 2018 by mentioning that some unionists are systematically arrested. Therefore, people might be afraid of being a trade union member due to political pressure. For example, a survey with 157 actors in Istanbul found that an only small number of the participants is a member of a trade union even if many participants agree on the necessity of being a trade union member (Hoş, 2018).

The organizations that professionals must be members of (like the public-professional organizations in Turkey) cannot engage in the political parties according to the constitution of the Republic of Turkey (The Constitution of The Republic of Turkey, 1982). When the membership is obligatory for keeping that profession, this situation is anti-democratic (Şahin, 2011; Çaha, 2011). Every individual should have a right to be a member of any civil society organization and a right to unsubscribe. On the other hand, some authors state that these public-professional organizations have a political stance (Şahin, 2011; Çaha, 2011). The professional organizations based on capital tend to the right-wing, while the professional organizations based on the diploma are related to the left-wing (Çaha, 2011).

An investigation done with 2200 professionals in 2011 showed that the participation rates in the activities of public-professional organizations and the elections of the organizations are low than almost half of members (Çaha, 2012). In the same investigation, half of the participants do not think that the working way of the organization is not democratic, and the organizations are not monitored enough financially.

Other challenges of trade unions and professional organizations are related to the economic structure of Turkey, such as high unemployment rate, high informal employment rate, high underemployment rate (an increase in part-time and on-demand working) and the increase in subcontracting practices (Gerşil & Aracı, 2006).

#### VI.C.2.b. Employers' Associations in the European Union

Employers' associations are the institutions that represent the collective interests of employers or firms in the labour market. Negotiating collective labour agreements, involving in bipartite or tripartite consultations, and dealing with employers or firms' interests are duties of employers' associations. Historically, employers' associations were developed later than trade unions (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2000).

The national 'peak' employers' organisations (NPEOs), which are not affiliated to any higher body, play a role in bipartite or tripartite consultations. However, NPEOs are also dual organisations that act according to the labour market or industrial relations interests. In some countries like Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and the UK, there is a single peak organisation, while in some countries like Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania and Norway, there are multiple peak organisations. (Eurofound, 2010).

Two organisations develop social dialogue as representatives of employers at the European level: the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP) and BusinessEurope. While the CEEP founded in 1963 implements lobbying for developing public services, BusinessEurope, which was established in 1958, focuses on advocating the growth and competitiveness at the European level.

The membership to a trade union was affected negatively due to the Global Economic Crisis of 2008, while the membership to employers' associations stayed stable as a long-term trend (European Commission, 2015). In 2006, the density of being a member of employers' associations was higher than the density of being a member of trade union in some European countries such as Austria (100%), the Netherlands (over 80%), France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Greece (70%-80%), Germany, Malta (60%–70%), Portugal, Cyprus, Sweden, Denmark, Italy (50%–60%), the UK,

Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic (30%–40%), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (20%–30%) (Eurofound, 2010).

### VI.C.3. Turkish Immigrant Associations as Labour Market Actors in the European Union

At the EU level, migrant workers have not been specifically represented. However, migrants have associations to support each other. Moya (2005) classifies immigrant associations: secret societies, rotating credit associations, mutual aid societies, religious associations, hometown associations, political groups, and other critical variables. The organisational form of Turkish nationals is very similar to hometown associations which are supranational and locality-based and preserve the connection with the home country. Since these associations promote the connection with the home country, they have a significant role in creating migration networks.

Immigrant associations have critical roles, especially as soon as new immigrants arrive in the destination country. However, today, some of these associations are also political representatives of the immigrants (Yurdakul, 2009) and deal with problems of the working population. Since many Turkish background people live in Germany (UNDESA, 2017), this part focuses below on the examples of Turkish immigrant associations in Germany.

#### VI.C.3.a. Turkish Immigrant Workers' Associations in Germany

In the 1960s in Germany, the Türk-Danış was established as an organization for helping Turkish workers as a consultancy office supported by 'Arbeiterwohlfahrt'— the Workers' Welfare Association (Altıntop, 2015) which is related to the German Social Democrat Party (Abadan-Unat, 2017)— and subsidized by the German government (Abadan-Unat, 1969). The Türk-Danış also gives German language course (Kökdağ, 2011; Aldoğan, 1978) and helps Turkish immigrants for finding accommodation and jobs (Erel, 2014).

The Federation of Workers' Associations of Federal Germany is another federation founded by Turkish origin immigrants in Germany in the 1960s. It is a workers' organisation which fight xenophobia and fascism while promoting human rights such as the right to be resident. (Federal Almanya İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu, 2017).

The Federation of Democratic Workers' Associations was established as a union of 33 Turkish origin workers' associations in Germany in 1980. The federation works for improving workers' conditions from the anti-imperialist viewpoint and contacts trade unions in Turkey. The political demands of the federation connected to the integration question are to provide language courses for immigrants, criticise the public stigmatisation about certain topics like forced marriages, introduce the Turkish language at schools, and replace religious education with the history of religious lessons. (Amelina & Faist, 2008).

#### VI.C.3.b. Turkish Immigrant Employers' Associations in Germany

The Turkish-German Businessmen and Industrialists Association (ATIAD) states to be a liberal, laic, and democratic organisation that regards minority rights. It aims to encourage Turkish origin people to be entrepreneurs in Europe, solve sectoral problems of Turkish entrepreneurs, support Turkey to become an EU member and contribute to vocational training of young Turks who live in Germany to prevent unemployment. (ATIAD, 2020).

The Turkish-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry was founded in 2003 in Germany. The chamber aims to strengthen the commerce relationship between Turkey and Germany, support immigrant-origin young people in their vocational training and contribute to the Turkish economy regarding EU integration. (Türk-Alman Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 2020).

#### VI.C.3.c. Response of Trade Unions to Employment Conditions of Immigrants

In many countries, the unionisation rate is the least among immigrants and foreign-born workers (Pradella & Cillo, 2015; Gorodzeisky & Richards, 2013). Immigrant/native workers' union membership ratio is closer to each other (around 0.9%) in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. In comparison, the lowest proportion (0.38%) is seen in Austria and Spain (Gorodzeisky & Richards, 2013).

Trade unions encounter some challenges concerning gaining immigrant members. Immigrants, especially new ones, would like to earn much money as soon as possible to return home country or to bring their families. Therefore, they are willing to work faster than others or to do overtime. This attitude may create conflict between immigrants and native workers. Also, lack of trade union experience, language barrier and discrimination make it difficult for immigrants to join a trade union (Castles, 1990).

Another difficulty is to contact undocumented immigrants. For undocumented immigrants, joining a trade union is harder than immigrants who have a work permit because they work in the informal economy, which means there is no formal paper. Therefore, meeting immigrant workers is hard for a union. Correspondingly, organising undocumented immigrants is almost impossible unless they would like to join the union.

## VI.D. INDICATORS OF SOCIAL SITUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The indicators of the social situation of the EU are size, population and the third-country nationals, households, education, social protection, income distribution, material deprivation and life expectancy (Social Protection Committee Indicators Sub-group, 2015). In addition, in this part, social dialogue in the EU is presented with the data related to foreign-born and non-EU immigrants.

### VI.D.1. Size, Population and The Third-Country Nationals

By the end of 2017, the EU had 511 million inhabitants in more than 4 million km2. The most populated Member State was Germany (82.5 million people), while the least populated Member State was Malta (429 thousand people). The surface area of France (632.8 thousand km2) is the biggest among the Member States, while the surface area of Malta (0.3 thousand km2) is the lowest among the Member States. (European Union, 2018). Turkey, with 783,5 thousand km², had 79.8 million population in 2017 (Eurostat, 2018).

In the treaties, the third-country nationals or non-EU immigrants refer to people, not citizens of a Member State. The third-country nationals who live legally in the EU's borders are considered migrants in the context of the EU (OECD, 2015). As of the 1st of January of 2017, almost 22 million third-country nationals lived in the EU; and the highest share of the foreign population was in Luxembourg (48%), while the lowest shares of the foreign population were in Poland and Romania (0.6%) (Eurostat, 2018).

The share of the Turkish population in the third-country nationals who lived in the EU is high. The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Turkey, almost 5 million Turkish people, including dual citizens, lived in 14 Member States— Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Greece, Spain, and Poland (DİYİH, 2015). In contrast, the UNDESA (2017) declared that the Turkish migration stock in the EU-28 was 2,372,222 persons in 2015.

In 2016, almost 1 million people acquired one Member State citizenship. The highest acquisition of citizenship realized in Italy (201.6 thousand people), Spain (150.9 thousand people), the UK (149.8 thousand people), France (119.2 thousand people) and Germany (112.8 thousand people) in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018).

### VI.D.2. Households

The average size of the households of the EU in 2017 was 2.3 members. In 2017, Croatia (with 2.8 members) had the largest average size of the households while

Sweden (1.9 members), Germany and Denmark (both with two members) had the smallest average sizes of the households. In 2017, in Turkey, the average size of the households (3.4 members) was larger than the average household size of all Member States. The household composed of a single person (33.6%) was the most common type of household in 2017, while this proportion was only 15.3% for Turkey. In the EU, from 2007 to 2017, the total number of private households had increased from 201 million to 221 million. From 2007 to 2017, Croatia was the only Member State whose number of households decreased (by 0.31 per year). In 2017, the highest shares of couples with children were recorded in Ireland (27.3%), Cyprus (24.9%), and Poland (24.3%) while the lowest shares of the couple with children while Denmark (8.6%), Lithuania (7.2%), the UK (6.6%), Estonia (6.6%) and Sweden (6.4%) were the Member States which had the highest proportion of households composed of single adults with children (Eurostat, 2018).

### VI.D.3. Social Protection

Social protection is provided in the case of revealing a social risk or a social need. Social protection has eight main benefits: sickness/healthcare benefits, disability benefits, old-age benefits, survivors' benefits, family/children benefit, unemployment benefits, housing benefits, and social exclusion benefits. In the EU, expenditures on social protection increased by 2.8 of total GDP from 2008 to 2009; then, this increased combined with a decrease in GDP (-5.7%), and as a result, social protection expenditures fell by 0.1 and 0.3 in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, social protection expenditures started to increase again (Eurostat, 2019).

In 2016, social protection expenditure in the EU was 28% of GDP. France (34.3%), Finland (31.6%) and Denmark (31%) were the three Member States which had the highest shares of social protection expenditures relative to GDP in 2016. For the same year, Finland, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands reported social protection expenditures relative to GDP above 25%. In contrast, some countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Malta, Estonia, Romania, and Lithuania reported social protection expenditures relative to GDP under 20%. Romania (14.6%) had the lowest share of social protection expenditures relative to

GDP among the Member States in 2016. Turkey (12.9%) had the lowest proportion for social protection expenditure (Eurostat, 2019).

### VI.D.4. Income Distribution

Income distribution displays income inequality which is highly related to the risk of poverty among countries, regions, and socioeconomic groups. Income equality is measured by the income quintile share ratio, which is the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income. In 2015, the data of a population-weighted average of national figures for each EU Member States showed that the top 20% of the population received 5.2 times more income than the bottom 20% of the population (Eurostat, 2019).

The inequality of income distribution ratio was lower in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (both 3.5). In contrast, the inequality of income distribution ratio was around six or more in the many Member States like Portugal, Estonia, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2015. The highest ratio was in Romania (8.3) in the same year (Eurostat, 2019).

Income distribution might cause the risk of poverty. The risk of poverty is measured by the at-the-risk-of-poverty rate, which is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income after social transfers below the at-the-risk-of-poverty threshold. The at-the-risk-of-poverty rate had remained almost the same, around 16.5%-16.7%, between 2010 and 2013 in the EU. Then, it increased a little bit, and in 2015 it reached 17.3%. While the highest proportions of the people at-the-risk-of-poverty were in Romania (23.6%), Latvia (22.1%), Lithuania (22.9%), Spain (21.6%), Bulgaria (23.4%), Estonia (21%), Greece (20.2%) and Italia (20.3%) in 2017, the lowest proportions of the people at-the-risk-of-poverty were in the Czech Republic (9.1%), Finland (11.5%) and Slovakia (12.4%). Turkey (22.2%) also had a high at-the-risk-of-poverty rate in the same year (Eurostat, 2019). Diversifying welfare policies according to the income level of households may mitigate poverty in Turkey (Yakut, 2015).

### VI.D.5. Material Deprivation

Material deprivation refers to economic strain and durables, including having adequate housing, nutrition, heating, and durable goods, living in a proper environment, paying unexpected expenses and affording annually a one-week holiday (away from home). It is measured material deprivation rate. The dimensions of material deprivation are age, sex, citizenship, education level, tenure status, income quantile and household type.

In the EU, the material deprivation rate decreased gradually from 2013 to 2017 from 9.6% to 6.7% of the population. This decrease continued in all Member States except Greece, which was the only Member State that the material deprivation rate was higher in 2017 (21.1%) than in 2013 (20.3%). In 2017, the lowest material deprivation rate was reported in Finland (2.1%), while the highest material deprivation rate was reported in Bulgaria (30%). Turkey (29.6%) had one of the highest material deprivation rates in the same year. (Eurostat, 2018).

The average material and social deprivation rate for the non-EU nationals in the EU-28 was almost three times more than for the total population of the EU. In 2017, this average for non-EU nationals was 22.6% in the EU-28. The highest rate for the non-EU nationals was seen in Greece (66.6%), while the lowest rate was in Luxembourg (10.1%) (Eurostat, 2018).

### VI.D.6. Life Expectancy

Life expectancy is the expected mean number of years to live since birth if subjected to current mortality conditions throughout the rest of his or her life. In 2017, life expectancy at birth was estimated at 83.5 in the EU-28. The highest life expectancy at birth was in Spain (86.1 years) and France (85.6 years) in 2017, while the lowest life expectancy at birth was in Bulgaria (78.4 years) and Romania (79.1 years). In 2017, in Turkey (83.1 years), the life expectancy was in the line with the average of the EU (Eurostat, 2017).

### VI.D.7. Education

Education might be divided into six areas: participation in primary, secondary, and tertiary education, vocational learning, lifelong learning, learning mobility, education finance and language learning.

In the many Member States, the age of starting compulsory primary education is around five or six. Before starting compulsory primary education, children might participate in pre-primary education or early childhood education from 3 years old to compulsory primary education. In the EU, in 2015, 15.4 million pupils were in pre-primary education while there were 28.7 million pupils in primary education. The school attending children who had seven years old to compulsory primary education was more than 97% in 2017 in the EU. In 2017, for seven years old, the lowest attending rate was in Estonia (76.1%), which was the only Member State that had an attending rate under 90%. For seven years old children, many countries like Spain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, and Turkey had reached more than 95% benchmark for compulsory primary education in the same year. (Eurostat, 2017).

In 2015, in the EU, 20.6 million pupils were in lower secondary education. The public sector realized the majority of this education (81.3%). In the same year, 21.8 million pupils were in upper secondary education. The majority of upper secondary education (71.9%) was in the public sector (Eurostat, 2017).

The pupil-teachers ratio was calculated by dividing the number of pupils by teachers. In the Member States, in lower secondary education, the pupil-teacher ratios were ranged from less than 8 (Greece in 2014) to 16 (the Netherlands in 2015). When it was compared to the pupil-teachers ratio between lower secondary education and upper secondary education in 2015, the lowest difference was in France (15.1 in upper secondary education compared with 10.4 in lower secondary education, a difference of 4.7 percentage points) while the highest difference was in the UK—26.1 in upper secondary education compared with 14.3 in lower secondary education, a difference of 11.8 percentage points (Eurostat, 2017).

In the EU, tertiary education includes four levels: short-term occupation-specific education (which is not found in every Member States), bachelor, master, and doctoral education. In 2017, there were 19.8 million tertiary education students in short-term occupation-specific education (7.2%), bachelor (61%), master (27.7%), and doctoral education (3.8%) in the EU. In the same year, Germany (15.6% of the EU) had 3.1 million students in tertiary education. France (12.8%), the UK (12.3%) and Spain (10.2%) followed by the highest shares at tertiary education in 2017. Short-term occupation-specific education in the EU was common in Spain, Malta, Latvia, and Austria for shares between 18 % and 20 % in 2017. Greece (86.3) had the highest shares of bachelor students in 2017 (Eurostat, 2019).

In Latvia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and Ireland in 2017, less than one-fifth of all tertiary education students were in master programs while this share increased to more than one third in the Czech Republic, Portugal, Cyprus, Croatia, France, Slovakia, Italy, and Luxembourg. Less than one-tenth of all tertiary students studied for master's degrees in 2017 in Turkey. In 2017, the highest proportion of master students was in Portugal (6.3%) and France (5.9%), while Turkey (0.6%) had an almost average proportion. (Eurostat, 2019).

Vocational learning in the Member States is generally divided into vocational training within secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education. In 2015, in the EU, vocational training within lower secondary education covered 3.1% of all pupils at this level. Belgium, the UK, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Netherlands, and Portugal had the highest shares in vocational training within lower secondary education while there is no kind of vocational education in 11 Member States at this level. However, in 2015, in the EU, vocational training within upper secondary education covered 47.3% of all pupils at this level. The share of vocational training in upper secondary education in some countries like Croatia, Finland and the Czech Republic was above 70% in 2015. Within post-secondary non-tertiary education, most pupils (90.4%) were in vocational programs. (Eurostat, 2017).

Lifelong learning is a philosophy of learning that sees people at every stage of their lives. Lifelong learning coves formal, non-formal and informal education. The

proportion of 24-64 years old adult participation in training or education was 10.8% in 2016. In France, Estonia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the shares of 24-64 years old adult participation in training or education were above 15% in 2016, while the lowest shares were measured in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Poland, and Greece (Eurostat, 2017).

Learning mobility is common among students who are in tertiary education. In Luxembourg, in 2015, almost half of the tertiary education students (45.9%) came from abroad, while the second-highest share (18.5%) was recorded in the UK in the same year. Cyrus (17.5%), Austria (15.9%), Belgium (11.2%), the Czech Republic (10.5%), Denmark (10.3%) and the Netherlands (10.2%) had the highest shares of tertiary education students among the Member States in 2015 while Slovenia (2.7%), Poland (2.6%) and Croatia (0.5%) had the lowest shares (Eurostat, 2017).

In the Member States, education is financed mainly by governments, and private and international organizations have a small role in education. The public expenditure for education was EUR 683 billion (estimated 5.1% of total GDP and 10.6% of total public expenditure) in the EU-25 (except Denmark, Greece, and Croatia due to the lack of data) in 2014 (2013 data for Estonia and Hungary). The highest share of public expenditure of GDP for education was observed in Sweden (with 7.1%) and Finland (with 6.8%) in 2014. In 2016, in Turkey (with 1.5%), public expenditure on tertiary education relative to GDP was relatively higher than many Member States (Eurostat, 2019).

Language learning is quite common in the Member States. The most popular language which is chosen to learn and to teach is English. In many Member States, language learning starts at an early age in primary school. It is recorded that almost all primary education pupils in Malta, Cyprus, Austria, and Spain (nearly 99-100%) started to learn English as a foreign language in 2015. This share of learning English decreased to 95.8% in secondary education in 2015. In secondary education, German, Spanish, and French are also popular languages to learn as a foreign language. In the EU, the minority languages like Catalan, Galician, and Basque in Spain, or Welsh and Scottish

Gaelic in the United Kingdom are also popular to learn, besides migrants' languages like Arabic, Chinese and Turkish (Eurostat, 2019).

#### VI.D.8. Skills Development and Training

The EU has initiatives for developing the skills and training such as the EU Digital Competence Framework (DigComp), the EU Entrepreneurship Competence Framework (EntreComp), The Grand Coalition of Digital Jobs and the European Alliance for Apprenticeship (EAfA). The reason is that "ICT has an employment enhancing effect in manufacturing" (Kılıçaslan & Töngür, 2018, p. 1).

The fundamental aim of DigComp is to develop a comprehensive understanding of digital competence. DigComp includes information and data literacy, communication and collaboration, digital content creation, safety and problem-solving. It supports lifelong learning, employability, inclusion, and professional development (European Commission, 2019).

EntreComp focuses on entrepreneurship competence with three key areas: ideas and opportunities, resources, and action. Each area contains five key competencies through eight progression levels. EntreComp aims to help for 442 learning outcomes about entrepreneurship (European Commission, 2019).

The Grand Coalition of Digital Jobs, also called DIGITALEUROPE, coordinates digital skills, entrepreneurship, and innovation projects. It involved in 20 projects with 80 partners for ten years with 23 million euros. Its policy areas are connectivity and infrastructure, consumer and accessibility, cybersecurity, data privacy, digital transformation, digital skills, digital trade, product compliance and standardisation, research and innovation and sustainability (Digital Europe, 2019).

The EAfA is a multi-stakeholder platform for strengthening the quality, supply, and image the apprenticeships in Europe and promoting mobility for apprentices. National communities and voluntary pledges run it. Companies and business organisations, chambers of industry, commerce and crafts, education and training providers, youth and non-profit organisations, regional and local authorities, social partners,

professional bodies, and networks participate in the platform to find partners, to promote events, to develop new ideas and activities and to provide access with the latest news and tools on apprenticeships. The benefits of EAfA are the transition from education and training to work, future employability, net profit on companies' investment, increasing youth employment (European Commission, n.d.).

Moreover, the EU supports company-university collaborations to improve the skills of students by using digital tools. For example, the MAPFRE— an insurance company— collaborated with the University of Seville for teaching about insurance by creating a digital simulation game (Rojo, González-Limón, & Rodríguez-Ramos, 2019).

# VII. COMPARISON OF LABOUR MARKET POLICIES OF SELECTED MEMBER STATES AND TURKEY

The EU creates a harmony between the common labour market values of the EU and the national labour market strategies of the Member States. Thus, the EU has the labour market standards developed from the shared values while the Member States can regulate their labour markets by considering these common EU values. This part aims to show the differences in labour market regulations among the selected Member States, Turkey (a candidate country) and the EU. This part compares the labour market policies developed for dealing with labour market difficulties like unemployment, considering the imperfections of the labour market.

The main aim of labour market policies and strategies is to fight against unemployment, which is the core problem of the labour market. The labour market policies are divided into two parts: Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and passive labour market policies. The governments develop ALMP to improve the functioning of the labour market, while passive labour market policies are short-term government policies such as providing unemployment insurance. Therefore, these policies and strategies are the state's intervention to regulate (Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 2014; Smith, 2013; Bonoli, 2010). ALMP, which refers to the intervention to provide the balance situation between labour supply and labour demand, plays a central role since Luxembourg Submit in 1997 (Greve, 2012).

This study focuses on the main categories of ALMP (job placement, job training, direct job creation (Butschek & Walter, 2014; Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 2014; Smith, 2013) and employee incentive programs besides some programs for youths and

disabled persons (Kluve, 2006; Kluve, et al., 2007; Leetmaa & Võrk, 2003)) due to the substantivity of the policies. Job placement or public employment services aims to match workers and vacant jobs. Job training policies give job-related education like an apprenticeship to unemployed people. Direct job creation provides a temporary position in the public sector for unemployed people to gain minimal skills and job experience by finding a regular job. Private incentive programs which aim to increase employment in the public sector depend on wage subsidies and self-employment grants.

Migrants might benefit from migrant-specific ALMPs. For example, language training for immigrants is implemented in Germany, while Sweden and Finland apply introduction programs and general programs exclusively for immigrants (Butschek & Walter, 2014).

Since the EU has 28 members (as of May 2019), it is hard to compare the labour market strategies of all Member States at the same time. Therefore, this study benefits from the classification of welfare states that easily analyse the Member States' labour market policies.

In this part, the labour market policies and strategies of these Member States are analysed separately. Then, this study compares them to understand to which model Turkey fits in the case of being a member of the EU.

### VII.A. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN DENMARK

Between 1982 and 1993, in Denmark, there was a Conservative-Liberal government that gave priority to competitiveness. During this era, the Danish labour market faced some problems like skills mismatch, low minimum wages, small social benefits, and high inflation. The turning point of Denmark labour market policies started with the Social Democratic coalition in 1993.

The new government developed some strategies for dealing with the problems in the 1990s: The Citizens' Income Path, which included extended parental leave, extended unemployment benefits, education leave and pre-retirement allowance, and the Active

Line, which focused on the structural unemployment that was born from the mismatch between wages and labour productivity. At the beginning of the 2000s, while these reforms continued, a new unemployment policy that assisted in finding more relevant jobs through education and new immigration and integration laws to improve education and employment opportunities for immigrants was adopted. These regulations activated ALMPs (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016; Andersen & Pedersen, 2006; Kvist & Pedersen, 2007; Madsen, 2003).

The results of these strategies, such as high flexibility, highly educated labour force and well-functioning tripartite cooperation, seemed like a miracle because Denmark treated the structural unemployment problem so that the lowest unemployment rate since 1974 was recorded in 2001, and the highest employment rate since all-time was recorded in 2002 (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016; Kvist & Pedersen, 2007).

Denmark, which includes the social democratic model countries, has a focus on full employment and ALMP by embracing a flexicurity system (Greve, 2012; Hendeliowitz, 2008) which combines "flexible hiring and firing rules for employers with income security for employees" (Andersen & Svarer, 2007, p. 389), as we mentioned before.

Bredgaard, Larsen and Madsen (2016) underline the importance of the state's role in financing the flexicurity system. Since the state assumes the responsibility of some payments like insurance and unemployment benefits, compensation for lost income and compensation for redundant employees, hiring and firing costs are low for employers (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016), but firing a worker is hard due to the employment security which is protected by legislation (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007). The conditions of unemployment benefits are based on the Ghent system (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016; Andersen T. M., 2012), which includes "having worked 52 weeks within the last three years, having been a member of an insurance fund for one year, and being able, willing and capable of working" (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007, p. 104). This situation leads to the flexibility of the entry to and sortie from the labour market and the income guarantee. Therefore, there is a high degree of labour mobility

from one job to another in the labour market (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016; Hendeliowitz, 2008; Madsen, 2003). Approximately 25-35% of the Danish workforce changes their jobs each year (Hendeliowitz, 2008). The 'circulation workers among jobs' (Madsen, 2003), is also called 'labour turnover'.

In the Danish labour market, the golden triangle, which consists of a flexible labour market including employment legislation, generous welfare scheme including unemployment insurance and ALMPs, is effective for improving the labour market (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016; Kvist & Pedersen, 2007; Hendeliowitz, 2008; Madsen, 2003; Andersen T. M., 2012). The Danish labour market, in this point, is a hybrid labour market between flexible liberal understanding and social democratic understanding. According to OECD (2018), the highest proportion of GDP for public spending on the labour market was in Denmark (3.2%) in 2016. For social protection spending, which includes public spending on the labour market, Denmark finances the system by taxes rather than social security contributions (Kvist & Pedersen, 2007).

However, the Danish labour market implemented by the Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment still has some concerns related to globalisation, mobility and social exclusion, challenges to income security, and challenges to ALMPs. Globalisation affects the Danish labour market negatively because of the increase in competition with low-wage countries. The marginalisation of the minority groups like immigrants and their social excision, despite respectively lower than other EU counties, might be another concern. Although some groups in the labour market in 2003 attempted to decrease the unemployment benefits provided by the state, they did not manage the change because the success of the flexicurity system depends on income security. Since the priority of ALMPs in Denmark is job placement, and there is a lack of priority of job training, the skills mismatch problem is growing (Bredgaard, Larsen, & Madsen, 2016).

#### VII.A.1. Job Placement in Denmark

The municipalities in Denmark have a huge role in applying the labour market policies related to job placement because job centres that promote employment are in

the municipalities. The main task of job centres is to bring job seekers and employers together (Larsen, 2004).

Jobcentres are run by the cooperation of the state and the municipalities. (Bredgaard & Halkjær, 2016; Hendeliowitz, 2008). Among the EU countries, Denmark (0.4%) was the top country that shared the biggest GDP growth or public employment services and administration (OECD, 2018). That is to say, high public expenditure for public employment services and administration might be a reason for the low unemployment rate and high employment rate in Denmark.

Online vacancy placing services, like Jobnet, Workindenmark, Jobindex, are also helpful in matching job seekers and employers. In addition, EURES is also used in Denmark for job search.

#### VII.A.2. Job Training in Denmark

For job training, Denmark (with 0.5%) had the highest GDP rate among the Member States in 2016. Job training is for both the public and private sectors in Denmark. There are four main types of job training: public training, private training, classroom training (Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008; Kluve, et al., 2007) and residual programmes (Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008). Jespersen, Munch, and Skipper (2008) address that public and private training are homogenous. While the wage rate of private training participants is negotiable, public training participants are employed in public institutions with a maximum hourly wage rate and get a monthly salary equal to the unemployment insurance payments. In addition, the duration of private training is shorter than public training (between 22 weeks and 39 weeks). Classroom training duration is generally 28 weeks, and the participants get a monthly salary equal to the unemployment insurance payments. Residual programmes include employment programmes, entrepreneurship subsidies, remedial education programmes and job search assistance.

Private training has a positive long-run impact on employment (Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008), although there is no such impact of public training (Andersen T. M.,

2012). While public training generates a significant social surplus, classroom training generates a significant deficit due to the costs (Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008). Unlike some authors (Andersen T. M., 2012; Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008), some studies (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004; Graversen, 2004; Munch & Skipper, 2004; Danish Economic Council, 2002; Bolvig, Jensen, & Rosholm, 2003) (cited in (Kluve, et al., 2007)) claim that these training programs have negative effects by increasing unemployment duration.

#### VII.A.3. Job Creation in Denmark

In the Danish labour market, employment protection legislation guarantees existing jobs and make it hard to lose jobs, but these regulations also constrain job creation (Hendeliowitz, 2008). There had been no public spending for direct job creation in Denmark from 2000 to 2016, although this country had had the highest GDP percentage for ALMPs among the Member States during the same period (OECD, 2018). However, in Denmark, job creation and job destruction (job turnover) are high (Andersen & Svarer, 2007; Madsen, 2003; Andersen T. M., 2012). Ibsen and Westergård-Nielsen (2011) mention that besides the net contribution of young firms are favourable to job growth, young firms tend to create new jobs than older firms, but also, they are more active to destroy jobs too in the Danish labour market.

Some studies (Rosholm & Svarer, 2004; Graversen, 2004; Munch & Skipper, 2004; Danish Economic Council, 2002) (cited in (Kluve, et al., 2007)) argued that direct job creation in the public sector has negative effects while a study (Jespersen, Munch, & Skipper, 2008) found that sometimes this has a net economic surplus. Other studies (Bolvig, Jensen, & Rosholm, 2003) found a positive effect.

#### VII.A.4. Employment Incentive Programs in Denmark

Kluve (2006) states that wage subsidies that encourage employers to hire new workers are the most prominent measure, and these subsidies might be direct wage subsidies or financial incentives to workers. Employment incentives include recruitment incentives, employment maintenance incentives, and job rotation and job sharing

(OECD, 2018), and start-up incentives which are the grants for starting a new job (Kluve, The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market Policy, RWI Discussion Papers, No. 37, 2006) are two parts of incentive programs. Employment incentive programs have positive effects, while direct public job creation rarely has positive impacts (Kluve, et al., 2007; Kluve, 2006). Denmark (0.25%) had the third-highest proportion of GDP for employment incentives while not having any budget for start-up incentives (OECD, 2018).

### VII.A.5. Immigrant-Specific ALMPs in Denmark

Denmark implements immigrant-specific labour market integration programs. After the granting of the resident permit, immigrants are obligated to enrol in an introduction program. If an immigrant fails in this program, the introduction allowance might be cut up to 30%. In addition, immigrants can take language lessons. In general, Denmark has three categories of labour market integration programs for immigrants. The first one is to obtain counselling about enrolling Danish labour market, the second one is to get job training for improving skills, and the third one is to take up employment with wage supplement (Liebig, 2007).

Many non-Western immigrants in Denmark are not members of an unemployment insurance fund, allowing them to take advantage of unemployment benefits. However, they take social assistance. They are the largest group that gets social assistance. (Heinesen, Husted, & Rosholm, 2013). Therefore, in Denmark, it is deduced that the employment gap is more considerable between native workers and immigrant workers comparing the other minority groups.

## VII.B. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN THE UK

The UK has weak employment protection and spending on ALMPs in the UK is lower than many other EU countries (Kluve, et al., 2007). Trade unions and employers' association had lost their bargaining power in the 1980s, and the labour market is dependent on the market dynamics.

ALMPs are not very strong in the UK, and New Deal is the main basis of ALMPs (Kluve, et al., 2007). New Deal as a welfare assistant (Beaudry, 2002) announced in 1998 is a group of workfare programs that aim to reduce unemployment by providing training, subsidies, employment and voluntary work (Kluve, et al., 2007; Blundell, Costa, Meghir, & Van Reenen, 2002; Van Reenen, 2004).

New Deal has three age categories (18-24, 25+ and 50+) while special programs such as New Deal for Young People (NDYP) (18-24 aged) (Staneva, Murphy, Jones, & Blackaby, 2016), New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed, New Deal for Lone Parents and New Deal for the Disabled (Beaudry, 2002) assigns a personal advisor to all applicants (Kluve, et al., 2007; Tonge, 1999).

New Deal has a crucial function all levels of ALMPs' main categories (job placement, job training, job creation and employment incentives) although ALMPs are not very strong as Kluve et al. (2007) mention so that the UK budgeted only 0.5% of its GDP for total public spending on the labour market in 2011 (OECD, 2018).

Jobseekers' Allowance (JSA) as unemployment benefits regime has two types: contributory and non-contributory. However, both have the same certain conditions: being under 60 aged, being available to work, seeking work actively and not being allowed income support. JSA is generally paid for up to 6 months. The applicants of JSA have to participate in one New Deal program after the claim. (Kluve, et al., 2007).

#### VII.B.1. Job Placement in the UK

Gateway is an intensive job search four-month period that young people (18-24 ages) can participate in after six months of unemployment. Gateway aims to increase interview skills and job search for young people. If the participants are still unemployed, they can join the job training or might be employed with wage subsidies by enrolling in one-day education within a week. Other options for these young people are to participate in voluntary work and environment task force (Kluve, et al., 2007;

Beaudry, 2002; Staneva, Murphy, Jones, & Blackaby, 2016; Blundell, Costa, Meghir, & Van Reenen, 2002; Van Reenen, 2004).

Some studies (Riley, 2000; Bonjour, et al., 2001) (cited in (Staneva, Murphy, Jones, & Blackaby, 2016); Van Reenen, 2004) mention that NDYP had positive effects on the UK's economy because more than 200,000 young people found a job during the first two years of the program.

Jobcentre Plus, which has been operating since 2002, integrates with benefit and employment services. Jobcentre Plus plays an important role in job search with three elements of services (job entry outcomes, customer service and benefit service). Participants have personal advisers by experiencing effective and efficient service (Karagiannaki, 2007; Rosenthal & Peccei, 2007).

Advisors in Jobcentre Plus give tips to the participants for work-focus interviews, which includes a claimant's skills, work experience, aspirations, and barriers to work (Toerien, Sainsbury, Drew, & Irvine, 2013). Therefore, the service offered by Jobcentre Plus is job matching (Bellis, Sigala, & Dewson, 2011) (see Figure 3). Gateway and Jobcentre Plus are financed from the UK's budget. However, the UK spent only 0.2% of its GDP on public employment services and administration in 2011 (OECD, 2018).

**Figure 3:** A Simplified Flow Diagram of New Deal




**Source:** Van Reenen, J. (2004).

Job training starts after Gateway. This training is up to one year and intensive. (Kluve, et al., 2007; Beaudry, 2002). In this way, the UK would like to improve workers' skills by taking a lesson from the absence of skilled workers before the 1980s because there were several accusations about the job training programs before the New Deal: being a form of cheap labour, being inadequate and getting an unsatisfactory outcome (Tonge, 1999). Therefore, the job training part of the New Deal is vital for the UK. However, job training programs are still suffering from an inadequate budget. The UK (0.1% along with Poland) was a Member State, which spent the lowest GDP proportion for job training in the EU in 2011 (OECD, 2018).

### VII.B.2. Job Training in the UK

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### VII.B.3. Job Creation in the UK

Voluntary sector and environmental task force (government provided employment) (Van Reenen, 2004), which are up to six months with the education up to one year include indirect job creation. Start-ups are another alternative of these two programs by the Youth Enterprise Initiative. During these programs, the participants continue to get JSA. (Kluve, et al., 2007). Staneva, Murphy, Jones, and Blackaby (2016) state that voluntary sector options and environmental task force have good results because they increase the self-confidence of potential workers.

The UK (with 0.1% along with Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Portugal) was one of the Member States who spent the lowest proportion of its GDP for direct job creation after Demark, Greece and Estonia (0%) in 2011. Like the UK, many Member States such as Belgium, Denmark, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Portugal did not spend money on start-ups in 2011. (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.B.4. Employment Incentive Programs in the UK

After an intensive job search in the UK, the unemployed people who cannot get a job can benefit from being employed with wage subsidies. However, employment incentive programs play a minor role in the UK. (Kluve, et al., 2007; Van Reenen, 2004). The UK (with 0.1%) was a Member State, which spent the lowest GDP proportion for employment incentives in the EU in 2011 (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.B.5. Immigrant-Specific ALMPs in the UK

The immigrant-specific ALMPs are weak in the UK. The Migration Impact Fund was founded in 2009 to promote immigrant workers' integration, but the government cut almost 70 million GBP in 2010. Another funding of the UK Border Agency for helping immigrants settle was ended. However, immigrants who are long term residents benefit from the same rights as UK citizens, such as child benefits, income supports, housing assistance, income-based Jobseeker's Allowance (Platonova & Urso, 2012).

In 2016, the Controlling Migration Fund, a new fund, was launched for mitigating the impacts of recent migration on communities in local areas. More than 70 million GBP was given to the local authorities. This fund was spent on projects about several topics, including the employment of immigrants (UK Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018).

### VII.C. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN GERMANY

After the unification, Germany suffered from a slow GDP growth mostly due to the poor performance of the Eastern German labour market. However, shortly after, the

Western and Eastern German labour markets converged totally, and Germany implemented two significant labour reforms: the 'JobAcqtiv' Law in 2002 and 'Hartz Reforms' between 2003 and 2005 (Kluve, et al., 2007).

The Hartz Reforms, which include a program of 13 modules like occupational training programs, subsistence payments, and temporary employment, aims to reduce the unemployment rate, activate the unemployed population and stimulate employment demand by deregulating the labour market (Hertweck & Sigrist, 2012; Fahr & Sunde, 2009; Jacobi & Kluve, 2007). Hertweck and Sigrist (2012) state that Hartz Reforms increase the efficiency of the matching process by 20%, while Fahr and Sunde (2009) agree with the findings of Hertweck and Sigrist (2012) and they also express that these reforms have a stronger impact on the regions of East Germany. The Hartz Reforms changed the institutional structure of ALMPs in Germany (Kluve, et al., 2007) by individual coaching, classroom training and temporary work targeting low-skilled young unemployed people (Kluve & Schaffner, 2013).

**Table 23:** Effects of Hartz Reforms

| **Measure** | **Evidence Before** | **Evidence After** | **Reform Effect** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Placement services** | | | |
| Customer services | (+) | (+) | The introduction of customer service centres seems positive, but the significance of effects unclear. |
| Placement voucher | n/a | 0 | No significant effect on re-employment probability |
| Assignment to private placement providers | n/a | 0 | No significant effect on re-employment probability |
| Placement via temporary work | n/a | - | That reduces employment probability of participants |
| **Training** | | | |
| Training | 0 older studies/ (+) | + | Exist rate into employment increased, locking-in effects reduced |

| | more recent studies | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Job Creation** | | | |
| Public job creation | - | (-) | Measures remain detrimental after the reform. Magnitude of negative effect is decreasing. Impact on employability is unclear. |
| Mini jobs (Employment with reduced social security contributions) | n/a | + | Reform caused large increase in employee in mini jobs (+1.8 million) |
| Midi jobs (Employment with reduced social security contributions) | n/a | (+) | Modest effect on creation of midi jobs (+125,000). Incidence of intra-enterprise displacement cannot be ruled out. |
| **Subsidies** | | | |
| Wage subsidies to employers | (+) | + | 20-50% higher probability of regular employment post-treatment. Extend of windfall gains unclear. |
| Start-up subsidies | (+) | + | Subsidy significantly reduces risk of unemployment (decreasing over time). Some windfall beneficiaries exist. |
| **Other regulations** | | | |
| Wage protection for older workers | n/a | 0 | No significant effect |
| Temporary work deregulation | n/a | + | +23,700 additional employees were in temporary work eight months after the reform. Deregulation is widely acclaimed. |
| Fixed-term contracts for older workers | n/a | 0 | No significant effect |

**Note:** Labour market effects: + positive, (+) modestly positive, 0 zero, (-) modestly negative, - negative
**Source:** Jacobi and Kluve (2007).

Federal Employment Agency executes the ALMPs under the jurisdiction and

supervision of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. This agency also runs the unemployment insurance system, which includes the payments for income support during the unemployment and the provision of employment services. Unemployment insurance, which is shared equally between the employer and the employee, is compulsory for all workers. However, German unemployment insurance does not cover self-employed people (Wunsch, 2005).

Germany used 1.45% of its GDP for public spending for the labour market in 2016, and this proportion was less than half of the proportion spent in 2002 (3.29%) (OECD, 2018).

### VII.C.1. Job Placement in Germany

The main employment agencies are in local areas of Germany. Each unemployed person gets personal assistance following the case management process. The assistants are called caseworkers. They have approximately 150 cases each. The Federal Employment Agency reimburses the costs of searching for a job for unemployed people who can also take advantage of the unemployment benefits. (Kluve, et al., 2007).

For decreasing the youth unemployment rate, Germany started a pilot project by establishing employment offices, focusing primarily on young people and having a partnership with the Federal Employment Agency and private temporary work agencies. This pilot project was implemented from 2007 to 2009 in three cities where the annual average youth unemployment rate is more than 14%. Along with training and temporary work, individual coaching positively affected the decrease in the unemployment rate (Kluve & Schaffner, 2013).

After Denmark (0.41%), Germany (0.36%) was the second Member State which budgeted the highest GDP rate for public employment services and administrations in 2016 (OECD, 2018).

### VII.C.2. Job Training in Germany

Training programs are predominantly vocational training that includes assessing skills, supporting job search, and facilitating job placement. Also, training is provided through job rotation in small and medium-sized companies. Federal Employment Agency supports the training programs in Germany (Kluve, et al., 2007).

Depending on the unemployed person's skills and local labour market needs, classroom training also frequent (Kluve & Schaffner, 2013). Many types of training are short-term training, less than six months (Wapler, Werner, & Wolf, 2014). However, long-term training programs are more than three years (Wapler, Werner, & Wolf, 2014). Kluve and Schaffner (2013) express that job training programs for young people in Germany are more effective than other OECD countries.

After Austria (0.45%), Denmark (0.53%), Finland (0.48%) and Portugal (0.2%), Germany (0.19%), along with Ireland, was the fourth Member State which budgeted the highest GDP rate for job training in 2016. From 2002 (from 0.58%) to 2016 (to 0.19%), the GDP rate, which Germany budgets for job training, had decreased almost to one in three (OECD, 2018).

### VII.C.3. Job Creation in Germany

Kluve et al. (2007) point out four different ways of job creation in Germany: active measures for promoting job creation, structural adjustment measures, employment-generating promotion of the infrastructure, and 1-Euro jobs. While private companies or non-profit institutions usually carry out both active measures promoting the creation of jobs and structural adjustment measures, the main differences employers who implement structural adjustment measures received a lump sum subsidy. The main difference in the employment-generating promotion of the infrastructure is to assign the number of unemployed persons. In a 1-Euro jobs program, participants receive unemployment benefits plus 1 euro per hour working. Unlike the many Member States which do not budget direct job creation, Germany (0.02%) spent a small proportion of GDP for direct job creation in 2016 (OECD, 2018).

### VII.C.4. Employment Incentive Programs in Germany

Incentives in Germany are divided into two parts: employer-related incentives and employee-related incentives. Employer-related incentives are integration subsidies, social security contribution subsidies for older workers, non-financial subsidies, and staff service agencies. Employee-related incentives are social security contribution subsidy, Mainzer Modell (between 2000 and 2003 an experimental program which offered a social security contribution subsidy and the level of the subsidy determine it which is 'mini jobs' (under 400 euros) or 'midi jobs' (between 401 and 800 euros), wage protection for older workers, mobility allowance, sanctions, and start-up subsidies. (Kluve, et al., 2007; Jacobi & Kluve, 2007; Wapler, Werner, & Wolf, 2014). Jacobi and Kluve (2007) express that these subsidies are for activating the unemployed population.

In Germany, the proportion of GDP spent on employment incentives was very little (0.02%) comparing with the other Member States, and Germany (0.01%) had a low amount of GDP rate for start-ups in 2016 (OECD, 2018).

### VII.C.5. Immigrant-Specific ALMPs in Germany

In Germany, the ALMPs do not target specifically immigrants as a group. The ALMPs in Germany are mostly individual-specific. Comparing to unemployed people, unemployed immigrants are underrepresented (Constant & Rinne, 2013). Therefore, there are few programs for immigrants. The most known immigrant-specific ALMPs are short-term training courses. The duration of these courses is a maximum of three months. The courses focus on improving the job search skills of immigrants and measuring their skills. During the courses, the skills of immigrants are evaluated according to the requirements of the job market (Thomsen, Walter, & Aldashev, 2013). Thomsen, Walter and Aldashev (2013) state four types of short-term programs financed by the Federal Employment Agency: (1) *Aptitude Tests*: These tests evaluate the ability, skills, and capability of immigrants; (2) *Job Search Training*: This course supports the applicants' job search abilities; (3) *Skill Provision*:

This course provides the necessary skills required for employment; (4) *Combined Programs*: It is a combined training course of the other three courses.

The research of Thomsen, Walter and Aldashev (2013) show that the aptitude test and skill provision have a positive impact on the job search of immigrants.

### VII.D. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN SPAIN

For the ALMPs, the Public Service of State Employment (SEPE), named the National Employment Institute before 2003, in Spain is the primary institution as an autonomous body attached to the Ministry of Labour, Migrations and Social Security. The SEPE aims to plan employment programs and policies, manage the unemployment benefits, and conduct research and analysis about the labour market. The focus groups of the SEPE are workers, employers, young people, and entrepreneurs. However, the implementation of the ALMPs in Spain is under the responsibility of autonomous communities (Cueto & Patricia, 2014).

Spain is a Member State which has been suffering from labour market problems for the last few decades. Especially after the Global Economic Crisis 2008, the unemployment rate had climbed above 20% (OECD, 2013). For tackling the unemployment problem, Spain made several labour market reforms (in 1984, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2011) and 52 minor legal changes to reduce the gap of Employment Protection Legislation for the workers who are under the risk of losing their jobs (Dolado, 2012; Bentolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012).

In 2012, Spain made one of the latest reforms to make the labour market more flexible and efficient (Horwitz & Myant, 2015) while suffering from the economic crisis due to the process of real estate boom and bust (Coq-Huelva, 2013).The 2012 reform underlined collective bargaining and severance pay as employment protection authors (Dolado, 2012; Bentolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012; Horwitz & Myant, 2015; OECD, 2013) and promoting permanent contract mainly for entrepreneurs (Horwitz & Myant, 2015). In the short-run, some authors (Dolado, 2012; Bentolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2012) evaluated these reforms by expressing that severance pay might be insufficient,

and collective bargaining shifted bargaining power from workers towards employers. However, OECD (2013) mentioned that the 2012 reform led to a drop in the growth of unit labour costs in the business sector of between 1.2% and 1.9% and increased the probability for the unemployed of being hired on a permanent contract by 24% during the first six months in unemployment. Although OECD (2013) stated that the 2012 reform was a significant step in the right direction, the data of Eurostat (2020), the unemployment rate in Spain continued to increase in 2013 (to 26.1%).

In the 2000s, rural employment had increased by the labour force participation of women. Women's entrepreneurship had been in mostly eco-tourism by welcoming guests, promoting the values of local culture, caring for the rural house or rural hotel, and protecting the environment (Cánoves, Villarino, Priestley, & Blanco, 2004). Women entrepreneurs in rural protect ecological heritage while being breadwinners. Thus, women in rural win power against men in rural by entrepreneurship (Goverde, Baylina, & Haan, 2004).

Spain gave 2.5% of its GDP as a budget for public spending on the labour market in 2015, and this proportion has been increased gradually since 2001 (2.06%) (OECD, 2018).

### VII.D.1. Job Placement in Spain

In Spain, employment services are controlled by SEPE, which is the public employment service. Since SEPE has a decentralised framework, each body of SEPE in an autonomous community has its schedule. An unemployed person can take advantage of the employment offices of SEPE by following this schedule. The Information System for Public Employment Services (in Spanish, SISPE) is the leading service for job placement and unemployment benefits management. Since the bodies of SEPE are autonomous, each autonomous community (17 in total) has its web portal for the job search of SISPE. Therefore, an unemployed person willing to move to another autonomous community has to check all job portals. (Cueto & Patricia, 2014).

The website of SEPE has information about finding a job and introduces EURES, which is the job portal for the EU. Besides, since 2014, the SEPE has implemented the program of Youth Guarantee (Garantía Juvenil in Spanish) led by the European Commission, which is an initiative for young people to facilitate their access to the labour market by providing young people information about the entrance of the labour market. (SEPE, 2018).

Spain spent 0.14% of its GDP on public employment services and administration in 2015, and it was the seventh-highest proportion that was spent among the EU countries in the same year (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.D.2. Job Training in Spain

Like job placement, autonomous communities implement job training with the help of SEPE. PREPARA (Professional Retraining Program) has been one of the critical programs for job training in Spain since 2011. The PREPARA aims to retrain unemployed people following the needs of the labour market. The PREPARA requires registration as a job seeker at least twelve of the last eighteen months and having family responsibilities, which are explained in the General Law of Social Security. (SEPE, 2018). The participation of the PREPARA can take advantage of an economic support system every month during the program (Cueto & Patricia, 2014).

SEPE organises the other types of training programs besides the PREPARA. Some studies (Cueto & Patricia, 2014; Kluve, et al., 2007) sum these training under the three titles: demand training which is company training, offer training which is promoted by public administration or social entities; and traineeship, which includes workshop schools, craft centres and employment workshops. Spain spent 0.12% of its GDP on the job training in 2015, and it was the ninth highest proportion, which was spent among the EU countries in the same year (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.D.3. Job Creation in Spain

Kluve et al. (2007) address that employment workshops are also considered as a job creation measure because these workshops allow unemployed people to make a

traineeship in the public and private sector by combining training. Spain promotes self-employment as a job creation measure. Congregado, Golpe and Carmona (2010, p. 838) concluded that "the number of own-account workers finding safer jobs during boom periods is smaller than the supply of new (possibly marginal) own-account workers during recessions suggesting Spain has problems in structurally improving employment rates." Spain spent 0.1% of its GDP on direct job creation in 2015, and it was the seventh-highest proportion, which was spent among the EU countries in the same year (OECD, 2018).

### VII.D.4. Employment Incentive Programs in Spain

Spain implements employment incentives as the key ALMPs. Between 2010 and 2013, Spain organised some programs aimed at stable employment for low skilled-young people and people over 45 aged). Later, in 2014, 'Tarifa Plana' (Flat Rate in English) was implemented. This plan aimed to promote the open-ending hiring by reducing business contributions to the common Social Security contingencies applied for two years to all contracts signed between 25 February and 31 December 2014 (Cueto & Patricia, 2014). Spain also encourages unemployed people to be self-employed by keeping low social security contributions. For example, under 30 aged, the social security contribution is only 50 euros per month (Cueto & Patricia, 2014). However, a study (Cueto, Mayor, & Suárez, 2015) related to Spain shows that if the unemployment rate increases by 1% in a region, the self-employment rate decreases by 0.061–0.068%. In 2015, Spain budgeted only 0.07% of its GDP on employment incentives, and this rate decreased from 0.32%, which was in 2006. However, the proportion of GDP for the start-up incentives had doubled from 2000 (0.05%) to 2015 (0.1%). (OECD, 2018).

### VII.D.5. Immigrant-Specific ALMPs in Spain

In Spain, the industries that use mostly temporary contracts such as construction, retail trade, hotels, and restaurants generally hire more immigrants than the other industries (Wölfl & Mora-Sanguinetti, 2011). Therefore, Spain concentrates on the seasonal worker program. *Contingente de Trabajadores Extranjeros* (the Contingent of Foreign

Workers) is a mechanism that allows hiring foreign workers who are not residents in Spain (SEPE, 2018). The Contingent of Foreign Workers is annually adjusted and does not allow hiring for more than nine months (Newland, Agunias, & Terrazas, 2008). Thus, the Contingent of Foreign Workers provides a legal base for seasonal immigrants. *Unió de Pagesos* is one of the farmers' unions with a seasonal workers program (Clemens, Huang, Graham, & Gough, 2018). It identifies the labour needs of the agricultural sector by cooperating with the Ministry of Labour. The immigrant workers are provided mostly from Morocco, Colombia, and Romania. (Newland, Agunias, & Terrazas, 2008). Spain experienced a deep regression after the Global Economic Crisis 2008, and this situation caused a huge budget cut for the ALMPs. In 2012, Spain started to give vocational training to unemployed people. Although this training does not target immigrants directly, unemployed immigrants can also participate (OECD, 2013).

### VII.E. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN ESTONIA

Estonian economic transition that started in the 1990s caused some changes in the labour market, and the unemployment rate rose dramatically from almost zero to more than 15% due to the Russian crisis in the 2000s (Kluve, et al., 2007; Brixiova & Égert, 2012). Nowadays, in 2018, the unemployment rate of Estonia decreased to 5.4%, according to the data of Eurostat (2019). While the unemployment rate was one of the lowest rates among the Member States, the employment rate was also one of the highest rates (Espenberg, Lees, & Espenberg, 2017). This result tells us that the recovery process of Estonia is successful. Leetma and Võrk (2003) state that ALMPs have positive and statistically significant impacts on employment in Estonia.

Since 2003, unemployed people in Estonia have taken advantage of unemployment insurance benefits. Enrolling on the unemployment insurance system is compulsory; so, each worker has to contribute to the system with 0.5%-2% of their wages because of the Unemployment Insurance Act, which has been implemented since 2001. Unemployed people also can apply for social assistance, which is given for houses expenses of each family member (Kluve, et al., 2007; Eamets, 2013).

National Labour Market Board was responsible for the labour market. In 2009, National Labour Market Board and Unemployment Insurance Fund were merged under the name of the Unemployment Fund, which has responsibility for all ALMPs like job placement, job training, direct job creation and employment incentives in Estonia (Eamets, 2013).

Early retirement, a decentralised collective bargaining system and the strictness of employment protection legislation are other measures related to the labour market, and these measures assist the ALMPs (Kluve, et al., 2007). However, Estonia's strictness of employment protection legislated in 2009 with the new Employment Contract Act, some acts related to wages, holidays, working and rest time (Eamets, 2013); so, the employment security became lighter (Brixiova & Égert, 2012). This step was for making the labour market more flexible than in the past. Besides, instead of job training, employment subsidies became more dominant than in the era before the Global Economic Crisis 2008 (Eamets, 2013). All these changes were named the 2009 labour market reforms.

Before the Global Economic Crisis 2008, the compensation for the ALMPs was low in Estonia (Brixiova & Égert, 2012; Eamets, 2013). In 2006 and 2007, just before the crisis, Estonia budgeted only 0.15% of its GDP as public spending on the labour market, and this proportion had increased gradually from 2007 to 2016 (0.78%) (OECD, 2018).

### VII.E.1. Job Placement in Estonia

Before the Global Economic Crisis 2008, job placement was not one of the dominant ALMPs' measures (Eamets, 2013). Therefore, this measure is relatively new for Estonia. The workshops on job search assistance and monitoring for young people started in 2014 under 'my first job' and age subsidies and reimbursement of employers' training costs (Tosun, Unt, & Wadensjöc, 2017; Eamets & Humal, 2015). Eamets and Humal (2015) mentioned that 70% of the participants get a job within six months after the program's participation. In addition, when young people are registered as unemployed people to the Unemployment Fund, they can benefit from

all public employment services, which includes job mediation, career counselling and career information (Eamets & Humal, 2015). Estonia spent 0.14% of its GDP on public employment services and administration in 2016, and this proportion was only 0.2% in 2006, which was just before the crisis (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.E.2. Job Training in Estonia

Job training in Estonia has two forms: vocational training and training for providing information about the labour market. Job training is short-term (around one month up to six months), and the unemployed people can get allowance during this training organised by local labour offices (Leetmaa & Võrk, 2003). The internship, which can last up to four months, is another option for job training, and the employer can get remuneration from the Unemployment Fund (Eamets & Humal, 2015). Youth-oriented ALMPs, which started in 2009, focus on apprenticeship training (Tosun, Unt, & Wadensjöc, 2017). Also, like Spain, Estonia benefits from the Youth Guarantee program of the European Commission (Eamets & Humal, 2015). In 2016, Estonia budgeted 0.08% of its GDP on the job training, but this rate was half in 2003 (with 0.04%). It even was less in 2008 (with 0.02%) during the crisis. (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.E.3. Job Creation in Estonia

Job destruction in Estonia was very dominant in job creation in the early transition era and mostly occurred in the state-own firms (Haltiwanger, Lehmann, & Terrell, 2003) (cited in (Eamets, 2013)). However, the Unemployment Fund encourages unemployed people for public work, community work and volunteer work; thus, a registered unemployed person can take advantage of a scholarship, including per diem and travel costs (Eamets & Humal, 2015). The budget for direct job creation of Estonia had been zero from 2003 to 2016 (OECD, 2018).

#### VII.E.4. Employment Incentive Programs in Estonia

Wage subsidy (around 50%) is given to the employer for recruiting ‘less competitive’ people who are registered unemployed (Eamets & Humal, 2015; Leetmaa & Võrk, 2003). Being ‘less competitive’ is explained with these conditions: “disabled persons,

pregnant women and women who are raising children under six years of age, young people aged 16-24, persons who will be retiring within five years and persons who have released from prison". (Leetmaa & Võrk, 2003). Estonia's budget for employment incentives had been zero from 2003 to 2009; later, Estonia budgeted 0.06% of its GDP in 2010, but this amount decreased gradually to 0.02% in 2016 (OECD, 2018). Business start-up grants have an important place for tackling unemployment in Estonia. To provide these grants, the applicants have to be at least 18-year-old and have relevant training or education with sufficient experience. After the approval, the applicant can benefit from the subsidy (Leetmaa & Võrk, 2003).

#### VII.E.5. Immigrant-Specific ALMPs in Estonia

For facilitating the labour market integration of immigrants, the OECD (2009) recommends that Estonia promotes Estonian language and professional training capacity, simplifying the work permit process and establishing a mechanism for formal recognition of immigrants' qualifications. The language courses for immigrants in Estonia became effective in 2009-2010. Kivi, Sõmer and Kallaste (2020) evaluate the impact of local Estonian language courses for immigrants during 2015-2016. Their findings show a significant positive effect of language courses after 11 months from the start of the course on the employability of immigrants.

### VII.F. LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN TURKEY

The welfare regime of Turkey is evaluated in the Southern European Model (Aysan, 2018; Gal, 2010; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). In Turkey, like other Southern European Model states, Family (including the extended form of kinship), religious groups and social networks (like foundations, NGOs) based solutions are common for handling social problems (Aysan, 2018).

The labour market of Turkey is characterised by the extensity of self-employment (Cilasun, Acar, & Gunalp, 2015; Buğra & Keyder, 2006), unpaid family labour (Buğra & Keyder, 2006) and informal employment practices (Cilasun, Acar, & Gunalp, 2015; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Almost half of the population in Turkey

(46.5%) had been working in the agricultural sector (in 1988) (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). However, today (as of 2018), the majority of the population (55%) has been working in the services sector (TOBB, 2019). This shift indicates significant internal migration from the rural to the urban within 30 years in Turkey. The de-ruralisation increases the urban population sporadically and causes an increase in informal employment in the urban, such that the share of informal employment in total employment is estimated to be almost 50% (Cilasun, Acar, & Gunalp, 2015; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). The majority of unpaid family workers, mostly women, work in the agricultural sector; notwithstanding, the labour force participation rate of women is low (around 28% in 2018) (Bilgin & Danis, 2018; Cilasun, Acar, & Gunalp, 2015; Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Correspondingly, the ratio of self-employed (including unpaid workers, own-account workers, and employers) in total employment tends to decrease from 45.5% (in 2004) to 33% (in 2015) (Bilgin & Danis, 2018).

The Turkish labour market is vulnerable because of the economic crisis. Historically, each financial crisis negatively affects the unemployment rate in Turkey around 2-3%. Before the 2001 financial crisis, the unemployment rate was about 7-8%. The 2001 financial crisis affected negatively by increasing it to approximately 10%. The 2009 global economic crisis affected the unemployment rate of Turkey negatively to about 12-13%. (Bilgin & Danis, 2018). As of the end of 2019, the unemployment rate in Turkey was 13.7% (Eurostat, 2019). Since the labour participation rate is meagre (a little bit more than 50% in 2017), the official unemployment rate seems to be smaller (10.9% in 2017) (10.9% in 2017) (Bilgin & Danis, 2018). Despite this vulnerability, Turkey spent only 0.29% of GDP in 2017 as the public unemployment spending (OECD, 2018).

The high unemployment rate in Turkey is considered a main problem in the labour market. The structural reforms that cover setting wages, hiring, regulating working hours, and forms and firing employees are needed (Bilgin & Danis, 2018). Under the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party) government, which has been the ruling party in Turkey since 2002 (as of May 2020), three main steps for structural reforms come to the forefront.

1) *2003 Labour Law (Law No. 4857)*: The law regulates the rights and obligations of labour market actors. "It introduced and institutionalised new forms of flexible employment and increased the control and disciplinary power of employers in the workplace, as well as reducing the extent of 'job security'. It paved the way for further precarity, insecurity and de-unionisation in the labour market." (Erol, 2016).
2) *2009 Private Employment Offices Bill*: The rental labour system became possible through these offices. The workers make registration to these offices, and the employers rent the workers from these offices, which do not have the employment status and work with a commission fee. The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ) describe this system as slavery. (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016).
3) *National Employment Strategy (2014-2023)*: The strategy aims to decrease the unemployment rate by resolving structural problems. It has four main policy pillars: strengthening links between education and employment, ensuring security and flexibility in the labour market, increasing employment of vulnerable groups, strengthening links between social protection and employment. (Coordination Bureau of National Employment Strategy, 2014).

The İŞKUR (Türkiye İş Kurumu or Turkish Labour Institute) is the central labour market institution for tackling unemployment in Turkey. The institute is responsible for the implementation of the ALMPs in Turkey.

### VII.F.1. Job Placement in Turkey

The İŞKUR provides the service of job placement. The candidate applies for the İŞKUR. The requirements are to be a registered unemployed to the İŞKUR, be more than 15 years old, fit in the occupation, and be unattended to any courses within 24 months. The İŞKUR gives job placement courses. Some of these courses guarantee employment in the firms which collaborate with the İŞKUR (İŞKUR, 2018). In 2018, the İŞKUR made almost 1.5 million job placements, but there was still registered 3.5

million unemployed people (İŞKUR, 2018), which means the unemployment rate was 10.9% (Eurostat, 2019).

### VII.F.2. Job Training in Turkey

The İŞKUR provides vocational training of employees, vocational training of a person with disabilities (financed by commission), vocational training of a person with disabilities (financed by the organization), vocational training of convicts (financed by the organization), vocational training program (employment guaranteed), vocational training program (without employment guarantee), vocational training program (vulnerable groups), on the job training program and entrepreneurship training program. In 2018, the İŞKUR gave this training to almost half a million people (İŞKUR, 2018).

### VII.F.3. Job Creation in Turkey

Entrepreneurship is the principal instrument for job creation in Turkey. The İŞKUR is one of two institutions that support entrepreneurship. The İŞKUR provides entrepreneurship training programs. The primary aim of these programs to help people to start up and run their businesses. In 2018, more than 81 thousand people participated in entrepreneurship training programs (İŞKUR, 2018). Another institution which supports entrepreneurship is the KOSGEB (Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Geliştirme ve Destekleme Dairesi Başkanlığı or Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization). The KOSGEB has Entrepreneurship Support Program, which helps entrepreneurs increase their capacities, Loan Support, which provides financial support with appropriate conditions, and the R&D (research and development) Innovation and Industrial Application Support Program, which helps entrepreneurs make their ideas real. (KOSGEB, 2020; Cengizçetin, 2014).

### VII.F.4. Employment Incentive Programs in Turkey

Employment incentives are given as part of Law No. 4447, Law No. 5510, Law No. 5225, and Law No. 5746. The Unemployment Insurance Fund pays the proportions of employers. These incentives give a discount on the social security contribution of

employers. The person who will benefit from the employment incentive has to be unemployed for more than six months. The candidate must be over 18 years old (between 18-29 years old for men, and there is no upper limit for women) (Cengizçetin, 2014).

### VII.F.5. Can Turkey Comply with the European Employment Strategy?

The candidates for being a Member State have to meet the minimum labour market-related requirements: having free trade union organizations, following the Economic Reform Program and closing three chapters of Acquis (Chapter 2 about freedom of movement for workers, Chapter 19 about social policy and employment and Chapter 23 about the judiciary and fundamental rights). After meeting these requirements, Turkey will be more democratic and have more stable within the scope of the labour market. However, after being a member, Turkey will still have to continue improving these areas like the other Member States. Turkey needs improvements in almost all areas. The EES quantitative factors have already been on the to-do list of Turkey. However, in Turkey, there is much work to be done for the qualitative factors of the EES, which are related to employment quality.

# VIII. REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The first part of his chapter presents the empirical findings related to the recent Turkish migration to the EU between 2008 and 2018 by using macro data. The second part of this chapter investigates the Turkish return migration between 2009 and 2018 and its benefits about labour income in the labour market of Turkey. The third part focus on the labour income of return immigrants from the gender perspective. Although there is a lack of specific data on where Turkish immigrants return, return migration is still relevant to this dissertation because most Turkish immigrants live in Europe. Since these last two parts of this chapter show the gain of migration experience when Turkish immigrants return, they are important to develop policies to mitigate the destructive effects of brain drain in Turkey.

## VIII.A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND TURKISH MIGRATION DESTINATION DETERMINANTS

In this part, the techniques of correlation analysis and multiple linear regression analysis to test the model of labour market determinants. Data is used related to the labour market, security-based, social, and geographical determinants.

### VIII.A.1. Data

This study focuses on documented (or legal) immigrants. The data of the first residence permits issued (for 12 months or more), which were gathered by Turkish nationals (Eurostat, 2019), is the dependent variable (the abbreviation is FirstPermit').

Migration includes many risks (there is a possibility of not satisfying the pre-migration expectations in the destination) even though people immigrate in the safest

way. Some people are willing to take dangers by migrating without having a legal document. Therefore, having a legal document is crucial for immigrating by not taking danger while crossing a border. That is to say, having a legal document gives an immigrant the ability to feel safe. Because having a document is very important to choose a migration destination, this study benefits from the data of the first residence permits issued (for 12 months or more), which shows the number of the documented immigrants (see Table 24).

**Table 24:** First Permits Issued for Turkish Nationals by the Member States, 2009-2018[3]

| | **2009** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EU-28** | : | : | : | : | 29,442 | 32,718 | 36,657 | 36,364 | 42,931 | 48,829 |
| **Belgium** | 3,063 | 2,775 | 2,537 | 1,777 | 1,430 | 1,328 | 1,372 | 1,192 | 1,442 | 1,680 |
| **Bulgaria** | 363 | 511 | 237 | 401 | 277 | 1,442 | 1,745 | 1,980 | 2,574 | 2,903 |
| **Czechia** | 96 | 124 | 315 | 292 | 365 | 225 | 476 | 928 | 994 | 1,050 |
| **Denmark** | 920 | 853 | 270 | 249 | 462 | 238 | 401 | 399 | 633 | 542 |
| **Germany** | 5,614 | 5,771 | 5,347 | 11,873 | 11,595 | 12,514 | 13,539 | 12,677 | 13,785 | 17,384 |
| **Estonia** | 35 | 26 | 37 | 29 | 45 | 54 | 51 | 51 | 112 | 136 |
| **Ireland** | 89 | 95 | 87 | 78 | 101 | 119 | 142 | 150 | 249 | 253 |
| **Greece** | 271 | 234 | 151 | 123 | 159 | 167 | 213 | 333 | 837 | 841 |
| **Spain** | 380 | 256 | 452 | 354 | 321 | 292 | 405 | 480 | 857 | 713 |
| **France** | 7,060 | 6,083 | 5,865 | 6,129 | 6,466 | 5,714 | 5,425 | 5,397 | 5,596 | 5,299 |
| **Croatia** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 17 | 27 | 43 | 23 | 23 |

[3] The share of the first permits issued (for 12 months or over) from Turkey has never exceeded than 0.7% of the total population of any Member State. It was calculated by dividing the total population into the number of the first permits issued.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Italy** | 1,443 | 1,314 | 778 | 588 | 585 | 456 | 451 | 486 | 1,485 | 1,737 |
| **Cyprus** | 31 | 23 | 27 | 3 | 8 | 22 | 24 | 28 | 13 | 58 |
| **Latvia** | 8 | 5 | 50 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 50 | 74 |
| **Lithuania** | 25 | 14 | 26 | 28 | 25 | 41 | 32 | 53 | 61 | 94 |
| **Luxembourg** | 23 | 22 | 25 | 40 | 44 | 31 | 44 | 76 | 121 | 109 |
| **Hungary** | 266 | 225 | 277 | 265 | 264 | 291 | 336 | 493 | 596 | 760 |
| **Malta** | 12 | 16 | 15 | 11 | 25 | 37 | 93 | 239 | 329 | 290 |
| **Netherlands** | 36 | 50 | 52 | 33 | 34 | 2,918 | 3,044 | 3,290 | 4,372 | 4,839 |
| **Austria** | 466 | 781 | 2,376 | 1,426 | 163 | 268 | 1,735 | 646 | 346 | 474 |
| **Poland** | 959 | 200 | 311 | 105 | 190 | 122 | 184 | 369 | 636 | 1,074 |
| **Portugal** | 33 | 53 | 72 | 70 | 83 | 61 | 38 | 58 | 159 | 530 |
| **Romania** | 1,493 | 318 | 272 | 716 | 676 | 607 | 706 | 646 | 758 | 1,012 |
| **Slovenia** | 10 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 24 | 13 | 21 | 16 | 35 | 69 |
| **Slovakia** | 39 | 49 | 31 | 40 | 43 | 51 | 62 | 86 | 75 | 122 |
| **Finland** | 395 | 314 | 366 | 389 | 418 | 396 | 360 | 363 | 389 | 283 |
| **Sweden** | 2,174 | 2,478 | 2,223 | 2,087 | 1,510 | 1,647 | 1,413 | 1,438 | 1,982 | 2,717 |
| **Iceland** | 7 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| **Liechtenstein** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 29 | 29 | 35 | 22 | 26 |
| **Norway** | 372 | 272 | 239 | 275 | 208 | 201 | 203 | 271 | 333 | 273 |
| **Switzerland** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 793 | 663 | 1,207 | 935 | 574 | 471 | 486 |
| **UK** | 9,446 | 8,744 | 6,984 | 4,783 | 4,120 | 3,644 | 4,316 | 4,450 | 4,584 | 3,762 |

**Source:** Eurostat. (2019, September 10).

Applying for the first residence permit is for family, education, employment, and other reasons. Almost half of the first residence permits taken by Turkish nationals

were issued for family reasons in 2018. Although labour migration has historical importance over Turkish nationals' immigration to Europe, the proportion of labour immigrants was around 16% in the same year (Eurostat, 2019) (See Table 25). Some studies (e.g., Kirişçi, 2007) support that Turkish migration continues through mostly family reunification.

**Table 25:** The Share of the Reasons for the First Permits Issued for Turkish Nationals by the Member States

| | Year | Family | Education | Work | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **EU-28** | 2013 | 61.8 | 13.0 | 9.0 | 16.2 |
| | 2014 | 60.5 | 10.6 | 9.9 | 19.1 |
| | 2015 | 61.7 | 10.7 | 9.4 | 18.2 |
| | 2016 | 57.1 | 11.4 | 11.7 | 19.8 |
| | 2017 | 49.4 | 13.2 | 14.3 | 23.0 |
| | 2018 | 47.4 | 13.0 | 16.1 | 23.6 |
| **Belgium** | 2008 | 85.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.9 |
| | 2009 | 82.5 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 16.0 |
| | 2010 | 64.1 | 11.4 | 7.3 | 17.2 |
| | 2011 | 67.9 | 11.9 | 8.3 | 11.9 |
| | 2012 | 67.0 | 13.6 | 11.1 | 8.3 |
| | 2013 | 62.7 | 18.1 | 9.6 | 9.6 |
| | 2014 | 59.6 | 19.1 | 12.7 | 8.6 |
| | 2015 | 61.3 | 17.3 | 13.6 | 7.8 |
| | 2016 | 61.4 | 20.1 | 13.9 | 4.6 |
| | 2017 | 49.0 | 20.4 | 18.2 | 12.5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2018 | 44.5 | 15.2 | 14.7 | 25.6 |
| **Bulgaria** | 2008 | 94.5 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 2.7 |
| | 2009 | 92.6 | 3.3 | 0.6 | 3.6 |
| | 2010 | 93.2 | 3.3 | 0.6 | 2.9 |
| | 2011 | 70.5 | 10.5 | 0.0 | 19.0 |
| | 2012 | 62.6 | 25.7 | 0.2 | 11.5 |
| | 2013 | 56.7 | 28.9 | 1.4 | 13.0 |
| | 2014 | 7.0 | 4.9 | 0.3 | 87.9 |
| | 2015 | 6.9 | 3.7 | 1.7 | 87.7 |
| | 2016 | 9.4 | 1.9 | 0.3 | 88.5 |
| | 2017 | 8.4 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 87.2 |
| | 2018 | 7.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 88.0 |
| **Czech Republic** | 2008 | 59.6 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 10.5 |
| | 2009 | 46.9 | 35.4 | 17.7 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 50.0 | 31.5 | 16.1 | 2.4 |
| | 2011 | 21.9 | 69.8 | 2.5 | 5.7 |
| | 2012 | 24.0 | 50.0 | 19.2 | 6.8 |
| | 2013 | 24.7 | 52.3 | 17.5 | 5.5 |
| | 2014 | 30.7 | 37.8 | 17.3 | 14.2 |
| | 2015 | 29.8 | 37.2 | 22.5 | 10.5 |
| | 2016 | 22.0 | 50.6 | 21.6 | 5.8 |
| | 2017 | 19.8 | 52.8 | 23.7 | 3.6 |
| | 2018 | 15.2 | 59.0 | 23.6 | 2.2 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Denmark** | 2008 | 34.0 | 54.5 | 10.9 | 0.5 |
| | 2009 | 47.5 | 32.2 | 13.8 | 6.5 |
| | 2010 | 48.5 | 35.9 | 14.4 | 1.2 |
| | 2011 | 73.3 | 6.7 | 19.3 | 0.7 |
| | 2012 | 69.1 | 6.8 | 22.9 | 1.2 |
| | 2013 | 72.7 | 8.7 | 18.2 | 0.4 |
| | 2014 | 55.0 | 13.4 | 30.7 | 0.8 |
| | 2015 | 68.6 | 9.5 | 21.9 | 0.0 |
| | 2016 | 61.4 | 8.0 | 29.3 | 1.3 |
| | 2017 | 64.9 | 10.3 | 24.0 | 0.8 |
| | 2018 | 56.8 | 12.5 | 28.6 | 2.0 |
| **Germany** | 2008 | 75.1 | 10.9 | 7.5 | 6.5 |
| | 2009 | 84.2 | 5.6 | 3.6 | 6.6 |
| | 2010 | 76.8 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 15.6 |
| | 2011 | 75.3 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 17.4 |
| | 2012 | 72.3 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 21.0 |
| | 2013 | 75.7 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 16.6 |
| | 2014 | 75.7 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 16.0 |
| | 2015 | 85.8 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 10.5 |
| | 2016 | 77.7 | 3.7 | 5.9 | 12.7 |
| | 2017 | 64.8 | 5.0 | 8.4 | 21.7 |
| | 2018 | 61.5 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 22.9 |
| **Estonia** | 2008 | 76.2 | 0.0 | 23.8 | 0.0 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2009 | 45.7 | 31.4 | 22.9 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 30.8 | 57.7 | 11.5 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 32.4 | 56.8 | 8.1 | 2.7 |
| | 2012 | 10.3 | 69.0 | 20.7 | 0.0 |
| | 2013 | 15.6 | 71.1 | 8.9 | 4.4 |
| | 2014 | 27.8 | 63.0 | 9.3 | 0.0 |
| | 2015 | 21.6 | 68.6 | 9.8 | 0.0 |
| | 2016 | 9.8 | 84.3 | 5.9 | 0.0 |
| | 2017 | 24.1 | 48.2 | 25.9 | 1.8 |
| | 2018 | 24.3 | 48.5 | 26.5 | 0.7 |
| **Ireland** | 2008 | 48.3 | 6.8 | 19.7 | 25.2 |
| | 2009 | 48.3 | 6.7 | 20.2 | 24.7 |
| | 2010 | 27.4 | 32.6 | 28.4 | 11.6 |
| | 2011 | 35.6 | 13.8 | 40.2 | 10.3 |
| | 2012 | 33.3 | 11.5 | 41.0 | 14.1 |
| | 2013 | 22.8 | 23.8 | 38.6 | 14.9 |
| | 2014 | 17.6 | 21.0 | 43.7 | 17.6 |
| | 2015 | 24.6 | 24.6 | 40.1 | 10.6 |
| | 2016 | 26.7 | 10.7 | 44.0 | 18.7 |
| | 2017 | 13.3 | 26.9 | 42.2 | 17.7 |
| | 2018 | 5.9 | 34.4 | 46.2 | 13.4 |
| **Greece** | 2008 | 32.8 | 51.6 | 10.2 | 5.5 |
| | 2009 | 26.9 | 58.7 | 9.2 | 5.2 |

**France**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 26.1 | 53.8 | 8.5 | 11.5 |
| | 2011 | 47.0 | 40.4 | 8.6 | 4.0 |
| | 2012 | 37.4 | 37.4 | 14.6 | 10.6 |
| | 2013 | 37.7 | 34.6 | 15.1 | 12.6 |
| | 2014 | 37.1 | 15.0 | 38.9 | 9.0 |
| | 2015 | 45.1 | 14.1 | 24.4 | 16.4 |
| | 2016 | 49.2 | 15.0 | 11.7 | 24.0 |
| | 2017 | 51.3 | 6.0 | 15.7 | 27.1 |
| | 2018 | 54.6 | 4.8 | 17.5 | 23.2 |
| **Spain** | 2008 | 31.8 | 34.5 | 20.5 | 13.2 |
| | 2009 | 32.9 | 32.4 | 25.5 | 9.2 |
| | 2010 | 48.8 | 21.5 | 27.7 | 2.0 |
| | 2011 | 36.3 | 38.3 | 23.0 | 2.4 |
| | 2012 | 32.5 | 42.7 | 18.6 | 6.2 |
| | 2013 | 41.1 | 26.8 | 25.5 | 6.5 |
| | 2014 | 39.7 | 27.4 | 27.1 | 5.8 |
| | 2015 | 40.5 | 23.2 | 25.7 | 10.6 |
| | 2016 | 41.9 | 24.4 | 23.5 | 10.2 |
| | 2017 | 41.4 | 17.6 | 25.1 | 15.9 |
| | 2018 | 43.3 | 18.5 | 18.4 | 19.8 |
| **France** | 2008 | 68.7 | 5.3 | 9.2 | 16.8 |
| | 2009 | 65.9 | 6.0 | 8.6 | 19.4 |
| | 2010 | 64.5 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 21.0 |

**Italy**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2011 | 66.3 | 8.0 | 5.9 | 19.8 |
| | 2012 | 67.9 | 7.3 | 3.1 | 21.7 |
| | 2013 | 64.1 | 9.4 | 5.3 | 21.2 |
| | 2014 | 59.3 | 8.8 | 8.3 | 23.6 |
| | 2015 | 61.6 | 10.2 | 9.0 | 19.3 |
| | 2016 | 60.5 | 8.8 | 9.9 | 20.8 |
| | 2017 | 55.9 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 21.5 |
| | 2018 | 53.7 | 10.8 | 10.3 | 25.2 |
| **Croatia** | 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2009 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2013 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2014 | 0.0 | 5.9 | 94.1 | 0.0 |
| | 2015 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 59.3 | 7.4 |
| | 2016 | 34.9 | 2.3 | 48.8 | 14.0 |
| | 2017 | 26.1 | 8.7 | 65.2 | 0.0 |
| | 2018 | 52.2 | 0.0 | 47.8 | 0.0 |
| **Italy** | 2008 | 18.9 | 0.3 | 26.1 | 54.8 |
| | 2009 | 18.2 | 1.4 | 37.4 | 43.0 |
| | 2010 | 54.9 | 0.2 | 28.8 | 16.1 |
| | 2011 | 69.8 | 1.3 | 16.5 | 12.5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2012 | 74.5 | 0.5 | 13.4 | 11.6 |
| | 2013 | 65.1 | 0.0 | 19.3 | 15.6 |
| | 2014 | 69.3 | 0.0 | 16.9 | 13.8 |
| | 2015 | 74.1 | 0.0 | 10.2 | 15.7 |
| | 2016 | 85.2 | 0.4 | 6.6 | 7.8 |
| | 2017 | 41.5 | 46.3 | 7.3 | 4.9 |
| | 2018 | 32.9 | 51.5 | 7.8 | 7.8 |
| **Cyprus** | 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2009 | 9.7 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 87.1 |
| | 2010 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.7 | 91.3 |
| | 2011 | 7.4 | 0.0 | 44.4 | 48.1 |
| | 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| | 2013 | 37.5 | 12.5 | 37.5 | 12.5 |
| | 2014 | 31.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 68.2 |
| | 2015 | 37.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 62.5 |
| | 2016 | 35.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 64.3 |
| | 2017 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 15.4 | 84.6 |
| | 2018 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.6 | 91.4 |
| **Latvia** | 2008 | 83.3 | 0.0 | 4.8 | 11.9 |
| | 2009 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 20.0 | 0.0 | 60.0 | 20.0 |
| | 2011 | 16.0 | 2.0 | 82.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2012 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2013 | 60.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2014 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2015 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2016 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2017 | 26.0 | 18.0 | 26.0 | 30.0 |
| | 2018 | 18.9 | 20.3 | 52.7 | 8.1 |
| **Lithuania** | 2008 | 56.0 | 4.0 | 40.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2009 | 68.0 | 0.0 | 32.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 64.3 | 0.0 | 35.7 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 69.2 | 0.0 | 26.9 | 3.8 |
| | 2012 | 46.4 | 14.3 | 39.3 | 0.0 |
| | 2013 | 44.0 | 4.0 | 52.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2014 | 31.7 | 17.1 | 48.8 | 2.4 |
| | 2015 | 53.1 | 28.1 | 15.6 | 3.1 |
| | 2016 | 43.4 | 24.5 | 28.3 | 3.8 |
| | 2017 | 42.6 | 24.6 | 21.3 | 11.5 |
| | 2018 | 26.6 | 31.9 | 25.5 | 16.0 |
| **Luxembourg** | 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2009 | 78.3 | 0.0 | 17.4 | 4.3 |
| | 2010 | 95.5 | 0.0 | 4.5 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 88.0 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2012 | 72.5 | 2.5 | 20.0 | 5.0 |
| | 2013 | 59.1 | 11.4 | 22.7 | 6.8 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2014 | 71.0 | 12.9 | 12.9 | 3.2 |
| | 2015 | 70.5 | 9.1 | 15.9 | 4.5 |
| | 2016 | 56.6 | 2.6 | 18.4 | 22.4 |
| | 2017 | 51.2 | 6.6 | 38.8 | 3.3 |
| | 2018 | 50.5 | 7.3 | 24.8 | 17.4 |
| **Hungary** | 2008 | 34.1 | 20.9 | 35.6 | 9.4 |
| | 2009 | 11.3 | 57.1 | 22.6 | 9.0 |
| | 2010 | 34.2 | 50.7 | 5.8 | 9.3 |
| | 2011 | 36.8 | 51.3 | 10.1 | 1.8 |
| | 2012 | 33.6 | 58.1 | 6.0 | 2.3 |
| | 2013 | 33.3 | 42.0 | 12.5 | 12.1 |
| | 2014 | 28.9 | 40.9 | 11.0 | 19.2 |
| | 2015 | 30.4 | 44.3 | 8.9 | 16.4 |
| | 2016 | 27.8 | 50.3 | 10.8 | 11.2 |
| | 2017 | 22.7 | 53.9 | 13.9 | 9.6 |
| | 2018 | 24.6 | 30.5 | 28.9 | 15.9 |
| **Malta** | 2008 | 19.3 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 76.4 |
| | 2009 | 91.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 |
| | 2010 | 68.8 | 0.0 | 12.5 | 18.8 |
| | 2011 | 60.0 | 0.0 | 13.3 | 26.7 |
| | 2012 | 63.6 | 0.0 | 9.1 | 27.3 |
| | 2013 | 36.0 | 16.0 | 32.0 | 16.0 |
| | 2014 | 29.7 | 16.2 | 27.0 | 27.0 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2015 | 32.3 | 5.4 | 30.1 | 32.3 |
| | 2016 | 20.1 | 2.5 | 40.2 | 37.2 |
| | 2017 | 17.9 | 0.9 | 51.7 | 29.5 |
| | 2018 | 11.4 | 1.7 | 58.3 | 28.6 |
| **Netherlands** | 2008 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2009 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2010 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2011 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2012 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2013 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| | 2014 | 75.7 | 5.6 | 12.0 | 6.8 |
| | 2015 | 68.4 | 8.8 | 12.9 | 9.9 |
| | 2016 | 64.2 | 9.9 | 16.0 | 9.8 |
| | 2017 | 58.9 | 9.4 | 17.8 | 13.9 |
| | 2018 | 54.7 | 10.6 | 21.9 | 12.9 |
| **Austria** | 2008 | 91.7 | 3.1 | 0.9 | 4.3 |
| | 2009 | 25.3 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 72.1 |
| | 2010 | 15.4 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 80.5 |
| | 2011 | 39.5 | 32.9 | 2.8 | 24.8 |
| | 2012 | 69.4 | 18.3 | 0.7 | 11.6 |
| | 2013 | 88.3 | 0.0 | 5.5 | 6.1 |
| | 2014 | 52.2 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 44.8 |
| | 2015 | 52.4 | 11.4 | 3.6 | 32.6 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2016 | 68.6 | 6.8 | 4.0 | 20.6 |
| | 2017 | 77.7 | 0.0 | 9.5 | 12.7 |
| | 2018 | 59.9 | 0.0 | 20.5 | 19.6 |
| **Poland** | 2008 | 31.8 | 8.1 | 50.8 | 9.3 |
| | 2009 | 30.7 | 8.6 | 51.4 | 9.4 |
| | 2010 | 36.0 | 57.5 | 5.0 | 1.5 |
| | 2011 | 39.9 | 8.7 | 43.1 | 8.4 |
| | 2012 | 99.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| | 2013 | 31.1 | 13.2 | 48.4 | 7.4 |
| | 2014 | 20.5 | 37.7 | 36.9 | 4.9 |
| | 2015 | 2.7 | 41.8 | 53.8 | 1.6 |
| | 2016 | 19.5 | 29.5 | 39.8 | 11.1 |
| | 2017 | 32.7 | 16.5 | 36.3 | 14.5 |
| | 2018 | 27.7 | 13.6 | 43.4 | 15.3 |
| **Portugal** | 2008 | 3.4 | 79.3 | 17.2 | 0.0 |
| | 2009 | 3.0 | 87.9 | 9.1 | 0.0 |
| | 2010 | 22.6 | 54.7 | 22.6 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 16.7 | 73.6 | 5.6 | 4.2 |
| | 2012 | 14.3 | 72.9 | 12.9 | 0.0 |
| | 2013 | 18.1 | 67.5 | 14.5 | 0.0 |
| | 2014 | 45.9 | 21.3 | 32.8 | 0.0 |
| | 2015 | 39.5 | 26.3 | 31.6 | 2.6 |
| | 2016 | 29.3 | 12.1 | 46.6 | 12.1 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | 2017 | 39.0 | 8.8 | 50.3 | 1.9 |
|  | 2018 | 55.3 | 4.5 | 40.0 | 0.2 |
| **Romania** | 2008 | 29.0 | 0.2 | 62.3 | 8.4 |
|  | 2009 | 41.6 | 0.3 | 48.2 | 9.9 |
|  | 2010 | 87.7 | 0.6 | 11.0 | 0.6 |
|  | 2011 | 96.7 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
|  | 2012 | 50.1 | 4.6 | 39.4 | 5.9 |
|  | 2013 | 58.3 | 3.6 | 34.3 | 3.8 |
|  | 2014 | 49.8 | 1.8 | 40.7 | 7.7 |
|  | 2015 | 48.6 | 4.0 | 38.2 | 9.2 |
|  | 2016 | 50.3 | 2.9 | 44.1 | 2.6 |
|  | 2017 | 43.9 | 4.1 | 47.0 | 5.0 |
|  | 2018 | 35.7 | 1.0 | 57.5 | 5.8 |
| **Slovenia** | 2008 | 61.5 | 23.1 | 15.4 | 0.0 |
|  | 2009 | 30.0 | 10.0 | 60.0 | 0.0 |
|  | 2010 | 85.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.3 |
|  | 2011 | 42.9 | 0.0 | 57.1 | 0.0 |
|  | 2012 | 37.5 | 37.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
|  | 2013 | 4.2 | 41.7 | 54.2 | 0.0 |
|  | 2014 | 38.5 | 0.0 | 53.8 | 7.7 |
|  | 2015 | 42.9 | 28.6 | 28.6 | 0.0 |
|  | 2016 | 50.0 | 0.0 | 43.8 | 6.3 |
|  | 2017 | 40.0 | 5.7 | 51.4 | 2.9 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2018 | 24.6 | 0.0 | 56.5 | 18.8 |
| **Slovakia** | 2008 | 29.5 | 17.0 | 43.2 | 10.2 |
| | 2009 | 41.0 | 7.7 | 48.7 | 2.6 |
| | 2010 | 63.3 | 4.1 | 32.7 | 0.0 |
| | 2011 | 67.7 | 6.5 | 12.9 | 12.9 |
| | 2012 | 47.5 | 2.5 | 47.5 | 2.5 |
| | 2013 | 41.9 | 4.7 | 51.2 | 2.3 |
| | 2014 | 35.3 | 7.8 | 56.9 | 0.0 |
| | 2015 | 38.7 | 8.1 | 53.2 | 0.0 |
| | 2016 | 46.5 | 5.8 | 44.2 | 3.5 |
| | 2017 | 42.7 | 8.0 | 48.0 | 1.3 |
| | 2018 | 27.9 | 5.7 | 66.4 | 0.0 |
| **Finland** | 2008 | 56.6 | 3.6 | 32.1 | 7.6 |
| | 2009 | 66.6 | 8.1 | 20.8 | 4.6 |
| | 2010 | 78.0 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 4.1 |
| | 2011 | 68.6 | 10.1 | 16.4 | 4.9 |
| | 2012 | 72.5 | 6.7 | 13.4 | 7.5 |
| | 2013 | 71.8 | 8.9 | 10.0 | 9.3 |
| | 2014 | 73.2 | 9.3 | 10.6 | 6.8 |
| | 2015 | 71.1 | 14.7 | 10.0 | 4.2 |
| | 2016 | 70.2 | 12.1 | 16.0 | 1.7 |
| | 2017 | 65.3 | 8.0 | 18.0 | 8.7 |
| | 2018 | 44.5 | 8.5 | 27.2 | 19.8 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sweden | 2008 | 68.5 | 8.1 | 4.5 | 18.9 |
| | 2009 | 67.2 | 11.9 | 16.3 | 4.5 |
| | 2010 | 61.1 | 10.5 | 26.9 | 1.5 |
| | 2011 | 63.2 | 2.9 | 32.5 | 1.4 |
| | 2012 | 69.6 | 2.6 | 25.0 | 2.8 |
| | 2013 | 70.5 | 4.4 | 22.4 | 2.7 |
| | 2014 | 71.6 | 3.2 | 24.0 | 1.3 |
| | 2015 | 67.8 | 3.6 | 27.1 | 1.5 |
| | 2016 | 71.0 | 3.5 | 22.9 | 2.5 |
| | 2017 | 63.7 | 5.5 | 29.1 | 1.7 |
| | 2018 | 45.9 | 4.0 | 25.0 | 25.1 |
| United Kingdom | 2008 | 17.3 | 51.8 | 14.2 | 16.6 |
| | 2009 | 18.0 | 58.7 | 8.6 | 14.8 |
| | 2010 | 18.1 | 50.7 | 10.0 | 21.2 |
| | 2011 | 19.2 | 47.3 | 11.9 | 21.6 |
| | 2012 | 23.4 | 40.0 | 9.1 | 27.6 |
| | 2013 | 25.9 | 40.0 | 11.4 | 22.7 |
| | 2014 | 26.7 | 38.2 | 11.9 | 23.2 |
| | 2015 | 19.4 | 36.7 | 13.9 | 30.0 |
| | 2016 | 19.8 | 29.9 | 13.1 | 37.3 |
| | 2017 | 22.2 | 28.3 | 12.7 | 36.8 |
| | 2018 | 30.3 | 35.4 | 15.9 | 18.4 |

**Source:** Eurostat. (2019, September 10).

The Member States that signed a labour force agreement with Turkey are shown in Table 12 and Table 13 because most of the first permits issued for Turkish nationals are by these countries, and most Turkish migration stock lives in these countries.

The rest of the variables are independent variables. The panel data includes the data from 28 EU Member States from 2008 to 2018.

Independent variables are:

- Emp: Employment rate (OECD, 2018). One of the critical labour market factors for migration is employment. It is highly correlated to the data of earnings and GDP. Since the prerequisite of earning well is to have a job, we chose the employment rate instead of earnings and GDP. This variable is a labour market determinant.

- Wage: Compensation of employees (Eurostat 2020a). Since the data was in national currencies and some countries are not in the Eurozone, the compensations in these countries were converted to Euro by the currency rate of December of each year (Trading Economics, 2020). Then the compensations in Euro were divided into the number of employees (Eurostat 2020b). Earning a higher wage is a powerful motivation to choose a migration destination.

- WorkHour: Average weekly hours worked on the main job indicate work-life balance (OECD, 2019). Having employment is not enough by oneself because a worker considers the quality of employment, including working conditions. This variable is a labour market determinant.

- LivingCost: Price-level ratio of PPP conversion factor (GDP) to the market exchange rate (World Bank, 2020). "It tells how many dollars are needed to buy a dollar's worth of goods in the country as compared to the United States" (World Bank, 2020). This variable is a labour market determinant.

- Freedoms: This variable is a percentile rank which shows the country's rank among all countries (World Bank, 2019). The rank captures "perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their

government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (World Bank, 2019). This variable is used for understanding the effects of political coercion and social pressure over migration. Some people want to live in a country that has freedom of expression. Social exclusion is a broad concept with economic, political, and social dimensions; thus, the level of freedom of expression is also one of the indicators of social exclusion (Bhalla & Lapeyre, 1997). "The idea and concept of democracy include human rights as democracy is built on the fundament of human rights" (Kirchschlaeger, 2014, p. 113). This study benefits from the democracy index as the descriptor of political oppression. This variable is related to the security-based determinants. This variable controls the possibility of whether Turkish citizens emigrate due to the authoritarian policies in the given period or not.

- TMigSt2005: Turkish immigrants stock data in the Member States in 2005 (UNDESA, 2017). The data of 2005 shows how many people lived in the Member States before the period, which is analysed in this study. This data represents the migration network of Turkish citizens because many Turkish nationals have one or more relatives who live in European countries. This variable is a social determinant.

- ExOttoman: This dummy variable represents whether a Member State lived under the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire at any stage of history. This variable is used for showing the cultural/historical link between Turkey and the Member State. The majority of Turkish origin people in the Balkans do not have Turkish nationality, and UNDESA (2017) data indicates that almost 50,000 Turkish foreign-born people live in the Balkans (7,992 in Romania, 32,881 in Greece and 9,867 in Bulgaria). Actually, because of the Ottoman legacy, today, the Turkish/Muslim population in the Balkans is estimated at 1.3 million (55,000 in Romania, 200,000 in Greece and 750,000 in Bulgaria) (Cole, 2011). This population have relatives in Turkey, so Turkish nationals might prefer to migrate to these countries. Also, the countries that lived under the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire at any stage of history are relatively closer to

Turkey than the other countries such as Germany, Spain, France, Portugal, and the UK. Therefore, this dummy variable is also an indicator of the distance. Thus, this variable is both a social and geographical determinant.

- ColdDays[4]: Heating degree days are the demand for energy needed to heat a building (Meteoroloji Genel Müdürlüğü, 2020; Eurostat, 2019). If heating degree days are less in a country, that country has a modest climate; this variable is an indicator of geographical determinants. Following the literature, this article hypothesizes that this variable might explain why Turkish migration stock has been increasing in the Mediterranean-European countries in recent years.

### VIII.A.2. Methodology

The panel data included 11 years (from 2008 to 2018) and 28 EU countries (including the UK), yielding 308 observations. After transforming the model into log-log form, all the independent variables for Turkey ('EmpT', 'WageT', 'WorkHourT', 'LivingCostT', 'FreedomsT' and 'ColdDaysT') were subtracted from all the independent variables for the member states ('EmpMS', 'WageMS', 'WorkHourMS', 'LivingCostMS', 'FreedomsMS' and 'ColdDaysMS'). Since using data at the macro level does not allow developing a more complex approach to the interaction of macro and micro levels, we assume that the differences between the home country and destination are highly correlated with migration motivation (Dudu, 2018; Sirkeci İ. , 2018). For example, if the employment rates difference between the two countries is high, the probability of migrating for employment motivation to the country with a high employment rate from the country with a low employment rate is likely to be high. Thus, while the dependent variable remained the same, new independent variables were created considering these differences:

[4] Although geographical drivers do not seem significant for Turkish migration to Europe, these drivers are a part of the general migration literature. Excluding them would mean falling into the trap of omitted variable bias— a type of selection bias that occurs in regression analysis when one does not include all the potential factors that may have some explanatory power on the dependent variable.

$$\ln(EmpDif)= \ln(EmpMS)-\ln(EmpT)$$

$$\ln(WageDif)=\ln(WageMS)-\ln(WageT)$$

$$\ln(WorkHourDif)= \ln(WorkHourMS)-\ln(WorkHourT)$$

$$\ln(LivingCostDif)= \ln(LivingCostMS)-\ln(LivingCostT)$$

$$\ln(FreedomsDif)=\ln(FreedomsMS)-\ln(FreedomsTS)$$

$$\ln(ColdDaysDif)=\ln(ColdDaysMS)-\ln(ColdDaysT)$$

The estimation was done by ordinary least square (OLS) model. The following model is used for the estimation from *i* country to *j* country:

$$\ln(FirstPermit_{ijt}) = \beta_0+\beta_1\ln(EmpDif_{jt}) + \beta_2\ln(WageDif_{jt}) + \beta_3\ln(WorkHourDif_{jt}) + \beta_4\ln(LivingCostDif) + \beta_5(FreedomsDif_{jt})+ \beta_6\ln(ColdDaysDif_{jt}) + \beta_7(ExOttoman_{ij}) + \beta_8 \ln(TMigSt2005_{ij}) + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

The expected signs of the variables are: $\beta_1>0$, $\beta_2>0$, $\beta_3>0$, $\beta_4<0$, $\beta_5>0$, $\beta_6>0$, $\beta_7>0$. The high employment rate is a sign of a high probability of finding employment (Ortega & Peri, 2009); thus, immigrants tend to immigrate to destinations with a high employment rate. The expected relationship between the number of first permits and the difference in the employment rates between the two countries (Turkey and the possible destination country in the EU) is positive. Similarly, higher wages (European Commission, 2006, 2013; Cedefop, 1998) are attractive for the immigrants, and the expected relationship is positive. Also, better working conditions, like more leisure time, can motivate choosing a migration destination (De Jong & Gardner, 1981). Since the countries with lower-than-average usual weekly hours worked on the main job is more attractive than the others, the expected relationship between the number of the first permits and the difference in the average usual weekly working hours between two countries is expected positive. Lower cost of living (Cedefop, 1998; Berger & Blomquist, 1992) is another desirable condition for choosing a destination; as a result, the expected relationship between the number of first permits and the difference in the cost of living between the two countries is negative.

The perception of democracy and human rights in Europe is considered to positively affect the probability of having migration aspirations, according to the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman, Verschragen, & Hemmerechts, 2018). Therefore, there is an expected positive relationship between the number of the first permits and the difference in the democracy level between the two countries. Also, since the modest temperature has a positive impact on migration, the expected relationship between the 'FirstPermit' and 'ColdDaysDif' variables is negative. Likewise, since there is a cultural/historical proximity between Turkey and the countries that lived under the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire at any stage of history and Turkish nationals still have relatives in these countries, the expected relationship is positive between the variables of the 'FirstPermit' and 'ExOttoman'.

**Graph 5:** Number of First Permits issued for Turkish Nationals from the Member States




**Source:** Eurostat. (2019, September 10).

**Table 26:** Descriptive Statistics of Data

| FirstPermit | Emp | WorkHour | Democracy | Agreement | ExOttoman | ColdDays |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Min.: 3 | Min.: 42.07 | Min.: 30 | Min.: 6.440 | Min.:0 | Min.:0 | Min.: 12.71 |
| Mean: 1412.11 | Mean: 63.24 | Mean: 38.12 | Mean: 7.966 | Mean: 0.24 | Mean: 0.2143 | Mean: 20.04 |
| Max.: 17384 | Max.: 70.08 | Max.: 42.40 | Max.: 9.880 | Max.: 1 | Max.: 1 | Max.: 29.79 |
| Sd: 2697.8 | Sd: 8.31 | Sd: 2.43 | Sd: 0.77 | Sd: 0.43 | Sd: 0.41 | Sd: 3.53 |

Descriptive statistics show that the range of residence permits issued by each Member State for Turkish people per annum is extensive. For example, a Member State has issued only three long-term residence permits within a year, while another state has issued more than 17,000 permits (see Table 25). The total number of residence permits issued for Turkish nationals from all Member States has a similar trend with the number of residence permits issued for Turkish nationals from countries with a labour force agreement with Turkey (see Graph 5).

In Turkey, the determinants of migration decisions like employment rate, wages, working hours, and democracy fall behind the Member States, but the temperature is more modest in Turkey than the many Member States. The employment rate in Turkey has been gradually increasing since 2008. The highest employment rate was in 2018, with 51.98% (OECD, 2018). However, this improvement is still lower than the average of the EU-28. The wages are lower in Turkey than in the Member States. The average usual weekly working hours ranged from 30 hours to 42 hours in the Member States while it had decreased from 51.7 hours to 47 hours in the given period (OECD, 2019). While comparing with the EU-28, Turkey has the most extended average weekly working hours on the main job. In Turkey, the level of democracy, which is lower than any Member States, has continued to fall sharply from 46.15 to 25.12 since 2008 (World Bank, 2019). The weather in Turkey is modest, like in Greece, southern Italy, and Spain, since Turkey is a Mediterranean country (Spinoni, et al., 2017) (see Table 25).

**Table 27:** Correlations

| | lnFirstPermit | lnEmpDif | lnWageDif | lnWorkHourDif | lnLivingCostDif | lnFreedomsDif | lnColdDaysDif | lnTMigSt2005 | ExOttoman |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **lnFirstPermit** | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| **lnEmpDif** | 0.2991 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| **lnWageDif** | 0.271 | 0.5232 | 1 | | | | | | |
| **lnWorkHourDif** | -0.34 | -0.5797 | -0.6326 | 1 | | | | | |
| **lnLivingCostDif** | 0.3512 | 0.5003 | 0.9219 | -0.5332 | 1 | | | | |
| **lnFreedomsDif** | 0.264 | 0.2539 | 0.5687 | -0.1468 | 0.739 | 1 | | | |
| **lnColdDaysDif** | 0.2447 | 0.4835 | 0.0652 | -0.2192 | 0.104 | 0.0762 | 1 | | |
| **lnTMigSt2005** | 0.8562 | 0.3251 | 0.419 | -0.4552 | 0.476 | 0.2175 | 0.1876 | 1 | |
| **ExOttoman** | -0.1 | -0.624 | -0.532 | 0.4804 | -0.4897 | -0.4041 | -0.2261 | -0.0481 | 1 |

The analysis shows us that some variables are highly correlated. For example, the 'FirstPermit' variable and the 'TMigSt2005' variable are highly positively correlated, with 0.85 (see Table 27). The labour force agreements with Turkey signed by a Member State significantly affect the migration networks between the two countries. That is the reason why a significant number of Turkish citizens lives in some Member States. Since the 1960s, many Turkish citizens have connected with these Member States by their relatives. Another high correlation is between the 'lnWageDif' variable and the 'lnLivingCost' variable, with 0.92 (see Table 27). People can adopt different product search strategies to buy a similar product in a different brandmark (Committee on Finance US Senate, 1995) by paying less when they cannot afford it anymore.

### VIII.A.3. Empirical Findings

Since the $R^2$ is 0.788, the model fits the data well, which means that the independent variables ('EmpDif', 'WageDif', 'WorkHourDif', 'TMigSt2005', 'FreedomsDif', 'ColdDaysDif', and 'ExOttoman') explain 78.8% of the dependent variable, 'FirstPermit'. As expected, according to the estimation, the 'FreedomsDif' and 'TMigSt2005' variables are positively and highly significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit' (see Table 14). The findings of the estimation show that the density of migration networks and the differences in the level of freedoms between Turkey and the EU-28 are significant determinants for choosing a destination in the EU for Turkish immigrants (see Table 28).

**Table 28:** Coefficients of the Estimation (OLS)

| | **Estimate** | **Robust Std Error** | **t value** | **Pr(>\|t\|)** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **_cons** | 0.592 | 1.034 | 0.570 | 0.572 |
| **lnEmpDif** | 0.262 | 0.863 | 0.300 | 0.764 |
| **lnWageDif** | -0.229 | 0.322 | -0.710 | 0.483 |
| **lnWorkHourDif** | -0.054 | 3.013 | -0.020 | 0.986 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **lnLivingCostDif** | -1.728 | 1.077 | -1.610 | 0.120 |
| **lnFreedomsDif** | 2.029 | 0.806 | 2.520 | 0.018*** |
| **lnTMigSt2005** | 0.622 | 0.055 | 11.300 | 0.000*** |
| **lnColdDaysDif** | 0.167 | 0.174 | 0.960 | 0.346 |
| **ExOttoman** | -0.525 | 0.394 | -1.330 | 0.194 |

Observation Number: 282

Multiple $R^2$: 0.788

Root MSE: 0.897

**Note:** Standard errors adjusted for 28 clusters in the country, significance denoted by '***' at 1%, '**' at 5%, and '*' at 10%.

The 'FreedomsDif' variable is significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit'. The estimation shows that a 1% rise in the difference in the level of freedoms between Turkey and the EU-28 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish nationals by 2.02% (see Table 5). This study focuses on the years between 2008 and 2018 when the level of democracy had decreased sharply from 46.15 to 25.12 (World Bank, 2019) while the demand for democracy had increased in Turkey. Also, Turkey ranked number 110 among 167 countries in 2019, the lowest rank among the EU countries (The Economist, 2020). However, according to the results of the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman, Verschragen, & Hemmerechts, 2018), the perception of democracy and human rights in Europe does not affect the probability of having migration aspirations of Turkish nationals. The results of the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman, Verschragen, & Hemmerechts, 2018) do not support the findings of this study. This study is also opposite to studies (Winter, 2019) that concluded that economic factors outweigh political factors. Although the level of democracy in Turkey had decreased regularly from 2005 to 2018, people in Turkey have elected the AKP as the ruling party since 2002— as of 2020 (World Bank, 2019). Also, the Syrian War and the terrorist attacks in the 2010s were effective in decreasing the level of democracy. On the other hand, the majority of young people in Turkey think that there is a democracy deficit (SODEV, 2020).

The 'TMigSt2005' variable has a high significance for choosing a migration destination for Turkish nationals. This study investigates the period between 2008 and 2018. The 'TMigSt2005' variable shows the number of Turkish people in the Member States in 2005, just before this study investigates. Therefore, this variable represents the power of migration network from Turkey to a possible destination because a higher Turkish population in a Member State means having a more powerful migration network for solidarity with newcomers. Like some studies (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015), the findings of this study show that migration networks positively affect the migration destination choice. The estimation indicates that a 1% rise in Turkish migration stock in the Member States in 2005 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish citizens by 0.62% (see Table 28)

The labour market variable 'EmpDif' is not significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit'. Many studies (Winter, 2019; Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017; Nica, 2015; Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015; Jennissen, 2003) support that employment is a crucial motivation for choosing a migration destination. In contrast, the finding of this study shows that today's Turkish immigrants do not place a great emphasis on having a job while choosing a destination, unlike the foregoer Turkish immigrants. It is vital for having a job to be a documented worker. Today, there is no such labour demand in Europe as in the 1960s. Therefore, even though the labour demand increases from time to time in Europe, it does not mean that every immigrant has a guarantee to have a job.

The labour market variable 'WageDif' is not significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit' although some studies (Winter, 2019; Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017; Nica, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013; Mayda, 2010) contradict this finding. In Turkey, wages are so low that Turkish citizens have higher wages when they migrate from Turkey to any Member State. Between 2008 and 2018, wages increased in the many Member States while wages in Turkey remained almost the same (Eurostat, 2020).

Another labour market variable, 'WorkHourDif', related to working conditions, is not significant at 95%, and this finding disaffirms the findings of Tabor, Milfont, and Ward (2015). Although the average usual weekly working hours have been decreasing in Turkey since 2008, it is still more than the average weekly working hours of any Member States. Therefore, the working time arrangement of the possible destination does not affect possible Turkish immigrants.

The labour market variable 'LivingCostDif' is not significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit', unlike the studies of Nica (2015) and Tabor, Milfont, and Ward (2015). The cost of living in Turkey is lower than in the Member States. Between 2008 and 2018, in the many Member States, the cost of living had decreased like in Turkey. However, this decrease had been sharper in Turkey. In 2008, a person needed $0.68 (USD) to buy a dollar's worth of goods in the country, compared to the United States, while the same person needed $0.33 (World Bank, 2020). This decrease is in accordance with the decrease in wages in Turkey.

The 'ColdDaysDif' variable is not significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit'. As a Mediterranean country, Turkey has a similar modest temperature with other Mediterranean countries of Europe; so, the heating degree days are less in Turkey than in many Member States (World Bank, 2020). However, most Turkish immigrants are located in the Northern European countries, which have relatively harsh climatic conditions. Similarly, this study shows that temperature is not a significant determinant of the migration of Turkish nationals in the EU-28.

The dummy variable of 'ExOttoman' is not significant at 95% in determining 'FirstPermit' in determining 'FirstPermit' by contrasting with Tabor, Milfont and Ward (2015). This dummy variable indicates the historical/cultural proximity between Turkey and the Member States that lived under the Ottoman Empire's hegemony at any stage of history. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Romania lived under the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire at any stage of history. These Member States are closer to Turkey than other EU countries. Therefore, living in a culturally and geographically close country might feel relaxed Turkish nationals due to the easiness to travel to Turkey whenever they want. However, today, the geographical

closeness to an EU country might not be a strong reason. For example, the UK is one of the farthest destinations of the EU from Turkey. Nowadays, the duration of a flight from Turkey to the UK has been approximately 4 hours, and the flight tickets are affordable due to the earning gap (Klein & Ventura, 2004) and the demand for the flights. Therefore, today, for Turkish nationals, the distance might not be a determinant for choosing a migration destination in the EU.

This study and results fill the gap in the lack of studies that focus on the determinants of migration destination choice of Turkish newcomers in the EU. In the literature, many studies (Winter, 2019; Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017; Nica, 2015; Pânzaru, 2013; Van Der Gaag & Van Wissen, 2008; Jennissen, 2003) which investigate the determinants of migration do not focus on the determinants of migration destination choice. Only a few studies (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013; Mayda, 2010) focus specifically on the motivations for migration destinations, but these studies do not handle specifically Turkey as a home country.

The findings of this study using macro data– the influence of social networks and demand for democracy on the Turkish nationals' migration destinations– support the findings of other studies (Elveren, 2018; Ozcurumez & Yetkin Aker, 2016; Sunata, 2010; Yanasmayan, 2019) which benefited from in-depth interviews and survey. This study filled a gap in the literature by focusing on the drivers of migration destinations of Turkish newcomers in the EU by using macro data.

## VIII.B. THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION EXPERIENCE IN TURKEY IN 2009-2018

As it was seen in previous chapter, millions of people have migrated from Turkey since the 1960s, mostly to European countries. The expectation of higher earnings abroad has played a key role in the decision to migrate and many, therefore, choose to remain in the host country. However, each year, a significant number of people return to Turkey. Some studies (Bijwaard, 2015; Dustmann, Fadlon, & Weiss, 2011), however, have found that the possibility of higher earnings in the home country is a

crucial factor in the decision to return, and the return of skilled migrants strengthens the human capital of the home country.

The migration experience increases the skills of individuals in two ways: learning while working (Dustmann, Fadlon, & Weiss, 2011; Iara, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013) and study abroad (Iara, 2006). Migrants who return to the home country have new skills and, as a result, earn more in the home country than they did before migrating. The human capital increased by skills gained abroad promotes economic growth in the home country (Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003) and, therefore, policies that encourage migrants to return to the home country may help to boost its economic development. This dissertation provides evidence concerning the returnees' labour income for the use of Turkish policy-makers to attract skilled migrants to return for the first time.

In this chapter, our question is, for the case of Turkey, if migration experience becomes an advantage in terms of jobs and labour income when they return to Turkey.

The migration experience increases the skills of individuals in two ways: learning while working (Dustmann, Fadlon, & Weiss, 2011; Iara, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013) and study abroad (Iara, 2006). Migrants who return to the home country have new skills and, as a result, earn more in the home country than they did before migrating. The human capital increased by skills gained abroad promotes economic growth in the home country (Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003) and, therefore, policies that encourage migrants to return to the home country may help to boost its economic development. This dissertation provides evidence concerning the returnees' labour income for the use of Turkish policy-makers to attract skilled migrants to return for the first time.

The goal of the present case study is to investigate the effect of migration experience on labour income in Turkey. To this end, the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey from 2009 to 2018 are used, which contain information on the working-age population (aged 15 to 64) of approximately 3.3 million. The hypothesis is that migration experience increases the salaries of people returning to the home country.

This study is limited to investigating the labour income of returnees by comparing with the overall wage earners in Turkey. Indeed, the findings suggest that migration experience has a positive impact on labour income in Turkey. The next section briefly reviews the literature. The section 'Data and Variables' provides descriptive statistics, while the section 'Analysis and Discussion' presents and discusses the findings. Finally, the last section summarises the findings and provides some policy recommendations.

### VIII.B.1. Literature Review

The literature shows that migration experience increases the income of migrants returning to their home countries (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Bijwaard, 2015; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013). Bijwaard (2015) states that returnees fall into the upper levels of income distribution in the home country. The migrants have increased their skills by working or studying in the host country.

Learning through experience of work or on-the-job training, through interactions and interpersonal communication, increases the skills of workers indirectly, who 'observ[e] different or better ways of doing, or of exchanging ideas and experiences with other employees' (Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013, p. 6). On-the-job training in a developed country increases the earnings of the returnees according to the following factors: individual characteristics (Bijwaard, 2015; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013), the promotion of upskilling in the host country (Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013), the duration of stay in the host country (Reinhold & Thom, 2009; Lacuesta, 2006), the applicability of the skills gained in the host country to entrepreneurship in the home country (Bijwaard, 2015; Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001; Martin & Radu, 2012), the advanced technological working knowledge of the host country (Iara, 2006; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003), the increase in productivity upon return (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996), and the network ties in the labour market of the home country (Martin & Radu, 2012).

Study abroad is another way to increase skills directly (Iara, 2006). Güngör and Tansel (2006) state that higher salaries, longer duration of stay, and the lifestyle in North America and England decrease the probability of Turkish students returning. Elveren and Toksöz (2019) further highlight that women students and professionals are more likely to remain abroad due to the gender gap in Turkey. The decision of highly skilled individuals not to return may cause a reduction in remittances for Turkey. However, Niimi, Ozden, and Schiff (2008) contend that high-skilled immigrants remit less than low-skilled immigrants. Therefore, the decision of high-skilled immigrants to remain in the host country means a 'brain drain' for the home country because these individuals do not contribute to the economic growth of the home country (Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003). Conversely, economic growth and the promotion of social freedoms in Turkey strengthen the motivation of immigrants to return (Sirkeci, Cohen, & Yazgan, 2012).

Other studies (Barcevicius, 2016; Mezger Kveder & Flahaux, 2013; Stark, 1995), however, have found that migrants may face difficulties in entering the labour market in the home country when they return. Asymmetric information concerning the returnee's skill level between potential employers in the home country and the returnee may result in the returnee not finding employment appropriate for her or his skill level in the home country. Returnees are, therefore, more likely to be involuntarily self-employed.

Migrants returning to Turkey comprise a significant part of the population because a substantial number of Turkish workers have emigrated since the 1960s. While labour migration continued into the 1970s, the political conflicts in Turkey caused further migration. After the military coup of 1980, the number of Turkish asylum seekers increased in Europe. In the mid-1980s, due to the long-standing conflict in the Kurdish regions (Sirkeci, 2003), the number of asylum seekers from Turkey increased constantly until the 2000s when, due to economic stability, the migration flow from Turkey stagnated. However, in the 2010s, the deterioration in democracy in the country and loss of economic stability increased the emigration of high-skilled individuals. According to UNDESA (2017), more than 2.5 million immigrants from

Turkey (including the Turkey-born naturalised population and Turkish citizens) lived in the 28 countries of the European Union (EU) in 2017. However, in 2015, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Turkey (known after 2018 as the Ministry of Family, Labour, and Social Services) numbered the Turkish migrant population in 14 EU Member States[5] at almost 5 million (including more than 2.5 million dual citizens) (DİYİH, 2015). Since many Member States do not record the ethnic background of individuals in their censuses, there is insufficient information about the number of people of Turkish origin living in Europe.

The studies by Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) and Yetkin Aker and Görmüş (2018) examine the returnees' status in the Turkish labour market and these two crucial studies guide the present article. However, the present article differs by focusing on the returnees' wage income in Turkey.

Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) analysed the choice of economic activity of Turkish returnees, based on surveys initiated by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in 1984, 1986, and 1988. In line with Mezger, Kveder, and Flahaux (2013) and Martin and Radu (2012), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2001) concluded that many returnees choose to be self-employed in the home country. Thus, Turkish returnees become entrepreneurs in Turkey. However, returnees with higher levels of education choose to be salaried employees because they expect higher wages in the home country.

In a recent study, Yetkin Aker and Görmüş (2018) examined the work status of Turkish returnees by using the Household Labour Force Survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) in 2014. The authors selected for the sample survey participants who had lived abroad for 12 months or more. The dependent variable was employment status, and the independent variables comprised age, gender, education, informal employment, workplace characteristics, and flexibility of work. The authors concluded that highly educated returnees find employment easily in Turkey, while lower educated returnees face some difficulties.

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[5] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK.

### VIII.B.2. Data

The present study uses the data of the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey from 2009 to 2018 provided by TurkStat. The survey is conducted annually following an address-based system covering more than 40,000 households across Turkey. Between 2009 and 2018, the data included approximately 4.5 million observations in total. We used two samples derived from this dataset. Our first sample, the main sample, is the 'overall wage earners', aged 15 to 64, which includes 3,333,743 million observations.

The second sample, the subsample, is the 'returned wage earners.' The data include responses to two critical questions concerning returnees: (1) 'Where were you born?' and (2) 'Have you ever lived abroad for a period of six months or more?'[6] The possible responses to the first question are 'Turkey' and 'abroad'. Since 2011, as a result of the civil war In Syria, more than 3.5 million migrants from there have settled in Turkey (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2019). It is very possible, therefore, that the survey respondents also include Syrian migrants. However, since the survey does not record ethnic background, there is no information on how many Syrian migrants participated in the survey. We therefore selected the data of the participants who were born in Turkey to ensure that they are not migrants who are living in Turkey. We then obtained the data of those who had lived abroad for 6–12 months or longer. The possible responses to the second question are 'yes' and 'no'. Thus, we are sure that this sample consists of participants born in Turkey and with migration experience—that is to say, they were in Turkey, went abroad, and returned to Turkey.[7]

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[6] Since 2014, this question has been phrased as 'Have you ever lived abroad for a 12-month period or more?'

[7] The Household Labour Force Survey data of Turkey do not include the reasons for moving abroad or returning to Turkey. However, Eurostat provides data regarding the reasons for moving abroad. For example, in 2018, 48,829 Turkish nationals got their first residence permits (for 12 months or more) from the EU-28 in 2018 due to four main reasons: family (47%), education (13%), work (16%), and

**Table 29:** Descriptive Statistics of Factor Variables

| | | Overall Wage Earners | Returned Wage Earners |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Variables** | **Labels of Variables** | **Count (Percentage)** | **Count (Percentage)** |
| **Gender** | Male | 428,691 (73%) | 7,907 (82%) |
| | Female | 160,881 (27%) | 2,144 (18%) |
| **Birthplace** | Turkey | 580,889 (98.5%) | |
| | Abroad | 8,683 (1.5%) | |
| **Living Abroad** | Yes | 17,231 (2.9%) | |
| | No | 572,341 (96.1%) | |
| **Education** | Illiterate | 17,308 (2.8%) | 147 (1.5%) |
| | Primary School | 123,405 (20.5%) | 2,821 (29.5%) |
| | Secondary School | 156,836 (25%) | 1,878 (19%) |
| | High School | 183,360 (31.2%) | 2,391 (25%) |
| | Higher Education | 108,663 (20.5%) | 2,446 (25%) |
| **ISCO** | Low Skill Jobs | 92,041 (16%) | 1,071 (11%) |
| | Low-Mid Skill Jobs | 338,714 (57.5%) | 5,120 (53%) |
| | Mid-High Skill Jobs | 55,872 (9.5%) | 955 (10%) |
| | High Skill Jobs | 102,945 (17%) | 2,537 (26%) |
| **Social Security** | Yes | 477,337 (81%) | 7,849 (81%) |
| | No | 112,235 (19%) | 1,834 (19%) |

other (24%), includes diplomatic permits and all other passengers who are not included in any other category (Eurostat, 2021).

| Employment Type | Full Time | 565,478 (96%) | 9,222 (95%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Part Time | 24,094 (4%) | 461 (5%) |
| NUTS1 | Istanbul | 89,459 (15%) | 955 (9.9%) |
| | West Marmara | 42,759 (7.4%) | 622 (6.4%) |
| | Aegean | 78,662 (13%) | 1,185 (12%) |
| | East Marmara | 64,962 (11%) | 1,071 (11%) |
| | West Anatolia | 80,698 (14%) | 1,818 (19%) |
| | Mediterranean | 65,091 (11%) | 1,715 (18%) |
| | Central Anatolia | 30,969 (5.2%) | 716 (7.4%) |
| | West Black Sea | 38,573 (6.6%) | 590 (6.1%) |
| | East Black Sea | 22,635 (3.7%) | 297 (3.1%) |
| | Northeast Anatolia | 22,635 (3.3%) | 206 (2.1%) |
| | Middle East Anatolia | 20,368 (3.4%) | 244 (2.5%) |
| | Southeast Anatolia | 35,415 (5.7%) | 264 (2.7%) |
| **Total** | | 589,572 (100%) | 9,683 (100%) |

**Source:** Elaborated with the data from Household Labour Force Survey of Turkey. TurkStat (2009-2018).

For the dependent variable, we took account the effects of inflation in the income question 'How much did you earn from your main job during the last month? (including extra income, such as bonus pay and premiums, in addition to salary, paid monthly or quarterly)', with answers recorded in Turkish Lira (TL). We calculated the real income by using the consumer price index (World Bank, 2019), and used real income—*Real Income*—as the dependent variable. We subtracted the people who were not in the labour force (1,554,463), unpaid family workers (224,617), and unemployed people (180,844) from the working-age population. Then we eliminated

the outliers based on Real Income. In the end, we had 589,572 observations for overall wage earners, which included 9,683 people fitting our inclusion criteria (see Table 29).

The independent variables include demographic variables such as *Gender* (female or male), *Age*, *Birthplace* (Turkey or abroad), *Education* (literate but not completed schooling at any educational institution, primary school, secondary school, high school, higher education – undergraduate, master's degree, or PhD) and *NUTS1*[8] regions (Istanbul, West Marmara, Aegean, East Marmara, West Anatolia, Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, West Black Sea, East Black Sea, Northeast Anatolia, Middle East Anatolia, and Southeast Anatolia). In addition to demographic variables, the analyses include *Living Abroad* (migration experience of 6–12 months or longer), *Years Living in Turkey* (the years spending in Turkey after returning to Turkey), *Social Security* (registration with any social security institution), *Experience* (the number of years between the year of starting the job and the survey year), *Employment Type* (full-time or part-time), and a dummy variable for the Syrian war, *Syrian War* (0 for 2009 and 2010 and 1 for other years). We also used ISCO[9] for the main occupations in the workplace. Since there are more than 30 groups of occupations, we created the *ISCO* variable (low-skill jobs, low to mid-skill jobs, mid to high-skill jobs, high-skill jobs) by classifying the occupation groups in accordance with the skills levels defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2012, p. 14) (see Table 29).

The mean income of the returned wage earners is higher than that of overall wage earners. Although income distributions appear similar between these two populations, the standard deviations of *Real Income* are different for all wage earners (515.5781) and the returned wage earners (557.3507). Moreover, more people of the returned wage earners earn over the mean income compared to overall wage earners. While 37.8% of overall wage earners earn more than the mean income of their group (961.8

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[8] Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) (Eurostat, 2020). NUTS1 refers to major socio-economic regions.

[9] International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (ILO, 2012).

TL), 42.8% of the returned wage earners earn more than the mean income of their group (1,076.6 TL) (Graph 6 and Graph 7).

**Graph 6:** Histogram of Real Income for Overall Wage Earners




**Source:** Elaborated with the data from Household Labour Force Survey of Turkey. TurkStat (2009-2018).

**Graph 7:** Histogram of Real Income for Returned Wage Earners




**Source:** Elaborated with the data from Household Labour Force Survey of Turkey. TurkStat (2009-2018).

### VIII.B.3. Regression Analysis

Eight models are used for the analysis: while Model 1, Model 1A, Model 1B, and Model 1C refer to the overall wage earners, Model 2, Model 2A, Model 2B, and Model 2C refer to returned wage earners (see Table 2). The models are transformed into log-linear form. We use the ordinary least square (OLS) method to estimate the following model:

$$lnIncomeReal_i = \beta_0 + \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^{K} x_{ki} + \varepsilon_i$$

'Model 1', 'Model 1A', 'Model 1B', and 'Model 1C' include overall wage earners, while 'Model 2', 'Model 2A', 'Model 2B', and 'Model 2C' include only the returned wage earners. 'Model 1' and 'Model 2' refer to the benchmark models. 'Model A' has the benchmark model and the NUTS1 variable, 'Model B' includes the benchmark model and the Year variable, and 'Model C' consists of the benchmark model and the *Syrian War* dummy variable (see Table 16).

**Table 30:** Regression Analysis (OLS) for Overall Wage Earners and Returned Wage Earners in 2009-2018

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 1A** | **Model 2A** | **Model 1B** | **Model 2B** | **Model 1C** | **Model 2C** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 5.876*** | 5.997*** | 6.007*** | 6.179*** | 5.872*** | 5.989*** | 5.869*** | 5.995*** |
| | (-0.005) | (-0.042) | (-0.005) | (-0.044) | (-0.005) | (-0.042) | (-0.005) | (-0.042) |
| Female | -0.147*** | -0.131*** | -0.151*** | -0.148*** | -0.148*** | -0.132*** | -0.147*** | -0.131*** |
| | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) |
| Age | 0.007*** | 0.002*** | 0.007*** | 0.002*** | 0.006*** | 0.002*** | 0.006*** | 0.002*** |
| | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) |
| Born Abroad-Abroad | -0.029*** | | -0.052*** | | -0.029*** | | -0.029*** | |
| | (-0.005) | | (-0.005) | | (-0.005) | | (-0.005) | |
| Living Abroad-No | -0.032*** | | -0.045*** | | -0.033*** | | -0.033*** | |
| | (-0.004) | | (-0.004) | | (-0.004) | | (-0.004) | |
| Primary School | 0.011*** | 0.090*** | 0.017*** | 0.083** | 0.013*** | 0.091*** | 0.012*** | 0.090*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) |
| Secondary School | 0.005* | 0.120*** | 0.015*** | 0.112*** | 0.005* | 0.121*** | 0.005* | 0.120*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) |
| High School | 0.143*** | 0.267*** | 0.156*** | 0.254*** | 0.144*** | 0.268*** | 0.144*** | 0.267*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.034) | (-0.003) | (-0.034) | (-0.003) | (-0.034) | (-0.003) | (-0.034) |
| Higher Education | 0.417*** | 0.606*** | 0.431*** | 0.579*** | 0.418*** | 0.607*** | 0.417*** | 0.606*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) | (-0.003) | (-0.035) |
| Social Security | 0.346*** | 0.297*** | 0.334*** | 0.278*** | 0.344*** | 0.296*** | 0.345*** | 0.297*** |
| | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) | (-0.001) | (-0.012) |
| Experience | 0.015*** | 0.014*** | 0.016*** | 0.014*** | 0.015*** | 0.014*** | 0.015*** | 0.014*** |
| | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) | (-0.0001) | (-0.001) |

**Table 14:** Continuation

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1A | Model 2A | Model 1B | Model 2B | Model 1C | Model 2C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part Time | -0.631*** | -0.466*** | -0.619*** | -0.469*** | -0.632*** | -0.466*** | -0.631*** | -0.465*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.021) | (-0.003) | (-0.021) | (-0.003) | (-0.021) | (-0.003) | (-0.021) |
| Low-Mid Skill Jobs | 0.103*** | 0.147*** | 0.090*** | 0.147*** | 0.103*** | 0.145*** | 0.103*** | 0.147*** |
| | (-0.001) | (-0.014) | (-0.001) | (-0.014) | (-0.001) | (-0.014) | (-0.001) | (-0.014) |
| Mid-High Skill Jobs | 0.233*** | 0.249*** | 0.214*** | 0.234*** | 0.233*** | 0.247*** | 0.233*** | 0.249*** |
| | (-0.002) | (-0.02) | (-0.002) | (-0.02) | (-0.002) | (-0.02) | (-0.002) | (-0.02) |
| High Skill Jobs | 0.377*** | 0.309*** | 0.365*** | 0.301*** | 0.377*** | 0.307*** | 0.377*** | 0.309*** |
| | (-0.002) | (-0.02) | (-0.002) | (-0.019) | (-0.002) | (-0.02) | (-0.002) | (-0.02) |
| Years Living in Turkey | | -0.003*** | | -0.004*** | | -0.003*** | | -0.003*** |
| | | (-0.0005) | | (-0.0005) | | (-0.0005) | | (-0.0005) |
| West Marmara | | | -0.194*** | -0.223*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.003) | (-0.024) | | | | |
| Aegean | | | -0.182*** | -0.162*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.002) | (-0.016) | | | | |
| East Marmara | | | -0.144*** | -0.116*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.002) | (-0.017) | | | | |
| West Anatolia | | | -0.091*** | -0.071*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.002) | (-0.016) | | | | |
| Mediterranean | | | -0.190*** | -0.196*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.002) | (-0.015) | | | | |
| Central Anatolia | | | -0.144*** | -0.166*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.003) | (-0.02) | | | | |
| West Black Sea | | | -0.172*** | -0.219*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.002) | (-0.022) | | | | |

**Table 14:** Continuation

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1A | Model 2A | Model 1B | Model 2B | Model 1C | Model 2C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| East Black Sea | | | -0.165*** | -0.150*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.003) | (-0.03) | | | | |
| Northeast Anatolia | | | -0.064*** | 0.04 | | | | |
| | | | (-0.004) | (-0.045) | | | | |
| Middle East Anatolia | | | -0.084*** | -0.192*** | | | | |
| | | | (-0.003) | (-0.031) | | | | |
| Southeast Anatolia | | | -0.158*** | -0.144*** | | | | |
| | | | -0.002 | -0.029 | | | | |
| Syrian War | | | | | | | 0.018*** | 0.006 |
| | | | | | | | (-0.001) | (-0.009) |
| Observations | 589,572 | 9,683 | 589,572 | 9,683 | 589,572 | 9,683 | 589,572 | 9,683 |
| Multiple $R^2$ | 0.515 | 0.463 | 0.532 | 0.478 | 0.516 | 0.464 | 0.516 | 0.463 |

**Note:** Year effects are controlled for. Standard errors in brackets; significance denoted by ‘ ***’ at 1%, ‘ **’ at 5%, and ‘ *’ at 10%.

The $R^2$ values for all models are higher than 0.53. That is, all models fit the data well, which means that the independent variables explain more than 53% of the dependent variable for all models. Except the *Syrian War* dummy variable for returnees, all independent variables are significant in determining *Real Income*.

The findings show that women in Turkey earn less than men, but, interestingly, migration experience does not close the earning gap between genders: female returnees earn less than male returnees. Part-time jobs and the lack of social security (informal employment) negatively affect labour income for the entire working population, including the returnees. Earnings are higher in Istanbul for the overall working population and the returnees than in other regions of Turkey. After returning, each further year lived in Turkey decreases labour income for the returnees. Although the Syrian War has had a positive effect on the labour income for the overall wage earners, it is not significant for returnees' income. In Turkey, being born abroad negatively affects labour income. While the survey does not record ethnic background, we argue that many people born abroad could be Syrian.

As expected, age and longer work experience have positive impacts on income. However, these positive effects are lower for returnees than for the overall working population group, possibly because returnees have less work experience as they have spent larger in education. On the other hand, the returnees earn more than the overall wage earners when education level and skill levels are the same. This finding contradicts the work by Barcevicius (2016) and Stark (1995), which focused on asymmetric information. The findings of the present study are in agreement with those of other studies (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Bijwaard, 2015; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Iara, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013; Martin & Radu, 2012; Reinhold & Thom, 2009), which highlight that employers in the home country recognise the benefits of the returnees' on-the-job training abroad.

## VIII.C. TURKISH RETURNED IMMIGRANTS' INCOME BY GENDER PERSPECTIVE

The studies (Akhmedjonov, 2012; Kara, 2006; Tansel, 2004) confirm a large gender pay gap in Turkey. This article hypothesizes that migration experience contributes positively to the labour income of women returnees and contributes to the literature by revealing that the impact of being married on labour income is higher than the impact of having migration experience on labour income for Turkish women because married women have higher reservation wage– which refers to the minimum wage for accepting a job. Since the recent increase of high-skilled Turkish immigrants is considered brain drain, return migration became a crucial topic in response. The study presents a literature review on the determinants of returnees' labour income and their struggles with (re)joining the labour market of the home country. Then, it describes the data and methodology. After sharing the analysis and findings, the article ends with a conclusion.

### VIII.C.1. Literature Review

Migration experience contributes positively to returnees' labour income because immigrants improve their skills in the host country by on-the-job training or studying because individual characteristics, the promotion of upskilling in the host country, the duration of stay in the host country, the applicability of the skills gained in the host country to entrepreneurship in the home country, the advanced technological working knowledge of the host country, the increase in productivity upon return, and the network ties in the labour market of the home country are the factors which contribute to returnees' labour income by on-the-job training through work experience in a developed country (Bijwaard, 2015; Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013). Another way for gaining skills in the host country is to get an education (Iara, 2006). However, the return intentions of Turkish students in the United States,

Canada, the United Kingdom is low due to higher salaries, longer duration of stay, the lifestyle difference with Turkey (Güngör & Tansel, 2006), and the gender gap in Turkey (Elveren & Toksöz, 2019). On the other hand, Turkish immigrants may tend to return if Turkey strengthens economic growth and promotes social freedoms (Sirkeci, Cohen, & Yazgan, 2012).

Returnees may struggle with (re)joining the labour market in the home country due to the asymmetric information concerning the returnees' skill level between potential employers. As a result, the returnees may suffer from not finding appropriate employment for their skill level in the home country and prefer to be self-employed involuntarily (Barcevicius, 2016; Mezger Kveder & Flahaux, 2013; Stark, 1995). For example, many Turkish returnees became entrepreneurs in Turkey while highly-skilled returnees remained wage earners because of their expectation of earning higher salaries (Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001). Similarly, highly educated returnees find employment easier than lower educated returnees in Turkey (Yetkin Aker & Görmüş, 2018). Regarding labour income, the returnees earn more than the overall wage earners with the same education and skill levels in Turkey, while female returnees earn less than male returnees (Dudu & Rojo, 2021). Differently, this article also takes into consideration the effect of the marital status of Turkish women returnees on their labour income.

### VIII.C.2. Data and Methodology

Using the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey pooled data between 2009 and 2018, provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute, this article utilizes the ordinary least square (OLS) method. The sample is limited to Turkey-born wage earners. The analysis consists of three models. The dependent variable is the labour income adjusted by the consumer price index (World Bank, 2021) and is used in logarithmic form with the following model:

$$lnLabourIncome_i = \beta_0 + \beta_k \sum_{k=1}^{K} x_{ki} + \varepsilon_i$$

Model 1, the benchmark model, uses independent variables which are gender (male and female), age groups (15-29, 30-49 and 50-64), migration experience (returnees and non-returnees), the education level (under high school, high school, and higher education), job skill level (low-skill jobs, low-middle skill jobs, middle-high skill jobs, and high skill jobs), regions (Istanbul, West Marmara, Aegean, East Marmara, West Anatolia, Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, West Black Sea, East Black Sea, Northeast Anatolia, Middle East Anatolia, and Southeast Anatolia), the status of the workplace (public, private, and other– e.g. NGOs), and years. Model 2 includes Model 1 and the interaction of gender and living abroad variables. Model 3 consists of Model 1 and the interaction of gender, migration experience and marital status variables.

For the robustness check, this article also applies the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method for linear regression models with the selection bias adjustment by Heckman-selection two steps procedure (Jann, 2008) by using the same independent variables. Model A1, Model A2, and Model A3 are unadjusted models, while the Heckman-selection two steps procedure adjusts Model B1, Model B2, and Model B3 with the following model:

$$\left(\overline{lnW^m} - \overline{lnW^f}\right) = \hat{\beta}^f \left(\overline{X}^m - \overline{X}^f\right) + \overline{X}^m (\hat{\beta}^m - \hat{\beta}^f)$$

Model As are for gender, Model Bs are for migration experience, and Model Cs are for marital status. Group 1 represents males, and Group 2 represents females for Model As. Group 1 represents non-returnees, and Group 2 represents returnees for Model Bs. Group 1 represents singles, and Group 2 represents married for Model Cs. In Model 2s, Model 1s are adjusted consistent with the Heckman-selection two steps procedure with the following probit model:

$$E(Y|X) = P(Y = 1|X) = \Phi(\beta 0 + \beta 1X)$$

### VIII.C.3. Findings and Discussion

The findings of the OLS method show that women earn less than men, consistent with the findings of other studies about Turkey (Akhmedjonov, 2012; Dudu & Rojo, 2021; Kara, 2006; Tansel, 2004). Similarly, the findings are in line with the literature (Bijwaard, 2015; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Dudu & Rojo, 2021; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013), which indicates that migration experience affects the labour income of returnees positively. Moreover, married workers earn more than single workers (see Table 31).

Surprisingly, women returnees earn less than women workers alone or all returnees alone. However, married women returnees earn more than all women alone or all returnees alone or all married wage earners alone. Therefore, the impact of being married on labour income is higher than the impact of having migration experience on labour income for Turkish women. The role of women in child/elder care and the lack of social policies may cause a high gender gap in the labour participation rate– for instance, 40.24% in 2018 (World Bank, 2021)– in Turkey, and it may increase the reservation wages of married women along with a high household income.

**Table 31:** OLS Estimation Findings[10]

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constant | 6.287*** | 6.287*** | 6.256*** |
| | (-0.003) | (-0.003) | (-0.003) |

[10] Since this article focuses on the gender perspective, Table 1 contains only gender, living abroad, marital status, and interactions. The findings related to other variables are as expected.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Female | -0.206***<br>(-0.002) | -0.207***<br>(-0.002) | -0.109***<br>(-0.003) |
| Married | 0.157***<br>(-0.002) | 0.157***<br>(-0.002) | 0.211***<br>(-0.002) |
| Age 30-49 | 0.136***<br>(-0.002) | 0.136***<br>(-0.002) | 0.126***<br>(-0.002) |
| Age 50-64 | 0.045***<br>(-0.003) | 0.045***<br>(-0.003) | 0.029***<br>(-0.003) |
| Migration Experience | 0.054***<br>(-0.006) | 0.049***<br>(-0.006 | 0.144***<br>(-0.017) |
| High school | 0.204***<br>(-0.002) | 0.204***<br>(-0.002) | 0.203***<br>(-0.002) |
| Higher education | 0.438***<br>(-0.003) | 0.438***<br>(-0.003) | 0.438***<br>(-0.003) |
| Mid Skill Jobs | 0.127***<br>(-0.002) | 0.127***<br>(-0.002) | 0.122***<br>(-0.002) |
| Mid-High Skill Jobs | 0.251***<br>(-0.003) | 0.251***<br>(-0.003) | 0.247***<br>(-0.003) |
| High Skill Jobs | 0.283***<br>(-0.003) | 0.283***<br>(-0.003) | 0.281***<br>(-0.003) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public Sector | 0.414***<br>(-0.002) | 0.414***<br>(-0.002) | 0.416***<br>(-0.002) |
| Other Sectors- e.g., NGOs | -0.047***<br>(-0.007) | -0.047***<br>(-0.007) | -0.033***<br>(-0.007) |
| West Marmara | -0.246***<br>(-0.003) | -0.246***<br>(-0.003) | -0.242***<br>(-0.003) |
| Aegean | -0.229***<br>(-0.002) | -0.229***<br>(-0.002) | -0.225***<br>(-0.002) |
| East Marmara | -0.173***<br>(-0.002) | -0.173***<br>(-0.002) | -0.171***<br>(-0.002) |
| West Anatolia | -0.155***<br>(-0.002) | -0.155***<br>(-0.002) | -0.154***<br>(-0.002) |
| Mediterranean | -0.289***<br>(-0.003) | -0.289***<br>(-0.003) | -0.288***<br>(-0.003) |
| Central Anatolia | -0.244***<br>(-0.003) | -0.244***<br>(-0.003) | -0.244***<br>(-0.003) |
| West Black Sea | -0.267***<br>(-0.003) | -0.267***<br>(-0.003) | -0.266***<br>(-0.003) |
| East Black Sea | -0.235***<br>(-0.004) | -0.235***<br>(-0.004) | -0.234***<br>(-0.004) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northeast Anatolia | -0.224***<br>(-0.004) | -0.224***<br>(-0.004) | -0.226***<br>(-0.004) |
| Middle East Anatolia | -0.267***<br>(-0.004) | -0.267***<br>(-0.004) | -0.268***<br>(-0.004) |
| Southeast Anatolia | -0.316***<br>(-0.003) | -0.316***<br>(-0.003) | -0.318***<br>(-0.003) |
| 2010 | -0.0004<br>(-0.002) | -0.0004<br>(-0.002) | 0.0005<br>(-0.002) |
| 2011 | 0.014***<br>(-0.002) | 0.014***<br>(-0.002) | 0.015***<br>(-0.002) |
| 2012 | 0.030***<br>(-0.002) | 0.030***<br>(-0.002) | 0.032***<br>(-0.002) |
| 2013 | 0.056***<br>(-0.002) | 0.056***<br>(-0.002) | 0.060***<br>(-0.002) |
| 2014 | 0.206***<br>(-0.003) | 0.206***<br>(-0.003) | 0.211***<br>(-0.003) |
| 2015 | 0.233***<br>(-0.003) | 0.233***<br>(-0.003) | 0.239***<br>(-0.003) |
| 2016 | 0.325***<br>(-0.003) | 0.325***<br>(-0.003) | 0.332***<br>(-0.003) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 0.304***<br>(-0.003) | 0.304***<br>(-0.003) | 0.311***<br>(-0.003) |
| 2018 | 0.281***<br>(-0.003) | 0.281***<br>(-0.003) | 0.288***<br>(-0.003) |
| Female & Migration Experience | | 0.028*<br>(-0.016) | -0.028<br>(-0.03) |
| Female & Married | | | -0.170***<br>(-0.004) |
| Migration Experience & Married | | | -0.116***<br>(-0.019) |
| Female & Migration Experience & Married | | | 0.068*<br>(-0.035) |
| Observations | 577,283 | 577,283 | 577,283 |
| Multiple R2 | 0.466 | 0.466 | 0.47 |

**Note:** Year effects are controlled for. Robust standard errors in brackets; significance denoted by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5%, and ‘*’ at 10%.

The findings of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method indicate wage gap for the detriment of females, non-returnees, and singles, consistent with the findings of the OLS estimation (Table 32).

**Table 32:** Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Method Findings

| | **Unadjusted** | | | **Selection Bias Adjusted** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Model A1** | **Model B1** | **Model C1** | **Model A2** | **Model B2** | **Model C2** |
| Group 1 | 6.736***<br>(0.0008) | 6.712***<br>(0.0007) | 6.510***<br>(0.001) | 6.736***<br>(0.0008) | 6.712***<br>(0.0007) | 6.510***<br>(0.001) |
| Group 2 | 6.654***<br>(0.001) | 6.830***<br>(0.006) | 6.798***<br>(0.0008) | 6.367***<br>(0.031) | 6.811***<br>(0.040) | 6.650***<br>(0.013) |
| Difference | 0.082***<br>(0.001) | -0.117***<br>(0.006) | -0.287***<br>(0.001) | 0.369***<br>(0.031) | -0.098**<br>(0.040) | -0.140***<br>(0.013) |
| Endowments | -0.153***<br>(0.001) | -0.076***<br>(0.005) | -0.072***<br>(0.001) | -0.123***<br>(0.003) | -0.066***<br>(0.006) | -0.075***<br>(0.003) |
| Coefficients | 0.182***<br>(0.001) | -0.001<br>(0.004) | -0.125***<br>(0.002) | 0.447***<br>(0.031) | 0.007<br>(0.040) | 0.009<br>(0.013) |
| Interaction | 0.053***<br>(0.0008) | -0.039***<br>(0.003) | -0.089***<br>(0.001) | 0.045***<br>(0.003) | -0.038***<br>(0.005) | -0.074***<br>(0.003) |
| Observations | 577,283 | 577,283 | 577,283 | 567,679 | 576,898 | 559,926 |

**Note:** Standard errors in brackets; significance denoted by '***' at 1%, '**' at 5%, and '*' at 10%.

Unlike the Turkish migration case in which 18% of returnees were women, the studies (e.g., Hlasny & AlAzzawi, 2018; Samari, 2021), which examined the effects of return migration in the MENA region, suggested that the immigrants—returnees as well—were mostly male due to gender norms. The Turkish case is similar to the countries like India,

Argentina, China, and Mexico—which have high outbound flows of high-skilled immigrants and facilitate the reintegration of returnees by offering incentives and removing the administrative barriers (Jonkers, 2008).

This case study strengthens that migration experience has a positive impact on labour income. However, since being a woman affects labour income negatively, women returnees earn less than all women alone or all returnees alone. That is to say, the positive effect of migration experience weakens the negative effect of gender on labour income. On the other hand, considering the marital status of women returnees, married women returnees earn more than all women alone or all returnees alone or married workers alone. Since married women mostly have another labour income in their households or many of them are voluntarily or involuntarily caregivers, they may cause their preference to work for high paid jobs. As a result, there is a need for social policies to increase their incentives to participate in the labour force in Turkey.

# PART FOUR - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Part Four of the thesis contains the discussion of results. It is organized in three chapters. The Chapter IX summarizes the objectives and discusses the main findings obtained in the Chapters IX, X, and XI, pointing out the most significant data. In the Chapter X, a discussion of the contributions is made, and the results are related to the theories and other works of other previous researchers studied in Chapter I of "Introduction". Possible explanations are offered for the differences or similarities or the interpretation of your data and the implications at a practical and theoretical level. The Chapter XI continues the synthesis and discussion of the findings of the regression analysis.

It is reiterated that the objective of the thesis research is to study the evolution of the variables that affect the decision to emigrate between labour markets and to choose a migratory destination. And that is studied for the case of Turkish emigration to the European Union between 2008 and 2018. The working hypothesis is that in international labour migration flows, as an economic convergence occurs between labour markets of origin and destination, it tends to increase the relevance of political and social variables concerning economic and labour market variables in deciding to emigrate or choose a migratory destination.

The findings confirm that the labour market variables are relevant since the origins of Turkish migration to the EU territory in the 1960s; but the security-based variables gained weight from the 1980s, and the social ones (see Chapter XI) that the labour market factors are no longer the only aspects shaping Turkish migration to the EU. Turkish

newcomers in Europe have different expectations and concerns than the foregoer Turkish immigrants.

# IX. SYNTHESIS OF INITIAL FINDINGS ON MIGRATION FLOW DETERMINANTS

This chapter begins by synthesizing the statistical and documentary analysis results carried out on the set of determining variables of the migratory flow from Turkey to the European Community and the EU-28 between 1960 and 2017. The variables identified as most determining are going to be the "status legal", "political pressure", the "host communities", and especially the "economic / labour market" determinants (see the model in Part One).

For the period 2008/9 to 2017/8 (Chapter IX.C.), the synthesis and discussion of results focuses on the determinant "economic / labour market" and its specific variables. These results confirm the strong economic and labour market convergence between Turkey and the EU-28 and offer a preliminary explanation of why the importance of labour market determinants in the decision to emigrate has diminished and to choose a destination.

From the results discussed in this chapter on the migratory behaviour of the Turkish population to the European Union, several initial findings stand out:

- The period 1960 to 2008, the economic and labour market variables initially stand out in the decision to emigrate, which will be accompanied by the variables of "physical security and political pressure" (security determinants), especially in the period 1970-1983.

- In the same period, 1960 to 2008, the choice of migratory destination, in addition to the economic and labour market variables, of the Turkish population to countries of the EU-28 territory, appears highly determined by the variable "status legal" (security-based determinants) by having specific agreements between Turkey and some countries. And that another variable that acquires a significant role is the "migration networks" (social determinants) that indicate the tendency that the more emigrants have already chosen a destination, the more they tend to choose the same one because the greater the social organization tends to be a reception.
- The period 1970 to 2000 shows the importance that the variable "political pressure" can have as a determinant of the decision to emigrate, even when the economy is unfavourable for that reception. That was the case between 1970 and 1990 in Turkish migrations to the European Union. It was when the European Union was in crisis, and unemployment was rising. In Turkey, political problems prompted some to leave and seek asylum in European Union countries. So, the reception would be for reasons other than economic in many cases.
- The period 2010 to 2017 is a period that allows observing a legal framework of the E.U. specifically aimed at favouring selective immigration: of qualified personnel; students or researchers; seasonal workers, and others. And this legal framework is going to be decisive in the recent profile of Turkish migrations. But in addition, the economic and labour market variables will be less relevant in this period since Turkey shows a high growth rate of its GDP. However, it still requires the necessary reforms to join the E.U requirements.

## IX.A. PRELIMINARY DATA ON DETERMINANT VARIABLES

Three aspects are discussed below. One is the security variables, and another is the determinants related to the legal status that attract emigrants to the destination. In the third, we deal with the balance of the EU-28 on the convergence in the labour market and economic variables.

### IX.A.1. On the Determinants of Security: Legal Status and Political Security

Regarding the variables that determine security, the analysis carried out indicates that the European Union has presented advantages as a territory of destination since the 1950s and 1960s. It is confirmed that it has been constituted as a great union of countries that It begins in the 1950s and has brought prosperity and well-being to all the countries that have joined it since World War II. First, under the name of the European Coal and Steel Community, then as the European Community and finally as the EU, it has reached 28 countries have remained at 27 with the loss of the UK.

As for Turkey, its aspiration to institutionally converge in the well-being and democracy of the European Union led it to apply for membership in 1963, and it has been considered a candidate country since 1999. But the 2017 reports of the EU point out that Turkey still fails to meet various requirements to become a full member.

Among the requirements to become a member, Turkey must have the stability of substitutions that guarantee democracy, govern the law and human rights, and respect and protect minorities. They are all requirements established in the Copenhagen Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty about accessions.

In the case of Turkey, it has had a series of interruptions in its democratic institutions, first in the 1970s and then in 1980 with military interventions that suspended civil rights.

Later, this aspect is discussed more extensively since political instability and stopping Turkey's accession to the EU have been a reason for migrations and asylum requests.

### IX.A.2. About the Variable "Legal Status" in Migration Destination Choice

Regarding the determinants of legal status to attract immigration and be chosen as a destination territory, it should be noted that, apart from the individual agreements between European countries and Turkey that will be seen later, there is the famous Ankara agreement signed in 1963 between Turkey and the European Commission.

And that the United Kingdom is considered the only country that accepted the Ankara agreement since 1973 as a framework to regulate Turkish immigration to its country. This agreement contemplated a year of Visa, extendable to 3 years. It is estimated that since 1973 around 77,000 visas per year have been issued in the UK. So, the UK became another of the most important destinations for Turkish migration to the EU-28 territory.

Another important milestone was in 2009, the entry into force for the entire territory of the EU, the blue card directive, aimed at qualified workers from non-European countries who obtain one-year contracts and with salaries 1.5 times higher than the average European.

### IX.A.3. Economic and labour market divergences between Turkey and the European Union as reported by the European Union in 2017

As summarised below, Turkey has achieved close economic and labour convergence with the EU. Still, the most recent 2017 reports from the European Union highlight that Turkey maintains a very low female employment rate (38%). Other data such as in 2017 unemployment of 11% and youth unemployment of 20% are not very different data from other EU countries in the same years.

The recommendations made by the EU to Turkey in the economic field are the following: effort in the educational field, surpassing the child labour index. To overcome it, Turkey has launched a program to eliminate child labour from 2017-to 2023. The level of occupational accidents is excessively high, which may be related to the high informality of the labour market and high subcontracting. The EU also points out that Turkey has had suspensions of the right to strike, that union leaders continue to be arrested and that workers are intimidated into joining unions.

## IX.B. DISCUSSION ON BEHAVIOUR OF MIGRATION DETERMINANTS

Concerning Turkish migrations to the EU from 1960 to 1917, the following pages summarize and discuss the more detailed results achieved on the influence of the legislative framework; its correspondence with the pattern followed by migratory statistics; and political events in Turkey as a variable also influential in the decision to emigrate. This part ends by presenting the preliminary analysis results of the economic and labour market variable.

### IX.B.1. Legal Status of Turkish Immigrants in European Countries from 1960 to 2017

With regard specifically to the fact that the country of destination has a legal immigrant reception status, the analysis carried out in the second part of the results indicates that, since the beginning of the sixties, different territories of the current European Union offered and a legislative framework favourable to Turkish immigration. Specifically, several countries such as Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, the Netherlands, and Sweden signed "Labour Force Agreements" between 1961 and 1967. And that will provide Turkish emigrants with a preferential opportunity to go to these countries.

These countries, in 1970, began to consider permanent workers for the Turkish immigrants who were in their territories and who began to benefit from family

reunification. So, from as early as the 1960s, this set of six countries was going to be consolidated as preferential territories for Turkish emigration within the European Commission, both because of the agreements and legal status specially agreed with Turkey as well as by the communities of Turkish social groups that are formed early in each of these countries. Especially in Germany, the Türk Danış was constituted in the 1960s, which would be an additional reinforcement for the Turkish social network in Germany.

Remember that to the six countries that signed agreements individually. The United Kingdom is added that without having signed an individual agreement instead, it applied the "Ankara Agreement" signed by the European Commission with Turkey. For these purposes, It also became a preferred destination.

Those Turkish immigrants who came to be considered "permanent workers" in 1970 will benefit from the entire labour market legislative framework promulgated by the European Community first and the EU later, starting in 1970. Thus, between 1970 and 2000, regulations such as 1970 the Directive on equal pay for men and women; 1974, European Social Dialogue; 1987, the Single Act; 1992, the Maastricht Treaty; 1998, the Amsterdam Treaty and in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty.

All treaties have been agreeing on additional rights for workers. Also, for any claim, there has been the Court of Justice since 1952; and for consultation and information, the Workers' Council since the year ninety-four.

So, in addition to the specific regulations of European countries in favour of Turkish emigration, the European Commission first and the European Union later will promulgate general regulations for emigrants from non-EU countries, which naturally will also apply to immigrants. Turks. The "Act for Foreigners" stands out in 1965, forcing a residence permit to be requested and especially between 2003 and 2009, everything began to be seen with very clear regulations on immigration. In 2003, the European Union regulated

long-term stays for immigrants who have been for more than five years, have a stable job and do not pose a security risk. In 2005 Germany entered into force the Migration Act to regulate the long-term residence of skilled workers.

We started in 2009 with the blue card that regulates the "long term residence status"; in 2011, the Single Permit Directive on equal treatment and working conditions; in 2014, the legislation on seasonal workers; also in 2014, there was the regulation of transfers of workers within an international company, and from the same year 2014 is the most updated version of family reunification.

In 2016 the directives were launched to encourage people to study or research in the EU, and in 2016 are the Action Plan to Integrate Nationals of Third Countries and the "Employers for Integration" to promote apprenticeships in businesses for businesses, immigrants, and refugees.

**Graph 8:** Turkish Migration Stock in the EU-28




**Source:** (The data for 1960, 1970 and 1980) World Bank. (2011, June 28).

(The data for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017) UNDESA. (2017, December).

#### IX.B.2. The Statistical Pattern of Turkish Migration to the European Union 1960-2017

The statistical pattern of Turkish emigration to all the countries of the European Union (EU-28) shows five stages or changes in trend between 1960 and 2017, as can be seen from Graph 8 of the evolution of the migratory stock:

- Stage 1, 1960 to 1970, which ends with about half a million Turkish people emigrating to the EU-28.
- Stage 2, 1970 to 1980, which is the decade of greatest emigration intensity of the entire period studied since it ends with around two million two hundred thousand Turkish people emigrating to the EU-28. In other words, in a single decade, the migratory stock tripled.
- Stage 3, 1980 to 2000, which are three decades in which the increase in Turkish migration will be relatively smooth. It increases to 150,000 emigrants per decade in three decades, going from 2.2 million Turkish emigrants to 2.5 million (see Table 33).
- Stage 4, 2000 to 2010, which is a decade in which there is a decrease in the migratory stock of the Turkish population in the EU-28.
- Stage 5, from 2010 to 2017, emigration resumes, increasing at a rate of about 400 thousand Turkish migrants to the EU-28 in 7 years; about 60 thousand a year (see Table 34).

**Table 33:** Turkish Migration Stock in Several European Countries

| Year | Belgium | Germany | Netherlands | Sweden | France | Austria | UK | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1960** | 3414 | 26986 | 11 | 199 | 45348 | 7923 | 4574 | 88455 |
| **1970** | 20782 | 442229 | 18665 | 3698 | 4534 | 32618 | 1255 | 523781 |

| 1980 | 68368 | 1653805 | 51658 | 14310 | 126356 | 151624 | 12131 | 2078252 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990 | 87317 | 1460465 | 148878 | 29524 | 173732 | 183825 | 32126 | 2115867 |
| 2000 | 58404 | 2008979 | 176306 | 31545 | 76505 | 179638 | 12709 | 2544086 |

**Source:** World Bank. (2011, June 28).

**Table 34:** Turkish Migration Stock in the EU-28

| Year | Stock in EU-28 |
|---|---|
| 2000 | 2,428,961 |
| 2005 | 2,305,658 |
| 2010 | 2,251,682 |
| 2015 | 2,372,887 |
| 2017 | 2,668,826 |

**Source:** UNDESA. (2017, December).

### IX.B.3. Correspondence of the statistical guideline with the migration legal framework of the EU-28

The results obtained show a strong correspondence between the phases of the legislative framework of the EU-28 countries and the migratory flow pattern from 1960 to 2017. The stage from 1960 to 1970 corresponds to that of the Labour Agreements signed individually between seven European countries and Turkey. The 1950s and 1960s are of strong growth and demand for workers by European countries. For Turkey it is a regressive period.

As can be seen in Table 33, practically all the around half a million Turkish emigrants registered by the World Bank in 1970 correspond to the stock of the seven countries that signed an agreement with Turkey throughout the decade of the 1960s.

This fact will mark a trend in the destination of Turkish emigration to Europe because the countries that signed an agreement will also be the first to form Turkish communities. Especially attractive was Germany, which gave them the status of "visiting worker" in that decade, enhancing the attractiveness for Turkish emigrants. The community social network in Germany will be the first to create its own labour institutions.

The second stage from 1970 to 1980, which is the one with the greatest migratory growth, with an increase of one and a half million emigrants, corresponds to the recognition of "permanent workers" to Turkish workers who had emigrated to countries within the territory of the EU-28 in the 1960s. In other words, by acquiring that status in 1970 they will have the same rights as workers from countries of the then European Community, they will be able to move from country to country, enter and leave with ease and especially benefit from family reunification.

However, since the mid and late 1970s in Europe there has been an oil crisis and a drop in growth, but in Turkey the situation will be worse because the labour policies were to cut labour rights and wages. Although European countries stop demanding immigrant workers, the reunification legislation for permanent workers will determine a significant flow of Turkish population to the countries of the Union.

As can be seen in Tables 33 and 34, almost the entire migratory stock of 1980 corresponds to Turkish emigrants to Germany. It could be a confirmation of the effect of the communities already created and the multiplication that family reunification represents.

The third stage from 1980 to 2000, in which the stock of emigrants increases by about 300,000 people. It is a period in which, from the point of view of the legal framework, the Commission or the European Union has not yet launched specific legislation for external emigration, beyond the requirement to apply for a work permit. Although, the data indicates that between 1991 and 2002 citizenship was granted to around 800,000 Turkish migrants who were long-term residents in different countries of the EU.

Practically all the new emigrants between 1980 and 2000 chose Germany as their destination, within the territory of the EU-28 (see Tables 33 and 34). As can be seen from the total stock in Germany compared to the total stock in the whole territory of the EU-28. However, between 1983 and 1984 Germany decreed a subsidy for all those Turkish migrant workers who returned to their country, and it is estimated that 250,000 people requested the aid (Abadan-Unat, 2017). The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s is a period of industrial reconversion in practically all Europe.

The context will change in the decade of the 1990s when the computerization of the European economy and society is launched, and investments are liberalized worldwide. In the case of Germany, these changes are reflected in its immigration policy and, in 1992, it launched an Immigration Law with an integrating spirit that included naturalizing young immigrants who were already citizens, who had not been convicted of a crime, who had been in the country for 8 years or more. Germany and with 6 years of schooling in Germany.

The fourth stage from 2000 to 2010, in which a decrease in the stock of emigrants is observed, it can be assumed that there was voluntary or forced returns due to non-renewal of permits. And that the EU was more restrictive in granting permits, due to the industrial and security crisis unleashed after the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Muslim jihadists, first in 2001 in the US and then in 2004 and 2005 in Spain and the UK. The 2003 EU Directive, to regulate the status of residency applicants, will expressly include "that they

do not threaten public security" in addition to guaranteeing that they have a stable job, regular income, and health insurance.

The fifth stage, from 2010 to 2017, corresponds instead to the new legislation favourable to external immigration in general that the EU is going to promulgate from 2009, beginning with the Blue Card aimed at qualified migrants and with facilities to become permanent.

This legislation, as indicated above, will facilitate the procedures to emigrate to the EU in such a way that, in addition to work, you can legally emigrate for family, studies and research, as well as mobility within the same company.

**Table 35:** Share of Reasons to Turkish Migration to EU. Trend from 2014 to 2018

| Reasons | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Family** | 60.4 | 57.1 | 47.3 |
| **Education** | 10.6 | 11.4 | 13.0 |
| **Work** | 9.4 | 11.7 | 16.1 |
| **Others** | 11.1 | 19.3 | 23.6 |
| **Total** | 100 | 100 | 100 |

**Source:** Eurostat. (2019, September 10).

It will also be the period in which the destinations of Turkish migration to different countries of the EU-28 diversify, given that the European legislation launched since 2009 will be applicable to all the countries of the EU-28.

**Table 36:** Number of First Permits Issued for 12 months or more to Turkish National by the EU-28

| Year | Permits issued |
|---|---|
| **2013** | 29,442 |
| **2014** | 32,718 |
| **2015** | 36,657 |

| | |
|---|---|
| **2016** | 36,364 |
| **2017** | 42,931 |
| **2018** | 48,829 |

**Source:** Eurostat. (2019, September 10).

It is possible to observe how the permits granted to Turkish emigration to the EU-28 will increase, in Table 36 between 2013 and 2018, and how the tendency to predominate the reasons for emigrating due to family and education and other reasons (see Table 35).

### IX.B.4. Influence of the Factors of Turkish Internal Politics in the Migration Pattern to the EU-28

The influence of political events on the migratory flow from Turkey to the EU-28 is summarized and discussed below, especially the political conflicts of the 1970s with the massacre of protesters on May 1, 1977, the military coup of 1980 and military government 1980-1983 with more than 8 thousand people arrested. In 1985 the war with the militants of the Kurdish Workers' Party is recorded, which will promote the asylum applications of the ethnic minorities of the 1980's and 1990's.

The asylum statistics collected in Graph 9 show that asylum applications in 1980 amounted to around 60,000 and between 1983 and 2000 there was an average of around 30,000 asylum applications per year. Between 1980 and 1999 there were an estimated 514,892 Turkish asylum applications to the EU-28 (UNHRC 2001).

Starting in 2000 and with the entry and continuity in the government of the AKP party in Turkey in 2007, 2011 and 2015, both the economy and the stability of democratic institutions and the recognition of the rights of the Kurdish minority improved.

However, the Syrian civil war starting in 2010 is going to cause new imbalances in the political and welfare balance in Turkey. Especially since 2016, when the Turkish occupation of Northern Syria took place.

Also in 2010, after a referendum allows changes in the concentration of powers in the Government and in 2013 the Gezi protests took place in the urban areas of Turkey demanding greater democracy. It is estimated that qualified and highly educated people predominated among the protesters.

**Graph 9:** Asylum Applicants from Turkey to the EU-15 between 1980 and 1999




**Source:** UNHRC. (2001).

### IX.B.5. Importance of the Immigrant Support and Reception Networks on the Decision to Emigrate

Turkish emigration to the countries of the European Union since the 1960s has generated a Turkish diaspora understood as an organized community of Turkey in different countries of the EU. Among the characteristic features of the presence of diaspora are:

- Turkish institutions and NGOs,
- Turkish businesses and service companies especially oriented towards the population of Turkish origin and which employ mainly Turks,
- welcome services for new immigrants and job search, especially for unskilled immigrants,
- contacts with Turkey and remittances to relatives

Another characteristic of this diaspora is the recognition and institutional regulation of Turkish emigration from the Ministries of the Turkish government, of emigrants, their right to dual nationality and their right to vote. Turkish authorities have regulated it since 1982.

Over time, the Turkish government has developed regular institutional relations with the Turkish diaspora, considering it a "soft power" in Turkish diplomatic relations. Especially in relations with the EU, Turkish governments envision that this "soft power" could play a favourable role in advancing Turkey's accession negotiations to the EU, currently underway.

## IX.C. FINDINGS ON LABOUR MARKET DETERMINANTS POST 2008

This part consists of three sub-parts: economic aspects of the labour market of the EU, job quality in the EU, social aspects of the EU, and the legislative adjustments of the EU for immigrants regarding Turkish migration.

### IX.C.1. Regarding the Economic Aspects of the Labour Market of the European Union

The results obtained show that unemployment increased with the 2008 crisis, especially until 2013, from 7% to 11%, being even higher that of workers born in countries outside the EU. In addition to the deterioration of the EU labour market in the period 2008 to 2013, it is noted that several problems remain persistent.

- Youth unemployment remains very high, with average rates of 11 percent in 2017 and especially in new-income countries with rates of 15%.
- Underemployment is estimated at 8% in 2017 in the EU.

- Employment in the informal economy was estimated for the EU in 2010 at 4.1% for men and 5.1% for women. In Turkey, informal employment was estimated at 30% for 2010 and 25% in 2015.
- Inflation increased in the Euro zone from 2.3% to 3.7% between 2006 and 2008, but in general it does not usually exceed 2%, which is considered a data of relative stability. The price of energy is the main cause of inflation imbalances in the Euro zone. Turkey is estimated to have high inflation: 16% in 2018.
- Industrial production was also affected by the 2008 crisis, its value falling by 20% in that year. In subsequent years it recovered, with Germany being the country that contributes 22% of total industrial production in the EU.
- GNP/GDP also fell by 4% with the 2008 crisis and has recovered since 2012. Five countries contributed 67.1% of the EU's GDP: Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. In the case of Turkey, its annual GDP growth rates are at 7.4% in 2017.
- The PPP varies a lot between countries, being the average of the EU 100, the PPS of Luxembourg is 253 while that of Greece is 67. Turkey has a PPS like that of Greece.
- The public deficit of the governments of the EU was -1.6% in 2006 and reached very high levels in different countries in 2009 (Greece -15%, Spain -11%, Ireland -13.6%). The situation has improved to 2017. In Turkey the deficit was at -2.7% in 2017, thus complying with the EU requirement that no country exceed -3% of public deficit.
- Governmental debt is a requirement of the EU that does not exceed 60% of GDP but due to the efforts to get out of the crisis of 2008 the EU it reached an average debt of 92% of GDP in 2014 and 81.6% in 2018. Turkey's is 35% in 2017.
- The labour costs per hour of the EU average rose by 2.5% from 2008 to 2017, mainly due to the increase in the new income countries. In Turkey, labour costs

per hour increased by 4.9%. Regarding minimum wages per hour of work, it has risen in different countries and stands at around 11 Euros in 2017 in countries such as Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. In Turkey the minimum hourly wage is 6.2 Euros.

The 2008 crisis had notable economic effects on the EU labour market such as a drop in employment rates and especially for young people, as well as a decline in industrial production, an increase in the public deficit, and an increase in debt. government and rising labour costs, and wages.

However, despite the crisis in the EU, the Turkish labour market continued to show comparative disadvantages with that of the EU: an average minimum hourly wage much lower than the larger EU countries, a much higher shadow employment as well as high levels of inflation. However, fortunately, in Turkey, both the public deficit and the government debt remained at the levels recommended by the EU.

### IX.C.2. Regarding the Job Quality in the European Union

The rate of fatal workplace accidents per 100,000 employees is 1.83 in 2015 and the number of occupational accidents was 1,513 per 100,000 jobs (almost half that in the USA). In Turkey they are also estimated considerably higher than in the EU. Regarding the EU exposure to physical risk factors is 7.9% in 2018 and to mental health risks 28%.

Child employment is prohibited in the EU. Only countries like Poland (3%) and Romania (1%) report child employment between the ages of 5 and 17 in 2017. Turkey reports that 3% of children between the ages of 5 and 14 were working in 2018, with a tendency to increase since the wave of Syrian emigration in 2017.

The statistics of forced labour provided by ILO for the EU in 2012 they indicate that 1.8% of every 1000 employees work by force: 30% are victims of sexual exploitation and 70% are victims of labour exploitation.

Women's salaries are 16.2% lower in 2016. There is also a trend towards salary differences with immigrants. Regarding access to managerial professionals, the 2000 survey showed that men tend to occupy 60% of legislative and management positions as well as 70% of the positions of managers of private companies and of 'senior government officials' in the European Union.

The average working day in the EU It is 40.2 hours a week in 2018. In the case of Turkey, the working day is 48.5 hours a week in 2018. As an indicator of job security, the temporary employment rate is used, which is 14.2% in the EU average and 15% for immigrants. In Turkey it was 12.5%. The social protection of the risks of the work reaches in the average of the EU in 2016 to 28.1% of GDP. In the case of Turkey, it was 12% in 2018. This deserves a specific chapter that also includes the chapter dedicated to trade unions

The differences in the quality of work in the European Union compared to Turkey are notable. The average working hours per week, the rate of accidents at work and child labour (5 to 17 years) are significantly higher in Turkey. And the percentage of State spending on Social Protection is much lower in Turkey (half in Turkey compared to the EU average). Therefore, after the crisis of 2008, the labour market factors of the EU that are comparatively attractive to Turkish emigrants.

#### IX.C.3. Regarding the Social Aspects of the European Union Labour Market

The EU had about 511 million inhabitants at the end of 2017, in more than 4 million $km^2$, with different weight of population by country. Turkey had about 80 million inhabitants in more than 783 $km^2$. The population of Turkish origin residing in the EU it was estimated at about 5 million people, including those with dual citizenship. The average life expectancy of the EU, like that of Turkey, stands at 83 years in 2018.

The average size of households in the EU is 2.3 members, but 33% of households are of a single person while in Turkey they are only 15%. There are large differences between countries when it comes to families of parents with children. While they are 27% and 24% in countries like Ireland and Poland, respectively, in countries like Denmark, UK or Sweden they are 8.6%, 6.6% and 6.4%, respectively. Instead, they have the highest proportion of single-adult households with children.

Education has a high coverage and education is promoted throughout life. For the most part it is financed by the state. It reaches 97% in the ages of primary education.

The distribution of income among the population of the EU estimates that in 2015 the richest 20% had 5.2 times more income than the poorest 20%. And the population at risk of poverty rate was around 17.3% in 2015. In Turkey it was 22.2% in 2019.

Material deficiencies in the EU they fell from 9.6% to 6.7% between 2013 and 2017. In Turkey the rate of people suffering material deprivation was 29.6%.

Regarding the way of life, income distribution and material deficiencies, in the average of the EU the trend is towards an increase in single-person households and single-parent families, although there are still significant differences by country. The risk of poverty reaches almost a fifth of the population, also in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's situation in terms of material shortages of families is four times higher than that of the whole of the European Union.

### IX.D. DISCUSSION ON LABOUR AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER COUNTRIES AND TURKEY

The labour and welfare rights system that prevailed in European countries until the 1970s and 1980s received a severe blow when the energy and technological crisis of the 1980s occurred. The European strategy focused on computerization and globalization of the economy through the liberalization of investments and markets To boost the economy.

But the change was radical since the full employment strategy that had characterized the construction of European welfare systems since the 1950s was ineffective.

The demand of the labour market in Europe was oriented towards more qualified employees in the new communication and information technologies and international trade. There was the situation that a country could have a high level of unemployment of unqualified people when its companies had emigrated and opened production units in countries with a labour force with lower wages and less demanding labour rights. So unskilled workers in European countries were left at a disadvantage in the information society or third industrial revolution.

Given this context, the labour policies of European countries, from the 1990s, most of the countries of the EU opted for a double strategy. On the one hand, they chose to deregulate their labour markets to facilitate flexibility and new forms of hiring and labour demand in the new economy. And on the other hand, they chose to attend to the needs of the unemployed, especially the unqualified, and their families, as well as help the employment of young people and the population at risk of exclusion.

In the analysis carried out on a selection of member countries of the EU, differences are observed in their degree of investment and characteristics of their public actions to solve their unemployment, exclusion, and job search of young people.

The common points are that public aid has been focused on helping job creation, helping train and qualification both job skills and job search for workers, implementing subsidies for workers and their families, or encouraging the hiring and labour integration of people at risk of exclusion. The studies analysed show specific differences in the performance and effectiveness of the measures.

## IX.E. SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE CORRESPONDENCES BETWEEN MIGRATION FLOW AND ITS DETERMINANTS

The results of the study have highlighted that of all the variables of the model of decisions to emigrate and to choose a migratory destination, there are especially four that are decisive. The first is the determinant of the economy and labour market, with all its specific variables, which was the determinant that was considered hypothetically relevant from the beginning.

The other determinant is security, within which two variables stand out: the legal status of the country of destination and the political pressure of the country of origin.

And the third determinant is social, within which the immigrant social community variable stands out. That is revealed as a highly influential variable in attracting the migratory flow. That has been verified in the 6 European countries that in the 1960s signed individual agreements with Turkey. One of the pioneers was Germany. Such an advantage in legal status will attract more Turkish immigrants to these countries. Turkish social communities were going to be formed that throughout the 1970s were going to play a decisive role in continuing to attract the Turkish population—through family reunification or new immigration.

Even though immigration regulations are going to be standardized in all the countries of the EU, the preferred destinations within the EU are going to be those in which the host communities are larger for quite some time.

**Table 37:** Chronological Comparison of the Variations in Turkish Migration Flow to the EU in Correspondence with Determining Variables 1960 to 2017

| Periods and Turkish Migration | Status Legal | Political Pressure | Economy and Labour Market |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960-1970<br><br>+ 50.000 per year | Some European Countries sign Labour Agreements<br><br>ECC 1965 Act for Foreigners<br>Ankara Agreement | Democracy<br><br>1963 Turkey request adhesion to ECC | EEC economy and employment demand growth |
| 1970-1980<br><br>+170.000 per year | Recognition of permanent workers: reunification flows<br><br>EU regulates work permit option | TK Social conflicts: 1977 Black May | EU labour legislation: equal salary by gender; Social Dialogue |
| 1973 | Global Oil Crisis | | |
| 1975-1985 | industrial crisis, unemployment, restructuring – factories displacement to third world – 1990's liberalization | | |
| 1980-1990-2000<br><br>+15.000 per year | 1991-2002 EU countries give citizenship to 800.000 Turks | 1980-1983 TK military government— rights suspension<br>1985 Kurdish warfare<br><br>30.000 Turks Asylum requests to EU per year from 1983 to 2000 | EU labour legislation: 1987 Single Act; 1992 Maastricht Treaty; 1998 Amsterdam Treaty |
| 1998 | Reunification Germany – migration and unemployment Eastern Germany | | |
| 2001 | Dissolution Soviet Union – unemployment and migrations from Eastern countries | | |
| 2001 – 2006 | Terrorism jihadist events – fear of Muslim immigrants | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000-2010<br><br>-25.000 per year | 2003 EU leg. Long term immigrants<br><br>2005 Germany Migration Act (residence of qualified immigrants)<br><br>2007 Lisbon Treaty | AKP Government 2002<br><br>Democracy increase | Economic and labour rights improvements<br><br>2003 Labour Law<br><br>2009 Employment Office<br><br>2008-2013 EU + unemployment; -20% industrial production; -GDP |
| 2008 | Financial Crisis – energy crisis – Digital Technology Revolution – Labour markets increase demand of qualified workers | | |
| 2010-2017<br><br>+60.000 per year | 2009 EU Blue Card (long term immigrants' status)<br>2011 EU Single Permit (equal treatment)<br><br>2014 Family Reunification<br><br>2016 EU Directives for Migrations to Study | 2010 Syrian War<br><br>2013 Gezi protests | 2014-23 TK National Employment Strategy<br><br>2014 EU Temporary workers migration<br><br>2014 EU multinational workers transfer |

**Source:** Author's own contribution.

As can be seen in Table 37, this set of variables combines with each other to influence the migratory flow, so it is difficult to establish that it is a single variable that determines the migratory flow in each period.

For example, in the period of the 1970s and 1980s, for economic and labour market reasons, the EU stopped hiring immigrants due to the industrial and energy crisis that caused an increase in unemployment in the EU in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, in the

1990s, with the computerization and globalization of European societies, the new job demanded would be mainly qualified. But in that same period 1970 to 1985/90, in Turkey there was a political crisis and persecutions that led many Turkish people to seek asylum in the EU countries. These asylum requests had a rate of about 60 thousand per year between 1983 and 2000. Therefore, the entries of Turkish immigrants to the EU kept increasing.

The balance of Turkish emigration from 2010 shows once again that the legal framework is a highly determining variable because between 2009 and 2016 the EU regulated a transparent and accessible framework for applicants for emigration permits. This legal framework of the EU since 2009 and which the member states have complied with, was aimed especially at qualified labour immigrants with contracts, stays for studies and research, regulating seasonal labour emigration, and the mobility of workers from multinational companies (see Table 37).

As has been observed in the analysis carried out, this migratory mobility of recent years, with respect to the migrations of the first decades, in addition to being different in terms of the profile of the average Turkish emigrant, will also diversify in terms of destination countries. in the European Union. This is facilitated because the legal status is similar in all the EU-28 countries as of 2009 and because as of 2013 there is a general economic recovery. But it is also confirmed that living conditions, democracy and labour rights have advanced to the point of being highly comparable with those of the countries of the European Union, for which reason the economic and salary/cost of living differences have ceased to exist. to be a priority in the decision to emigrate from the Turks to the EU (see Table 37).

# X. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This chapter discusses the findings of the statistical and document analysis in terms of empirical and theoretical contributions. Comparison is made with other authors' contributions as studied in the theoretical framework pf this dissertation (see Part One).

## X.A. LEGISLATIVE ADJUSTMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR IMMIGRANTS REGARDING TURKISH MIGRATION

The EU has specific legislation for immigrants, developing within decades. Historically, the labour demand of the EU Member States such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium led to mass migration to Northern Europe from Southern Europe like Spain, Italy, the Balkan countries, and Turkey in the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1960s, each country that had labour demands regulated the mass migration by bilateral agreements with the countries that the immigrants came from. These agreements made way for the 'guest worker scheme', which allowed immigrants as temporary workers without job security and other arrangements like family unification. One of the earliest bilateral agreements signed between Germany and Turkey in 1961.

In 1963, Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community. In the Ankara Agreement, European countries accepted Turkey as one of European countries. The Ankara Agreement contained the detailed provisions on the rights of Turkish workers. Moreover, it eased the migration of Turkish people to Europe by

removing the legal obstacles. However, the Ankara Agreement was implemented only by the UK due to the concerns of Germany about the increasing number of Turkish immigrants. Since the UK has not been a member of the EU as of the end of 2020, the Ankara Agreement does not apply anymore.

Parallel to the establishment of pioneer institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community that prepared the establishment of today's EU, European countries regulated this mass migration with several common legislative decisions. As a first step, in 1968, 'Directive 68/360 on Free Movement for Workers within the then European Community (EC); and Regulation 1612/68 on the Abolition of Restrictions on Movement and Residence within the EC for Workers of the Member States and their Families' enabled immigrants from an EC member country to live and work in another EC member country.

Although many other immigrants returned to their home countries after decreasing the labour demand in European countries in the beginning of the 1970s, many Turkish immigrants decided to stay and demanded their rights regarding their works. As Abadan-Unat (2017) stated, the Turkish immigrants got their rights like family reunification, job security, unemployment benefits, and retirement benefits in the 1970s.

In the 1980s, some countries enacted specific laws to encourage immigrants to return to their home countries by giving monetary benefits. This type of legislation caused a decrease in the migration stock in Europe. For example, Germany enacted a return law in 1983, which caused a decrease of 5.4% in the Turkish migration stock (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

The Schengen Agreement in 1985 was one of the huge jumps in the name of free movement in Europe. Thus, European citizens can reside and seek employment in another European country without facing legal obstacles. Since Turkey has not been an EU member yet (as of 2022), Turkish citizens must apply for a visa to work and reside in an EU member state.

The EU regulates the right to work (the EU Blue Card Directive, the Directive on Intra-Corporate Transfers, The Single Permit Directive), the right to family reunification, the right to study and research, and the right to reside in long-term with the specific directives for non-EU citizens. Turkish citizens must respect these directives to reside and work in the EU countries.

### X.B. THE LABOUR POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ABOUT MIGRATION

The EU has been passing successive directives to regulate the situation of immigrant workers from countries outside the EU. In 2003, it adopted the non-EU nationals with long stay (more than 5 years) and with regular income and health insurance, the non-EU nationals began to enjoy all the rights of national workers. In 2009, the directive of the 'Blue Card of the European Union' renewable every two years, to freely leave and enter the EU, and which can be enjoyed by those who have a job offer, qualification and a salary three times the country's minimum. In 2011 the Single Permit Directive, which unifies the application for work and residence permits. In 2014 three directives were adopted: intra-corporate transfers for managers, specialists, and trainers of multinationals; the Family Reunification Directive and the Directive for the stay of seasonal immigrant workers from 5 to 9 months. In 2016, the Study and Research Directive and the Action Plan for the Integration of third-country nationals were adopted. In 2017, the 'Employers Together for Integration Initiative' was adopted to make visible employers who support the integration of immigrants in the labour market.

Between 2009 and 2017, the institutions of the EU They have generated clear directives to regulate the different forms of labour immigration from outside the EU, differentiating between permanent workers, specialized workers, mobility of multinational workers or temporary workers.

The first part of this subchapter gives the details of the labour market policies of the EU. The second part shares the labour market policies of the EU over Turkish migration. The third part reports the differences of the labour market policies between the Member States and Turkey over migration. Finally, the fourth part presents an evaluation on Socio-Economic Structure of Turkey within the Context of the Compliance of the Labour Market and Immigration Policies of the EU.

### X.B.1. Labour Market Policies of the European Union over Turkish Migration

This dissertation presents that the labour market policies of the home countries and the host countries are highly effective on international migration by showing the case of Turkish migration to Europe. Unlike the study of Constant and Tien (2011), this dissertation agrees that the labour market policies directly link with migration policies at macro level. In the example of Turkish migration in the EU, the differences in the labour market policies between the Member States and Turkey impact the Turkish migration flow to Europe. Moreover, the additional findings show that the demand for democracy in Turkey and the existing migration networks of Turkish nationals in Europe, besides labour market policies, are effective on the migration from Turkey to Europe. Additionally, when the immigrants return to Turkey, migration experience contributes positively to their labour income.

### X.B.2. The Differences in Labour Market Policies among the Member States and Turkey on Turkish Migration in the European Union

The differences in the economy and labour market between Turkey and the Member States are highly noticeable. Turkey falls behind in the Member States— Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia— in the perspectives of the job quality indicators such as safety and ethics of employment, income, and benefits from employment,

working time and work-life balance, security of employment and social protection, and skills development and training. Moreover, the economic indicators and other labour market indicators such as unemployment rate, inflation, wages are in detriment of Turkey, comparing the same Member States.

According to the migration theories like migration laws, pull-push factors model, neoclassical approach, and world-systems theory, people tend to migrate from one country to another due to the economic forces. That is to say, people are willing to migrate to earn more. The main finding of this dissertation is convenient with these theories because these theories show us a direct link between migration policies and the labour market policies, which may strengthen the economy of a country.

### X.B.3. An Evaluation on Socio-Economic Structure of Turkey within the Context of the Compliance of the Labour Market and Immigration Policies of the European Union

Turkey has an almost 80 million population as of 2017. This population is close to the population of Germany, which has the largest population in the EU. When Turkey is a Member State, the number of chairs that Turkey will own in the European Parliament will be high. Thus, Turkey will be an effective member of the EU. Considering the population of Turkish-origin people and Turkish immigrants in the EU and their impact on public policy, Turkey will be the most powerful country in the case of being the Member States. As a result, Turkey has transformed into an Islamist movement that rejects modernization and Europeanisation (Agartan, 2010; Yavuz, 2006), although Turkey is the most secular Islamist country among the 57 Islamic countries (Tibi, 2004).

Meanwhile, the Turkish government accused the EU of being Islamophobic (Yabancı, 2016), and some authors (Rumelili, 2008; Hurd, 2006; McLaren, 2000) discuss whether the EU is a Christian club. Although there is no conclusive result of this discussion, it has

an important place in the debate on Christian and Islamic identities. Turkish immigrants in Europe remain in between Christian and Islamic identities because the majority of Turkish immigrants are Muslims living in a Christian Europe.

Another concern is that the Member States have some concerns, such as the undemocratic implementations and the rejection of modernization and Europeanisation. Since the anti-democratic implementations have been common in Turkey nowadays (World Bank, 2019; Yabancı, 2016), there might be some fears that Turkey might lead the EU policies to the undemocratic direction.

Despite these concerns, the EU continues to have a close relationship with Turkey and still welcomes Turkish immigrants. Today, the needs of the European labour market – the need for high-skilled workers – are still shaping the immigration policies of the EU like the 1960s. European countries ease the migration of Turkish high-skilled newcomers who have immigrated since the 2010s. Turkish immigrants benefit from the Blue Card, allowing highly-skilled non-EU nationals to work and reside in a Member State. Also, Turkish immigrants keep going to the UK through the Ankara Agreement.

The socio-economic conditions of Turkey might shape the migration destination choice of Turkish immigrants. Turkey is still suffering from:

- high unemployment, informal employment, and inflation rates,
- high at-the-risk-of-poverty and material deprivation rates,
- weak social dialogue.

Turkey is still challenging on satisfying the requirements of labour market-related chapters of Acquis (Chapter 2 about freedom of movement for workers, Chapter 19 about social policy and employment and Chapter 23 about the judiciary and fundamental rights), freedom of association and the Economic Reform Program (ERP).

These struggles might affect the migration decision of Turkish nationals and lead them to choose a migration destination in the EU that is relatively better in these areas. Therefore, this study investigates the labour market policies of five Member States (as of 2019)—Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia—by choosing them according to the welfare state classification of Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999). This study prefers the welfare state classification instead of the European Welfare Model. Since the EES is not binding for the Member States (Bazzani, 2017), the discussion on the European Welfare Model in the context of the labour market does not help compare labour market policies that are effective for choosing a migration destination.

Among these five Member States, Turkey's socio-economic situation and labour market policies are most likely close to Spain. The welfare model of both Spain and Turkey are considered inside the Southern European Model (Gal, 2010; Grütjen, 2008; Buğra & Keyder, 2006), in which self-employment, unpaid family labour and informal employment have extensive coverage (Buğra & Keyder, 2006), relatively non-democratic administration exists, the religion is a dominant factor (Gal, 2010), there is a rudimentary welfare system under the cooperation with family and the state (Gal, 2010; Grütjen, 2008). However, the labour market policies of Spain and Turkey are slightly different from each other. Although both Spain and Turkey are suffering from a high unemployment rate (Eurostat, 2020), Turkey is not as willing to spend on the labour market improvements as Spain. For example, while Spain spent 2.02% of GDP in 2017 as the public unemployment spending, Turkey only spent 0.29% of GDP in the same year (OECD, 2018).

As the labour market policies of the destination country affect migration destination choice, the labour market policies of the home countries might have an impact on the migration destination choice. For example, the immigrants from powerful economies like the US and the UK prefer a destination do not choose a destination due to economic

reasons. Dudu (2018) found that American immigrants choose the destination due to social reasons while British immigrants choose the destination due to geographic reasons. Similarly, Turkish immigrants, who are from a country suffering from high unemployment and informal employment rates (Buğra & Keyder, 2006), would like to choose a destination that is a powerful economy. Although the findings of this study do not correspond to the labour market determinants as the determinants of migration choice of Turkish newcomers, other studies (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017) confirm that for Turkish immigrants since the 1960s.

The improvement in the labour market policies of Turkey might decrease the estimated arrivals of future Turkish immigrants to the EU. If Turkey improves the labour market policies and satisfy the Acquis requirements, the Commission of the European Communities (2004) estimates that the migration flow from Turkey to the EU will be around half a million people in the case that Turkey will be a Member State. If Turkey will not be a member, it is expected to be 4 million people until 2025/2030 (Paçacı Elitok & Straubhaar, 2012; Paçacı Elitok, 2010; Erzan, Kuzubaş, & Yildiz, 2006). The estimations for the migration destinations of Turkish nationals are in the direction of Germany, France, Austria, and the Netherlands (Commission of the European Communities, 2004) because the population of Turkish migration-backgrounded people is already significant in these countries (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017); that is to say, there have already been migration networks for Turkish nationals. The findings of this dissertation confirm this estimation (Paçacı Elitok & Straubhaar, 2012; Paçacı Elitok, 2010; Erzan, Kuzubaş, & Yildiz, 2006) because being a member of the EU refers to being a more democratic country due to the EU's core political values.

## X.C. EVOLUTION OF TURKISH MIGRATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The evolution of the migrations of Turkish citizens to the European Union shows an annual growth of immigrants from 1960 to 1980, a slight increase between 1980 and 2002, and a slight decrease throughout the crisis of 2008 to 2015 in which immigration it picks up again.

It is found that from the mid to late 1970s, the political situation in Turkey was problematic, with repression of the freedoms to strike and unionize (massacre of May 1, 1976), a military coup in 1980 that dissolved Parliament and suspended the Constitution. Therefore, asylum claims are going to become another of the motives for emigration to the EU, apart from the advantages of its job market. In 1980, 60,000 asylum applications were registered by Turkish citizens to the EU.

Starting in 1980, in the decision to emigrate for Turkish citizens, the best conditions of the EU job market will come into play. compared to that of Turkey, but also the conditions of democratic and political security. This is demonstrated by the political incidents of the coup d'état, the Syrian war on the borders, terrorist attacks in cities, as well as the evolution of the data on asylum requests, in addition to the general increase in migrations to the EU as of 2009.

The upturn in the migration of the Turkish population to the European Union in 2010 to 2013 corresponds to the political instability in Turkey encountered in those years with the Syrian war on its borders and the government's refusal to increase freedoms despite citizen protests. The devaluation of the currency, economic stagnation and rising unemployment will aggravate the situation by promoting a new wave of migration. This time it is estimated that people with higher educational levels emigrate than in previous migratory periods.

### X.C.1. Changing Characteristics of Turkish Immigrants in the European Union

The common idea of the migration theories like migration laws, pull-push factors model, neoclassical approach, and world-systems theory is that migration flow is from the lower-income countries to the higher income countries. However, the first case study of this dissertation found that migration networks affect the migration destination choice positively. Turkish migration network in Europe has more than 50 years of history. This dissertation found that the characteristics of Turkish immigrants changed from the 20th century to the 21st century. Turkish immigrants in the 20th century were low skilled labours who targeted to earn more in the Member States. However, in the 21st century, Turkish immigrants are highly skilled labourers who demand to live in a more democratic country, compared with Turkey. Their destination country choice in the European Union is affected by the density of Turkish immigrants/backgrounded people in the Member States because of migration networks.

#### X.C.1.a. Turkish Immigrant Network in Europe: Past

Bringing foreign labour force for satisfying labour needs was a European states' labour market policy, starting from the 1960s to the 1990s. This policy led to a significant amount of the Turkish migrant stock and, correspondingly Turkish migration network in Europe. That is to say, the labour market policies of European countries shaped the migration destinations of Turkish citizens in Europe historically.

In the 20th century, the mass migration from Turkey to Europe began through the labour demand of European countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, Austria, and the UK (Abadan-Unat, 2017; Martin, 2012). The Turkish government in the 1960s supported this mass migration flow due to the economic instability of Turkey (Boratav, 2005). Although European states accepted Turkish immigrants as ‘guest

workers' in the 1960s (Abadan-Unat, 2017), the majority of these foregoer immigrants stayed in Europe. This decision to stay was the first step of creating a Turkish migration network in Europe.

The foregoer Turkish migrants in the EU might help the Turkish newcomers find accommodation and jobs through the migrants' organizations (Erel, 2014); so, the newcomers adapt to the society faster (Dudu, 2018). Even the Turkish foregoers might be the employers of the Turkish newcomers who have a challenge with speaking the language of the destination. These reasons are effective in that potential Turkish immigrants to tend to migrate to countries with a dense Turkish origin population in Europe.

In the past, the main characteristic of the Turkish immigrants who migrated to Europe between the 1960s and the 1970s was to have low skilled labour (Akgüç & Beblavý, 2017). Although European employers preferred skilled labour in those years, the Turkish government supported Turkish workers migrating to Europe to gain industrial skills (Abadan-Unat, 2017). For example, the Turkish workers worked in the automotive industry, manufacturing industry, iron-steel industry, and mining during Germany (Abadan-Unat, 1969). Another characteristic of the migration flow from Turkey to the EU in the past is that the number of Turkish asylum seekers had grown between the 1980s and the 2000s (Akgüç & Beblavý, 2017). Most of the Turkish asylum seekers applied for asylum from Germany. The reason might be the idea of getting support from their relatives or Turkish foregoers who migrated to Germany in the 1960s and the 1970s.

#### X.C.1.b. Today Turkey Immigrants Network in Europe

Today, the main characteristics of the Turkish immigrants after the 2000s are the migration of high skilled labour (Akgüç & Beblavý, 2017) and the dense Turkish-origin population, which involves in a diaspora.

Between the 1960s and the 2000s, it was seen that creating a Turkish diaspora in Europe was supported by the Turkish governments for increasing the skilled labour force by training them in Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2017) and raising the income of the remittance (Martin, 2012) (cited in (Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017)). However, after the 2000s, Turkey has given the significance to Turkish diaspora as an actor of public diplomacy and has declared the diaspora a soft power of Turkey (Köşer Akçapar & Bayraktar Aksel, 2017). Indeed, the Turkish diaspora in Europe is a political manoeuvre for making Turkey a desirable candidate country of the EU.

Turkey has been a candidate country since 1999 and has negotiated for accession since 2005. As of 2020, Turkey has been on the waiting list for a long time. Besides implementing the Copenhagen Criteria for the EU accession, Turkey needs more supports, and Turkish Diaspora gives that support for Turkey's EU accession. Many civil society organizations related to Turkish origin people in Europe support the EU membership of Turkey (Küçükcan, 2007).

After the 2000s, the demand for high-skilled labour increased in Europe. Some countries like Germany, the USA, the UK, Australia (Constant & Tien, 2011), Latvia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic (Rutkowski, 2007) eased the recruitment of high-skilled workers. For example, in 2005 in Germany, the Migration Act entered into force to place on long-term residency for immigrants, especially high skilled immigrants (Gesley, 2017). This easiness might be effective that Turkish high-skilled citizens have grooved on migrating to Europe in recent years. Thus, the education level of Turkish immigrants might increase. This increase brings with the discussion about brain drain in Turkey. Although the educated Turkish Diaspora might be a soft power of Turkey, the loss of high-skilled workers might bring risks to Turkey for providing some basic services such as education and health in the long run (Elveren, 2018).

Between 2008-2018, the level of democracy decreased sharply from 46.15 to 25.12 in Turkey since 2008 (World Bank, 2019). Also, Turkey ranked number 110 among 167 countries in 2019 has the lowest rank among the EU countries (The Economist, 2020). Despite these low ranks of the World Bank and the Economist, according to the results of the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman, Verschragen, & Hemmerechts, 2018), the perception of democracy and human rights in Europe does not affect the probability of having migration aspirations of Turkish nationals.

Unlike the findings of the EUMAGINE project (Timmerman, Verschragen, & Hemmerechts, 2018), choosing a migration destination that has a high level of democracy is a valid reason for Turkish newcomers in 2008-2018. As it is disclaimed in Chapter IX, the findings of the regression analysis indicate that the differentiation in the level of freedoms determines the migration destination choice of Turkish newcomers in the EU between 2008 and 2018. The estimation shows that a rise in the difference in the level of freedoms between Turkey and the EU-28 increases the number of first permits issued for Turkish nationals.

Since the working life covers a big part of human life, democracy in the labour market is equally essential with democracy in life after work. Therefore, this part discusses the demand for democracy of Turkish citizens in the migration context by dividing it into two areas: democracy in the context of socio-economy such as free trade unions and social dialogue and socio-political democracy as freedom of expression.

#### X.C.2. Changing Perception of the Turkish Government towards Turkish Immigrants in the European Union

In the 1960s, the Turkish government encouraged the Turkish nationals to move to European Countries developed with respect to industry for two motivations: (1) Turkish immigrants were seen as the source of remittance, and (2) the increases in the skill levels of the Turkish nationals through migration experience would help the Turkish industry

improve when the upskilled immigrants return to Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 2017; Martin, 2012). Since the majority of Turkish immigrants have never returned to Turkey, the second motivation of the Turkish government has never been achieved. On the other hand, the Turkish immigrants in the European countries have remained to be seen as the source of remittance for the next couple of decades. For example, according to Kumcu (1989), the remittances and the foreign exchange deposits of the Turkish immigrants provided 24% of Turkey's imports in 1989 (Kadirbeyoglu, 2007).

Because of the remittance expectations, the Turkish government supported the Turkish nationals to stay in the European countries and get the citizenship of the destination country. The Turkish government legalised dual citizenship in 1981 if the immigrant informs the government about this second nationality (Kadirbeyoglu, 2007). As a response to the legalization of dual citizenship in Turkey, some European countries abolished dual citizenship. For example, in Germany, German Citizenship Law prohibits dual citizenship and made it legally possible only until 2000.

> "The pre-2000 law maintained only that the person naturalising in Germany should not have another nationality. Yet, the new law made it possible for German officials to withdraw German citizenship from those who had taken up another citizenship following their naturalisation in Germany – hence those who had become dual citizens 'illegally'. Based on this clause, the German Government declared that 48,000 people of Turkish origin who had naturalised in Germany since 2000 had lost their German nationality because they had become 'illegal dual citizens'. These people were to have their German nationality withdrawn but could stay in Germany as permanent residents and reapply for naturalisation there provided, they were willing to renounce their Turkish nationality." (Kadirbeyoglu, 2007, p. 296).

After Turkey's diplomatic efforts, a new legislation of Germany allows Turkish citizens to be dual citizens in both Germany and Turkey (Kadirbeyoglu, 2007). On the other hand, as it was mentioned before, there are still legal barriers for Turkish citizens to reside and work in the EU because they are not the EU citizens.

Still, as this dissertation shows in the D section of Chapter V, the number of Turkish migration stock in the EU has increased over the years. Recent Turkish migration to Europe, especially after 2005, lead to a brain drain discussion in Turkey because many Turkish immigrants are high-skilled workers.

The high-skilled workers tend to send less remittance (Niimi, Ozden, & Schiff, 2008). Therefore, the Turkish government could not encourage migration from Turkey to the EU by seeing Turkish immigrants as the source of remittance in the 2010s. However, with a changing viewpoint, the attitude of the Turkish government is closer to interpreting this situation as soft power.

Since the recent Turkish immigrants are high-skilled workers, it is considered that they are well-educated. Therefore, the Turkish government considers that these immigrants are the modern face of Turkey in Europe. Moreover, these immigrants have capacities to compete with other well-educated European colleagues. They are able to work in prestigious companies, international non-governmental organizations, universities, and the institutions of the EU like the European Commission, which give Turkish citizens opportunities to work. Thus, they are seen as effective policy instruments for lobbying in the EU by the Turkish government. That is one of the powerful reasons why they are evaluated as soft power by the Turkish government.

# XI. SYNTHESIS OF THE FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

This chapter consists of the discussion of the findings and contributions of the regression analysis with three sub-chapters. Each sub-chapter corresponds to the following objectives:

- Regression analysis on the explanatory weight of the different variables of the migration destination decision model applied to the migration from Turkey to the EU from 2008 to 2018. As a result of testing the main hypothesis of this dissertation, the security-based variables—like demanding more democracy—acquire explanatory weight in the decision for the migration of Turkish citizens in the recent period.
- Regression analysis for understanding the effects of migration experience over the labour market of Turkey. Although there is no statistical information about where the Turkish return immigrants lived abroad, this analysis is still relevant to this dissertation because the majority of Turkish immigrants live in Europe. That is why this dissertation assumes that an investigation about the Turkish return immigrants implies the investigation of the effects of migration experience—which gained in the EU—in the labour market of Turkey in Europe. Therefore, this dissertation investigated the effects of migration experience on labour income in Turkey and found

out that having migration experience has a positive impact on labour income.

- Regression analysis related to the effects migration experience on labour income by gender perspective because the labour force participation rate of women in Turkey is very low compared to any EU Member States, and this situation has an impact on the gender pay gap. The hypothesis is that migration experience mitigates the negative impact of the gender pay gap in Turkey. Indeed, the positive effect of migration experience weakens the negative effect of gender on labour income. On the other hand, considering the marital status of women returnees, married women returnees earn more than all women alone or all returnees alone or married workers alone.

## XI.A. THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION DESTINATION CHOICES OF TURKS IN EUROPE

Migration laws (Ravenstein, 1885), pull-push factors model (Lee, 1965), neoclassical approach (Harris & Todaro, 1975; Sjaastad, 1962), human capital theory (Constant & Massey, 2005; Mancinelli, Mazzanti, Piva, & Ponti, 2010), segmented labour market theory (Averitt, 1968; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Kerr, 1954; O'Connor, 1973; Piore, 1979), world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 2011), and the new economics of migration (Stark & Bloom, 1985) shows us the economic factors are the centre in the migration studies. More employment opportunities (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015), higher average wages (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2013), better working conditions, such as lower daily working hours (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015), and lower cost of living (Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Nica, 2015) are predominant labour market drivers. One of the well-known examples is in the Turkish migration history is the labour force agreements signed by Turkey and several European states such as Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden in the 1960s.

On the other hand, it is obvious that political turmoil such as war, terrorism, and political polarization pushes people to migrate to other countries (Castles, 1990; Schmid, 2016; Sell, 1983). In the Turkish migration case, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, thousands of Turkish people were asylum seekers in Europe due to the left-right wings conflicts and terrorism in Turkey. Even today, highly skilled Turkish citizens emigrated due to the authoritarian policies and practices of the AKP (Sánchez-Montijano, Kaya, & Sökmen, 2018). Turkish people who have a fear about their security like Turkish political refugees and LGBTQ+ may apply for a residence permit if they meet the requirements. For some people, the consequences of gender inequality and social exclusion cause human insecurity, which is a powerful reason to migrate. Although the migration causes of socially oppressed people seem social drivers at first sight, the reason is not to be an LGBTQ+ or woman (social drivers). The reason is to be an oppressed person (human insecurity) because not all LGBTQ+ or woman are oppressed individuals.

Social drivers such as family unification and education are another important factor to choose a migration destination because migration networks are created between the foregoer immigrants and possible newcomer people (De Jong & Gardner, 1981; Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017; European Commission, 2006; Geis, Uebelmesser, & Werding, 2015; Haug, 2008; Sell, 1983). For example, in the 1970s, Germany allowed Turkish ‘guest workers’ to bring their families to Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2017).

Several studies in general migration literature (Berger & Blomquist, 1992; European Commission, 2006; De Jong & Fawcett, 1981; Lee, 1965; Tabor, Milfont, & Ward, 2015; Thompson, 2017) have already shown that a moderate climate is one of the crucial drivers to choose a migration destination. At first, it seems as if geographical drivers (although it is included in the literature) are not significant for Turkish migration to Europe. However, Turkish migration stock is increasing in the Mediterranean-European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Malta (UNDESA, 2017). These countries’

economies are not as strong as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which are historically popular migration destinations for Turkish people. There are not many Turkish immigrants—which might create migration networks— in these countries. However, there has been a slow but steady increase in Turkish migration stock in the Mediterranean-European countries in the 2000s.

The migration destination choice depends on security-based, labour market, social and geographical determinants. All these factors were controlled in the analysis, which found out that security-based and social factors are effective to choose a migration destination for Turkish people in Europe.

Interestingly, although several studies (e.g., Dedeoğlu & Genç, 2017) underline the importance of economic factors for Turkish immigrants to choose a migration destination, our analysis does not show the significance of labour market factors, which are the differences in employment rate, wages, working hours, and living costs between Turkey and the Member States. The reason may underlie that Dedeoğlu and Genç (2017) investigate the period between 1960 and 2013 with Turkish migration stock data while our analysis comprises the period between 2008 and 2018 with Turkish new comers (first residence permit holders). Even though the labour market drivers are the most dominant factors in the Turkish migration history, the other factors may be more effective in the period between 2008 and 2018. The great majority of period of the study of Dedeoğlu and Genç (2017) involves the labour migration period of Turkish people, who were low-skilled immigrants. On the other hand, our analysis focuses on a period in which predominantly high-skilled people immigrate. It is not surprise that high-skilled immigrants may earn more and work in good conditions in Turkey as well, parallel to their education level. That is why their primary concerns differ from the foregoer Turkish immigrants.

As expected, geographical drivers are not significant in our analysis. The reason may underline that Turkey's climate is more moderate that many Member States such as Germany, the UK, and Scandinavian countries. However, still, we must control for this driver not to fall into the trap of omitted variable bias— happens when one does not control for a variable that has already been in the literature. Omitted variable bias is a type of selection bias that occurs in regression analysis when one does not include all the potential factors that may have some explanatory power on the dependent variable (Baltagi, 2011; Greene, 2018; Gujarati, Porter, & Gunasekar, 2012). Omitted variable bias causes changes in the findings. With omitted variable bias, the significance levels of the variables are more likely to seem higher or lower than what they are supposed to be. Moreover, omitted variable bias in an analysis may cause the relationship between the dependent variable and an independent variable (positive correlation/ negative correlation) to seem different from what they are supposed to be. For example, let's say we would like to analyse what drivers are associated with labour income. When we included age, gender, job experience, and education in our analysis, probably we will find that they are highly significant. Do not we forget an important variable such as education level? If we do not include the 'region' variable in our analysis, we fall into the trap of omitted variable bias. Since we do not add region (the literature review indicates that it is highly related to labour income), the significance levels of age, gender, job experience, and education seem to be more than their levels in real.

The drivers of Turkish newcomers' migration destinations to the EU-28 in the 21st century are different from those in the 20th century. In the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, Turkish immigrants were motivated by political and economic factors. Although Turkish citizens' emigration to the EU slowed due to Turkey's economic stability in the first years of the 21st century, their emigration stepped up again towards the second decade of the 21st century. This dissertation confirms that a country's migration network

and freedom level were significant drivers of Turkish migrants' EU destinations between 2008 and 2018.

This study's novel significance was its exclusive focus on Turkish newcomers to the EU. The article drew on data collated from OECD, Eurostat, and World Bank databases. The regression analysis produces two main findings: (1) the size of an EU country's Turkish migration stock significantly increase the number of Turkish immigrants receiving a long-term residence permit because of familial ties, and (2) the greater the difference in freedom levels— in the meaning of being free from fear as a security-based driver— between an EU country and Turkey, the larger the number of Turkish immigrants. Thus, the analysis confirms that the sharp decrease in Turkey's democracy level due to state interventions and authoritarian policies is a significant driver of destination choice. Such that, the effect of a possible rise in the difference between the freedom levels of Turkey and the EU-28 is greater than the effect of the possible rise in Turkish migration stock in Europe.

This analysis is limited to the macro level data with quantitative analysis. Despite this limitation, our analysis supports the findings of other micro level studies (Elveren, 2018; Ozcurumez & Yetkin Aker, 2016; Sunata, 2010; Yanasmayan, 2019), which investigated high-skilled migration from Turkey to the developed regions like the EU countries, the USA, and Canada in the 2000s and 2010s through in-depth interviews and online surveys, and agreed that other drivers except for labour market drivers such as social networks, familial consideration, quality-of-life explanations, the social-cultural-political context in the destination country, and demand for better governance and civic society also impact the individuals' migration destination choices.

Security-based (democracy level) and social drivers (migration networks) have become highly relevant in the 21st century because the profile of Turkish immigrants has changed. Unlike in the 1960s, labour market drivers are no longer the strongest motives. Thus, this

study presents the drivers of migration destinations of Turkish newcomers in the EU in the 21st century at the macro level. For further studies, we consider examining the link between highly skilled newcomers and the demand for more democracy, which contributes significantly to brain drain studies, and the migration networks from the perspective of identity studies.

## XI.B. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MIGRATION EXPERIENCE AND SALARY OF THE RETURNED IMMIGRANTS

This dissertation agrees that labour market policies lead to the migration decision and the destination choice of the potential immigrants. On the other hand, the second case study of this dissertation shows that the returned immigrants also positively affect the home country's labour market. The returnees earn more in Turkey. This finding is convenient with the existing literature (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Bijwaard, 2015; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013).

The migration experience increases the skills of individuals in two ways: learning while working (Dustmann, Fadlon, & Weiss, 2011; Iara, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013) and study abroad (Iara, 2006). Migrants who return to the home country have new skills and, as a result, earn more in the home country than they did before migrating. The human capital increased by skills gained abroad promotes economic growth in the home country (Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003) and, therefore, policies that encourage migrants to return to the home country may help to boost its economic development.

Since the 1960s, Turkish citizens have migrated to countries across the globe but in particular Europe, where approximately 5 million Turkish citizens live as of 2015 (DİYİH, 2015). While emigration continues, some emigrants return to Turkey each year and join Turkey's labour force. Migration experience contributes to improving migrants' skills in two ways: (1) indirectly, by on-the-job training, and (2) directly, by studying

abroad (Barrett & O'Connell, 2000; Bijwaard, 2015; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003; Iara, 2006; Lacuesta, 2006; Lianos & Pseiridis, 2013). When migrants return to their home countries, they bring these new skills with them and thus increase the productivity of the labour market. This study hypothesises that migration experience increases salaries when migrants return to their home country for the case of Turkey.

The present study examined the effect of migration experience on Turkish returnees' labour income using the Household Labour Force Surveys in Turkey from 2009 to 2018 by OLS analysis with the following variables: gender, age, education, region, skill level, employment type, and social security holding status.

This analysis is limited to micro level data with quantitative methods. Since the Household Labour Force Surveys do not ask people in which country they lived abroad, we do not have enough information to compare the labour market gains of returned immigrants who lived in different countries. That is to say, we cannot reveal the effects of living different countries. Moreover, we do not enough information about how many years returned immigrants live abroad. Despite of these limitations, with the knowledge of whether the participants of the Household Labour Force Surveys had lived abroad, we were able to analyse the effects of migration experience on the returnees' labour income.

Previous studies (Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001; Yetkin Aker & Görmüş, 2018) concur that the majority of Turkish high-skilled returnees are salaried workers due to their expectation of higher salaries. Our analysis supports the findings of previous studies (Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2001; Yetkin Aker & Görmüş, 2018). The findings are confirmed by the present study, which adds that migration experience increases labour income in general, especially for men. That is to say, having a migration experience is an asset in the labour market of Turkey even though returned immigrants have face some difficulties like not finding employment appropriate for her or his skill level (Barcevicius,

2016; Mezger Kveder & Flahaux, 2013; Stark, 1995). Part-time jobs, informal employment, each further year lived in Turkey after returning, and living outside Istanbul have a negative impact on earnings for the returnees.

For the returnees, in agreement with Lianos and Pseiridis (2013), Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2001), and Iara (2006), high education levels and upskilling abroad have a significant impact on labour income, compared with the overall wage earners in Turkey. In other words, highly educated and upskilled returnees contribute more to the economic growth of Turkey, as suggested by Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003).

For the future studies, this study may improve by investigating where the return immigrants came from and which skills, they earned abroad by what ways. Qualitative methods such as the surveys and in-depth interviews might be helpful to collect more detailed data to produce an effective policy recommendation.

### XI.C. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN MIGRATION EXPERIENCE AND SALARY OF THE RETURNED IMMIGRANTS BY GENDER PERSPECTIVE

This analysis was like an extent of the previous analysis about return migration. Since several studies (Akhmedjonov, 2012; Kara, 2006; Tansel, 2004) suggest that the gender earnings gap is in detriment of women, the aim of this analysis was to investigate the contribution of migration experience to women's labour income in Turkey. It hypnotized that migration experience may contribute positively to women's labour income in Turkey.

Therefore, we used the same data set as the previous analysis. For this aim, we added marital status to the previous analysis. Marital status is highly related to gender because of 'reservation wage', which refers to the minimum wage that an individual demands for doing a particular job (Coen et al., 2010). The reservation wage has a reverse relationship

with household income. If another person earns a salary in a household, the other person is more motivated to accept the job offers with higher wages.

Consequently, women who have a partner with a job are less willing to take up low salary jobs. Another reason might be that many women are caregivers as well. Care facilities for the elderly and children in Turkey are very expensive with low availability (Uraz, Aran, Hüsamoğlu, Okkalı Şanalmış, & Çapar, 2010). Therefore, it is not logical for caregiver women to give up caregiving and work with low salaries because their salary may not meet the cost of care facilities.

As a result, the lack of social policies may cause a high gender gap in the labour participation rate– for instance, 40.24% in 2018 (World Bank, 2021)— in Turkey. Even if women participate in labour force, their earnings are lower than male workers. Our analysis found out that women returnees earn less than all women alone or all returnees alone although migration experience has a positive impact on labour income. However, the negative effect of gender on labour income decreases due to the positive effect of migration experience. On the other hand, married women returnees earn more than all women alone or all returnees alone or married workers alone. The reason of this finding may be related to their high reservation wages.

# PART FIVE- CONCLUSIONS

# XII. CONCLUSIONS

The EU is an umbrella organization covering all Member States through its history and own principles, laws, regulations, institutions, and implementations. At first, the EU is an organization based on economic strength and prosperity. Throughout the history of the EU, it is confirmed that there is a need for political and social unity for economic strength and prosperity. As a result, various institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, and the European Council were founded, and several agreements like the Act on Foreigners, the Schengen Agreement, the Single European Act were signed. In 2009, the EU was born. The long journey of the EU is continuing with future policies, strategies, and enlargement. As a part of constructing the future in Europe, labour market policies and strategies are essential for protecting the sustainability of keeping peace and developing economic and social structures in Europe.

The EU live through five enlargements, and today, it has 28 members (as of 2019): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the UK. For the future enlargement of the EU, Albania (official candidate), Bosnia and Herzegovina (potential candidate), Kosovo (potential candidate),

Montenegro (official candidate and negotiating), North Macedonia (official candidate), Serbia (official candidate and negotiating) and Turkey (official candidate and negotiating) are on the list.

The focus group of this dissertation is Turkish immigrants in the EU because they are one of the most affected minorities from the labour market policies of European countries and are the most populated immigrant group in Europe; besides, the oldest application for being a member owns Turkey since 1999.

The main findings of this dissertation are that the labour market drivers for Turkish immigrants are no longer the main determinants of the decision to emigrate in Europe because political and social factors are gaining relevance. It has four sets of conclusions: revealing the changing trends in the labour market, comparing labour policies of the EU and Turkey, determining the drivers of migration destinations in Europe for Turkish immigrants and the gains of migration experience in the Turkish labour market.

This dissertation benefited from the data from the European Commission, Eurostat, EUR-Lex, and Eurofound, OECD, the World Bank, and ILO to reveal the changing labour market trends and to compare the labour market policies of the EU, Turkey, and the selected Member States. For determining the drivers of migration destinations in Europe for Turkish immigrants, this dissertation took advantage of a blended macro level data set from the World Bank, OECD, and Eurostat. For determining the gains of migration experience in the Turkish labour market, the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey provided by the TurkStat.

The methodology of the dissertation is predominantly the ‘compare-contrast’ analysis. Since all labour policies of the EU are not binding, the labour policies of the Member States differ from each other. This situation makes a direct analysis between the EU and Turkey harder. Therefore, this dissertation compared labour market policies and strategies of the EU by choosing five Member States— Denmark, Germany, the UK,

Spain, and Estonia—according to the most well-known classification of the welfare models made by Esping-Andersen with five different models: The Social Democratic Model (for example; Sweden, Denmark, Norway), the Liberal Model (for example; the UK, the USA, Australia), the Corporatists Model (for example; Austria, Germany, France), the Southern European Model (for example; Spain, Italy) and the Eastern European Model (for example; Estonia, Latvia, Belarus). Then, it compares these countries, Turkey, and the EU in the light of the Copenhagen Criteria.

For determining the drivers of migration destinations in Europe for Turkish immigrants and the gains of migration experience in the Turkish labour market, econometric analysis was used: the OLS analysis and the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Method with the Heckman Selection Two-Steps Procedure.

The contributions of this dissertation to the literature are to get attention to the chancing labour market trends and to compare the labour market policies within the context of Turkish migration. Moreover, since the studies about the high-skilled Turkish immigrants predominantly used qualitative methods such as surveys and in-depth interviews, this dissertation contributes to the studies about the high-skilled Turkish immigrants by using macro level data with econometric methods. This study fills the gap in the lack of studies that focus on the determinants of migration destination choice of Turkish newcomers in the EU. With this perspective, this dissertation differs from the other studies. On the other hand, the findings of this dissertation are supportive to the studies about the high-skilled Turkish immigrants. Moreover, this dissertation is the first study that focused on the effects of migration experience in the Turkish labour market.

This dissertation reached ten following conclusions on Turkish migration to Europe:

Conclusion 1- Turkey's High Unemployment, Underemployment, and Informal Employment Rates Problems Created a Migration Flow

The differences in the labour market policies and structures between Turkey and the EU Member States key play role in migration from Turkey to Europe. While Turkey has been suffering historically from structural unemployment, underemployment, and informal employment rates problems, many Member States— especially Western European countries— have demanded for labour. These unbalance labour market situations created a migration flow from Turkey to Europe. The majority of Turkish immigrants in the 1960s went to Germany, which accepted them under the 'Gastarbeiter' (guest worker) scheme. Then, other European countries like Austria, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands accepted low skilled workers from Turkey. The solidarity among Turkish workers strengthens, and many Turkish organizations were born in Europe. The most well-known is the Türk-Danış, established in the 1960s in Germany. However, the labour demand decreased in the 1970s, and a significant number of Turkish nationals preferred to stay in these European countries.

The EU is still suffering from some difficulties such as high unemployment rate, high youth unemployment rate, low labour mobility, the high unbalanced situation of purchasing power among member states, high risk of poverty or social exclusion, poor work-life balance, the tension among religious and ethnic groups, ghettoization and xenophobia, and the existence of non-binding policies. Despite the EU's these sufferings, Turkey's these indicators are not as good as the EU's indicators. Moreover, Turkey's economic indicators such as inflation, industrial production, GDP, government deficit/surplus, government debts, and labour costs and wages are not as good as the Member States. Many Turkish citizens have migrated with the hope of better life quality to Europe since the 1960s.

ALMPs are a vital part of the labour market policies for fighting a high unemployment rate. There are four main ALMPs: job placement, job training, job creation and employment incentive programs. This study investigates the ALMPs of selected countries— Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia— by choosing one representative of each welfare model. This study also examines immigrants specific labour market programs because its focus group is Turkish immigrants in the EU.

All selected countries processed labour market reforms at the end of the 1990s and the 2000s. The UK spends the least proportion of its GDP on the labour market than the others, and the unemployment rate is higher than the others— except that Spain. All selected countries have their tools, methods, and institutions as the ALMPs. Among the others, in fighting unemployment, the most brilliant one is Germany, which represents the continental European model. In Germany, the unemployment rate is relatively low, and the employment rate is relatively high. However, many of them have immigrants specific labour market programs. Only Denmark and Germany have a labour market program for immigrants, and only Estonia provides language courses. These programs are not enough to include immigrants into the labour market because there is evidence that the employment gap between immigrants and native workers is significant, favouring native workers.

The countries included in the Southern European Model (including Spain, Greece, Turkey, Italy) suffer from a high unemployment rate than the countries included in other models. Indeed, among the selected countries, the closest one to Turkey is Spain. Both countries have a high number of average household members, relatively low social protection expenditures, a high number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, high material deprivation and a low level of democracy (voice and accountability). However, although there are similarities between Spain and Turkey comparing the rest of the selected countries, these indicators are better in Spain.

In the EU, in general, the core part of labour market policies is the European Employment Strategy, which avoids unemployment, makes work pay, activates the unemployed, and guarantees the sustainability of welfare systems. It involves employment guidelines, joint employment reports, national reform programmes and country reports. The ESS has three mechanisms: (1) peer pressure, (2) strategic use, and (3) socialization/disclosure formation and learning. However, being non-binding is the main problem of the EES.

ALMPs are a vital part of the labour market policies for fighting a high unemployment rate. There are four main ALMPs: job placement, job training, job creation and employment incentive programs. This study investigates the ALMPs of selected countries— Denmark, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Estonia— by choosing one representative of each welfare model. This study also examines immigrants specific labour market programs because its focus group is Turkish immigrants in the EU.

All selected Member States processed labour market reforms at the end of the 1990s and the 2000s. The UK spends the least proportion of its GDP on the labour market than the others, and the unemployment rate is higher than the others— except that Spain. All selected countries have their tools, methods, and institutions as the ALMPs. Among the others, in fighting unemployment, the most brilliant one is Germany, which represents the continental European model. In Germany, the unemployment rate is relatively low, and the employment rate is relatively high. However, many of them have immigrants specific labour market programs. Only Denmark and Germany have a labour market program for immigrants, and only Estonia provides language courses. These programs are not enough to include immigrants into the labour market because there is evidence that the employment gap between immigrants and native workers is significant, favouring native workers.

The ALMPs in Turkey, on the other hand, have similar tools, methods, and institutions with the selected countries. However, the effectiveness of these ALMPs is disputable because the labour market of Turkey is characterised by the extensity of self-employment, unpaid family labour and informal employment practices. Although the AKP government made some labour market reforms in the 2000s, informal employment is considered 50% of total employment in Turkey; so, half of the society is suffering from the lack of social insurance, and another half is paying the burden of the inexistence of half of the income taxes.

Although there is a significant lack of migrant integration policies in the Member States, this unbalance labour market situations between Turkey and European countries are the reason why labour market policies are in the centre of the discussion about the migration from Turkey to the EU.

Conclusion 2- Turkish People Immigrate to Europe with the Expectation of Having Better Jobs

Turkey has poorer job quality than the EU-28 for most indicators. In addition, Turkish immigrants are less favourable than the position of native workers, although the Turkish-speaking community outperforms comparing with native counterparts in terms of the (standardized) job prestige score. Also, the unemployment rate of Turkish immigrants is higher than the unemployment rate of native people.

Turkey felt behind the Member States in terms of safety and ethics of employment, employment relationship and work motivation, income, benefits from employment, working time and work-life balance, and security of employment and social protection.

The EU has some standards about job quality and expects all EU candidates to catch these standards. The candidate countries must satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria and improve labour market policies for accession to the EU. Social policy and employment

(Chapter 19) of the Copenhagen Criteria includes minimum labour standards. There are nine areas dealt with in this chapter: (1) labour law, (2) health and safety at work, (3) social dialogue, (4) employment policy, (5) the ESF, (6) social inclusion, (7) social protection, (8) anti-discrimination, and (9) equal opportunities. Turkey, as a candidate country, must make more improvements in all these areas for accession.

The literature (see Chapter IV Part C) shows that the expectation of having better jobs with minimum labour standards triggers people to migrate. That is why Turkish people would like to immigrate to Europe, in which working conditions are more decent. Moreover, if Turkey makes these improvements in the related areas of the Copenhagen Criteria for accession, the density of migration flow from Turkey to the EU may decrease.

Conclusion 3- While the Inadequacy of Social Dialogue in Labour Market in Turkey May Trigger Turkish Migration to Europe, the EU May Need Improvements Social Dialogue in Favour of Immigrant Workers

Social dialogue is an indicator of job quality. It refers to a democratic management approach in the workplace by building a dialogue between workers and employers. The trade unions are the representatives of workers while employers' associations are the representatives of employers. Moreover, in the EU, European Work Councils play a vital role in regulating social dialogue.

Collective labour agreements and strikes are two struggle tools of trade unions against unfair implementations of employers. Thus, trade unions help to protect workers' rights. However, trade union membership has been declining for decades all around the world. Despite this decline, the average rate of trade union membership is higher in the EU than in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey is one of the ten worst countries for workers in the world in 2016 and 2018 because some unionists are systematically arrested, and people might be afraid of being a trade union member due to political pressure (see Chapter VII Part A).

Therefore, Turkish workers may immigrate to the countries such as the Member States in which there is more democracy in the workplaces.

As a candidate country, Turkey has to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria and improve labour market policies for accession to the EU. Labour market conditionalities of the Copenhagen Criteria has three dimensions: political criteria related to the labour market, economic criteria, and legal alignment. The political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria are the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. The intersection of the political criteria of the Copenhagen Criteria and the labour market policies is the freedom of associations, which is highly related to democracy and human rights. Trade unions are the important actors of the social dialogue and labour market of the EU. Since trade union rights are related to the labour market, these rights get involved in both political and economic criteria. Trade unions in Turkey face a low density of membership due to the lack of trust to trade unions, the anti-democratic characteristics of the laws that may conclude the loss of workers' jobs, and ineffective and unmodern unionists and their policies.

On the other hand, although the many Member States are most respectful to trade union membership in terms of social dialogue, the EU has some difficulties on immigrants' trade union membership. The unionisation rate is the least among immigrants and foreign-born workers in many countries. Immigrant workers have a lack of trade union experience, are less able to speak the language of the host country, are willing to do overtime and overwork to earn more and face discrimination. Moreover, some of them are not documented. Therefore, they are not able to be an official trade union member. These characteristics make harder them to be a trade union member. The EU must develop better policies to improve their conditions in terms of respect to minority workers' rights.

As an alternative to the trade unions, in the case that immigrants cannot be members of the trade unions, associations, foundations, and voluntary institutions can be established to help immigrant workers advocate their rights. One of the good examples in the Turkish migration case is Türk-Danış in Germany, as a consultancy office for Turkish immigrants. Besides, thanks to foregoer guest workers in the 1960s, Turkish immigrants have already had several other workers' associations as an alternative to the trade unions in Germany. These types of organizations may be popularized in other European countries.

Conclusion 4- Turkey Needs to Improve Social Living Conditions

Turkey is a country that has a crowded population compared with many small Member States such as Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Luxembourg. Households in Turkey are also relatively crowded compared to the Member States. Life expectancy in Turkey is as same as the average of the EU.

On the other hand, public expenditure for education in Turkey is lower than in the Member States (see Chapter VII). Low public expenditure for education leads to calling the quality of education into question in Turkey. Although the ERP is the economic criteria for accession, in the context of the labour market, Turkey must increase the quality of education for implementing the ERP because the Turkish education system does not satisfy the needs of the labour market and cannot provide a qualified education to the Turkish students for higher performance in the PISA test.

Similarly, Turkey fell behind the average of the EU on income distribution and material deprivation. Almost one in four people in Turkey is at-the-risk-of-poverty while approximately one in three people is suffering from material deprivation (see Chapter VII). Obviously, Turkey needs to improve social living conditions, which is also demanded by the EU for the accession criteria.

The countries included in the Southern European Model (including Spain, Greece, Turkey, Italy) suffer from a high unemployment rate than the countries included in other models. Indeed, among the selected countries, the closest one to Turkey is Spain. Both countries have a high number of average household members, relatively low social protection expenditures, a high number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, high material deprivation and a low level of democracy (voice and accountability). However, although there are similarities between Spain and Turkey comparing the rest of the selected countries, these indicators are better in Spain.

Conclusion 5- The Characteristics of Turkish Immigrants in the EU Have Changed since the 1960s

In the 1960s, the mass migration from Turkey to Europe began with the 'guest workers' scheme to meet labour demand in Europe from the viewpoint of Western European countries and to increase the skill levels of Turkish immigrants through workplace training and to gain remittances from the viewpoint of the Turkish government. That is to say, the Turkish immigrants in the 1960s were low-skilled immigrants, who needed to improve their abilities.

In the 1970s, families of these immigrants had begun to be trailing immigrants through family reunifications. Turkish immigrants who went to Europe from the end of the 1970s to the mid-1990s were political immigrants due to political polarization and terrorism in Turkey.

Although there was a stagnation period of Turkish immigrant flows in the 2000s, the number of Turkish immigrants increased again in the 2010s due to the antidemocratic implementations of the AKP government, the loss of economic stability, and the instability due to the terrorist attacks and the effects of the Syrian war on Turkey. These Turkish newcomers have been high-skilled immigrants. These highly-educated Turkish people have migrated to Europe despite the fact that they have a capacity to earn well

parallel to their education levels even though they remain in Turkey. It is obvious that their reasons for taking a migration decision and choosing a destination in Europe do not depend on only economic factors. Moreover, in this period, the need for high-skilled workers in Europe increased, and some European countries eased the recruitment of high-skilled workers.

Several studies (see Chapter VII) revealed that Turkish newcomers' other migration drivers except for labour market drivers are social networks, familial consideration, quality-of-life explanations, the social-cultural-political context in the destination country and demand for better governance and civic society impact the individuals' migration destination choices. Therefore, there is a shift in the characteristics of Turkish immigrants in Europe, which changed between two centuries from low-skilled high-paid job-seekers to high-skilled democracy demanders.

Conclusion 6- A Further Discussion Is Needed on High-Skilled Turkish Immigrants: Brain Drain or Soft Power from the Viewpoint of Turkey?

Europeanisation is another dimension of the labour market because it relates to integration—including labour market integration. Europeanisation includes adapting laws and institutions and European citizenship and identity, which collect people under the same or similar norms, institutions, regulations, and symbols.

Turkish immigrants in Europe another face of the Europeanization of Turkey. Some Turkish immigrants constitute the Turkish diaspora in Europe, the Turkish population who live in Europe and adhere to the same ethnonationalism and similar ideology. Turkish diaspora in Europe is supported by several Turkish ministries, government centres/offices and official organizations. Since the high-skilled Turkish immigrants have increased in Europe in the 2010s, there is a discussion about whether the Turkish diaspora is brain drain or soft power. The concept of brain drain perceives the high-skilled Turkish immigrants as a loss of the educated population of Turkey. On the other

hand, the Turkish government introduces the Turkish diaspora – including the high-skilled Turkish immigrants – as a soft power representing Turkey's interests outside Turkey.

Today, it is estimated that more than 6 million Turkish immigrants and Turkish backgrounded individuals (naturalized citizens, second-generation, and third-generation) live in Europe. Even though these Turkish immigrants and Turkish backgrounded individuals are not responsible for representing Turkey, it is normal that European people evaluate Turkey based on their experiences with these people. Therefore, there is a situation of representing voluntarily or involuntarily. If these people represent Turkey voluntarily, it calls ‘public diplomacy’. If these volunteers are well-educated and socio-economically well-off people, this representation becomes a 'soft power' from the view of Turkey.

On the other hand, it should take into consideration what Turkey gains if these people live and produce in Turkey. These people may contribute more to Turkey’s economy in the case that they live in Turkey. Besides, the absence of these people may be considered as the loss of the human intellectual capital for Turkey. Therefore, Turkey should calculate well the advantages and disadvantages of the absence of high-skilled Turkish people in Turkey and develop policies regarding this calculation.

Conclusion 7- High-Skilled Turkish Immigrants’ Demand for Democracy is a Significant Driver to Choose a Destination in Europe

A significant number of high-skilled people had moved abroad in the 2010s. High-skilled Turkish immigrants are able to find good jobs and earn well in Turkey because of their high education level. Considering this fact, this dissertation hypothesized that their primary reason for moving might differ from labour market drivers.

To test this hypothesis, this dissertation benefited from the ‘first permit’ data which is the first residence permits issued (for 12 months or more) by the Member States— which shows the number of the documented immigrants— shared by the Eurostat. In this way, this dissertation analysed the data of Turkish documented newcomer immigrants (Turkish migration flow data), different than other studies which focuses on the Turkish migration stock data.

In the OLS analysis, we controlled the ‘democracy’ by using a ranking of the World Bank, called ‘voice and accountability’, which includes participating in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. This variable is highly significant for determining in choosing a migration destination for high-skilled Turkish people who migrated in the 2010s.

The studies on the high-skilled Turkish immigrants in the 2010s (see Chapter VII) show that social networks, familial consideration, quality-of-life explanations, the social-cultural-political context in the destination country and demand for better governance and civic society are effective drivers to choose a migration destination. Besides, this dissertation has the same finding that the gap in democracy level between Turkey and the Member States affects the migration destination choices of the potential Turkish immigrants.

The anti-democratic reaction of the Turkish government against the Gezi Protest (in 2013), the Suruç Bombing (in 2015), Atatürk Airport Attack (in 2016), 15 July coup d'état attempt (in 2016), and the Reina Nightclub Shooting (in 2017) might have been the reasons to move from Turkey for the high-skilled immigrants. Some studies (see Chapter VII) show that Turkish high skilled immigrants in the EU have increased after the Gezi Protests, and there was a significant connection between the demand for the democracy of high skilled labour and the increase in the number of Turkish migrants in the EU after the Gezi Protests.

Conclusion 8- Existing Migration Networks Makes Attractive Europe to Move for Turkish People

Migration networks are the social aspect of migration. Since the 1960s, Turkish people have had a migration network with European countries, particularly Western European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and France. Migration networks may help to increase migration stock directly or indirectly.

The family reunification with first-degree relatives is one of the most well-known examples of migration networks. The significant number of family reunification happened in the 1970s, particularly family reunifications of guest workers. Even today, family reunifications are one of the most significant reasons to move abroad.

Many people in Turkey have at least one relative in Europe. Turkish citizens who want to move abroad may prefer to go to a country in which there is her or his relative. The solidarity between relatives helps newcomers to set up easily in a new country.

The knowledge of the existence of a significant number of Turkish immigrants in a country encourages people to move there even though they do not have relatives in that country. The greater number of Turkish immigrants in a country means a greater solidarity network in that country. For example, newcomers who do not have proficiency in the host country's language need to ask other people how they resolve bureaucratic procedures like getting a domicile certificate. When these newcomers fall in with a person who can speak their native language may feel more confident. Moreover, the knowledge of the existence of the ethnic economy in a country leads newcomers to think of finding jobs easily there.

Conclusion 9- Migration Experience is an Asset in the Labour Market in Turkey

Since the Turkish immigrants mostly migrate to Europe (approximately 5 million Turkish citizens live as of 2015), this dissertation also brings the effects of their migration experiences in the labour market of Turkey into question as the return of migration.

The literature review (see Chapter VII) shows that migration experience contributes to improving immigrants' skills by on-the-job training and by studying abroad because immigrants have the opportunities to learn the language and working culture of the host country.

This dissertation benefits from the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey from 2009 to 2018 are used, which contain information on the working-age population (aged 15 to 64). The survey data contains whether the participants have ever lived abroad or not. However, in the surveys, there is no question about the place where they live or the duration of their stay abroad. With this limitation, this dissertation used the following variables to analyse the effects of migration experience on labour income in Turkey: gender, age, education level, region, job experience, skill level, having social security, employment type, and Syrian War dummy variable.

The OLS analysis found out that migration experience has benefits to the labour income of Turkish returnees in the labour market. All variables were significant. While the Syrian War dummy variable was significant positively for all wage earners in Turkey, it was not significant for Turkish returnees. Men earn more than women; the same applies to returnees. Age and longer work experience positively impact labour income, while part-time jobs and the lack of social security (informal employment) negatively affect labour income for the entire working population, including the returnees.

Conclusion 10- Migration Experience Does Not Close the Gender Pay Gap in Turkey

The previous analysis shows that migration experience is an asset in the labour market of Turkey. That is why this dissertation hypothesized that migration experience might have a positive impact on the gender pay gap in Turkey, which is bigger than gender pay gaps of the Member States, as further analysis.

This analysis was done with the same data set. The 'marital status' variable was added to the analysis since it plays a very important role in the women's labour force participation rate and labour income due to the reservation wage concept.

This dissertation took advantage of the OLS analysis to investigate the women's labour income in Turkey. For the benchmark model, the same variables of the previous analysis were used, including marital status. For the second model, the analysis also contained the multiplication of two variables (gender and migration experience). For the third model, the analysis included the multiplication of three variables (gender, migration experience, and marital status). In this way, the analysis revealed the differences between being a woman, being a woman with migration experience and being a married woman with migration experience in the labour market of Turkey. The robustness check of this analysis was done with the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Methods with the Heckman Selection Two Steps Procedure.

The findings of the analysis indicated that the positive effect of migration experience weakens the negative effect of gender on labour income and married women returnees earn more than all women alone or all returnees alone or married workers alone. However, migration experience does not close the gender pay gap in Turkey.

How can labour market policies of the EU shape the future of Turkish migration?

The migration flow from Turkey to the EU depends on the difference in the job creation capacities of the labour markets of Turkey and the EU. Historically, when the Turkish

labour market locks in job creation and the need for labour increases in Europe, the migration flow from Turkey to the EU increases. Turkish citizens prefer the migration destinations in Europe where the Turkish network is robust, and the labour market of the possible destination country is strong.

Turkey might strengthen its labour market by increasing democracy through intense social dialogue and more freedom of association. When Turkey makes strong its labour market by democracy, the accession to the EU might be easier because Turkey will satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, and the migration from Turkey to the EU might decrease. Thus, Turkey, which has already had a diaspora in Europe through the huge number of Turkish immigrants and Turkish backgrounded people, might be freed from brain drain.

Limitations and Future Direction of This Dissertation

By virtue of the topic, this dissertation is limited to Turkish migration as a case. However, the findings of this dissertation may be valid for the other countries which have the following similar characteristics to Turkey: geographic approximation to developed countries, less developed economy and industry, higher population, and relatively substitutable education system into the destination country. From this viewpoint, the Turkish case is similar to the countries like India, Argentina, China, and Mexico—which have high outbound flows of high-skilled immigrants.

In addition, different from the existing studies on Turkish migration (see Part I and Part III), this dissertation handles the Turkish migration as a result of choice. Until the 2010s, the Turkish immigrants had been analysed and evaluated as passive actors, who went to where they were invited as guest workers and where they were accepted as political refugees. However, this dissertation handles the Turkish immigrants as active actors in the migration process because they have capacities to choose wherever they would like to go in the EU due to their competencies as high-skilled and well-educated workers.

By virtue of the data, this dissertation is limited to secondary data sources. It takes advantage of the qualitative sources such as the documents of international organizations such as Eurofound, Euro-Lex, and European Commission. The quantitative data sources use the macro-level data from the World Bank, OECD, UNDESA, and Eurostat, and the micro-level data from the Household Labour Force Surveys of Turkey. On the other hand, different from the other studies (see Part I and Part III) which investigated mostly at only one level, this dissertation analyses migration in both macro and micro levels together.

By virtue of the methodology, this dissertation is limited to mostly quantitative methods such as descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, the Ordinary Least Square, and the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition with Heckman-Selection Two-Step Procedure. The qualitative descriptive analysis was only used for the description of the documents benefiting from the document analysis technics in this dissertation.

One of the future directions of this dissertation is to investigate Turkish migration by adding the dimension of the meso (household) level of the migration. More than one person is involved in the migration at its different stages like the migration decision stage, migration destination choice stage, or migration itself as an action. The migration may be a joint decision even if only one person migrates. That is to say, migration is a joint action that involves people's social networks like family members and friends.

Another future direction of this dissertation is examining Turkish migration using a more balanced mixed-method because this dissertation predominantly takes advantage of quantitative methods. For the future, using qualitative methods other than document analysis, like in-depth interviews, will help us understand better the Turkish migration trends. Thus, mixed-method, consisting of quantitative and qualitative methods, enables the investigation of Turkish migration to enrich.

The other one is to compare the Turkish migration case with similar cases like India, Argentina, China, and Mexico. The differences and similarities among these cases help to understand comprehensively international migration and to develop more fruitful policies in order to improve the living conditions of immigrants, and increase their productivity in the host countries and expand the benefits of the home countries from their migration processes.

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