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El efecto de la descentralización del sector público sobre la deuda pública de los países

 

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Opened Access El efecto de la descentralización del sector público sobre la deuda pública de los países
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Author: Atienza Montero, Pedro
Rodriguez Jiménez, José María
Department: Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica
Date: 2017
Document type: Presentation
Abstract: El endeudamiento excesivo de los gobiernos subcentrales se considera uno de los peligros de la descentralización fiscal. Por otra parte, la descentralización podría garantizar la estabilidad fiscal del sector público al restringir los gobiernos “Lev...
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Excessive borrowing by subnational governments is considered to be one of the perils of fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization might ensure the fiscal stability of the public sector by constraining Leviathan governments. Since the impact of decentralized government on fiscal outcomes is therefore ambiguous from a theoretical perspective, we explore this question empirically with a panel of 8 federal countries, with only regional decentralization measures over 1990-2001 period, and another panel of federal and non-federal countries, both regional and local measures of decentralization over the 1980-2011 period. Our findings suggest that regional decentralization increases public debt, while local decentralization reduces it. Also, the size of Public Sector increases the debt, while the primary balance seems to have a negative relationship, with no other significant variables.
Cite: Atienza Montero, P. y Rodriguez Jiménez, J.M. (2017). El efecto de la descentralización del sector público sobre la deuda pública de los países.
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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/11441/84050

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