Opened Access Intention and responsibility in speech acts
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Autor: Navarro Reyes, Jesús
Coordinador/Director: Witczak-Plisiecka, Iwona
Departamento: Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Metafísica y Corrientes Actuales de la Filosofía, Ética y Filosofía Política
Fecha: 2014
Publicado en: Cognitive and pragmatic aspects of speech actions
ISBN/ISSN: 978-3-631-64156-9
Tipo de documento: Capítulo de Libro
Resumen: I have argued elsewhere (Navarro-Reyes 2010) that the kind of excuses that appeal to a lack of intention in the performance of a speech act do not, in general, try to deny that the deed itself took place (i.e., in cases where we say that the act is performed unintentionally, we would not imply that the act was not performed at all, but that it was performed in a particular way). If this is correct, speech acts token performances ought to be defined independently of the speaker’s putative illocutionary intentions. In this paper I will pursue this idea by discussing the views of Alston (2000), a prominent champion of the intentionalistic account, who defines speech acts in terms of the notion of “taking responsibility”. Unlike Alston, I will claim that ‘unheard speech acts’ are not a legitimate category within speech acts, whereas cases of ‘unintended speech acts’ might be correctly considered as legitimate cases of speech acts, since they do effectively change the normative c...
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Cita: Navarro Reyes, J. (2014). Intention and responsibility in speech acts. En I. Witczak-Plisiecka (Ed.), Cognitive and pragmatic aspects of speech actions (pp. 187-206). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang
Tamaño: 1.404Mb
Formato: PDF

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/11441/75720

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