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HISTOIRE ET MéMOIRE

Faire des choix ?
Les fonctionnaires dans l'Europe des dictatures, 1933-1948


Sous la direction de
Marc Olivier Baruch
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Establishing Early Francoism: Central and Local Authorities in Spain, 1939-1958
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Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the construction of the Spanish state after the Civil War (1936-1939). Such an aim implies studying early Francoism in the context of the political convulsions of the Interwar period. Throughout our analysis, we examine key issues, such as the political consequences of extreme situations and conflicts. In this regard, the case of Spain is especially relevant given that the dictatorship of General Franco was built after a civil war and the defeat of a democratic regime, as was the Second Republic. The dictatorship also lasted far beyond the end of the Second World War. These events were related to the international situation determined by the controversy between communism and fascism.

Our study adopts a relatively novel approach to clarify the nature of Francoism. The regime could be considered totalitarian, given its strong ties with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The presence of Falange as the single party appears as yet another characteristic of a totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, the Francoist dictatorship was always based on a relatively broad conservative coalition and the army played a significant role providing key support for the dictator. Additionally, the international context favoured Franco almost from the outset of the Civil War. Not only did fascist powers help the Nationalists: the policy of neutrality followed by democratic countries also played a significant role in determining the outcome of the war. The importance of British policy towards Spain and the Non-Intervention Committee is particularly worth stressing.

For a better understanding of how the Francoist regime was established, the study of the state and its functioning is meaningful. The term «state» is generally understood to refer to a central power that controls a territory, but a different approach offers a number of attractive features. We refer to the idea of studying states from below, from the perspective of the local configuration of the state (local governments) and how relations between central and local powers were structured. Our methodology followed focuses on local governors (similar to French prêtres) and how they conducted local politics in accordance with the instructions and interests of the regime. Governors were responsible for multiple aspects of a province's governance. They selected mayors or presidents of Diputaciones (provincial governments) and were the highest supervisors of
a wide range of activities (supplies, agriculture, industry, trade, public order). Ultimately, they controlled the provinces on behalf of the central government and, in addition to their power, were also provincial chiefs of the Movimiento (Falange).

Consequently, the study of Francoist civil governors is highly relevant to understanding the nature of the regime.

Introduction

Our principal aim is to propose and discuss certain points of view regarding the key questions that inspire this international meeting, titled *Etre des Choix: Les fonctionnaires dans l’Europe des dictatures 1933-1948*. The general questions posed in the call for papers refer to events and phenomena which influenced the political sphere during the Interwar period, even in neutral countries—such as Spain—that were absent from the world wars. Certainly, the Interwar period in Europe was a time of conflict, swept by extreme ideologies and a deep crisis of democracy. Also in the periphery of continental Europe, these difficult times led to political change, ideological controversy, and socio-political conflict in the midst of a severe economic crisis. Spain was a breeding ground for the appearance of these elements of instability, given its backward socio-economic structures and the fragility of its political system. As a result of its situation, the country recorded an increase of tensions that ultimately drove to an extreme situation, namely the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936. Therefore, Spain provides a valuable case study for the behaviour of states in extreme circumstances. As such an analysis, it is advisable to understand the concept of “state” as describing not only abstract notions of government or administration, but also the human resources that serve them, whether as mere employees or as political representatives.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the importance of states and their public servants in twentieth-century European history and, specifically, in the events of the Interwar period. In the case of Spain, the duration of the Franco regime (1939-1975) provides a wider chronological scope, allowing for an analysis not only of the state’s performance in a critical situation, but also of its consolidation process. In other words, the goal of this paper is to clarify the consequences of an extreme situation (the civil war) in terms of the changes experienced in power, in the make-up of institutions and in the relationship between individuals and institutions. Our analysis addresses a number of issues. Are institutions the sum of the people who work for them or, to the contrary, do they have a distinct personality in and of themselves and develop their own inertia? If an extreme situation explodes, does that imply a radical rupture in the mid or long term? Does political change imply deep changes in terms of public service and, moreover, in terms of administrative attitudes and cultures? Such questions are also applicable to situations in other European countries, such as the radical political changes suffered by France (the collapse of the Third Republic, the division of the country during World War II, and the birth of a new republican system); to what extent did the changes in regime affect public servants and the administrative culture in such a centralised country?

Needless to say, Spain was plagued by severe instability during the 19th and, especially, the 20th century. After having been an empire for a long time, Spain became a dependent and independent country in a world whose rules were set by the great powers of Modern Europe. Consequently, its incorporation to modernity was extremely complex and the construction of the Spanish liberal state was drawn out for decades. This backwardness becomes particularly striking in the study of the country’s local administration. With regards to the methodology followed in this paper, it is convenient to emphasize that analysing states from below provides insights that are generally not available when studying them from the more dominant top-down view. It is our contention that an approach from below is highly useful to a more detailed study of the evolution of states, the creation of administrative cultures and the attitudes of their human resources. By focusing of the local dimension of states, we intend to offer a different perspective of relations between central and local powers, including central/local government as well as interest groups. Hence, this paper will focus on examining the relationship between local and central powers through the analysis of a key figure of the Spanish administration between 1849 and 1997: civil governors (equivalent to French préfets). The political role played by civil governors is crucial to a more complete understanding of the construction of the Spanish liberal state, and no less significant to the analysis of the internal functioning of regimes such as the two republican periods or the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera and Franco.

Spain during the Interwar period

A substantial number of liberal states were built under the deep influence of the French revolutionary experience of 1789. The revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic period forged a centralised model of state that inspired occupied countries such as Spain, Portugal or Italy. In Spain, the liberal state was modelled after the French example throughout the 19th century, in the context of a long and winding road marked by conflict and instability, including coups d’État, civil wars, political upheaval and the late liberal revolution of 1868. The Restoration that came afterwards was an attempt to copy the British political system (Monarchy, bicameralism, constitution, etc.) in order to re-establish order and progress. However, the adoption of the British system was incomplete and superficial: the centralised nature of the Spanish state remained intact and was thereafter progressively reinforced by the highest representatives of central power in the country’s provinces: civil governors. Governors were completely in charge of the provinces under their control and played a key role in the electoral

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1 This paper is a result of a R&D project funded by the Spanish Government (Plan Nacional B-09: Code HAR2016-19397). We would like to thank Irene Mitchen González for reviewing and editing the translation of this paper.
manipulation commonly known as “caciquismo.” Thanks to them (among other players), majorities were artificially guaranteed to the benefit of a two-party system made up of conservatives and liberals. The result was an official image of Spain that soon became estranged from the reality of a country swept by new ideas, as the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset rightly pointed out. The system built under the Restoration came to an abrupt end in 1923, undermined by graft, corruption and the gradual dissolution of the two-party system. In this context, a coup d’état supported by the majority of public opinion swiftly gave way to the dictatorship of general Primo de Rivera.

A sensible approach to the events of the Interwar period in Spain is to understand them as a sequence of political experiments: the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera during the twenties and the Second Republic between 1931 and 1936. Albeit with different ideological underpinnings—conservative or progressive—both regimes can be viewed as attempts to regenerate the country. Unfortunately, neither the authoritarian right-wing dictatorship nor the Republic’s democratic forces—increasingly overpowered by the revolutionary left—were capable of solving Spain’s problems. Ultimately, this was to be one of the causes of the outbreak of the Civil War, along with the influence of the international context.

Yet despite such political changes, what is remarkable is the continuity and persistence of a centralised structure for the Spanish state. Throughout these very different political contexts, centralism remained, guaranteed—as always—by a tightly controlled local administration and the key figures of civil governors. In other words: under the light of a local perspective, the evolution of contemporary states takes on a significantly different and much more nuanced appearance. The Restoration, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and even the Second Republic were very much alike in terms of the structure of local administration, continuity of civil servants, and administrative culture. Beyond their many differences, all these regimes were remarkably similar in one key aspect: their centralised form. Only the Second Republic recognised an autonomous regime for Catalonia, with the civil governors of the four Catalan provinces being replaced by a single government delegate. The rest of the country would remain the same, with civil governors named by the central government as its representatives the provinces. Such was ultimately the true content of the concept of integral state proclaimed in the republican Constitution of 1931.

How new was the “New State”? 

The discussion above raises the question: was the Francoist State truly as new as it was purported to be? It is commonly agreed that extreme situations bring about radical change, and there can be little doubt of the extreme nature of the Spanish Civil War, which was among the most dramatic breaks of the Interwar period. Almost three years of civil conflict were certainly long enough to change the structures of the state, particularly in a country torn in half. Both sides were determined to obtain a total victory over the enemy. Both engaged in a policy of exclusion in order to build their own political regime. Last but not least, both were under the influence of foreign powers that provided support (the USSR to the Republic; Italy and Germany to Nationalist Spain under Franco’s leadership).

Under such conditions, a radical break could be expected after the victory of General Franco. In fact, the term «New State» (Estado Nuevo) was coined to define the purported change; similar concepts could be found in Portugal (Estado Novo) or Italy (Ordine Nuovo). Yet did the term reflect true changes or was it merely a rhetorical device? Was the Francoist state truly as “new” as the regime claimed? The answer to such questions sheds light on the fundamental issue of whether the Francoist dictatorship was totalitarian in nature or, to the contrary, a classic authoritarian regime with limited pluralism, despite the formal prominence of the single party (FET-JONS) (Falange)?

At this stage, it is convenient to recall the role played by liberal democracies in the Spanish conflict. The attitude of Great Britain and the creation of the Non-Intervention Committee, inspired by the conservative British governments of Baldwin or Chamberlain, are particularly worth noting. From the outbreak of the civil war, British foreign policy placed both factions at the same level by strategically adopting a position of neutrality. It must be emphasized that British neutrality hindered the arrival of war supplies for the Republic, while supplies—mainly oil—were sent to Nationalist ports through the British colony of Gibraltar. Under the guise of legal formalism, the British clearly favoured the Francoist cause. A document preserved in the Public Record Office reveals the true preferences of Her Majesty’s government. Few days after Franco’s nomination as Head of the State, on 9 October 1936, the official responsible for Spanish Affairs in the Foreign Office, Montagu-Pollock, drafted a memorandum:

Our chances of regaining influence in Spain during that [postwar] phase are sizeable due to the fact that the Spanish revolution, unlike the Fascist and Nazi revolutions, will have been won essentially by the military, who by tradition leans more toward the United Kingdom and France than Germany and Italy (...). It is thus in the British interest to see the appearance of a liberal military dictatorship rather than a fascist dictatorship: 1) to counteract Italian and German influence; 2) to stabilize the domestic situation.

In light of this memorandum, it seems clear that Whitehall counted on a Nationalist victory from a very early stage in the conflict. Furthermore, the Foreign Office predicted a “liberal” military dictatorship for Spain’s future, an option seen as preferable to a regime under totalitarian influence. The New State would not be as new as one might have expected. At least from the British vantage point, Franco Spain was neither a great risk nor a new totalitarian regime on the European horizon.

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A careful analysis of the internal situation of Spain leads to a similar conclusion. The Nationalists built their state under the guidance of Minister Serrano Suner, especially after 1938. Far from being a new, totalitarian and revolutionary state, the organisation of the Nationalist Spain was remodelled after the previous one.

In terms of local administration, the structure closely followed the same scheme: a hierarchy defined by civil governors, diputaciones (or provincial governments), and ayuntamientos (city councils). Once again, civil governors played a key role in the control of the provinces, supported by the central government and acting as its representatives. Consequently, neither the Spanish state nor its administrative culture experienced a radical break from their traditional patterns.

Two elements are missing from this analysis: (1) the abolition of autonomous regions (such as Catalonia, which had obtained its statute in 1932) and (2) the impact of political repression on the state. Obviously, the former is in accordance with the reinforcement of centralism during the Francoist dictatorship, which affected the whole country after the war.

The Republic had promoted and recognised statutes of autonomy for certain regions—namely Catalonia—yet always within the confines of an “integral state”, ultimately implying the rejection of a federal structure. Furthermore, local governments (city councils and provincial governments) did not experience an increase in their responsibilities, whether it be Catalonia or the rest of Spain. The Republican Municipal Law of 1935 was no less centralist than its predecessors or those that would follow. The same can be said of the Catalan Municipal Law of 1934, which it took a full year to design. In short, autonomous regions implied neither self-government nor decentralisation of local administration; to the contrary, a new regional centralism, modelled after the one known at the national level, arose in these territories.

As for the second element, it is well-known that the repression and subsequent punishment of the defeated increased the power of the authorities, in a context of fear that configured a silent population. Recent research has clarified the number of victims as well as the various methods for control of the population. Civil servants were also victims of repression in several ways (death, imprisonment, dismissal, etc.). However, the incidence of punishment varied by group: teachers suffered intense repression (around one third were repressed), while there were fewer victims among diplomats (of whom at least 68% joined Nationalist cause).

To date, the most complete study of repression in Francoist Spain offers data that leads to significant conclusions. Firstly, and in general terms, repression of civil servants was more intense among the lower and middle ranks than among bureaucratic elites; comparing the purging of engineers (around 10-14%) to that of post service employees (around 35%) is enough to highlight this point. Secondly, it is worth noting that the purging varied strongly from province to province: 13% of the personnel were purged from the Diputación (provincial government) of Cáceres, whereas in Badajoz around 75% were affected. In any event, we feel that future research would benefit from rigorous comparative analyses (namely between Spain, France and/or Italy) for a better understanding of the Francoist regime in its European setting.

Aside from the quantitative and qualitative discussion of Francoist repression of public employees, there can be little doubt of the severe social trauma it unleashed, affecting thousands of people. Yet it is worth pointing out that the purging of state personnel left a majority of civil servants untouched. The largest share of employees embraced strategies ranging from explicit support for the new regime to several degrees of adaptation—at times including forms of resistance—survival being the main goal. State employees were subject to severe restrictions determined by hierarchy and fear, but most managed to passively or actively settle into the new situation. Consequently, it is plausible that the bureaucratic climate and administrative culture of the Spanish state did not undergo radical changes.

The study of the civil governors as an adequate methodology.

Typologies of civil governors

Given the centralised structure of the Spanish state until the Constitution of 1978, Civil Governments (Gobiernos Civiles) are key institutions for the study of

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5 CASANOVA, Marina: La diplomacia española durante la guerra civil, Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1996, p. 27-29. There is a large amount of literature on Francoist repression of teachers, mostly of local or regional scope. For a recent general analysis: Llof RUBARA, Herminio: Amnistía la senilla de Cain: la represión del magisterio republicano, Zaragoza, Universidad de Zaragoza, 2007.


7 BOUQUET, François: L’expulsion administrative en France après la libération. Une analyse statistique et géographique, in Vingt-Siècle, Revue d’histoire, n° 33, janvier-mars 1992, p. 106-117. This author rightly criticises the official number of civil servants purged after the liberation. In 1948, the French government stated that 16,113 civil servants had been victims of repatriation, but this number did not include local administration employees, among others. For a comparative approach: Brachette, Marc, Le Bonne, Jean, Fonctionnaires dans la tourmente, Évocations administratives et transcriptions politiques à l’Epoque contemporaine, Genève, Georg, 2009.
several periods of modern Spanish history, including the Franco regime. Certainly, civil governors in Spain were neither recruited from a specific body nor necessarily members of the civil service. In this sense, Spanish civil governors were partially different from their French counterparts. Although Spanish governors occupied posts of confidence under discretionary designation, most of them held university degrees and a significant number came from the bureaucratic elite, making them comparable in this respect to government representatives in other countries. Additionally, governors were representatives of the regime in their provinces and occupied strategic channels in the relationship between central and local politics. For the purposes of this paper, this last feature facilitates an analysis of how the early Francoist state was established, especially at the provincial level. This local perspective provides insights that help clarify the nature of a regime lasting almost forty years.

As we have pointed out, a close analysis suggests that the "New State" was not as new as its supporters claimed. Under this premise, the question arises of whether the early Francoist state was a totalitarian regime. At first sight, it is tempting to reply in the affirmative, given the existence of a single party (Falange) and a political discourse clearly aligned with the European fascist regimes. Nonetheless, a focus on the local level radically alters the image of Francoist Spain. Civil governors were in charge of the organisation of the provinces, including the designation of local authorities, and they were also the highest authorities responsible for public order in their provinces. Did they implement measures in accordance with a new and totalitarian State? Was the single party the main source of power in local contexts? In other words, was the behaviour of civil governors a clear example of an extreme situation bringing about radical changes?

The following analysis of civil governors during Early Francoism is one of the outcomes of a research and development project focusing on the relationship between central and local powers from the Civil War to the Spanish Transition. First of all, civil governors suffered from severe instability during the initial years of the regime, particularly between 1939 and 1945. This instability was not caused by disruptions from below, for the population was kept silent under the threat of repression. To the contrary, it originated from above: from the government and its evaluation of the governor as the appropriate person to control the province. For the purposes of this paper, we will analyse the group of governors serving between 1 January 1939 and 31 December 1958. The choice of chronology responds to appropriate benchmarks, as are the year on which the Civil War ended (1939) and the year of the first Francoist piece of legislation (a decrees) regarding governors (1958). To a large degree, the period overlaps with Early Francoism, which is frequently considered to last until 1953 (when the bilateral agreements with the USA were signed). In fact, the aforementioned 1958 decree was meant to transform civil governors into key figures for the promotion of economic development, in the context of rising foreign investment and the forthcoming stabilisation plan (1959).

According to the sources consulted, 315 designations took place between 1939 and 1958, as reflected in the following table:

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nominations from BOE (Boletín Oficial del Estado). Author's elaboration.

As we have pointed out, over 50% of these nominations took place before 1945, in a context of instability determined by the evolution of the Second World War and the struggle between political factions within the regime (Falangists, Catholics, carlistas, etc.). The existence of Falange as the regime's single party did not lessen the influence of non-Falangists. To the contrary, the very diverse right-wing groups supporting the dictatorship were all officially placed under the umbrella of Falange, provoking internal dissent and thereby weakening the single party. Additionally, in the context of the regime's consolidation process, governors were often renovated, as was also the case with directors-general, sub-secretaries and other high-ranking state personnel. Certainly, the government initially failed to select the best representatives for its interests and many governors proved equally incompetent at managing their provinces.

It is important to distinguish the number of nominations from the number of people that held positions as governors. A sizeable number of governors were designated more than once. Hence, while there were 315 nominations, only 215 different people actually occupied these posts (during one or more terms). This distinction shows the real level of renovation (beyond the number of nominations), since the same person could be designated for several consecutive Gobernadores Civiles.

### Table 2

<table>
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<th>Civil governors and number of terms (1939-1958)</th>
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<td>Records by number of terms (1939-1958)</td>
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<tr>
<td>records</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 term</td>
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<td>2 terms</td>
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<td>4 terms</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 terms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Governors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A: number of governors that only acted between 1939 and 1958
B: number of governors that also acted before or after the period 1939-1958

Source: Nominations from BOE (Boletín Oficial del Estado). Author's elaboration.
As the above table shows, 113 people were governors for one term, which accounts for 52.5% of the total. Another 63 governors served two terms, with 46 of them acting twice between 1939 and 1958 and the remaining 17 serving a term before or after that period. For governors serving three terms, the number shrinks to 28 (with 13 serving all their terms in 1939-1958 and 15 serving one or two terms outside the indicated period). Four or more terms are much less frequent. Aside from the information contained in the table, it is worth emphasizing that 72% of the 113 one-term governors were nominated before 1946. That is to say that stability and confidence in governors increased as the regime gained strength. Certainly, some one-term governors were promoted to higher positions, as was the case of Luis Alfonso de la Luara (governor of Madrid between April and August 1939), who became minister of Industry. Yet this was not at all usual. Having been governor was important for a political career, but two or more terms were generally required before being appointed to higher responsibilities.

Another piece of information is also important: the average tenure increased throughout the years. The nominations of 1939 reveal an average permanence of 1.92 years, rising to 4.22 years for governors appointed in 1943, and reaching an average of 5.30 for those nominated in 1953. Despite the high instability of the early years of the dictatorship, Francoist governors on average experienced a remarkably high duration of around 3.5 years at their posts, lasting much longer than governors during the former regimes of the Restoration or the Second Republic, when party interests, ideological struggles, and elections determined a higher pace of renewal for governors.

As for the age of those nominated, there was a clear preference for relatively young governors. At this stage of our research, we know the birth date of 128 governors, which represents a significant sample. 70% of them were born between 1900 and 1919, belonging to a generation that had lived through the dictatorship of Franco (1923-1930) and seen their years of youth marked by the experience of the Republic and the Civil War. Many of them were members of right-wing parties and had participated in the coup d'état of 1936. In fact, it is remarkable that a relevant number of veterans were governors for more than two terms. Between 1939 and 1958, over 70% of them were under 40 years old, and close to 40% were around 30 years old when they served as governors. Significantly, those who got promotions to other destinations were the youngest.

In general, those were men who showed a notorious ability to adapt. In short, people malleable and docile enough to faithfully obey the orders and slogans of the central government.

Their average levels of educational attainment and professional development are no less remarkable. Most governors had university degrees, and some had held a previous professional position before beginning their political career. According to the available pieces of information, it must be underlined that 44% had a degree in Law and a further 44% were military men. The remaining 11% was made up of engineers, chemists, architects, some historians, etc. A mixed education was relatively frequent, as in the case of army officers holding a degree in Law. One case of a military man with a legal profession was Francisco Sáenz de Tejada y Olózaga, Baron of Benasque, who served five governorships between 1937 and 1952 and would become a Supreme Court judge. Hence, the regime appears to have sought a certain level of credentials in its governors.

After all, loyal bureaucrats were suitable professionals for carrying out a mission in which administrative activities and official representation were more important than political leadership. Certainly, as Ortiz Heras has pointed out, the institution of the Gobiernos Civiles was the regime's most important pillar in the provinces. Yet the view of governors as charismatic leaders must be qualified for their authority ultimately stemmed from the power vested in them by Madrid. Governors appeared before the provinces as powerful authority figures, but they were nevertheless the product of a pure assignment. In principle, a governor was to be respected and obeyed, but the possibility of resistance could arise. Where conflict arose between authorities, Madrid usually relocated the governor to a more adequate destination. Local control was not worth risking local conflict.

The percentage of bureaucrats found among governors was by no means exceptional. The high presence of certain bureaucratic bodies in Francoist politics has been well documented in an increasing amount of literature on the topic. Unfortunately, most studies do not focus on early Francoism, but it seems that it was a characteristic of the regime from the beginning. In 1965, 90% of the government executives were bureaucrats. As Julián Álvarez suggested a few years ago, this phenomenon was probably induced by the lack of democratic political parties and the weakness of civil society. Such a situation allowed the political emergence of a complex bureaucracy, composed of a constellation of special bodies imbued with corporatism: university professors, state attorneys and members of the State Council.

Despite this, it should be underlined that most studies of the bureaucratic elite do not include military bodies or employees of the Movimiento, the regime's official trade union (Organización Sindical Española, OSE). This absence may

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9 There were exceptions, such as that of the bandolería (bullfighting) Joaquín Miranda González (governor of Huelva, 1938-1943) or the industrialist Luis Julio Cepero, governor for four terms between 1942 and 1958 (Huesca, Cáceres, Castellón y Málaga).


12 See: BUSTRÚN Villalba, Miguel, La élite burocrática... op.cit. p. 51-52. See: Álvarez Álvarez, Julián, Buenavista y poder... op.cit. p.113-114 y 117.
dramatically distort the analysis of Francoist political elites. Fortunately, the concept "bureaucratic elite" has been expanded thanks to research focused on the Movimiento and its personnel, specifically the technical bodies that served as recruitment platforms. In fact, a significant number of governors had held previous responsibilities in Falange or the OSE.

It is advisable to separate this group of governors with previous experience in Falange from the rest. Naturally, all governors were involved in Falange, but this was to a certain extent a mere formality, because after 1944 all civil governors were also provincial chiefs of Falange. The unification of the two posts was implemented progressively as a measure to avoid conflicts between the highest representative of the government and the highest representative of the party in each province. In the period before the figures were fused together, when different men occupied each position, there were many cases of conflicts between the two. The solution came in the shape of total identification: civil governors would also be provincial chiefs of Falange. Such an arrangement may be expected to have increased the power of Falange, yet the outcome was rather the opposite. The party came to be more closely controlled, because civil governors generally saw themselves primarily as governors and only very secondarily as party representatives.

The situation can probably be better understood by analyzing the true strength of the single party. Even during early Francoism, Falange played an important role in a governor's political promotion, but there were other more important requirements, such as participation in the war effort, and above all, loyalty to Franco. In this regard, we must emphasize that the regime was more personal than systemic. The Francoist dictatorship was more an authoritarian and personal regime than it was a party-based political system. Nevertheless, the party played an important role for several years, as a platform for political recruitment or later promotion. The party thus served more as a structure in which to frame and control the regime's human resources than as an ideological organization equipped with political principles and means to configure a totalitarian and Falangist State. In fact, the head of the party was General Franco himself, who always saw Falange as an instrument rather than as the essence of his regime. Its use as a recruitment structure can be seen in the fact that 40% of civil governors went on to become Consejeros Nacionales del Movimiento and over 50% of them became procuradores en Cortes (members of parliament in the Francoist Cortes) 15. And loyalty was essential: 75% of the governors who became Consejeros Nacionales had been governors in two or more provinces. As experienced governors, they enjoyed political promotion.

Taken together, these results suggest that to become civil governor usually implied a step within a political career. The political biography of most of them indicates that they had carried out previous political positions before becoming governors and, also, that most of them later continued their political activity. Logically, the governors of the early forties had less experience than those of the fifties. The renovation of political personnel was almost absolute —in terms of civil governors— after the trauma of the Civil War. Not one of the post-war governors had held a post as governor during the Second Republic. Focusing our attention on those nominated between 1939 and 1943, we can verify their scarce political experience, which partially accounts for the instability of their terms. Only a few of them had been governors, members of city councils or mayors during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. To a lesser extent, others had been representatives of right-wing parties in the republican Cortes. Finally, among them were also high-ranking officers and noted persons in charge of executive posts in Falange.

Such trends started to change around 1945. Firstly, the presence of governors with previous experience in Falange rose. Secondly, some governors assigned from 1943 onward had been local politicians during the early forties. These transformations in the recruitment of civil governors were reinforced in the ensuing years. At least until 1958, the main platforms for recruiting governors were the bureaucratic structure of Falange and the sphere of local politics. However, it is worth emphasizing that many of them were also employees of the state, for there was no regulation establishing the incompatibility of these activities.

After having been governor, there were grounds to expect some sort of promotion toward a further political career. In general terms, we find four main paths for promotion (aside from the minority that returned to their private or professional activities after a brief career). The first path was to be reassigned to another province, and it was relatively frequent to the extent that governors seemed to belong to a professional body. Another destination was to become city council mayor or president of a Diputación, implying an involvement with local administration. This option was rare, for governors had abandoned their roots to be sent to a Gobierno Civil (normally not in their province of origin or where they lived). Their ambitions aimed at higher responsibilities in Madrid or the central government after having left their native lands. Thirdly, another infrequent promotion path was to obtain a high-ranking position in Falange. Finally, the most desired promotion was a post in the central government as director general, sub-secretary or even minister. Among those who became Ministers were Alarcón de la Lastra (ministry of Industry after being civil governor in Madrid in 1939) or Carlos Arias Navarro, who was civil governor in Tenerife, Leon and Navarra during the forties and fifties and became director general of Security in 1957 and, years later, Minister and President of the last government of Franco and the first one under the monarchy of Juan Carlos.


The relationship between central and local powers during Early Francoism: few notes

The above being said, an examination of the local sphere will allow us to analyse the features of governors' behaviour in their provinces. Such an approach is relevant to the study of the nature of the regime, for it helps clarify whether the Francoist dictatorship had a totalitarian essence or, to the contrary, was only an allegedly "new" regime built upon a myriad of traditional practices.

It is convenient to note that governors played a double role. They served as confidential information channels for the central government while also being in charge of transmitting orders to their provinces. This parallel and double flow of information allows us to detect the working mechanisms of the Francoist regime beyond the central powers located in Madrid. In addition, the local perspective is quite important in measuring the extent to which Spain was a backward country of Southern Europe. This backwardness was also accompanied by an ineffective administrative culture, not to mention the exceptions to the obligations of public service. The whole picture was further complicated by the struggle between Falange, monarchists, Catholics, etc, and the regime's need to survive at all costs.

A single case may serve to illustrate how administrative procedures often slid into oblivion having no tangible consequences. In Cordoba, as in the rest of the Spanish provinces, a Provincial Junta for Socio-Economic Development Planning (Junta Provincial de Ordenación Económico-Social) was established in 1946 as a result of the creation of the homonymous General Secretariat (Secretaría General de Ordenación Económico-Social), created by governmental decree on 21 January. Certainly, all legal formalities were complied with, and the civil governor, serving as president of the aforementioned Provincial Junta, chaired its meetings starting in February 1946. The Junta prepared a detailed report on the needs of Cordoba, which was sent to the government. Nevertheless, the proposed initiatives remained on paper. The report was finished in November 1946, but the next session of the Junta was not held until July 1948. Throughout the next decade, the ineffectiveness of a purely bureaucratic show only increased; in December 1952, one member of the Junta requested electric power supply for three villages in the province. One year later, the situation remained exactly the same. 16

Everything seems to point to the difficulties inherent to governors' missions, despite the authority they enjoyed. Due to such limitations, Gobiernos Civiles were not always capable of tackling their province's problems, and a governor's replacement could take place if he did not manage a suitable equilibrium with local powers. The following map shows the total number of governors deployed to each province between 1939 and 1958.

Map 1
Number of governors assigned to each province between 1939 and 1958

The map shows that four provinces were especially unstable (in dark grey): Cadiz, Balearic Islands, Teruel and Pontevedra. The prevailing trend consisted in having between six and eight governors throughout the studied period of 20 years, meaning that governors' terms lasted around three years on average: 64% of the provinces belong to this group. Nine provinces were somewhat more stable (five governors), including Barcelona, Huelva, Granada, Salamanca and Burgos. Finally, in beige, five provinces show a high stability, with four governors in 20 years (Albacete, Caceres, Santander, Soria and Valencia). The most likely explanations for these differences lie in local political structures and their relations with central powers. The limited length of this paper does not allow for a complete description of each province, but it is possible to provide some examples.

One particularly stable province was Valencia, where the governor and local authorities were in tune in their desire to contain radicals from Falange. In fact, the mayor (the baron de Carce) and the governor (the monarchist and army officer Francisco Javier Planas Tovar) were intent on holding back local Falangists opposing the government. 17 The governor was able to remain in his post until 1948, and later became a member of the Cortes (provocador en Cortes), nominated directly by Franco. In other provinces, the stability of the governor's

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16 Historical Provincial Archive of Cordoba (Archivo Histórico Provincial), book. 6757.

17 The local Falange complained about the low prices fixed by the government for rice. See: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, hereafter quoted as FENFA (Francisco Franco National Foundation Archive), doc. 3.
term did not imply a lack of conflicts. In Malaga, the governor Manuel García del Olmo issued an order for the preparation of a farm registry. The province's most prominent landowners rejected the measure. The governor exercised the utmost restraint and managed to remain in his post until 1954. Diplomacy was useful for governors when they had to deal with local interests.

Navarra was less stable than some provinces in the Vascongadas (Basque Country), such as Vizcaya or Álava. There, Carlist partisans, the Biscopians and other monarchists caused several problems for the governor (Juan Junquera Fernández-Carvajal), who had been selected for his firm Falangist convictions. He stayed in Navarra from 1943 to 1949, after having been governor in Salamanca (1943-1945) and before being promoted to Zaragoza (Saragossa) from 1949 to 1955. Franco supported this governor in that complicated province, where certain local powers were involved in monarchist conspiracies (for instance, the court of Rodezno, vice president of the Diputación). Logically, the court of Rodezno attempted from the start to remove Juan Junquera. Rodezno wrote to Franco in 1946 to request the removal of the governor from Navarra, but Franco kept him in his post until the risk posed by conspirators had been reasonably stifled. A Falangist governor could have been a problem in Valencia or other provinces, but seems to have been strategically useful to the government in Navarra.

A good example of prudence was the governor of Ciudad Real, Jacobo Rolón Losada. He was an army officer who wrote to the Minister in 1948 about the social problems in the Almadén mines. Actually, these problems were the responsibility of central government departments, but he issued a warning that proved relevant to avoiding future problems and preventing conflicts. He would remain in Ciudad Real four more years before being promoted, in 1952, to another long term at a Gobierno Civil (Santander, 1952-1960).

In Seville, conservative-leaning governors usually enjoyed longer terms. While the governor Manuel Ricardo Lechuga Párrid – a member of Falange and army officer – was only in Seville for a year, his successor – Fernando Coca de la Pintana – remained in charge from 1943 to 1949. In 1948, the vice-secretary general of Falange complained about Coca de la Pintana's negative attitude towards Falange in Seville. The accusations were especially grave, for the Falangists claimed that the governor, defending landowners' interests, had opposed the celebration of a party-organized agrarian conference (Congreso Sindical de la Tierra), France was aware that something had to be done to balance the situation in Seville. The governor resigned, but only to be promoted to a better position as director general in Madrid. An even more conservative army officer, Alfonso Ortíz, filled the vacancy. His term would be long: 1949-1959.

Even corruption was not always clearly punished. José González-Sanza was governor of Tarragona between 1951 and 1961. He quickly won the sympathy of local businessmen thanks to the support of the Pujo family and, specifically, of Agustín Pujo. The governor nominated local authorities following the criteria designed by Agustín Pujo. Pujo and not the governor was the real local power behind the scene. He even became member of Cortes (procurador) and managed to have a Labour University built in Tarragona (Universidad Laboral). Naturally, his brother (Antonio Pujo) was the architect of the building, while another brother (José María Pujo) was the supplier of construction materials. The family clan saw its power strengthened. The docile and compliant governor was rewarded with two further appointments as governor: Pontevedra (1961-1965) and Saragossa (1965-1970). Franco knew about the behaviour of González-Sanza in Tarragona through a report received in the early fifties. In other words, there were no objective criteria regulating the selection of an appropriate governor.

Aside from these examples, it must be added that a significant number of governors tried to play the role of representatives of their provinces in Madrid. To obtain benefits for their provinces was a tacit goal for gaining local support, provided that it did not involve a direct conflict with the central government. That is to say: governors were ready to assist their provinces within the limits of real possibilities and, in all events, trying to hold on to their political positions. It was relatively frequent for governors to apply for increased resources or public works in order to foster their provinces' wealth and development. And certainly, the real intentions behind these initiatives were sometimes concealed. The aforementioned governor of Tarragona, in fact, was among those requesting financial assistance.

**By way of conclusion**

Several conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis. To summarize them, it should be stated that an extreme situation did not necessarily lead to radical change in terms of the transformation of state structures. Even in Spain, after a cruel civil war and the subsequent repression, the main structures of the state did not change significantly. Relations between central and local powers remained rather similar and the recruitment of political personnel did not follow the path of totalitarian regimes. To the contrary, civil governors were selected from different ideological fields, rather than from an exclusive party as Falange intended to be. Paradoxically, the position of governor was tied to the provincial

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18 See: FFNFA, doc. 21990.
20 The governor of Valencia served Franco loyally. In 1946, he informed Madrid of the pro-monarchist activities of General José Monasterio. See FFNFA, docs. 20529 and 27897.
21 FFNFA, doc. 6005.
22 There cases from Seville, in FFNFA, docs. 3, 539 and 20580.
23 See: FFNFA, doc. 20462.
leadership of Falange (Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento), but this mechanism subordinated the party to the state, rather than the state to the party. The situation may be understood by bearing in mind that the political roots of many governors were to be found in diverse factions of the right wing (monarchists, CEDA, authoritarian conservatives in general). The close link between the two positions (governor and provincial head of Falange) did not lead to a totalitarian regime, as time would show throughout the decades of Francoism. In fact, the dictatorship was embellished several times, trying to adapt to the post war world. The supreme aim was the permanence of Franco in power, even if he had to switch allies as the circumstances evolved. Less than twenty years elapsed between the pictures of the Franco-Hitler and the Franco-Eisenhower meetings.

Despite the changing nature of dictatorship, it must be emphasized that the administration—and, more specifically, the administrative culture—did not experience radical changes. Early Francoism was built on ancient ideas and traditional systems of patronage, duly adapted. A patronage system developed for ages in a centralised state marked by central control over local administration. Certainly, the regime suffered a notable level of instability during the early forties. Yet after 1945, the dictatorship achieved greater stability and governors became key pieces in the centralised regime rather than local leaders capable of promoting mass mobilisation. Mobilisation would only occasionally take place under orders from the central government, namely during the protests against the rejection of the regime by the UN, during the referendum of 1947 or in the local election that took place for the very first time in 1948.

Further research is needed to better understand the reaction of states in extreme circumstances. Comparative approaches will clarify what was done by state administrations and it will allow for the detection of differences and similarities between European countries. Finally, we wish to emphasize the utility of a local approach to the history of states and administrations. In the case of Spain, it proves quite useful to analyse the “New State” from below and, more specifically, from the perspective provided by central government representatives such as the regime’s civil governors. In light of the available studies on administrations and public service personnel, signs of continuity are more evident than those of radical rupture. Of course, this is a general idea, an overall frame to be discussed, enriched and qualified through further research. Ultimately, it is important to not confuse extreme situations with their short-term outcomes with the general traits of a regime lasting 36 years.

Abridged Bibliography


