THE FINAL LINE IN CALLIMACHUS' HYMN TO APOLLO

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Un examen del verso final del Himno a Apolo de Calímaco dentro del marco de las teorías poéticas calimaqueas lleva a la conclusión de que la lectura Φθόνος es genuina, mientras que la variante φθόρος es una trivialización.

An analysis of the final line of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo, conducted within the framework of the poet's literary theories, shows that the reading Φθόνος is genuine, whereas the variant φθόρος is a trivialization.

The final line in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo has been the subject of copious debate during the last centuries. Fortunately for us, most of the relevant material has been assembled by F. Williams, in his doctoral dissertation which was directed by me at my Classics Research Centre, University of London, so that I can now conveniently refer the readers to the monograph in question¹. As is well known, the problem consists in choosing between the variants Φθόνος or φθόρος in line 113. The editiones veteres, as Ernesti noted in his commentary ad loc.², read

χαῖρε ἀναξ· ὃ δὲ Μῶιος, ἢν ὦ Φθόνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο

¹ F. Williams, Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo (Oxford 1978) 96 ff.
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but the variant Φθόνος was rejected by Ernesti, who judged φθόρος to be the correct one. Accordingly, Ernesti, following Bergler (cf. Thes. Gr. Ling., s. v. φθόρος) printed

χαίρε ἰναζ ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἵν ό φθόρος, ἐνθα νεότο.

and explained the line as meaning “Salve, rex. Momus autem in malam rem abeat”. According to Ernesti, that is to say, Callimachus expressed the wish that Μῶμος (personification of the unfair criticism levelled at him by his envious rivals) might die (“interea Momus”): if we were to replace “pro morte invidiam” in line 113, i. e. if we were to read, in the said line, Φθόνος instead of φθόρος, the sense would be stupid (“insulse admodum”). The same view was taken by Spanhem, in his commentary ad loc. According to him, Μῶμος, in line 113, was the same character (“idem”) as the personified Φθόνος whom we encounter in lines 105 ff. of the Hymn, where he is kicked away by Apollo. Therefore, so argued Spanhem, it would be tautological to write ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἵν ό Φθόνος, ἐνθα νεότο in line 113: the correct variant, Spanhem maintained, in line 113 is φθόρος (not Φθόνος). In Spanhem’s opinion, Callimachus’ words in line 113 mean that he wishes Μῶμος, i. e. Envy (which, personified as Φθόνος, had already been kicked away by Apollo in lines 105 ff.) to “in persiciem abire”. Expressions involving phrases like εἰς φθόρον, εἰς τὸν φθόρον, εἰς φθοράν are used, in Greek, in order to wish someone dead (which notion subsumes the notion of becoming silent, insofar as the dead do not speak: material in Spanhem, loc. cit., σιγώσα, ἄφωνος). These considerations demonstrate “abunde”, Spanhem concluded, that the variant Φθόνος was introduced “absurde omnino” into the place of the correct reading φθόρος in line 113. Since 1870, editors have -correctly, as we shall see- accepted the variant Φθόνος in line 113, for reasons clearly indicated by Williams, loc. cit.

Two articles have recently appeared, in which the textual problem contained in line 113 is discussed anew. C. Meillier, in a paper full of brilliant insights, does not reach a firm conclusion as to which of the two variants must be regarded as the genuine one. He correctly states (p. 80) that “rien dans l’état de la tradition ne permet...d’assurer qu’une leçon est meilleure que l’autre” (I shall revert to this point later); the criterion utrum in alterum which he accordingly tries to apply does not lead him to settle the question. On the one hand he writes that “la leçon Φθόνος offre un sens tout à fait satisfaisant” (p. 94), and that “le passage de Φθόνος à φθόρος peut se comprendre” as a trivialization, due to “la plume d’un Chrétien”, who identified “Phthoros” with the “Diable” (p. 93, n.36), but on the other hand he wonders whether φθόρος might well be “la lectio difficilior” (p. 80).
Meillier, in my opinion, is wrong when he invokes a “déplacement du rapport Phthonos/Momos en un nouveau rapport Phthoros/Momos” (p. 88) and when he, asserting that “Phthonos est réduit à Phthoros” (p. 90), postulates a “relation Phthonos-Phthoros” (p. 93): he is wrong because personified Phthonos and personified Momos are commonplace in the ancient world (cf. Roscher, Lex. Mythol., s. v. Personificationen, 2167 s.), whereas, as far I know, the personification of φόρος never existed in antiquity. In his own paper, J. Blomquist, developing the arguments used by Spanhem, asserts that the reading φόρος is the correct one, in line 113, whereas the variant φόνος is to be rejected. I shall now try to show that Blomquist’s thesis is wrong.

First of all: Blomquist, following unquestioningly in Pfeiffer’s footsteps, thinks that the variant φόνος “can be dismissed as a scribal correction”, because “the archetype had φόρος” (p. 18). Such assertions by Blomquist are ungrounded, insofar as Dr. H. White and I have shown that Pfeiffer’s views concerning the manuscript transmission of Callimachus’ Hymns are devoid of any foundation (cf. lastly CL 6 [1990] 39 ff.). Since the reading φόνος cannot be dismissed as a mere “scribal correction”, it follows that the criterion called utrum in alterum or lectio difficilior is the only one that can serve to establish which of the two rival readings is the genuine one. Blomquist himself, admitting that “the textual transmission cannot help us to choose between the two readings” (ibid.), uses this criterion, only he misapplies it.

Schneider (Callimachea, 194 f.), whom Wilamowitz followed, correctly pointed out that the reading φόνος is the result of a mistake made by someone (a scribe, or ancient critic) who wrongly thought that Μώμος and Φόνος were one and the same: if Μώμος “were just another name for Φόνος”, of course it would be necessary to read φόρος, in line 113. Μώμος and Φόνος are of course constantly associated with each other in ancient texts: this is why the scribe or critic who created the reading φόρος in line 113 mistakenly thought that Φόνος, in Callimachus’ line under discussion, was merely another name for Μώμος. The same mistake was made, as we have seen, by Spanhem, and was repeated by modern scholars such as Kambylis (Blomquist, loc. cit.). In reality, as Schneider, Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl and others have shown, Μώμος and Φόνος are not to be identified with each other, because they are the personifications of the two entirely different concepts. Wilamowitz’ distinction between Μώμος and Φόνος is regarded as “basically sound” by certain critics (cf. Williams, p. 97). Blomquist, Köhnken and others (cf. Blomquist, pp. 19-22) reject the type of distinction made by Wilamowitz between Μώμος and Φόνος, but the important, indeed crucial, point, which Blomquist of course cannot avoid accepting, is that ancient texts

6 Cf. Williams, loc. cit., for details concerning Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl, etc.
7 Cf. Blomquist, art. cit., 17 f. n. 2.
(Agatharchides, Pindar, Bacchylides, Plutarch, Gregory, etc.) show that a clear difference existed between Ὑμωσ and Φθόνος, as Schneider (Callimachea, I, 194) was the first to underline: Φθόνος, Envy, is the cause of Ὑμωσ, which latter can be best translated as “Tadelsucht” 8, “Blame” (see the acute observations made by Meilier, art. cit., 78). In other words: in antiquity, the relationship between Φθόνος and Ὑμωσ was supposed to be “one of cause and effect” (Blomquist, art. cit., 22). That is to say: Envy, i. e. Φθόνος, causes envious people to produce that “Blame”, i. e. Ὑμωσ. In other words: Ὑμωσ is the effect, the result of Φθόνος.

In the light of the crucial point just mentioned, the conclusion reached by Blomquist is mistaken. His objection to the reading Φθόνος, in line 113, is that this word would produce a “circular expression”, because, according to him, the sense of the phrase ὅ δὲ Ὑμωσ, ἐν' ὧν Φθόνος, ἐνθα νεῦτο will be “may my critics go where my critics are”. Having reached the conclusion that the variant Φθόνος would produce a “circular expression” - a conclusion which we shall see is entirely wrong - Blomquist sees himself compelled to accept, faute de mieux, the reading Φθόνος, because this latter makes sense, whereas the reading Φθόνος, according to him, does not, insofar as it produces, as he believes, “a circular expression” which is “muddle-headed”. In Blomquist’s opinion, the variant Φθόνος produces the meaning “may my critics turn silent” (art. cit., 23), and indicates that Callimachus tells Φθόνος and “its representative Ὑμωσ, i. e. his critics, simply to go to hell” (art. cit., 19).

Both these contentions made by Blomquist are erroneous. First of all, the reading Φθόνος produces a sense which is the opposite of a “circular expression”, and which is in reality adroitly pointed and admirably cogent. Ὑμωσ and Φθόνος, in line 113, do not both mean “my critics”, as Blomquist asserts. Already Cahen 9 has underlined that Callimachus, by writing ὅ δὲ Ὑμωσ, ἐνθα νεῦτο, makes a “distinction subtile” between “Critique” (Φθόνος) and “Envie” (Φθόνος). According to Cahen, this “distinction” made by Callimachus “brode sur une assertion platonicienne”, i. e. rests on Phdr. 247 A, a passage already quoted in this connection by Schneider (Callimachea I, 194). In reality, as we shall see, the passage of Plato in question is not directly relevant to the distinction between Φθόνος and Φθόνος which Callimachus makes here, although it is relevant to Callimachus’ argument to the effect that his poetry is valid.

In order to understand the sense not only of line 113, but also of the whole conclusion offered by the Hymn in its lines 105-113, it is necessary to examine

8 Ὑμωσ was “tadelsüchtig”, because he was motivated by Φθόνος (Babrius 59, 1-18 Perry), and on account of his “Tadelsucht” (i. e. his desire to criticize what in reality does not deserve to be criticized) was punished by Zeus (Roscher, Lex. Mythol., s. v. Monos, 3119): Zeus ejected him from Olympus, by way of punishment, because he unjustifiably criticized gods and goddesses, as we read in Aesop, 155 Hausr.=155 Halm, 100 Schn.: καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς, ἀγανακτήσας κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ, τοῦ Ὑμωσον αὐτὸν ἐξέβαλεν.
9 Les Hymnes de Callimaque (Paris 1930) 88.
the said conclusion within the framework of Callimachus' own "Poëtik" -a task which neither Meillier nor Blomquist has carried out. The fundamental principles of Callimachus' "Poëtik", as I have shown elsewhere in every possible detail 10, are two: these two principles are enunciated by the poet, in an exactly parallel manner, in Epigr. 21 Pf., Aitia fr. 1.1 Pf., and in the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo. The said principles are: a) Callimachus' poetry is valid, because it is approved of by the deities presiding over poetry, i. e. Apollo and the Muses; b) the criticism levelled at Callimachus' poetry by his rivals is not valid, because, instead of being objective, it is caused by envy. In Epigr. 21 Pf. Callimachus asserts that his poetry is valid, by calling to witness the fact that it is approved of by the Muses: the Muses, by approving of Callimachus' poetry and by protecting him insofar as he is a valid poet, have enabled him to triumph over the Βασκανία, Envy, nurtured against him by his rivals. In Aitia 1.1 Pf. Callimachus makes two assertions. First: his poetry is valid, witness the fact that Apollo (lines 21 ff.) and the Muses (lines 37 ff.) approve of it and support him as a poet. Second: the criticism brought against him by his rivals is not valid, because his rivals are the progeny of Envy (lines 17 ff.: Βασκανίς ὁλῶν γένος), i. e. they are motivated by Envy. His rivals are not only motivated by Envy, Βασκανία, and therefore unable to judge Callimachus' poetry impartially and objectively: they are, moreover, incompetent in matters of poetry, because they are equated by Callimachus with the Τελχίνες, malevolent δαίμονες (not gods), devoted to carping criticism, who, precisely because they are mere δαίμονες, cannot possibly be a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself. Callimachus invites his rivals, therefore, to overcome their incompetence concerning poetry, and to learn how to judge poetry by using the aesthetic canons promulgated by Apollo and followed, upon Apollo's instructions, by Callimachus (lines 17 ff. αὖθι δὲ τέχνη κρίνετε, κτλ.).

In sum: the criticism levelled at Callimachus by his rivals is said, in Aitia 1.1 Pf., to be doubly invalid, in that his rivals are motivated by envy and they are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo, who supports Callimachus. Exactly the same principles preached by Callimachus in Aitia 1.1 Pf. are applied by him in the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo. Callimachus asserts that he has, thanks to the help of Apollo, who approves of Callimachus' poetry, triumphed over the envy which motivates his rivals: Apollo kicks Φθόνος away, and refutes him (Hymn. Ap. 105 ff.). In other words: The criticism aimed at Callimachus by his rivals is doubly invalid, because it is motivated by envy, Φθόνος, and because the god of poetry supports Callimachus. The presence of Μόης alongside Φθόνος in line 113 of the Hymn is demonstrated to be necessary by the overt parallelism with Aitia, fr. 1.1 Pf. Callimachus attacks not only the cause of the unfair criticism pointed at him, i. e. Envy (Βασκανία Αitia 1.1.17=Φθόνος Hymn. Ap. 105 ff.), but al-

10 "Das Dichten des Kallimachos...", in Scripta Minora Alexandrina I (Amsterdam 1980) 235 ff.; cf. also "Hellenistic Topoi in Ovid's Amores", in op. cit. IV, 515 ff.
so the unfair critics themselves. These critics are said to be the “progeny of Envy” (Aitia 1.1.17: Βασκανίης ὁλον γένος: they are, that is, generated by, i. e. the effect of, Envy) and are equated with the malevolent non-gods called Τελχίνες (Aitia 1.1.7), just as the said critics are equated with the malevolent non-god called Μώμος in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo. Since, in antiquity, the relationship between Φθόνος and Μώμος was known to be one of cause and effect, as Blomquist himself says (art. cit., 22), it follows that Μώμος, personifying Callimachus’ critics in Hymn. Ap. 113, is denounced by the poet as the effect of Envy. In sum: the malevolent non-gods Τελχίνες (in Aitia, fr. 1.1) and Μώμος (Hymn. Ap., 113), who personify his critics, are denounced by Callimachus as the product of Envy. Insofar as his critics are motivated by Envy, and therefore not fair, their judgement -this is the basis of Callimachus’ argument- is not valid.

Not only are the Τελχίνες, insofar as motivated by Envy, incapable of judging poetry impartially: they are, for good measure, incompetent in matters of poetry, as I have already underlined. They are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself: this is why Callimachus exhorts them to overcome their incompetence by learning to judge poetry according to the canons which Apollo had issued and which Callimachus followed. In lines 17 ff. of Aitia 1.1, Callimachus writes:

έλλατε, Βασκανίης ὁλον γένος· αὖθι δὲ τέχνη
κρύνετε, μη σχολίῳ Περαιδᾶ τὴν σοφίην' 
μηδ’ ἀπ’ ἐμεὶ διφάτε μέγα ψοφέουσαν· δοιδήν
τίκτεσθαι· βροντάν οίκ. ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ Δίος.

The sense is: “come now (έλλατε), you baneful race of Jealousy! Hereafter (αὖθι) judge poetry by the canons of art...” The adverb αὖθι, “hereafter”, means “now that you have heard from me the correct canons of art”. The structure of the Hymn is very clear: Callimachus first enunciates the correct canons of art (lines 7 ff.), then exhorts the Τελχίνες to follow these canons after they have heard them from him (αὖθι), and finally explains why such canons are correct: they are correct because (lines 21 ff.) they were issued to Callimachus by none other than Apollo, the god of poetry (lines 21 ff.: καὶ γὰρ δέτε κ.τ.λ.). Since Eustathius quotes Callimachus as having written έλλητε Βασκανίης ὁλον γένος, certain critics wanted to supplement έλλητε Βασκανίης in the papyrus fragment of Aitia 1.1.17. The word έλλητε was explained by Eustathius as being equivalent to έρρητε, “abite in malam rem”, but such a word presented two difficulties. First of all, the equivalence of έλλητε and έρρητε is phonetically impossible to explain, as was already pointed out by Ahrens (material in Schneider, Callimachea II, 513, fr. 292). Secondly: if Callimachus, in fr. 292=Aitia 1.1, line 17, had written έλλητε, a word equivalent to έρρητε and meaning “abite in malam rem”, i. e. “drop dead”, such a word would be contextually impossible, because Callimachus, in the passage under discussion, exhorts the Τελχίνες to do something, i. e. to judge poetry correctly (κρύνετε...μηδ’...διφάτε...): dead people cannot do anything. Therefore
it was suggested that the correct word was ἔλλατε, which we find, in fact, attested in Callim. Aitia fr. 1.7.13 Pf.=fr. 121 Schn. The form ἔλλατε, in Callim. Aitia fr. 1.7.13 Pf., is followed by an imperative (ἐνυψησάτε), and means "come now" (so, correctly, Trypanis, in his Loeb edition of Callimachus), "agedum". The scholiast on Aitia, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., now confirms that Callimacus, in Aitia fr. 1.1.17 Pf. wrote precisely ἔλλατε: the word ἔλλατε is followed by imperatives (κρίνετε restored by the editors in line 18, and μηδὲ...διήατε, restored in line 19). In other words: in Aitia, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., Callimachus wrote ἔλλατε, which means "agedum", "come now". The reading ἔλλετε, in Callim. fr. 292 Schn., was evidently invented by some late grammarian who could not explain the form ἔλλατε etymologically (its etymology is debated to this day), and imagined that ἔλλετε could be equivalent to ἐρρετέ. We shall now see that, just as the non-gods Τελχίνες are said by Callimachus to be incompetent in judging matters of poetry, because they are no match for the god of poetry himself, Apollo, as is Μώμος (the malevolent non-god who personifies, in Hymn. Ap. 113, the rivals of Callimachus just as the Τελχίνες personify the same rivals in Ait. 1.1 Pf.) said by Callimachus to be no match for Apollo, and therefore to be incompetent in judging poetry. What is the exact meaning of the phrase ὃ δὲ Μώμος, ἵν ὣ Φάνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο? Williams thinks that it is an ἀποτομητη or ἐπιτομητη (op. cit., 97). According to him, line 113 means that Callimachus invited Φάνος and Μώμος to attack "each other". Williams' hypothesis is not tenable, because both the ἀποτομητη and the ἐπιτομητη were prayers whereby a human invited one deity to attack persons other than the suppliant. As far as I know, neither in the ἀποτομητη nor in the ἐπιτομητη were two deities invited to attack each other, and in fact in the ἀποτομητη written by Leonidas, which Williams uses as the basis of his contention, Μώμος is invited by Leonidas to attack other human beings, not to attack any other deity.

The correct answer to the question which I have asked, i.e. the question as to the precise meaning of the phrase ὃ δὲ Μώμος, ἵν ὥ Φάνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο, can be arrived at if we establish where Φάνος and Μώμος were supposed to dwell. Φάνος (Roscher, Lex. Mythol. s. v. Phthonos, 2474) was a would-be god who as such wanted to live in Heaven (οὐρανός, Orph. Hymn. 64.5 Quandt), whereby he was constantly ejected by the real gods. Zeus (Plato, Phdr. 297 A) ejected him, and the same was done by the god Ἡμύνας and the goddess Νέμεις (material in Quandt, Hymn. Orph. 64.5, where it is underlined that Callimachus' ἔλαιος ου in Hymn. Ap. 107 corresponds exactly to ἔλαιος in Hymn. Orph. 64.5 and ἔλαιοι in Mesomed. 10.6). The present forms ἔλαιες and ἔλαιει show that, when Zeus ejected Φάνος from the circle of the gods, Φάνος did not resign himself to his fate, and constantly tried to return amongst the gods, only to be kicked out of their circle again; Callimachus' λάθρος in Hymn. Ap. 105 underlines that Φάνος tried furtively to remain within the circle of the gods. Μώμος was another would-be deity (Roscher s. v. Momos, 3119), who, exactly like Φάνος, was ejected by Zeus from "Ολυμπος" ("aus dem Olympus verbannt") be-
cause of his "Tadelsucht" (Aesop. 155 Hausr.). In Artemidorus 4 Prooim. p. 307, as quoted in Roscher (loc. cit.), we read ήν δέ τις ἁρα ἐν ἀνθρώποις Μόμος ἀπεληλαμένος θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων οὐκ ἀγάθος. It will be noted that Artemidorus' ἀπεληλαμένος corresponds exactly to Callimachus' ἥλασεν, in Hymn. Ap. 107 11. Callimachus' final line of his Hymn to Apollo ὅ δέ Μόμος, ἐν ὧν Θόνος, ἐνθα νέοτο, meaning as it does "may Μόμος return where Θόνος dwells" signifies that Μόμος cannot aspire any more than Θόνος to be considered a god inhabiting Olympus like the god of poetry, i. e. Apollo: Μόμος, that is, is not a match for Apollo in judging poetry, and is just as incompetent to judge Callimachus' poetry as the Τελχίνες are. Cahen' translation (Les Hymnes de Callimaque, Paris 1930, 281) is correct: "que Μόμος aille rejoindre Θόνος là précisément où l' a précipité le coup de pied d' Apollon". It is only necessary to add that "là précisément", as I have shown, means "away from the circle of the gods", in the sense that neither Θόνος nor Μόμος can aspire to be competent judges of poetry, such as real gods like Apollo and the Muses are.

The reading Θόνος, in line 113, is, we may conclude, genuine: its presence in the line, far from creating a "circular expression", as Blomquist states, renders Callimachus' argumentation cogent and exactly parallel to the argumentation employed by Callimachus in the Αἰτία: both Μόμος and Θόνος do not dwell in Olympus, do not belong to the circle of real gods, and as such cannot be a match, when it comes to judging poetry, for real gods such as Apollo and the Muses, who preside over poetry.

The reading Θόνος, on the other hand, was created by someone who did not understand that Callimachus distinguishes between Θόνος and Μόμος: Μόμος, that is, is the personification of his critics, and is the effect of Θόνος, insofar as Callimachus' critics are the progeny of Envy, i. e. are motivated by Envy. The reading Θόνος produces a "platitude", as Cahen (loc. cit.) already noted. For Callimachus to send his critics "tout simplement à la male heure" (Cahen, loc. cit.) -this is the meaning which line 113 has, if we accept the reading Θόνος- would not constitute an argumentation capable of demonstrating that Callimachus' critics are incompetent to judge poetry: it would be a mere platitude, without any cogency. Things would be worse if we accept the reading Θόνος and understood the line to mean "may my critics turn silent", as Blomquist suggests. Callimachus' critics had already spoken (Hymn. Ap. 105-106, Αἰτία 1.1.1 ff.): since they have already spoken, Callimachus want them not to become silent -their becoming silent after publicly criticizing Callimachus' poetry would not undo the damage they have done to Callimachus' reputation as a poet: what Callimachus wants them to do is not to become now silent -their silence would not cancel what they have said against Callimachus- but, logically enough, to recant and admit that Callimachus'
poetry is valid. That retraction, not silence on the part of his critics is what Callimachus wants is demonstrated not only by logic, but also by Callimachus' own words: in *Aitia* 1.1.17 ff. he calls upon his critics to learn how to properly judge his poetry, not to be silent.

Conclusion: if we examine line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo according both to logic and to Callimachus' own statements regarding his poetry which are contained in the *Aitia* and in *Epigr.* 21 Pf., the criterion called *utrum in alterum* or *lectio difficilior* demonstrates that the reading *φθόνος* is genuine, whereas the variant *φθόρος* is a trivialization produced by someone who did not understand the distinction made by Callimachus between *Μώμος* and *φθόνος* and who, by introducing *φθόρος* into the place of the genuine reading *φθόνος*, created a platitude.

For the convenience of the readers, I might as well summarize our results. Callimachus distinguishes sharply between Envy (*Βασκανία, φθόνος*) and his critics, who were motivated by Envy. In *Aitia* 1.1, he distinguishes between *Βασκανία*, over which he triumphed thanks to the protection of the Muses (*Aitia* 1.1.37 ff.; the same motif is in *Epigr.* 21 Pf.: cf. *Scr. Min. Alex.* I, 246 ff.) and his critics, who, personified as the *Τελχίνες* (malevolent *δαίμονες*, not real gods) are said by him to be the progeny, the product of *Βασκανία* (*Βασκανίτης ὀλον γένος: *Ait.* 1.1.17). In the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus distinguishes, in line 113, between Envy (*φθόνος* over whom he triumphs thanks to the support of Apollo: lines 105 ff.) and his critics, personified by *Μώμος*, a malevolent would-be god who was regarded, in antiquity, to be the product, the effect, the progeny of *φθόνος*.

The parallelism of Callimachus' triumph over the *Τελχίνες* and over *Μώμος* is just as elegant as it is complete. In *Aitia* 1.1.17 ff. the *Τελχίνες* are invited by Callimachus, insofar as they were known to be mere *δαίμονες* and not real gods, to learn how to correctly judge poetry according to the canons established by no less an authority than the god of poetry, Apollo, and adhered to by Callimachus. In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphs over *Μώμος* no less elegantly and completely. It was known in antiquity (Plato, *Phdr.* 247 A) that *φθόνος* ἐξω θελου χροδοι ἱσταται: that is to say, *φθόνος*, who was a mere "Dämon" (*RE*, s. v. "Phthonos", for details), tried to usurp a position amongst the gods, but they (Zeus, Nomos, Nemesis) kicked him away from their *χορός*, their circle. In the Hymn to Apollo, *φθόνος* tries to usurp a position within the *χορός* of the gods, in that he tries to enunciate his own canons for judging poetry, which were contrary to those promulgated by the god of poetry, i.e. Apollo: but Apollo ejects *φθόνος* from such a usurped position (cf. Herter, *RE, Supplem.* V, s. v. "Callimachos", 440), by kicking him away (*Hymn. Ap.* 107). *Μώμος*, by trying to criticize Callimachus' poetry, acted as *φθόνος* did in the Hymn to Apollo, i.e. he tried to

12 The adverb *σιδῆ* "hereafter" which qualifies *κρίνετε* in *Ait.* 1.1.17 f. makes it clear that Callimachus expects his critics to retract their previous judgement of his poetry.
usurp a position as a peer amongst the gods, in that he, Μώμος, wanted to oppose
his own judgement concerning poetry to the poetic rules issued by the god of
poetry himself, Apollo, but Callimachus tells Μώμος to abandon such a usurped
position and to return where Μώμος really belongs, i.e. to the same place where
Φθόνος belongs, that is to say, outside the circle of the gods. It was well known,
in antiquity, as we have observed, that both Φθόνος and Μώμος had been ejected
from the ranks of the gods, whence it follows that neither Φθόνος nor Μώμος
can aspire to be a peer of Apollo, which latter, in his capacity as the god of poetry,
approves of the poetry written by Callimachus.

Callimachus explicitly tells Μώμος, in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo, to
dwell precisely where Φθόνος resides: since both Μώμος and Φθόνος dwelled,
according to ancient authors, outside the circle of the gods, Callimachus’ “allu-
sion” to such authors (an allusion which Williams, op. cit., 97, a priori excludes,
without explaining why) could no be more overt. Such an allusion, as I hope to
have demonstrated, throws full light on the meaning of line 113 of the Hymn.

In the light of what I have written Blomquist’ error will, I trust, have become
clear. He believes (art. cit., 23) that the reading Φθόνος, in line 113, would pro-
duce a “circular expression”, i.e. the sense “may my critics (=Μώμος) go where
my critics (=Φθόνος) are”, because Φθόνος, in Callimachus’ Hymn to Apollo,
motivates no other critics than those who are, in line 113, personified by Μώμος.
But Blomquist has overlooked the fact that, according to the ancient way of think-
ing, Φθόνος and Βασκανία were real mythological beings (no less real than
Apollo and the Muses), who were distinct from the humans motivated by Φθόνος
or Βασκανία. I have explained all this in Scr. Min. Alex. I, 235 ff. Callimachus’
triumph is, in his Hymn to Apollo, a double one, as it is a double one in Aitia 1.1.
In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphed, with the help of Apollo, over per-
sonified Φθόνος (lines 107 ff.), who motivated his critics, and over his critics, i.e.
over Μώμος, in Aitia 1.1, Callimachus triumphed over his critics, i.e. the Τελ-
χίνες, who were motivated by personified Βασκανία (βασκανίης ὀλόκληρον γένος,
lines 17 ff.) and over personified Βασκανία, who rendered the Τελχίνες destruc-
tive: Βασκανία, the personified “Kraft” (Scr. Min. Alex. I, 245) who animated the
Τελχίνες, could be defeated, as Callimachus makes it clear in Epigr. 21 Pf., lines
4-6, and in Aitia 1.1.37 f., by Callimachus only with the help of the Muses’ be-
nevolent eye (Scr. Min. Alex. I, 245-250).

13 In other words: Blomquist does not seem to have understand that personifications of abstract
concepts (his art., 19), i.e. "Personifikationen abstrakter Begriffe", to use Roscher’s terminology (Ros-
cher, s. v. "Personifikationen") were envisaged by the ancients as animated beings, living persons.