2019-11-202019-11-202019Navarro Reyes, J. (2019). Bridging the Intellectualist Divide: A Reading of Stanley’s Ryle. Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 10 (3), 299-324.2069-0533 (print)2069-3052 (online)https://hdl.handle.net/11441/90376Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice.application/pdfengAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Knowing-howDispositionsBehaviourismIntelligenceIntellectualisminfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910327