dc.creator | Prada Delgado, Miguel Ángel | es |
dc.creator | Baturone Castillo, María Iluminada | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-07T10:07:21Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-07T10:07:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Prada Delgado, M.Á. y Baturone Castillo, M.I. (2021). Behavioral and Physical Unclonable Functions (BPUFs): SRAM Example. IEEE Access, 9, 23751-23763. | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2169-3536 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11441/131921 | |
dc.description.abstract | Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have gained a great interest for their capability to
identify devices uniquely and to be a lightweight primitive in cryptographic protocols. However, several
reported attacks have shown that virtual copies (mathematical clones) as well as physical clones of PUFs
are possible, so that they cannot be considered as tamper-resistant or tamper-evident, as claimed. The
solution presented in this article is to extend the PUFs reported until now, which are only physical, to make
them Behavioral and Physical Unclonable Functions (BPUFs). Given a challenge, BPUFs provide not
only a physical but also a behavioral distinctive response caused by manufacturing process variations.
Hence, BPUFs are more difficult to attack than PUFs since physical and behavioral responses associated to
challenges have to be predicted or cloned. Behavioral responses that are obtained from several measurements
of the physical responses taken at several sample times are proposed. In this way, the behavioral responses can
detect if the physical responses are manipulated. The analysis done for current PUFs is extended to allow for
more versatility in the responses that can be considered in BPUFs. Particularly, Jaccard instead of Hamming
distances are proposed to evaluate the similarity of behavioral responses. As example to validate the proposed
solution, BPUFs based on Static Random-Access Memories (SRAM BPUFs), with one physical and one
behavioral responses to given challenges, were analyzed experimentally using integrated circuits fabricated
in a 90-nm CMOS technology. If an attacker succeeds in cloning the physical responses as reported, but
does not attack the way to obtain the behavioral responses, the attacker fails on SRAM BPUFs. The highest
probability to succeed in cloning the behavioral responses with a brute-force attack was estimated from
experimental results as 1.5 · 10−34, considering the influence of changes in the operating conditions (power
supply voltage, temperature, and aging). | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades de España (MICINN), Agencia Estatal de Investigación de España (AEI) y fondos FEDER de la Unión Europea. TEC2017-83557-R y RTC-2017-6595-7 | es |
dc.description.sponsorship | Consejería de Economía, Conocimiento, Empresas y Universidad de la Junta de Andalucía. AT17_5926_USE y US-1265146 | es |
dc.format | application/pdf | es |
dc.format.extent | 13 p. | es |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | es |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEEE Access, 9, 23751-23763. | |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Hardware security | es |
dc.subject | multimodal biometrics | es |
dc.subject | physical unclonable functions | es |
dc.subject | SRAM | es |
dc.title | Behavioral and Physical Unclonable Functions (BPUFs): SRAM Example | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es |
dcterms.identifier | https://ror.org/03yxnpp24 | |
dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es |
dc.contributor.affiliation | Universidad de Sevilla. Departamento de Electrónica y Electromagnetismo | es |
dc.relation.projectID | TEC2017-83557-R | es |
dc.relation.projectID | RTC-2017-6595-7 | es |
dc.relation.projectID | AT17-5926-USE | es |
dc.relation.projectID | US-1265146 | es |
dc.relation.publisherversion | https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3055493 | es |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3055493 | es |
dc.journaltitle | IEEE Access | es |
dc.publication.volumen | 9 | es |
dc.publication.initialPage | 23751 | es |
dc.publication.endPage | 23763 | es |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MICINN). España | es |
dc.contributor.funder | European Commission (EC). Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) | es |
dc.contributor.funder | Agencia Estatal de Investigación. España | es |
dc.contributor.funder | Junta de Andalucía | es |