



**Remigration of “new” Spaniards since the economic crisis:
the interplay between citizenship and precarity among
Colombian-Spanish families moving to Northern Europe**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID	RERS-2019-0317.R1
Manuscript Type:	S.I. NEW TRENDS IN EU MOBILITIES
Keywords:	remigration, Colombian-Spanish families, crisis, Citizenship, precarity, Europe

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

1
2
3 **Remigration of “new” Spaniards since the economic crisis: the interplay between citizenship and**
4 **precarity among Colombian-Spanish families moving to Northern Europe**
5

6 Anastasia Bermudez¹
7

8 Department of Social Anthropology, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
9 Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM), Université de Liège, Belgium
10 Instituto Universitario de Estudios sobre América Latina, Universidad de Sevilla, Spain
11
12
13

14 **ABSTRACT**
15

16 Following the recent economic crisis, there is renewed interest in intra-European mobilities,
17 including new South-to-North flows. The focus has been on quantifying such flows and identifying
18 the economic and labour-market causes, especially in the case of young Spaniards moving North. By
19 contrast, less attention has been afforded to the remigration of naturalised third-country migrants
20 exercising their rights to free mobility. Based on quantitative-qualitative fieldwork with Colombian
21 migrants in Europe carried out over the last fifteen years (including some 150 interviews and two
22 surveys), this article analyses how naturalisation has allowed Colombian-Spanish families to
23 remigrate to other EU countries (the UK and Belgium) as a main strategy to survive the impacts of the
24 crisis. However, rather than experiencing upward social mobility within a “global hierarchy of
25 citizenships” these “new” Spaniards face renewed precarious lives in a context of “(re)peripherilised”
26 South-North flows, where so-called EU free mobility becomes instead precarious intra-EU migrations.
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 **ARTICLE HISTORY** Received January 2020; Accepted
34

35 **KEYWORDS**

36 Remigration, Colombian-Spanish families, crisis, citizenship, precarity, Europe
37
38

39 **Introduction**
40

41 The impact in Europe of the 2008 global financial and economic crisis has varied along geographical,
42 national and gender and generational lines, among others. In southern European countries, such as
43 Spain, the effects on people’s lives included unemployment, worsening working conditions and the
44 “mortgage crisis” (leading many to lose their homes while still retaining the debt). While in other
45 countries, such as Belgium and the UK, job destruction was less severe, although precarious working
46 conditions have also been on the rise. Throughout Europe, it resulted in the intensification of
47 austerity measures and thus a reduction in social protection, thus leading to a growing
48 “precarisation” of lives affecting particularly the most vulnerable, including many migrants. This
49 precarisation has been unequal as well, affecting worse those countries with already weaker welfare
50 policies.
51
52
53
54

55 As a result studies have noted an acceleration in intra-EU migration, mostly from Southern to
56 Central and Northern Europe, adding to the East-West flows experienced since EU expansion, that
57 together created great anxiety in receiving countries (Lafleur and Stanek 2017). These South-North
58
59
60

¹ Anastasia Bermudez: abermudez1@us.es

1
2
3 flows are not completely new, in that research identifies continuities with previous (from the 1950s
4 to the 1970s) intra-European migration (see López de Lera; Oso; Góis and Marques, in this issue) thus
5 reviving core-periphery theories (King 2017). However, most recent movements have been partly
6 invisibilized by the transformation of southern European countries into main migrant destinations
7 from the 1990s, as well as public discourses portraying such flows as composed mostly of young
8 professionals in search of career opportunities. They have also been framed using concepts such as
9 “liquid migration” developed by Engbersen (2012) in the context of post-accession East-West flows.
10 Nevertheless, the present article seeks to contrast more idealised pictures of current intra-EU
11 movements as free, “legal”, individualised projects affecting the high skilled and students
12 (“unproblematic mobilities” as opposed to “undesired migrations”) to highlight instead the
13 precarities embedded in such moves. To achieve that, it focuses on the experiences of third-country
14 nationalised migrants, and more specifically the less studied case of “Euro-Latin American” citizens
15 (Mateos 2015).
16
17
18
19

20
21 The article first enquires into questions related to the crisis, citizenship, mobility and
22 precarity based on the literature, in order to identify its contributions. Next it offers contextual and
23 methodological information on the data used, based on some fifteen years of quantitative-
24 qualitative research with Colombian migrants in Europe (UK, Spain and Belgium) (Bermudez 2016). It
25 then looks at experiences of naturalisation among Colombian migrants in Spain before and after the
26 crisis, and the specific case of Colombian-Spanish families remigrating to London and Brussels in
27 recent years, seeking to understand diverse ways of living intra-EU mobility and growing precarity
28 from a structure-agency perspective.
29
30

31 **“New” intra-EU flows: crisis, remigration, precarity and citizenship**

32
33 Strey et al. (2018) divide recent intra-EU mobilities into three periods: “pre-enlargement” (before
34 2004), “post-enlargement” (especially after 2007) and the latest moves caused by the economic crisis
35 (from 2008). Although such flows have remained relatively small and stable, in the past years and
36 since the crisis they have increased and diversified (European Commission 2018). Taking into account
37 the difficulties inherent in quantifying and qualifying such moves (part of “free movement” within
38 the Union), research highlights how they include a variety of mobilities along the East-West axe but
39 also renewed South-North movements, including permanent and temporary migration and different
40 types of onward, circular and return migration. In addition, intra-EU migrants represent an
41 increasingly diverse group, according to socioeconomic profiles, education levels, migrant and family
42 statuses and motivations for migration. Nevertheless, studies generally frame such mobilities as part
43 of long-standing labour migrations (Strey et al. 2018) or through new concepts such as “liquid
44 migration”.
45
46
47
48
49

50 Engbersen (2012) uses liquid migration to underline changes in institutions key for migration
51 like the nation-state, family and labour markets, arguing that such transformations, together with
52 others in transport and communications, have created new and less predictable migrations. He refers
53 mostly to temporary “legal” migrations for work based on individual strategies characterised by
54 “intentional unpredictability” and involving a growing variety of movements and receiving countries.
55 However, although these portrayals of intra-EU migration represent certain experiences, they leave
56 others unexplained. Among these, the report by Strey et al. (2018) highlights how the mobilities of
57 third-country nationals within the EU remain under studied. In addition, research on EU mobile
58
59
60

1
2
3 families, as opposed to young students or professionals, and the gender and generational
4 implications of it, need further attention.
5

6
7 The impact of the recent economic crisis on intra-EU migration has increased interest in this
8 subject. The crashing of already fragile labour markets in Southern Europe, aggravated by austerity
9 measures and neoliberal reforms, led many citizens to migrate to countries perceived as more
10 prosperous or offering better welfare in Northern and Central Europe (Lafleur and Stanek 2017).
11 These new flows in turn helped increase hostility towards immigrants and support for the
12 “retrenchment of freedom of movement rights” (Barbulescu 2027, 15), culminating in national
13 processes such as “Brexit” and the rise of far-right populist parties. However, we know little about
14 how migrants involved in these mobilities experience such changing circumstances. Recent literature
15 has focused on high-skilled migration within the EU, including from a gender perspective or young
16 migrants (Nijhoff and Gordano 2017; Triandafyllidou and Isaakyan 2016; see also Cortés et al. in this
17 issue).
18
19
20

21
22 Less research has looked at third-country migrant mobility within Europe, including both
23 naturalised citizens and those with non-EU citizenship. Ahrens (2013; Ahrens, Kelly and van Liempt
24 2016) studies some of these experiences for African and Asian migrants in Europe. The case of Latin
25 American onward migrants (OLAs) to the UK has received attention as well (Bermudez and Oso 2018;
26 Mas Giralt 2017; McIlwaine and Bunge 2019; Ramos 2017). Some of this research mentions the
27 growing precarity that such groups remigrating within Europe face, both in terms of the reasons
28 leading to onward migration (the impact of the crisis in Spain) but also in relation to living conditions
29 in the new host countries. This precarity, as McIlwaine and Bunge (2019; see also McIlwaine in this
30 issue) stress, goes beyond the poor working conditions that migrants often find in host societies and
31 that should be analysed as part of a continuum stretching from their countries of origin to different
32 migrant destinations. For these authors (*ibid*, 603), “onward precarity” refers more to “the
33 intersections between multiple precarities within and beyond the labour market and in relation to
34 different forms of mobilities across space and as well as socially and occupationally”, and in relation
35 to structural transformations, transnational strategies and other factors such as gender. However,
36 such literature has not explored in depth the naturalisation strategies of third-country nationals in
37 such a context, and especially how expectations of enjoying the rights attached to EU citizenship can
38 clash with the reality of growing barriers to EU free mobility and welfare.
39
40
41
42
43

44
45 This connects with current discussions on citizenship acquisition based on instrumental or
46 identity values and the so-called genuine link between citizens and states (Bauböck 2019). Such
47 debates gain specific relevance in a global context of expanding dual and multiple nationalities¹ in
48 which as Bauböck (*ibid*) remarks both individuals and states have practical interests. Although the
49 present article does not engage fully with the wider literature on citizenship and migration, it relates
50 to several of its arguments. As Bauböck (*ibid*, 1025) points out citizenship has become “hugely
51 important for people’s autonomy and chances to lead a good life as well as for governments’
52 capacity and legitimacy to rule them”. It is in this setting that within a “global hierarchy of
53 citizenship”, individuals from “second” or “third-tier” countries seek to obtain more advantageous
54 citizenships (from “first-tier” states) as a strategy for “global upward mobility” (Harpaz 2019). These
55 strategies become more important as the value of international mobility increases, both for labour
56 migrants and those seeking cosmopolitan lives (Bauböck 2019), and thus are increasingly interpreted
57 as instrumental (Harpaz and Mateos 2019). However, within recent intra-EU mobilities, such
58
59
60

1
2
3 strategies need to be analysed in reference to arguments about the “(re)production of peripherality”
4 (Nagy and Timár 2017) within new South-North flows, as well as notions of “second-class citizenship”
5 as applied to migrant integration (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008).
6
7

8 The case of dual and multiple citizenships among Latin American, including Colombian,
9 migrants in the US has been researched in more depth, from both a host and transnational
10 perspective (Escobar 2004; Guarnizo et al. 1999). This article contributes to the literature by looking
11 at the less known case of Euro-Latin American citizens remigrating within Europe, a relatively
12 invisible community. It does so by exploring the case of “new” Spaniards, or Colombian-Spanish
13 families, moving between Spain, the UK (London) and Belgium (Brussels). First it looks at how
14 instrumental and identity values are linked to naturalisation strategies, and how such strategies
15 become more urgent as the economic crisis unfolds. Secondly, it analyses how becoming Colombian-
16 Spanish in the recent context does not necessarily mean escaping precarity, but rather encountering
17 new precarious living conditions. By doing so, it also engages debates on the value of citizenship and
18 new-intra EU mobilities.
19
20
21
22

23 **Background and brief methodology**

24
25 By the end of the 20th century European countries had become main destinations for Colombian
26 migrants (Mejía Ochoa 2012). Since then, flows have grown rapidly, with changes following the 2008
27 economic crisis. In Spain, by far the largest community within Europe, numbers kept growing until
28 2012, when they experienced decline followed by gradual recovery from 2016. This decline was due
29 to a reduction in new arrivals, together with returns and remigrations. According to official statistics
30 (*Padrón Municipal*, INE), in 2018 there were 394,432 people born in Colombia residing in the country
31 (59% women), 226,346 of whom had Spanish nationality (61% women). Naturalisation has increased
32 significantly, partly due to two factors: (1) Latin American migrants in Spain enjoy special conditions,
33 since they can apply after two years of continuous legal residence as opposed to ten years for other
34 nationals; (2) those naturalising can keep their nationality of origin, thus becoming dual nationals, an
35 issue that is key (Finotelli and La Barbera 2017; see also studies of Colombians in the US).
36
37
38
39

40 The communities based in the UK and Belgium are smaller (it is also harder to estimate their
41 real numbers), but despite the lack of colonial links they go back a long time. Out of the
42 approximately one quarter of a million Latin Americans estimated to reside in the UK in 2013,
43 Colombians are the second-largest group, numbering more than 25,000 in the 2011 Census
44 (McIlwaine and Bunge 2016). Current figures could be significantly higher, since as McIlwaine and
45 Bunge’s (2016) survey of OLAs arriving in the UK since the crisis shows a large majority have Spanish
46 passports. Estimates from the Annual Population Survey put the size of the Colombian-born
47 population in the UK in 2018 at 38,000, and Colombian nationals at 14,000 (ONS), mostly located in
48 London. The statistics show that this is also a feminised population. Given the long history of the
49 Colombian community in the UK many migrants have acquired British citizenship as well. Since 1990,
50 citizenship grants to Colombian migrants total more than 18,000, with naturalisations peaking in
51 2007 and declining since (data.gov.uk). In Belgium, for which recent official data is harder to obtain,
52 the OECD estimates the size of the Colombian-born population in 2017 at just over 6,500 (and
53 Colombian nationals at 1,866; women being a majority in both cases), with naturalisations at 100-200
54 per year since mid-2000 but declining from 2013.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Despite differences between the three communities, there is a dense web of transnational
4 connections, with migrants, relatives and friends moving to one country or another depending on
5 migration regimes and opportunities, as well as economic, political and other links (Bermudez 2016).
6 These transnational links were revived during the crisis as part of remigration strategies from Spain
7 to the other two countries.
8
9

10 The data analysed next is part of several projects conducted over the last fifteen years,
11 including a 2005-2007 (pre-crisis) qualitative study with Colombian migrants in London, Madrid and
12 Barcelona and another one in London and Madrid in 2010 (focusing on transnational politics), but
13 mainly research conducted in 2014-2015 in Madrid, London and Brussels looking at the impacts of
14 the crisis. Although the latter looked at several migrant strategies, including those who remained in
15 Spain and returns, in this text the focus is on remigration experiences. This is complemented with an
16 ongoing new project on labour, family and political considerations among recent Spanish migrants to
17 Europe that involves “native” and “new” Spaniards. In total, the dataset consists of over 150
18 qualitative interviews with Colombian migrants, adult men and women, and key informants (from
19 migrant organisations, churches, ethnic businesses, etc.), as well as two non-representative surveys
20 with Colombian migrants and extensive fieldwork² (for more details see Bermudez 2016).
21
22
23
24

25 **Becoming Colombian-Spanish: individual and family strategies**

26 *Ambivalences towards naturalisation before the crisis*

27
28
29 Colombian migrants in Spain go through naturalisation for diverse reasons, including identity- and
30 instrumental-related (Bauböck 2019). Since the bulk of Colombian migration to Spain dates back only
31 to the turn of the century, initially the number of naturalisations was small but rising gradually to
32 over 1,000 by 2002 (Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, Portal de Inmigración).
33 Still, Colombians have been among the main migrant groups acquiring Spanish nationality. The
34 motives for the initial slow progression could be several. In the interviews conducted in 2005-2007 in
35 Madrid and Barcelona (around fifty), the issue of naturalisation was not investigated directly, but
36 some interviewees were dual nationals. One is “Noelia”³, a woman in her 40s and married with
37 children who arrived in Madrid in the mid-1980s escaping threats to her life: “I’m one of the veteran
38 ones. When I arrived really there were not many Colombians... out of the people that came then, I
39 would venture to say that all now have Spanish nationality”. Like Noelia, many interviewees in this
40 earlier project were “refugees”⁴, which sometimes led to a certain reticence (or difficulties) regarding
41 naturalisation. Thus Elena, 34-year old and in Madrid since 2000 seeking refuge, maintains an
42 ambivalence towards becoming Spanish. She explains that her partner is also Colombian but their
43 daughter was born in Spain, and they are trying to respect the fact that she feels Spanish as well:
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 we have taken the decision at home... not to talk badly about Spain... not in front of her, no,
51 because we have no right to condition their views about this country... the other day Montoya
52 [Colombian car racing pilot] won... we were in a group of people... [singing] the national
53 hymn, and my daughter came up in the middle [saying] “go Alonso” [Spanish car racer]... and
54 I said, “hey, we are going to disinherit you”... [she replied] “but I am Spanish, I have to cheer
55 Alonso”... it’s very complicated.
56

57 Both women worked in Colombia in the academic and media or community sectors, and
58 experienced labour downward mobility in Spain, however, for Elena this had contributed to her
59 reluctance to naturalize: “I’m Colombian, and will always be Colombian”; this is despite experiencing
60

1
2
3 discrimination in the job and housing markets. This actually explains her mixed feelings about Spain,
4 expressing that she has gained things since leaving Colombia (“I have my daughter”) but also
5 disappointment with the host society:
6

7 This country, I think is not what I expected...

8
9 ... in Colombia we still have the idea of the mother country... there are many things that a lot
10 of us over there think about Spain... and I end up finding a very brusque way of dealing with
11 people...
12

13
14 I thought this is Europe... women have more liberty... and then when I started realizing how
15 they kill women here, like in Colombia...
16

17 Although Colombians naturalising through residence do not do so through “ethnic
18 citizenship” rules, Latin Americans feel they have a special affinity with Spain based on a shared
19 (colonial) history, which is partly why many choose to come to Spain and why they enjoy special
20 conditions to apply for Spanish nationality.⁵ However, many feel this “special status” does not match
21 how they are treated in the host country, often encountering discrimination (see Juliano 1994). This
22 could explain why participants interviewed in 2014-2015 in London and Brussels felt more
23 discriminated in Madrid. Finally, like Elena, other Colombians interviewed felt that having a residence
24 and work permit was enough, not seeing the urgency in applying for Spanish nationality. Some were
25 thinking about it, while in other cases the priority was to achieve economic stability first. It was
26 assumed that this would change with time: “the majority of people that... left Colombia, we left in... a
27 matter of two years. Soon we’ll be able to have nationality in one place and another, once we have
28 organised ourselves” (Eva, in her 30s, married with children, Barcelona, arrived in 2000). The
29 statistics support this claim since naturalisations grew more rapidly since the mid-2000s and reached
30 more than 15,000 in 2008, just when the crisis started.
31
32

33 ***“Identity” versus “instrumental” in the context of the crisis***

34
35
36 If we can think of citizenship before the crisis both in terms of identity and instrumentally, in the
37 context of the Colombian migrants interviewed later and their families it assumes a stronger strategic
38 dimension. In the survey conducted in Madrid in 2010 among Colombian voters and non-voters (400
39 adult Colombian respondents, men and women) (McIlwaine and Bermudez 2011), 33 per cent were
40 naturalised or in the process, while 51 per cent were permanent residents, thus reflecting a much
41 more stable community (43 per cent had been living in the country for nine to twelve years).
42 However, the immense majority identify themselves as Colombian, compared with Colombian-
43 Spanish (only 8 per cent sometimes or a lot) or Spanish (4 per cent) (or other categories such as Latin
44 American or Hispanic).⁶ In another survey conducted in 2014 (200 adult respondents, men and
45 women, each in Madrid, London and Brussels), with the economic crisis well advanced, half of the
46 sample in Madrid were dual nationals, with a significant proportion applying for Spanish nationality.
47 This coincides with official statistics, which show that between 2009 and 2018, almost 155,000
48 Colombian migrants naturalised, with citizenship grants reaching a peak in 2013 and declining since,
49 coinciding with the general trend for naturalisations in the country (Finotelli and La Barbera 2017).
50 Around 55 per cent of these grants corresponded to women.
51
52

53
54
55 Greater levels of naturalisation do not mean necessarily a stronger identification with the
56 host country, although sometimes it is the case. The large majority of survey respondents and
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 interviewees who were dual nationals (or applying for Spanish nationality) during the 2014-2015
4 study, express primarily practical motivations. According to the survey: “because it opens the doors
5 to the world”, “to be able to travel”, “because I had businesses and needed it”, “to have more job
6 opportunities”, “to have legal security”, “because of the children”. Some also relate it to their
7 intention to remain in Spain, while for others becoming Colombian-Spanish represents an
8 opportunity to come and go between the host and home (or other) countries depending on needs:
9 “if things get really bad and he returns, there will always be the possibility of coming back to Spain”.
10
11
12

13 In 15 interviews conducted in Madrid with migrants as part of this same study, half of them
14 are Colombian-Spanish and among the rest a few are in the process of naturalising. Moreover, ten
15 more migrants interviewed in London and Brussels (out of 15 in each city), having remigrated there
16 from Spain recently, are Colombian-Spanish. Among this group of dual nationals, most explain their
17 reasons for acquiring Spanish nationality also in instrumental ways, especially related to easier
18 mobilities:
19
20

21 Mostly to be able to travel, because with a Colombian passport you face many difficulties to
22 go to other countries and so, and now it is much easier to move every time I travel
23 somewhere for work, for holidays or whatever (Nelson, Madrid, 36 years old, single, arrived in
24 2007, obtained Spanish nationality in 2014, worked as a journalist in Colombia).
25
26

27 To have the possibility of being able to go to many other parts of the world, the possibility of
28 one day further on be able to obtain a loan or something, to buy a house, because of the
29 facilities to be able to be with my son peacefully, have some rights like healthcare (Macarena,
30 Madrid, 43 years old, single mother and actress, arrived in 2002, obtained Spanish nationality
31 in 2010).
32
33

34 Some interviewees are very emphatic about their purely practical reasons: “for me it does
35 not mean anything more than... a document that helps me travel” (Rufo, Madrid, 27 years old,
36 married, arrived in 2010, applied for naturalisation in 2012, was a student and librarian in Colombia).
37 Or highlight that their Spanish nationality is secondary: “I have dual nationality, Colombian and
38 Spanish, but the main one is Colombian” (Alicia, London, 34 years old, married with children, arrived
39 in 2013 from Spain, obtained Spanish nationality in 2006, was studying and working as shop assistant
40 in Colombia). The emphasis on greater mobility rights tend to be more common (but not unique) for
41 migrants with a middle class background or professional status. However, these attitudes can
42 interact with identity issues, especially but not only among migrants with long years of residence or
43 family (particularly children). Thus, for some it also has to do with the fact that they like living in
44 Spain and plan to remain, or because they feel they have made a contribution to the host country.
45 Macarena, cited above, despite expressing mostly instrumental reasons for naturalising, mentioned
46 her anger when a friend suggested she was “a second-class citizen”: “it doesn’t matter that I wasn’t
47 born here, I’ve been twelve years working, making this country more beautiful... so they can say...
48 that I am a second-class national?” Others identify strongly with the host country: “because it is an
49 honour to be nationals of a country that to us it means a lot” (Gabino, 44 years old, married with
50 children, arrived in 1996, applied for naturalisation in 2000, worked in the army and a company in
51 Colombia). These cases highlight how instrumental and identity aspects can go together “rather than
52 one depreciating the other” in contrast to other, more gloomy analyses, that envision a move
53 towards “a radical marketization of citizenship” (Bauböck 2019, 1016, 1025).
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 More importantly, for some participants, especially those remigrating to London and Brussels
4 since the crisis, dual nationality is part of their survival strategies, or what Godinho (2017) calls
5 “possible practices”. It opens opportunities not only to travel freely between Spain and Colombia,
6 but also the “freedom” to move to another EU country in the context of a global hierarchy of
7 citizenships in which as Harpaz (2019, 897) argues dual nationality can become “a strategy of global
8 upward mobility”. Only that in our case, for some Colombian migrants, it becomes more a strategy
9 for survival. Moreover, as explored next, the “mobility value of a European passport” (Bauböck 2019,
10 1016; Mateos 2015) in the current conjunction is being increasingly questioned, both with regard to
11 spatial mobility, with Brexit and other impediments against free movement, and social mobility, as
12 austerity measures and increased precarity complicates the lives of Colombian-Spanish families
13 remigrating.
14
15
16
17

18 **Precarious lives in London and Brussels: survival strategies and future expectations**

19 ***Remigrating as “new” Spaniards***

20
21 Although research based on quantitative data (see López de Lera in this issue) shows that a majority
22 of those remigrating from Spain to another EU country since the crisis are not naturalised citizens,
23 studies highlight the relevance of acquiring an EU passport for these remigrants, at least in the Latin
24 American case (Bermudez and Oso 2018; see also McIlwaine in this issue). In their study of OLAs in
25 the UK, McIlwaine and Bunge (2016) find that the vast majority arriving in the country since the crisis
26 have Spanish passports, Colombians being the largest group. This research, and other (Bermudez
27 2016), reminds us well that these new intra-EU flows are linked to long-established transnational
28 connection between different migrant communities in Europe. The study of OLAs characterises the
29 new flows as feminised and composed mainly of families leaving their previous EU country for
30 economic reasons, with most choosing London because they have family or friends there or in search
31 of better opportunities (McIlwaine and Bunge 2016).
32
33
34
35
36

37 Among the ten Colombian migrants interviewed in the 2014-2015 study that have remigrated
38 to London and Brussels since the crisis, all but one are dual nationals. A majority did not have tertiary
39 education and in Colombia they were either students, housewives or worked in working/lower-
40 middle class occupations, which contrasts with the background of other interviewees in the three
41 cities. Their reasons for remigration include the impact of the crisis on employment and social
42 conditions (being unemployed, losing businesses, repossession of homes, exhausting benefits,
43 worsening working conditions) sometimes mixed with (or as a result of) other “crises” (relationships
44 breaking down, wanting to keep the family together, needing a change). Still, in most stories the
45 decision to move to another EU country is clearly linked to naturalisation. Vicente is a case in point in
46 that his mobility strategies between Colombia, the UK and Spain exemplify the strategic uses of
47 citizenship; he is 36 years old and arrived in London from Madrid in 2014, where he lives with his
48 wife and two daughters. Vicente first departed Colombia, where he was a factory worker, in 2000
49 because “always wanted to leave”. His dream was to go to the US, but entering Europe seemed
50 easier so he aimed for the UK via Spain (a strategy employed by many Latin Americans before the
51 crisis). He tells us that he entered Spain with his Colombian passport, but to move next to the UK he
52 used a Venezuelan passport since “Venezuelans are not required to have a visa”. This first time he
53 was “unlucky” and ended being deported: “they deported me to Spain and I stayed”. He lived for
54 fourteen years in Spain, where married and had two children, but the economic crisis forced him to
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 reconsider options (he lost his job and the family flat). In this new context having Spanish nationality
4 seemed crucial:
5

6 Well, before the nationality, I had community status, [with] that I can move throughout
7 Europe but I cannot work. But I applied for nationality, got it and immediately I came here
8 with the nationality because... If I have nationality, I don't need a visa.
9

10
11 Pointing out the ironies of his "return" to the UK, Vicente concludes: "they deported me
12 because I had no papers and now I come back with papers." Other interviewees emphasize as well
13 how having an EU passport was key for their remigration, since it means not only being able to enter
14 their new host country freely but also in principle accessing the "legal" labour market and social
15 benefits. Hugo (38 years old, with partner and child) and Genaro (51 years old, single), both of whom
16 left Colombia despite having jobs to prosper, interviewed together in Brussels (arrived from Spain in
17 2009 and 2011, respectively) mention how having Spanish passports was "the door" that allowed
18 them to remigrate and "work 'declared' here", meaning having a legal contract and paying social
19 security to have the right to social benefits, although the latter is not always possible (see below).
20
21
22

23 For families, naturalization can also be decisive in who remigrates first and who follows,
24 independently of who is unemployed or lost the most in Spain. Although the literature underlines the
25 stronger impact of the economic crisis, at least initially, on male employment, with women tending
26 to remain in Spain while husbands and sons return or remigrate, this is not always so (Bermudez and
27 Oso 2018). The coordinator of a Latin American migrant organisation in London (Carila, key
28 informant, 2014) details the difficulties many new Latin American arrivals with EU passports
29 experience, including families becoming separated:
30
31
32

33 About four years ago I had the case of a youngster who escaped from his mother. She had to
34 leave her partner in Spain, at their home... because he still did not have his papers to
35 migrate... she came to work with her baby daughter, of three, and the young boy, of fifteen or
36 sixteen, and another young man, who was already twenty two.
37
38

39 In some cases, like Alicia's (mentioned above), the family reunites in London after the
40 remaining partner in Spain achieves nationality. For her, the move to London was motivated by her
41 husband becoming unemployed, despite the fact that she "had everything" in Spain: "a car, a large
42 apartment... a good job. I worked in a boutique". Since she achieved nationality first the family
43 strategy was for her and her daughter to move to London and start sorting out the paperwork
44 (applying for National Insurance Number). Meanwhile, her husband put pressure on the authorities
45 in Spain (explaining that his family was in the UK) to resolve his case, since he had been waiting for
46 more than two years for a resolution on his application. When it is the husband who remigrates first,
47 generally he does so alone until there is some security for his wife and children to join them (see also
48 Bermudez and Oso 2018).
49
50
51

52 The reasons for choosing London or Brussels have to do with having relatives, friends or
53 contacts, and in some cases, like Vicente's, previous migration experience. It can also be a matter of
54 hearing through the grapevine: "'such person went to Switzerland, another to London'. And well,
55 since the option was to leave" (Luciano, Colombian-Spanish, London, 47 years old, married with a
56 child, arrived in 2011 from Spain). London, maybe more than Brussels, embodies as well the idea of
57 greater opportunities (to work or study), especially for those with children. Nevertheless, in most
58 cases, despite the importance of having an EU passport as an entry point, the reality confronted in
59
60

1
2
3 London and Brussels can be different from expected, as being an “European citizen” (as an
4 interviewee defined himself), especially of non-EU origin, does not offer enough insulation against
5 precarity.
6

7 ***Combining labour and family life: expectations and reality***

8
9
10 Mateos (2015, 85) talks about “the growing value of EU citizenship” in the context of his research
11 with Euro-Latin American citizens, nevertheless, in recent years we could focus rather on its
12 “devaluation”. Most key informants (from organisations, churches, etc.) in London and Brussels in
13 the two latter projects explain how the expectations of many migrants coming from Spain recently
14 have been confronted by declining rights for mobile EU citizens (Barbulescu 2017; Lafleur and
15 Mescoli 2018). The director of a Latin American women’s organisation (LAWRS) in London cites the
16 situation of recent female arrivals as particularly difficult as the government tightens rules on
17 immigration and welfare benefits (Care Connect and LAWRS 2015). In both cities they stress that for
18 earlier arrivals (at the beginning of the crisis) things were easier, but later the rules began to change:
19
20
21

22
23 People coming from Spain come with the idea that here they will give them money... ‘I come
24 from Spain and I am in a bad state, I have no money, nowhere to go’, and right there they will
25 say to them, ‘here, no worries’ [...] it is not that easy, many people achieved that when the
26 crisis started [...] (key informant, Latin American shop, Brussels, 2014).
27

28 immigrants that come with European passports, that have the right to be here, it is very
29 complicated... since last year especially, they started limiting those services that people...
30 recently arrived from other European Community countries can access... you have to be
31 working to be able to access some social services, and also you have to have lived in the
32 country for some time... all those people, all those women, arriving here... running away
33 because of all this issue of the recession, they arrive here and have no access whatsoever to
34 anything (key informant, LAWRS, London, 2014).
35
36

37 Some migrants interviewed and other key informants, including a Colombian trade union
38 leader recontacted in London as part of ongoing research on recent emigration to Europe from Spain,
39 claimed that although this affected all arrivals, native Spaniards in general had higher levels of
40 education and could access better jobs. They also stressed how the situation can be more
41 complicated for women, some of whom left Spain accompanying their husbands rather than as a
42 personal decision, and who can find it difficult to combine work and care responsibilities as well as
43 learning the new language and adapting. However, for other women remigration can represent
44 opportunities, both for them and their children. Thus different forms of precarity can combine with
45 having an EU passport to affect the lives of mobile citizens in the labour market and beyond, based
46 on factors such as nationality, gender or previous experiences. Still, having EU-citizenship, as some
47 informants express and other studies on the remigration of third-nationals point out, offer some
48 security (Ahrens 2013; Ahrens et al. 2016).
49
50
51
52

53 In the case of our Colombian-Spanish participants, precarity is confronted first and foremost
54 in the idea of “I have to start again” (Vicente, see above). In most cases, after a lengthy stay in Spain,
55 where migrants had to redo their lives, they had experienced some upward social mobility, only to
56 lose everything again. In this respect, their experiences were somehow different from mobile native
57 Spaniards. Genaro, mentioned before, explains how after ten years in Spain he lost his job, his home
58 and his relationship. To this, we have to add that their first preoccupation when arriving in the new
59
60

1
2
3 host country is to find work and accommodation, whether they came alone (in some cases as the
4 first member of the family) or as a family. The Colombian-Spanish families interviewed (and key
5 informants) talk about precarious ways of arriving (“many people who come... in terrible conditions”,
6 key informant, Latin American shop, Brussels; “couples with their children at our doors here to say ‘I
7 don’t have anywhere to live’”, key informant, Carila, London); but also about precariousness in the
8 labour market, housing and social services.
9
10

11 The majority of interviewees have found jobs in cleaning, construction and other low-skill
12 occupations, sometimes in the informal labour market, in large part because those are the main
13 sectors that Latin American migrants in the two cities have access to. These are the same jobs they
14 found in Spain when they first arrived, but through time some of them managed to find better work.
15 Thus, Genaro, despite thinking his Spanish passport would allow him to work legally and pay social
16 security, has discovered otherwise. Following McIlwaine and Bunge’s (2019) concept of “onward
17 precarity”, Genaro explains that when he first arrived in Spain, he did so with a “package” including
18 work and accommodation, but it was a scam and he ended up an “irregular” migrant. Similarly, in
19 Brussels he has been abused by employers (not being paid, working irregularly). He thinks that if he
20 learns the language he could do better, but being so worried about his situation makes it difficult to
21 study. Genaro reflects that although the crisis has not diminished the work available in Brussels, it
22 has led to deteriorating labour conditions (“people don’t get paid”, “many work in ‘black’”). Such
23 conditions can leave recent EU mobile citizens, especially those entering low-skill sectors, in a “semi-
24 irregular” situation close to “deportability” (Lafleur and Mescoli 2018).
25
26
27
28
29

30 In London, the majority of OLAs, despite their previous experiences, find work cleaning (men
31 and women): “[where] we Latin American immigrants especially find” (Armando, Colombian-Spanish,
32 43 years old, married with children, arrived 2011). Thus Armando, having started university in
33 Colombia, where he also worked as a sales supervisor, in Spain began working in the hospitality
34 sector, but with time managed to use his sales experience working for two multinationals. However,
35 in London he has not been able to access other jobs. To survive in a city as expensive as London also
36 requires holding several cleaning jobs at the same time, which as Armando complains limits family
37 life. Also, in this sector they compete with other migrants, creating tensions within the larger Latin
38 American community, with instances of abuse towards recent arrivals (expensive rentals, false
39 contracts...), especially those with EU passports who are seen as unfair competition given that many
40 Latin Americans in the UK still have an irregular migration status. For women, combining work and
41 caring responsibilities can be challenging. Cleaning by hours has advantages (“this way I can take her
42 [my daughter] to school”) but it also means punitive timetables for little money (“twelve pounds
43 daily”) (Alicia, see before):
44
45
46
47
48

49 I work four [hours] but it is as if I was working all day [...] I get up every day at 3.30 am... Then
50 you arrive at work, and leave at 7am and again running to get the metro to come to take your
51 daughter to school... and again run to prepare food... and run again to catch the bus once
52 more to go to my other job. From this one I finish at 3pm, running, to get the bus... and pick
53 up my daughter... then you arrive at 6pm at home, running to cook dinner.
54
55

56 Starting again from a precarious base affects as well housing. Many go back to renting or
57 sharing accommodation with relatives or strangers, unless they can access public help (social
58 housing, rental subsidies) in a shrinking welfare state that does not offer them equal rights. Their
59 assumed privilege as European citizens has been devalued, and they find themselves in similar
60

1
2
3 conditions to other migrants with “second-class” citizenship. Although this can be partly explained as
4 the penalty paid by all new migrants, in our case it is also the result of shrinking rights for EU mobile
5 citizens and the labour niches Latin Americans have access to. Contrary to Harpaz’s (2019) thesis of
6 dual nationality being used for upward social mobility, the cases studied have experienced
7 downward mobility. At the community level, although the recent arrival of Colombian-Spanish
8 families in London and Brussels could reinforce “citizenship inequalities” (Spiro 2019), such
9 expectations have been dampened as they become “migrants” rather than “mobile citizens”.
10 Nevertheless, applying for British (or Belgian) nationality, is hardly considered, even in the context
11 (or because) of an impending Brexit; it was not deemed necessary or being EU citizens was perceived
12 as better. Still, a majority of them plan to stay, with moving somewhere else or returning to
13 Colombia not envisaged. Return to Spain is not ruled out, especially if economic conditions improve
14 or during retirement, which reinforces the idea of the identity value of citizenship discussed by
15 Bauböck (2019). Others though plan to settle in the new country, where they think educational and
16 employment opportunities are best for their families, thus aspiring to upward mobility in the longer
17 term.
18
19
20
21
22

23 Conclusions

24
25 The empirical material analysed helps draw attention to two understudied phenomena. First, it adds
26 to the scarce literature on third-country naturalised citizens exercising their right to freedom of
27 movement within the EU, and especially Euro-Latin Americans. It does so in the context of the recent
28 economic crisis, which has resulted in different intersecting precarities affecting not only work, but
29 also through austerity and neoliberal reforms generating more precarious mobilities and lives.
30 Colombian-Spanish families in London and Brussels, despite experiencing intra-EU migration to
31 escape falling into precarity, once in the new host society experience renewed precarious conditions
32 and limited rights. Their spatial mobilities so far have led to downward social mobility, having to start
33 from zero despite the perceived value of their dual citizenship, as EU mobility rights are increasingly
34 questioned. Nevertheless, many of these new (second-hand) EU citizens aim to stay in the new host
35 society, while others think of alternatives, because as Godinho (2017, 109-110) depicts: “We live a
36 long moment of uncertainty, in which lives become precarious for longer and human beings become
37 used to provisional materialities, to mobilities without anchoring or direction, with “innovations”
38 constantly demanded.” It is in this context, and in reference to the (re)production of peripherality,
39 that current South-North EU flows have to be understood.
40
41
42
43
44

45
46 Secondly, the article connects the study of naturalisation among Euro-Latin Americans with
47 analysis of onward precarity (McIwaine and Bunge 2019). It does so by analysing the strategies and
48 values involved in Colombian migrants acquiring Spanish citizenship through residence, underlining
49 both practical reasons and feelings and especially the importance of becoming EU citizens during
50 crises. It finds that both instrumental and identity values can work together, depending largely on
51 rules for acquisition and renunciation (Bauböck 2019). Finally, rather than encompassing these new
52 intra-EU mobilities within concepts like liquid migration, the article centres attention on family rather
53 than individual labour migration strategies in which unpredictability is not so much “intentional” as
54 inherent, going beyond the idea of young professionals moving around freely. These strategies have
55 gender, generational and national origin implications, with the experiences of new Colombian-
56 Spanish families sharing similarities but also differences with Latin American and Spanish migration
57 (old and new) to the cities studied. Further research could compare the three groups in more detail,
58
59
60

as well as follow up citizenship practices in the current European context, taking into account both migrant agency and structures.

Notes

¹ The author is aware that nationality and citizenship do not mean exactly the same. However, often they are used interchangeably and this text does so.

² See funding information.

³ Names used are pseudonyms.

⁴ Classified as refugees because of the reasons they left Colombia, independently of whether they were recognised.

⁵ Some Latin Americans access Spanish citizenship through ancestry.

Acknowledgements

I express my gratitude to the funding agencies, institutions and participants who made this research possible, as well as the anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

Funding

The projects on which this work is based were supported by: "Political Transnationalism, Gender and Peace-building among Colombian Migrants in the UK and Spain", Economic and Social Research Council [PTA-030-2002-01565]; "Transnational voting practices among migrants: the Colombian 2010 elections from the UK and Spain", British Academy [SG090907]; "Crisis, migration and integration: the experiences of Colombian migrants in Madrid, London and Brussels", Marie-Curie COFUND [Université de Liège, Belgium]; "New intra-EU mobilities: decisions around work, family and politics among Spanish transmigrants'", Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades [CSO2017-84618-P].

References

- Ahrens, J. 2013. "Suspended in eurocrisis: New immobilities and semi-legal migrations amongst Nigerians living in Spain." *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 22 (1): 115–140.
- Ahrens J., Kelly M., and van Liempt I. 2016. "Free Movement? The Onward Migration of EU Citizens born in Somalia, Iran, and Nigeria." *Population, Space and Place*, 22 (1): 84–98.
- Barbulescu, R. 2017. "From international migration to freedom of movement and back? Southern Europeans moving north in the era of retrenchment of freedom of movement rights". In *South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis*, edited by J.M. Lafleur and M. Stanek, 15-31. Dordrecht: IMISCOE-Springer.
- Bauböck, R. 2019. "Genuine links and useful passports: evaluating strategic uses of citizenship." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (6): 1015-1026.
- Bermudez, A. 2016. *International Migration, Transnational Politics and Conflict. The Gendered Experiences of Colombian Migrants in Europe*. London: Palgrave Mcmillan.
- Bermudez, A., and Oso, L. 2018. "'Kites' and 'Anchors': the (im)mobility strategies of transnational Latin American families against the crisis in Spain." *Population, Space and Place* 25 (6): 1-10.

- 1
2
3
4 Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., and Yurdakul, G. 2008. "Citizenship and immigration: multiculturalism,
5 assimilation, and challenges to the nation-state." *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, 2008. 34:153–79
6
7 Care Connect, and LAWRS. 2015. "Latin Americans migrating from Europe to the UK: barriers to
8 accessing public services and welfare". [http://www.lawrs.org.uk/wp-](http://www.lawrs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Latin-Americans-migrating-from-Europe-to-the-UK.pdf)
9 [content/uploads/2015/11/Latin-Americans-migrating-from-Europe-to-the-UK.pdf](http://www.lawrs.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Latin-Americans-migrating-from-Europe-to-the-UK.pdf)
10
11
12 Engbersen, G. 2012. Migration transitions in an era of liquid migration. In *European immigrations:*
13 *Trends, structures and policy implications*, edited by M. Okolski, 91–105. Amsterdam: Amsterdam
14 University Press.
15
16 Escobar, C. 2004. "Dual Citizenship and Political Participation: Migrants in the interplay of American
17 and Colombian politics." *Latino Studies* 2: 45-69.
18
19
20 European Commission. 2018. *2018 annual report on intra-EU labour mobility*. Brussels: European
21 Commission.
22
23
24 Finotelli, C., and La Barbera, M.C. 2017. "Naturalizaciones en España: normativa, datos y tendencias."
25 In *La inmigración en el ojo del huracán. Anuario CIDOB de la Inmigración 2017*, edited by J. Arango, R.
26 Mahía, D. Moya and E. Sánchez-Montijano, 254-273. Barcelona: CIDOB.
27
28
29 Godinho, P. 2017. "Lo que nos enseñan quienes plantan castaños: experiencias, expectativas y
30 futuros posibles". In *Antropologías en transformación: sentidos, compromisos y utopías*, edited by
31 M.T. Vicente, M. Albert, M.P. Espeso and M.J. Pastor, 105-134. Valencia: Institució Alfons el
32 Magnànim.
33
34
35 Guarnizo, L.E., Sánchez, A.I., and Roach, E.M. 1999. "Mistrust, fragmented solidarity and
36 transnational migration: Colombians in New York City and Los Angeles." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22
37 (2): 367-396.
38
39
40 Harpaz, Y. 2019. "Compensatory citizenship: dual nationality as a strategy of global upward mobility."
41 *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (6): 897-916.
42
43
44 Harpaz, Y., and Mateos, P. 2019. "Strategic citizenship: negotiating membership in the age of dual
45 nationality." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (6): 843-857.
46
47
48 Juliano, D. 1994. "La construcción de la diferencia: los latinoamericanos." *Papers*, 43: 23-32.
49
50
51 King, R. 2017. "Theorising new European youth mobilities." *Population, Space and Place*, 24 (1): 1-12.
52
53
54 Lafleur, J.M., and Mescoli, E. 2018. "Creating undocumented EU migrants through welfare: a
55 conceptualisation of undeserving and precarious citizenship." *Sociology*, 52 (3): 480-496.
56
57
58 Lafleur, J.M., and Stanek, M. (eds) (2017). *South-North Migration of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis*.
59 Dordrecht: IMISCOE-Springer.
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

- 1
2
3
4 Mateos, P. 2015. "Ciudadanía múltiple y extraterritorial: tipología de movilidad y ancestría de euro-
5 latinoamericanos." In *Ciudadanía múltiple y migración. Perspectivas latinoamericanas*, edited by P.
6 Mateos, 81-112. México D.F.: CIDE.
7
8
9 McIlwaine, C., and Bunge, D. 2019. "Onward Precarity, Mobility, and Migration among Latin
10 Americans in London." *Antipode*, 51 (2): 601-619.
11
12 McIlwaine, C., and Bunge, D. 2016. *Towards Visibility: The Latin American Community in London*.
13 London: Trust for London.
14
15 McIlwaine, C. and Bermudez, A. (with Cock, J.C., Bejarano Soto, M.C. and Calderon, M.) 2011.
16 "Transnational voting practices among Colombian migrants in London and Madrid. The Colombian
17 2010 elections from the UK and Spain." Queen Mary, University of London.
18
19 Mejía Ochoa, W. 2012. "Colombia y las migraciones internacionales. Evolución reciente y panorama
20 actual a partir de las cifras." *Revista Interdisciplinaria da Mobilidade Humana*, 20 (39): 185-210.
21
22
23 Nagy, E., and Timár, J. 2017. "The (re-)production of peripherality in Central and Eastern Europe."
24 *European Spatial Research and Policy* 24 (2): 5-16.
25
26
27 Nijhoff, K.G., and Gordano, M.C. 2017. "Looking at intra-European mobilities through migrant types:
28 young Spanish and Polish migrants in London and The Hague." *Innovation: The European Journal of*
29 *Social Science Research*, 30 (2): 1-22.
30
31
32 Ramos, C. 2017. "Onward migration from Spain to London in times of crisis: The importance of life-
33 course junctures in secondary migrations." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (11): 1841-
34 1857.
35
36
37 Spiro, P.J. 2019. "The equality paradox of dual citizenship." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45
38 (6): 879-896.
39
40 Strey, A., Fajth, V., Dubow, T.M., and Siegel, M. 2018. "Determinants of migration flows within the
41 EU. Literature review." [https://www.reminder-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/D-3.1-](https://www.reminder-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/D-3.1-Submitted_28Feb2018_with-cover.pdf)
42 [Submitted_28Feb2018_with-cover.pdf](https://www.reminder-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/D-3.1-Submitted_28Feb2018_with-cover.pdf)
43
44
45 Triandafyllidou, A. and Isaakyan, I. 2016. *High skill migration and recession. Gendered perspectives*.
46 Houndsmill, Basingstoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Response to the comments made by the referees

In line with the comments made by the two referees, I have made some changes to the article while others I deemed not necessary or there was not enough space. Here is a summary of them:

Referee 1

I am well aware of the literature on Colombian migration to the US, and indeed know the authors suggested by the referee (in some cases I have collaborated with them). However, the present article does not aim to compare the situation of Colombian migrants in Europe and the US. Still, the original version did make a reference to Bloemraad's work on citizenship, and in the new version I have made clear that I am not comparing my sample in Europe with US-based studies (including references to Guarnizo and Escobar).

I do not neglect the much larger population of Colombians who stayed in Spain despite the crisis, as I have now made clear in the text, although I explore the different mobility strategies migrants have employed as a result of the crisis, including staying put and return (with references to other work). This article is mainly about remigration experiences, since these have received less attention.

Referee 2

I have incorporated most of the suggestions made by this referee, within the word-limit available, since I found them quite useful.

The definition of precarity has been expanded in the conceptual section.

Contextualization has also been addressed throughout the analysis of the data, by adding more details and analysis based on previous educational and working experience of the migrants interviewed. I could have added more on this, but there was no space for it. Whenever possible, brief comparisons with other Latin Americans in London and Brussels (not recently remigrated from Spain) and with native Spaniards who left Spain as a result of the crisis as well have been made. However, a full comparative exercise would require a new text.

The issue of what is new or different about the case of recently Colombian-Spanish families remigrating to other EU countries has been argued further in the analysis and conclusions: remigration is a new experience (which they do not share with the majority of native Spaniards migrating since the crisis); the rights of intra-EU mobile citizens are increasingly questioned (thus affecting recent migrants most); and Colombian-Spanish families in London and Brussels are equated with the larger Latin American migrant communities there, thus accessing the same unskilled jobs and being open to greater exploitation. Whenever possible, it has been made clear too that the majority of participants interviewed in the two cities who had remigrated had no tertiary education and were not professionals.