


# *Thémata.*

*Revista de Filosofía*

The cover features a complex abstract design. At the top, a series of black vertical lines radiate downwards from a central point. Below these, there are intricate blue line drawings of what appear to be mechanical gears or wheels. The bottom half of the cover is dominated by a large, dark, curved shape with concentric black and white lines, resembling a stylized eye or a lens. To the right of this shape, the number '64' is printed in a large, bold, black font. Below the number, the text 'segundo semestre' and 'julio • diciembre 2021' is written in a smaller, black font. The overall aesthetic is graphic and intellectual.

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Una preocupación constante de sus realizadores ha sido fomentar los planteamientos interdisciplinares. La revista ha estado abierta siempre a colaboradores de todas las latitudes y ha cubierto toda la gama del espectro filosófico, de lo que constituye una buena prueba la extensa nómina de autores que han publicado en sus páginas. En sus páginas pueden encontrarse trabajos de todas las disciplinas filosóficas: Historia de la Filosofía, Metafísica, Gnoseología, Epistemología, Lógica, Ética, Estética, Filosofía Política, Filosofía del Lenguaje, Filosofía de la Mente, Filosofía de la Ciencia, Filosofía de la Historia, Filosofía de la Cultura, etc. También ha querido ser muy flexible a la hora de acoger nuevos proyectos, fomentar discusiones sobre temas controvertidos y abrirse a nuevos valores filosóficos. Por esta razón, los investigadores jóvenes siempre han encontrado bien abiertas las puertas de la revista.

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# ***Estudios.***





# Human animal and the dynamic of becoming humans.

El animal humano y la dinámica de devenir humanos.

**Juan Carlos Zavala Olalde<sup>1</sup>**

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## Resumen

Este ensayo muestra una organización de la explicación del ser humano como animal humanizado. Se fundamenta en explicar la tendencia humana de educar y generar seres humanos como la emergencia peculiar del ser humano. Para explicar la calidad humana, se aborda la comprensión del desarrollo humano que se humaniza en sociedad, que construye una realidad del ser humano en la cultura y del hacerse humano como fin. La humanización surge como lo opuesto a la animalidad en cuya dinámica se encuentra el ser humano. Se presentan varios ejemplos de cómo actúan los seres humanos al crear y convertirse en humanos. Proponemos un proceso y lo importante que es responder a qué somos los seres humanos, en un mundo como el actual que no tiene una base firme para construir conocimiento.

*Palabras clave:* humano, desarrollo, antropología filosófica, emergencia, ontogenia

## Abstract

This essay shows an organization of the explanation of the human being as a humanized animal. It is based on explaining the human tendency to educate and generate human beings as the peculiar emergence of the human being. To explain the human quality, it addresses the understanding of human development that is humanized in society, that builds a reality of being human in the culture, and to become human as an aim. Humanization comes as the opposite of animality in whose dynamics the human being is. Several examples of how human beings act in making and becoming human are presented. We propose a process and how important it is to respond to; what are human beings, in a world like the current one that does not have a firm foundation to build knowledge.

*Keywords:* human, development, philosophical anthropology, emergence, ontogeny

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## 1 • Mention of the historical background

To speak of the human animal is to remember the oldest proposal of definition and synthesis of the human. In Epicurus and Plato we can mention a profound reflection on animality and the human, of being deeply animal characterized by reason. Aristotle, when defining a political animal, characterizes it as the most social animal and the only one with language (García Peña 2010).

During the Scholasticism Escoto Eriúgena recognizes the animality of the human being, but grants him only a rational soul. That soul is like God, made in the image of God, so being rational is the true nature of the human being. The human being is a microcosm that shares growth and nutrition with plants, animals sensation and emotion, and with angels the faculty of understanding (Fernández and Ross 2011).

This order of beings is explicitly developed by St. Thomas who recognizes in human being the reason for approaching God, but above it there is faith to penetrate the truth about the divine. The only hint of duality in St. Thomas that I find, is his acceptance of the human being as the unity of body and soul (Copleston 1995). Modernity in attention to the philosophical reflection of Descartes will centre his idea of the human being in the mind, until evolutionary theory proves the animality of the human being and an anthropological philosophy emerges.

Philosophical anthropology traces its roots to the Kantian question: What is man? (Boerlegui 1999). In the 19th century, Hegel asserts that the human being is at the centre of understanding, displacing nature (Gehlen 1993). The birth of this philosophical anthropology is in the twentieth century thanks to Scheler, for whom the human being is not limited to the rational animal, but a kind of spiritual animal, with which it refers to the autonomous freedom of being, diametrically opposed to the animal (Scheler 1997).

The proposal of the human animal tries to present a balance between the idea of the human being as the cusp of evolution and its fair relationship with the Animal Kingdom, of which it is a taxonomically-evolutionary part. In some cases the proposal is reductionist towards biology. For this reason, anthropologists reject it as a guide to their understanding of the human. In

other proposals of the human animal, the authors consider themselves unfit to describe culture, so they only dedicate a few pages to it in their books. This generates the same result; they are not useful for anthropology. In these cases, the philosophical proposal lacks the depth of a philosophical anthropology or is limited to a personal vision.

Some examples that use the human animal title are: La Barre 1954, Morris 1994, Soler 2012. La Barre is the closest to my idea because for he there is an essence of humans: “the ability to love others. He must learn in order to become human. As a child he must love in one way, but as an adult in other” (La Barre 1954: 208). “Human nature, therefore, in his sense no automatically organic, not instinctually spontaneous, but necessarily disciplined and shaped by a long apprenticeship to childhood” (La Barre 1954: 219). A proposal within an anthropology text that is lost among many other authors with greater prestige.

Morris published the *Naked Human* and the *Zoo Human* for a general audience, the subtitle refers to a personal view to explain the human beings. He has a deep ethological point of view to explain the modern world. Morris studies the human being as a captive animal with cultural peculiarities. Soler is more focused on the animal ethological explanation on which he makes comments applied to the human being.

In this essay it will be treated as a dynamic between becoming human or dehumanized, which I will call animal. The explanation has the purpose of saying what the human beings, I will advance that, it refers to reproducing similar being themselves.

## 2 • Breakdown of dual descriptions through complexity

In the 20th century it bears the burden of dualistic definitions of the human being. The name is often used as a rational animal. It is recognized in Bacon (1620) to understand us as *Homo faber*, and taxonomic science has maintained Linnaeus' proposal of *Homo sapiens* (1766), which is used colloquially as the correct scientific way of naming the human species. As part of philosophical anthropology, which flourishes in the 20th century, Cassirer (1945) calls us *Homo symbollicus*.

Entering the 21st century the concept of the human animal as a dichotomy is simplistic. Morin began the breakdown of dichotomies by citing the many that exist and proposing them, all of them, as partial explanations. To understand the complexity of the human being, it is necessary to understand that it has antagonistic characteristics: *sapiens-demens* (rational and delusional), *faber-ludens* (worked and playful), *empiricus-imaginarius* (empirical and imaginary), *economicus-consumans* (economic and wasteful), *prosaicus-poeticus* (prosaic and poetic) (Morin 2001: 55). That is only the beginning to understand the complexity of the human being (Morin 2003). The human being as an animal-human has the same dynamic of being (human) and not being (animal), manifesting its existence in the world among those alternatives.

This theoretical proposal is framed in a world where Western ideas of the human are preserved by force and the media. However, the various forms of human being, that is, the cultural diversity that exposes its expression are visible to all. The presence of him, instead of clarifying what the human being is, shows us before our ignorance of it.

It seems that, contrary to leaving the amazement that Scheler described, its impossibility of solution has been considered. Scheler said: "After some ten thousand years of history, our time [20th century] is the first in which man has become fully, fully problematic; he no longer knows what he is, but he knows that he does not know it" (Scheler 2000: 4). Currently there is a tendency not to try to solve the question, but to assume that it does not exist and human beings can be anything or in any way. But the immobility and meaninglessness that postmodernism has left is of little value, once it is inherent to the human being the desire to know, as Aristotle tells us.

### 3 • The human as an emergence

Studies on complexity have been coupled with post-modern philosophy. I do not intend to confuse them, however, they have agreed in the refusal towards an ultimate explanation. Both open up the panorama to understand reality and each one takes its own direction: complex systems tend to recognize their explanatory value for precise phenomena in mathematical terms, post-modernity generates a devastating critique of authority and

ends up limiting its field of action to the speech that by being critical tries to get rid of its own criticism.

The result is that the complexity applied to human studies becomes a complicated explanation or a cluster of hypotheses as a conclusion. Post-modernism is in itself contradictory and its goal is to generate nothing but criticism. However, both in their own way, lead us to consider the principle on which to base knowledge. The principle on which the proposal of the human animal is based is the concept of emergence.

Emergence is a term proposed by Stuart Mill (Cintora 2020), its meaning in science explains that a system or structure has properties that its components do not have separately. The most accusing properties of the human being can be found in other living beings, for example: the use of signs, language, syntax, conscience, society, culture, even war. But none of them emerge as human beings, nor do they claim to be. Including bonobos and chimpanzees, those that have lived as foster children of humans (Fouts and Tukul 1998).

The concept of emergence is not new, nor is its use original to explain the human being. Nicol already mentions the core of the emerging proposal: the human being humanizes the human (Nicol 1982). Vera even has a title suggestive of her good study of mind and culture in the human being: Mind and culture: Emergence! (Vera 2008). He presents this idea of emergency as something that happens, we don't know what, but he recognizes it as different. Quoting Lizarraga: "The humanizing process must be seen as an emergent phenomenon of the hominization process" (Lizarraga 2002: 127). All of authors are understanding to be human as an emergence.

The beginning of the emergence of the human being is located in a chain of evolutionary novelties that begins with bacteria, then with the emergence of eukaryotes, continues with multicellularity, sex, on the path of animal life with the emergence of body plans (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Once the animals have diversified, the mammals avoid the Triassic-Quaternary extinction and the primates diversify. The next evolutionary novelty is sociability and an emergence is the sociocultural life of our ancestors, represented, not without controversy, in *Homo habilis*.

Now, the emergence as an evolutionary novelty is not the exception, but the rule. In our hominid ancestors we find the emergence of bipedalism

and sociocultural life. The emergence that follows this is in the direction of the evolutionary process by the sociocultural factor based on a pattern of becoming human: of being human, the true humans, the human descendants of the first true humans, or simply living as human beings. It's an emergent character, the first that is generated as a distinctive unit of the species. It serves as a principle in the regulation of reproduction. It's bases the way of life, whose pattern establishes coincidences and distance. In some cases it explicitly functions as an idea that assumes the homogeneity of those who are considered human. Between the indigenous people it conforms to the idea of tradition; things are done one way and not another by tradition.

It is the emergence of the human way of life. That for anthropology will mean the entire broad spectrum of known and historical cultural diversity, which has occurred since we *Homo sapiens* are this species. Such a cluster is impossible to know, but it is precisely in this definition of the human way of life that the emergence of the human can be considered.

The human *Ethos* emerges, this idea of a way of living that is transformed into the way of being, of behaving, and that later gives rise to the notion of ethics and morals (González 2000). The materialist theory that men are the product of circumstances and education (Marx and Engels 2000) is framed with the notion of an alleged human existence. The being of the human being is a becoming in life, a becoming according to existentialism. It is also an ontogenesis in becoming in evolutionary, historical, family and personal time. The unity of all this is the emergence. The being of becoming is to become human in the context of the time that he has to live with the inheritance that he is responsible for.

## 4 • Human animal

I will cite examples that show how becoming human beings is the core common to our species, which constitutes our explanation as humans. In history we can realize that human beings have a way of being by which they are distinguished, they explicitly seek to mark themselves as human. Levi-Strauss, in *The Way of the Masks* (Levi-Strauss 1981), has shown us that the more similar groups are the more they can highlight, differences and present opposites. That builds part of the peculiar mode of the cultural group.

In the case of many groups, for example: the Inuit, the name of the group is the way of speaking of the real men. The *Inuit* conceive their identity around the *Inuit* way of living and learning, in life with other *Inuit*, from the name that has an ethnic identity. Translated as “the *Inuit* way of speaking or the way of the *Inuk*”, the *Inuktitut* indicates what it is like to be *Inuit*; talking, hunting, walking, eating, sleeping, raising children, dancing and even smiling (Searles 2008).

Creation myths are also distinguished by presenting the human being as a special creation. In the Bible the human being is created after the whole world and until the end of all living forms. The creation of the human being is in such a relevant way that in a second narration it is seen that he is a spirit from God which provides him with true life, beyond that which comes from the non-living environment (Santa Biblia 1999).

Creation according to the Mayan culture introduces us to the human being made from different kinds of corn. This derives from its peculiar diversity of skin colors. In Chilam Balam the Mayans even talk about how the human being is generated as a Mayan person. It is a doctrinal writing and a moral vein that explicitly points out how the Mayans are different from the Spanish whom they resemble with animals (Arzápalo 2009, Garza 2003, Libro de Chilam Balam de Chumayel 1941).

Language has a prominent place in our definition of the human being. Among the *Tzotziles*, children are considered true humans when they begin to speak, their soul reaches them, and so they become *Tzotzil* people (León 2005). The *Otomí* from Central Mexico call themselves *ñähñu*, which is the same word to speak, therefore, by calling themselves *ñähñu*, an *Otomí* is a person recognized as such by their language (Dow 2002).

In every example there is always the other side, the one that is opposed, the different. It is not the animal in all cases, not until the degree of the impossibility of the human. The animal is on the biological basis, in evolution in the instincts and elemental needs of organic life that have been evolutionary, novelties at another time and now only support and are transformed by the human. The animal is like a trigger, a memory of how one is not human, and a way that one should not be. The analogy to animal is a way that the human being can to decide to have, but that is not accepted, does not want, because a different way belongs to him, but even a decision that makes us different.

Parts of the failure of the proposals that speak of the human animal have the same meaning. People prefer humanistic, philosophical and traditional explanations that support the idea of a special being in nature. The animal is not human, since ontologically we are human, being as an animal is too dehumanize. Being an animal is not reaching the emergence of being human.

Totemism presents an idea that seems to contradict this separation from the animal. However, among the Australian aborigines, where the concept has come from, totemism is the idea that human beings share the world, the space of beings, with other beings derived from space, the totem (Swan 1993). The totemic beings can organize more with the sacred beings, in the time of the origin that continues to exist and sustain the beings and the space where they live (Meggitt 1987).

Another cultural phenomenon contrary to what has been said is the widespread concept of the *nahual*, *nahual* means the ability of some people to transform themselves into animals. In the Mayan example, the *nahual* is called *uay* and for the Mayans it is no longer a person. The *uay* contains the negative nature of the person who manifests himself as an animal. In that condition the Mayans do not hesitate to kill him, he is not a person, but a dangerous being. The unity of the animal and the human being is contained in the concept of the Mayan person, at the same time that the opposition is highlighted (Dzib 1999).

The replication (to use a term that is neutral) of human beings in the human environment is not fully consciously generated, nor exclusively positive. Much of human history is characterized by social systems that replicate humans for the purposes of those who hold power. Let's start naming them: slavery, vassalage, patriarchy, state religion, education for the industrial age, consumer, and voters. In other words, human beings seek to make their close friends human beings and dehumanize others so that they serve them, so that they are useful.

The dehumanization of others is not a point against, but a confirmation. Well, it assumes the value of the human and that only without it is its use as a thing possible. When Kant speaks that human beings are not to be use for your own purposes, but ends by themselves, he is proposing the human as a principle.



## 5 • Biological, psychological, sociocultural studies of the human being

In twentieth century science, whose birth we can find in the nineteenth century and persists to the present, the human being has been studied by various disciplines with multiple results, not always coincident and without a unifying nucleus.

Biology develops its study primarily in its medical aspect and in the mid-twentieth century around evolution and behaviour. The human being is treated as an organic machine that can be repaired to some extent. It's also a species that occupies a place in taxonomy and whose evolutionary explanation is one more scientific area. Biological behaviour allows biology to point out the close similarities within the primate group and to leave the cultural trait to anthropology.

Psychology has taken the area of philosophy dedicated to the study of the human mind. It has at least three ways of approaching the human. A very scientific so-called dedicated herself to studying behaviour, as the observable form of the mind. Another, considered less scientific, focused on the study of the unconscious, this perspective suggestively indicates the duality and presence of the animal and the human. The third perspective, which currently prevails as a valuable academic psychology, is the cognitive one whose clearest feature is its experimental basis for understanding the human mind.

Sociocultural studies are focused on studying society, culture or the combination of both as a peculiarity of the human being. It is undoubtedly the area of study of the human being in itself when starting from anthropology. It is also where the greatest controversy and lack of consensus exists among the proposals that try to explain it. In this same area I include applied studies such as law, economics, pedagogy, social work, political science.

The persistence of these three areas of study of the human has its origin in the existence of its unit of study. Each area states that the biological entity-species, the mind and the sociocultural life exist in a distinguishable and scientifically analyzable way respectively. So its scientific study is justified.

It is assumed as obvious that the unified conception of the human being derives from the explanatory unity of these disciplines. In terms of Morin

(2003) the human being is the unit of species, individual and society. By coinciding in a single subject under study, in whose being its units of analysis are located, disciplinary studies have explanatory crossovers, as well as inconsistencies when carried out in isolation. The analytical character of the disciplines loses, helped by their specialization, the capacity for explanatory synthesis.

## 6 • Emergence, From where?

Human beings possess biopsychological traits that we can consult in any psychology book. They refer to the mode of perception, cognition, memory, consciousness and language. These behavioural and cognitive traits typical of human beings have a biological basis that indicates their evolutionary character. For their part, social and cultural characters are distinguishable properties of the human being. Both; the biological-psychological scientific units of analysis, as well as the social-cultural ones, seem to be what we are.

For example: in a neurobiology laboratory we can find biologists, medical doctors and psychologists working together. Some dedicated to the study of memory, others emotions, executive functions and consciousness. Even evolutionary psychology assumes that it can be integrated into biology (Tooby and Cosmides 2015). The bio-psychological of the human being does not give rise to controversy, but rather to a coherent explanatory framework. Criticisms of it come when that perspective tries to explain everything human in its limited terms.

The sociocultural trait is the most accusing of the human being. Its existence among other primates and the hominid ancestors of the human being shows the evolutionary character of the traits. The diagnosis of the genus *Homo* contains, thanks to Napier, the cultural, at the same level of importance as the brain and the bipedal posture (Walker and Shipman 1996). The sociocultural stands out in the human being for showing the diversity in the ways of life.

In the case of the sociocultural, the authors on whom the methodologies or theories are based are agreed. Durkheim considers himself a sociologist, but he studied as a precursor of anthropological theory. Furthermore, Harris's (2000) concept of culture assumes that culture is the way of think-

ing, feeling and acting that is acquired within a social group. That makes the social and cultural closely dependent for their existence. This shows that the social and cultural inseparable, just as they are not inseparable from the human psyche. A society lacking culture has not been discovered, nor has a culture without the pre-existence of a social group. One, culture, is inseparable from the other, life in society.

The need for unity between the biological-psychological factors with the social-cultural ones arises immediately when the specialized explanation is insufficient. It is the person in situation what makes us become humans (Ross and Nisbett 2011). For example, in his study on violence Ostrosky showed that while they can prove that there are biological differences in impulsive and premeditated aggressive behaviours (Arias and Ostrosky 2010), his explanation of the phenomenon of violence is not limited to what happens in the mind of people, but also in the sociocultural environment where they live, the type of life they had and lead. That raises the question about the causes of the behaviour. Is the person who is born aggressive or is it done for sociocultural reasons? The answer is that the environment influences to the degree of influencing the development of the psyche predisposed towards aggressiveness that can be done violence (Arias y Ostrosky 2010, Díaz y Ostrosky 2012, Ostrosky *et al.* 2008, Ostrosky y Vélez 2013).

What traits, phenomena or processes of the human exist and can help us understand it? So far we have assumed that they are the biological-psychological and the social-cultural. Morin's answer is: the species as the representation of the biological, the individual as the nucleus of the psychological, and society as the representation of the social-cultural. Let's see to what extent are the elements from which the human being emerges.

## **7 • The species, the individual and society as elements for the emergence of the human**

The core problem is that the human being lives in the reality that exists, but which he can only know from the faculties limited to his human constitution. The human being himself is part of the reality that is only made known to him through inferences and representations in a sociocultural

context. The species is a good start to exemplify what has been said.

The concept of species is a fundamental conceptual problem in biology. On the one hand, evolutionary theory explains the biodiversity that we can see. Suggests or assumes that diversity is represented by species. But we do not have a concept of species since, on the one hand, they are in continuous evolutionary change and the diversity of the living does not leave room for a simple definition that encompasses all species.

The problem is in the question: Do species exist? In nature we observe biodiversity and the human mind appears as ordered in sets that we call species. But are they real? In evolutionary history; do these groups of organisms behave as an evolving unit?

In humans, the problem of the species is, without exaggeration, dangerous. Without an understanding as a species, the domination of one group over another would be justified. If ideologies have been enough for atrocity, with a pretended scientific justification it can be strengthened. Not in terms of the human, because how human is devastating the human. By destroying other humans we attack the human in ourselves.

So the solution to the human species is more philosophical than real, more human than scientific. We are a human species because the human comes before the monstrous of denying humanity to human beings. We construct the concept of the human species as recognition of the human in the other that is similar to the self. Because the self does not exist without the other. When we become human it is given to us to recognize ourselves as human. Scientific evidence can support these claims in terms of evolutionary history, genetic similarity, and ontogeny.

But the question about reality remains. What has been said is a search for consensus, a social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 2003). It is necessary to approach the question of the real to know: what can the human being know? If we add to this that research on human evolution is unable to give us a complete answer to: what is the human being, what can it be and what is it made of? Then it will be necessary to find a real process that discovers; what we are? Leading towards the answer to: how do we make ourselves what we are?

So, to find the real features of the human being, I will consider reality as that condition in which the entity in question adjusts to its essence, or in

less essentialist terms, it corresponds to what, in truth, it is. Knowing reality will be having access to the true being of the known, what is itself. The real is true, it expresses its being in itself without intermediation or interpretation. It is neither more nor less than what it has to be in the universe or in existence.

If the concept of species does not serve us and the study of its evolution is insufficient. I am inclined to think of ontogeny. Ontogeny or development as what is real of the human being, that allows us to know how we becomes what we can be. Ontogeny is closely linked to evolution. At the same time that it allows evolutionary change, it leads to stable development. It does not provide us with an immutable essence, but with a being that exists. The complete justification is very extensive, it goes from Darwin (1859), to Waddington (1960) and Gould (2004), in philosophy we see Fodor and Patelli (2010) and Caponi (2008).

The existence of the individual is not open to many doubts. To this appearance of reality it is presented that for the existence of the individual has to live in society and become human. Human because, in terms of Harris (2000), he learns how to live, think and feel, also human because it is in society where his humanity will be recognized. Equally in society is where it reaches the fullest of the development of all its potential.

The individual presents a duality that goes beyond his name. He is the being who can become aware of his own self-consciousness and make this human property the core of his existence. At the same time, he is the being whose development throughout life defines even the possibilities of his self-awareness. This means that his individuality does not mean independence, his autonomy is determined and his freedom depends on his existence. His body appears individual, but if we turn to his evolution, it is, even his body, the result of sociocultural life. That part of the individual called; mind, it acquires the qualifier of human, since patterns of thinking, feeling and above all, developing, are shared in communion with all individuals. So the individual is an invention both of himself and of society.

Society is also an invention, but what is relevant, above all, is in society where the human being is made (Pescaru 2019). Society does not exist by itself, but rather individuals, by interacting in various ways, make it take shape, structure and become a human system of cultural life (Harris 2000,

Linton 2006). One way is where it manages to reproduce and thereby give rise to evolutionary continuity. However, the social being does not manage to encompass everything that is proper to society with its culture. It is an emergent level of the human being. Social facts (Durkheim 1986), society (Linton 2006), theory of society (Parsons 1952), social world (Bourdieu 1986) or social system (Luhman 1995), what is humanly important is that for your life in such a state or process, it becomes humanized. That is, it acquires a culture as a way of feeling, thinking and acting (Durkheim 1986, Harris 2000).

It is not necessary to go around the subject, we can directly quote Levi-Strauss: "Every society is made, first of all, by its past, by its customs and traditions: a set of irrational factors that theoretical ideas confront, allegedly rational" (Enthoven and Burgure 2010: 10). Human life is given by its way of life that later or at the same time contains an explanation of how one is human. "Similar technologies applied to similar media tend to produce a similar organization of work, both in production and in distribution, and this in turn is social groupings of a similar type, which justify and coordinate their activities by resorting to similar systems of values and beliefs" (Harris 1996: 3). It means: to be human makes humans your relatives.

But, to be human means that all the human properties work together, as a system, a complex system to build the humanity. For example, in terms of evolutionary process, that niche construction represents the human character to transform the environment (Laland *et al.* 2015). The influence of the environment in the heredity, and its influence on evolution can be explained by epigenetic processes (Jablonka 2017). In the foundation is the culture as trigger and driving of the humanity (Colagé and D'errico 2020). Every force that can participate on making the human more human is working.

On a metaphorical sense we could recall that Freud called the process: domestication, in a clear sense of transforming the animal into human (Freud 2010), original idea by Charles Darwin (1871). Recently the argument about the pro-social evolution of humans has arisen (Hare 2017). In sociology, it is identified within the idea of socialization (Pescaru 2019). Here I have pointed it out within the idea of acquiring culture, in the sense of acquiring, like language, where there is a cognitive system to develop it once the infant is exposed to language.

Paleoanthropology has used the term humanization, I cite two outstanding examples:

“From hominization emerges a humanization [...] accessing the constructional exercise of their way of being, being and doing” (Lizarraga 2002: 119-120). “Humanization is the emergence of operational intelligence, a product of its socialization. It is the acquisition of the ability to think about our intelligence, to understand the life process and to adapt to the environment through knowledge, technology and thought. Humanization is represented in the history of our humanity through the different social formations” (Carbonell and Hortola 2013: 10). What the paleoanthropology is explaining is that human evolution is becoming humanized.

Therefore, we come to understand the human animal as the species whose characteristic is acquired during development, its social life makes the individual autonomous and dependent on the continuous process of humanization.

## 8 • The human being from its development

All living beings are creators; the human being is no exception. Humans create themselves as humans and become aware that they cannot create themselves free from culture and their society, so they decide to make their offspring human. With this they create humans similar and limited to their historical context of human beings.

To understand the development of the human being who becomes human in society, one must “take development seriously, not only affirm that it is relevant, but really consider it in all its complexity when studying it” (Benítez 2011: 54). In between: development, evolution and historical-cultural context in becoming the human (Gärdenfords and Högberg 2017, Henrich 2014). For example, the frontal lobes are the basis for the regulation, programming and verification of mental activity, they are the last structures to mature, they only fully mature around 7 to 12 years of age (Ardila and Ostrosky 2009). Thanks to them we regulate behavior, such is the demand that we make in infants at this age. Human development is “an individual trajectory that is always built in the company of others” (Hidalgo *et al.* 2008: 86,

Hare 2017). Sociocultural factors explain similarities in development, personal experiences speak of differences (Hidalgo *et al.* 2008). Here we see the scope of possibilities to build human diversity.

Understanding the human being from its development places us next to research in development of the life cycle. This discipline has principles that must be remembered: development occurs throughout life, is multidimensional, multidirectional and plastic, requires to be approached by various disciplines and occurs in a context (Ross and Nisbett 2011, Santrock 2006). The difference begins with the fact that such studies are psychologically biased (Oakley 2004) and primarily here we present an explanatory core that seeks coherence and not an encyclopedia of human development.

Can we reduce the human to its biological development? Do not think, not even remotely. If we use the term development, it is to be seen clearly defined as the process that begins with fertilization and ends with death. With this we have two clarifications, the extension and the limit. Fertilization as a beginning speaks of the conditions for it to be carried out and supported in genetic, historical and family inheritance. Death sets a limit as far as understanding goes and life after death is not addressed, but its existence is not denied.

Development comes before itself as the character of the human. The human animal is the being in becoming, a being that changes and transforms throughout life. This principle is necessary to understand that it is a humanized animal.

Although development, and more precisely ontogeny, indicates the individual, for the human being it is not. There is no human development without society, no fully developed human without culture. The same fertilization comes from the existence of a sociocultural environment.

Could it be “that existence precedes essence”? (Sartre 1973: 2). I am inclined to think that essence corresponds to existence. Here it stands out that all the time we refer to the human being as a whole, the species that once extinct, its human essence of becoming, will disappear. In modified terms of Sartre: “man begins by existing, he finds himself, he arises in the world” (Sartre 1973: 5) and that defines him. The so-called human nature can be considered the potential of cultural diversity that is accessible to him to humanize himself.

What place has human cruelty? What about pathology in serial killers



or psychopaths? What are abnormal and their role in understanding the human? All these questions require a deep and specialized treatment, but your look from a model of human development will help in the construction of an explanation. Possibly to understand the human animal can help us to have a human solution.

## 9 • Relevance of conceptualization

I have considered the subject as having a core importance that seems obvious to philosophy, even less obvious to science. That is why I must raise its relevance.

An understanding of the human being, its development and its cognitive faculty allows us to develop an epistemology. Knowing the human being allows the construction of an epistemology based on human cognitive capacity, with clear limits to its scope. And even the role played by his humanity and his animality level in his capacity to learn. It is, of course, to recognize that a dynamic arises between the two that guides our object of knowledge and the method of knowing. Well, if the being is in becoming and human-animal dynamics, knowledge will be in becoming, with human and animal traits.

Science currently lacks epistemology, speculative philosophy has been left aside, the theory of knowledge from the hand of Carnap, Russell and Quine failed to base it on empiricism, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Popper only do sociology of science (García 2000, García 2006). The certainty of science and its recognition by society comes together with the success of inventions such as vaccines, antibiotics and their application in technology that has made it possible to leave the planet and establish a global communication network, among many other scientific advances. However, the study of the fundamentals, extension and method of knowledge is not the basis of its development.

This lack means that the lay person can criticize science as postmodernism does, seeing in it only a way of knowing grounded in the exercise of power. Science, on the other hand, is the best method of knowing that the human being has known so far, its limits and scope have to be supported in its epistemology, which supposes a clear vision about the ability to know of the human being (Harris 2000)

Epistemology serves to establish the relationship between science and technology. Well, science responds to the ability to know the human being at the same time to answer his doubts. The application of science and the technology depends on a human vision of science. That which is humanly acceptable, which at the same time is necessary for the well-being of the human being, can have a good end by realizing. To know what is that good? It takes philosophical reflection. There is little doubt that some of the problems of the current environmental crisis would have been avoided by prioritizing reflection on scientific application.

In conclusion, if we recognize that the human being is inherent in his humanized being, epistemology can guide our own knowledge of the human being and to determine the path of science and technology.

## 10 • To do the human

Here we have dealt with the understanding of the human being, his way of knowing and with it as a foundation for epistemology. However, understanding the human being in philosophical anthropology has an ontological character (Gehlen 1993). If we have been correct in saying that the human being is the emergence of the way of being the human making human beings, the human being humanized, the becoming of the human being as nature, and then there may be a way towards this ontology.

It is immediate to assume the relevance of fundamental values of the human. Just like remembering “freedom, equality, and fraternity”. Without detracting from the importance of ideas, it is the way of life and its reproduction in the offspring that makes the human in each one. Much of it is defined by tradition, and with it religion, based on education and example. The range of modes of being human characterizes the idea of the emergence of the human. The conceptualization that we thus do of the human being does not define him, but only models what his being exposes to the unity of the human and the diversity in bringing him into being.

We may be tempted to seek a way in which human beings can express their full potential. There is no doubt that it has been done repeatedly, one is the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In such a situation it must be said that the declaration highlights certain elements, but forgets

others, as all human work is sociocultural located, and historically. It is just one example of the way in which a hegemonic group applies its vision of the human person in coherence with the defense, by the State, of private property of individuals and free market capitalism (Fundación Juan Vives Suriá 2010).

For this reason, we cannot underestimate or fail to highlight certain aspects of great relevance to our topic. In principle, the proclamation said: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity ...” (NU 2015: 4), highlights an elementary principle. Article 26 states: “Everyone has the right to education. [...] Education shall aim at the full development of the human personality...” (NU 2015: 54). It is an example that shows how any proposal above the human lacks transcendence without its transmission to the following generations through education.

Thus, a text that proposes the human as the end of the education and socialization of the human being cannot end without recognizing its dark side. Hobbes says “the man is a kind of God for man and that man is the authentic wolf for man” (Hobbes 2000:34). This is a dilemma, the opposite thesis, the presence of contradiction and the bet that human beings aspire to humanity and fall into an animality.

At the beginning of the XXI century that still lacks historical identity, after a XX century that Harris characterizes as “broken dreams” (Harris 2000: 159), I read “everything that was solid and stable is destroyed; all that was sacred is profaned, and men are forced to view their conditions of existence and their reciprocal relationships with disappointment ” (Marx and Engels 2000: 31). It moves me and then I notice that the 21st century is looming worse. The destruction has happened, the Armenian genocide, the death camps during the Second World War, the extermination of the Tutsi, among many others, and what has been built on it? The desecration is already nineteenth-century history and is still in free fall. Disillusionment has given way to the acceptance of uncertainty, inequality and the environmental crisis. How is it that humans speak of humanity or make it possible? I have gone from the question of the human being to the question of how to become human, but in the understanding of the human as aspiration, work and property of our species. So, if what has been said about the animal being that humanizes itself is true, we will always hope for the persistence of humanity.

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# ***Thémata.***

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