Ceuta: The Humanitarian and the Fortress EUrope

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Abstract: Ceuta, a Spanish city and former colonial enclave in North Africa, is a key place in the construction of the European Union's external borders. Over the last 30 years, border governance dynamics have developed in this city, marked by the imbrication of security dynamics and humanitarianism. This paper analyses, from a historical and ethnographic point of view, the development of practices, forms of knowledge and institutions shaped by the joint action of securitarian and humanitarian actors. Particular attention is paid to the development of humanitarian reception institutions, especially the CETI (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes—Centre for the Temporary Stay of Immigrants), and humanitarian practices that reinforce the border government's capacity for control and filtering.

Resumen: Ceuta, ciudad española y antiguo enclave colonial en el norte de África, es un lugar clave en la construcción de las fronteras exteriores de la Unión Europea. En esta ciudad se han desarrollado a lo largo de los últimos treinta años dinámicas de gobierno de las fronteras marcadas por la imbricación entre las dinámicas securitarias y el humanitarismo. En este artículo se analiza, desde un punto de vista histórico y etnográfico, el desarrollo de las prácticas, formas de conocimiento e instituciones configuradas por la acción conjunta de actores securitarios y humanitarios. Se analiza con particular atención el desarrollo de las instituciones de acogida humanitaria y en especial el CETI (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes), y las prácticas humanitarias que refuerzan la capacidad de control y filtrado del gobierno de frontera.

Keywords: border governance, humanitarianism, detention, biopolitics

Introduction

The former colonial enclave of Ceuta has been, along with Melilla, the most visible symbol of "Fortress Europe" since the 1990s (Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas 2016). It has been compared to the gates of the "Rio Grande of Europe" (Carr 2012), the US border with Mexico, for its tragedy and cruelty (Bejarano et al. 2012). It is undeniable that Ceuta and Melilla have become central "stages" of the Spanish and European borders. The bordering process has had one of its most striking expressions in the spectacles (De Genova 2013) in Ceuta, being the basis for the "discourses of invasion" (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015:909), a myth that has been assumed in other European borders (Chouliaraki and Musarò 2017).

Located in North Africa, the city of Ceuta and its twin city Melilla are the only African territories of an EU Member State (excluding the Canary Islands) since Algeria became independent and ceased to be a French "province" shortly after the Treaty of Rome. With the independence of Morocco in 1956, Ceuta and

Melilla became two cities neither independent nor recognised as Spanish by the new Moroccan state. Ceuta had a traditional openness and contact with its regional surroundings; however, with the incorporation of Spain into the European Union (the European Community at the time, 1985), the city became key in the configuration of the common external borders of EUrope. From this time onwards, a government dynamic was established, aimed at accentuating the representation of "illegal" migrants as a threat to security, and fortification as a necessity not only for the Spanish State but also for Europe (Alexander 2019). Excluded from the Schengen Area despite being a territory of a Member State, the construction of the fences of Ceuta began in 1993 and was completed in 1995.

However, the configuration of these autonomous cities as borders has been a deeper and more complex process than their "fortification", focused on the construction of the fenced "border perimeters". Border studies have increasingly emphasised the complex dynamics linking securitarian and humanitarian practices in the configuration of border regimes. Several studies have analysed humanitarianism in this process elsewhere (Cuttitta 2018; Hess and Kasparek 2017; Tazzioli and Walters 2019). In this paper, I will discuss the interconnection and hybridisation of the securitarian and humanitarian logics, focusing on how the humanitarianism has become a key issue in order to understand the border governance and migration management in Ceuta.

After a presentation of the theoretical and methodological bases of the study, the paper is divided into four sections, completed by some brief conclusions. In the first section, the development of the first humanitarian actions in Ceuta, the incorporation of humanitarian actors into the governance of the border area and the development of "reception" practices, culminating in the creation of the CETI (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes—Centre for the Temporary Stay of Immigrants), are presented from a historical perspective. The second section completes the historical overview, focusing on the increased relevance of the humanitarian dimension in border governance and migration management that can be dated after the "El Tarajal Tragedy", an episode in which police forces acted with extreme violence to block a group of migrants attempting to swim into Ceuta. Thirdly, I will focus on the CETI as a key facility, analysing the characteristics of this place and the humanitarian detention of migrants. Finally, I will focus in the fourth section on the filtering process that humanitarian logic and practices contribute to define, in particular through the "biographical appraisal".

Humanitarianism and Border Governance in Ceuta

Humanitarianism has become a central dimension in global politics (Blanchet and Martin 2006; Fassin 2011). Border governance and migration management have been two dimensions of governance in which humanitarianism has had a notable influence. Humanitarianism has redefined the dynamics of borderwork. This paper will take a closer look at how "the border humanitarian practice, as a rationality of government with specific meanings and values about life and specific practices of intervention and assistance, is a form of borderwork producing particular

borders in particular ways" (Pallister-Wilkins 2017a:89). The practices of humanitarianism in Ceuta have been just as important as the security practices when it comes to building the regime of government on this border. While the institutions and mechanisms of securitarian practices in Ceuta have been analysed (Andersson 2014; Andreas and Snyder 2000; Fisher 2018), humanitarian institutions have been less studied.

This paper analyses how the process of securitisation has been accompanied by discursive and practical elements of humanitarianism that have shaped the borderwork (Pallister-Wilkins 2017a; Rumford 2006) in Ceuta. The dynamics of government applied combine the securitarian and humanitarian logics in a complex and interconnected way. This hybridisation is analysed with particular attention to its productive dimension, to the projects it brings into existence and to the practices it establishes.

Perspectives on humanitarianism have shown how the production of the victim is one of its central processes (Agier 2008; Feldman and Ticktin 2010). At Europe's borders (inside and outside the Schengenland borders; Albahari 2006), the subjects of necropolitics (Davies et al. 2017; Mbembé 2003) have become the victims in need of care, sine qua non of the irruption of humanitarian actors. At the conceptual level, the humanitarian construction of the victims of migration allows for a filtering process, constructing hierarchies of humanity (Fassin 2011) or hierarchies of victimhood (Lafaut and Coene 2019). Victimisation and humanitarian hierarchisation generate three problems for Ticktin (2016:264): the problems with innocency (the pure victim); emergency (the temporal perspective of crisis or emergencies); and compassion ("humanitarianism is about feelings rather than rights; it is about compassion, not entitlement").

The production of hierarchies of humanity in humanitarianism has met at the borders with the forms of hierarchisation of the migration management paradigm. The "categorical fetishism" (Crawley and Skleparis 2018), focusing on legal and administrative concepts, intersects with other processes of categorisation as gender categorisation and racialisation. Processes of humanitarian categorisation based on vulnerability and care are intertwined with a racialised and gendered representation of migrants. In this sense, Fassin (2007:501) defines humanitarianism as "politics of life":

> humanitarian intervention is also a politics of life, as I suggest to phrase it, in that it takes as its object the saving of individuals, which presupposes not only risking others but also making a selection of which existences it is possible or legitimate to save ... [It] is also a politics of life in that it takes as its object the defense of causes, which presupposes not only leaving other causes aside but also producing public representations of the human beings to be defended ...

What is interesting to note is how this connects with localised practices of confinement and care that humanitarian logic puts into operation. Thus, while the categories of humanitarianism at the conceptual level maintain a certain stability, the techniques and practices of localised governance are continually adapting to the challenges and migrant struggles, to the autonomy of migratory movements (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Mezzadra 2005; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). As

noted by Makaremi (2008:82), "At European borders, there are constant innovations in the daily reality of the field, introducing new experiences of control and subjectivation".

The techniques of humanitarianism that have been analysed most closely are those that focus on the construction of the body (Fassin 2012; Feldman and Ticktin 2010; Sanyal 2019) as the main source of legitimate knowledge. This paper focuses on what practices and techniques the participation of humanitarian actors and organisations in Ceuta's borderscape has shaped or generated. Thinking on the productive dimension of border tactics (De Genova 2017), it explores how humanitarian practices, techniques and dispositifs (Foucault 2009) contribute to restrict migrants' rights and facilitate the disruption, fractures and filtering process in Ceuta. It will aim at demonstrating "how social practices can engender domains of knowledge that not only give rise to new objects, concepts and techniques, but also give birth to entirely new forms of subjects and subjects of knowledge" (Foucault 1996:14).

In this paper I will analyse the CETI as a dispositive and the practices that generate knowledge domains related to the CETI. These practices are the basis of the everyday exercise of filtering and categorising migrants throughout medical examinations and biometric data records, the production of a special type of documentation and the exercise of a particular form of interrogation which I propose to call "biographical appraisal". The main contribution of this approach is to show how the encounter and hybridisation of different forms of knowledge-power take place in everyday life and how, through this process, specific subjectivities are defined. "Humanitarian detention", as a very specific and recent form of power, is produced and validated for reasons different than criminal detention, as it is based on very different forms of knowledge production, on different forms of knowledge-power. In this paper, I highlight the parallels and differences with the techniques of power through the biography of the disciplinary power as it has been exposed by Foucault (1996:252):

> The introduction of the "biographical" is important in the history of penality. Because it establishes the "criminal" as existing before the crime and even outside it … so one sees penal discourse and psychiatric discourse crossing each other's frontiers; and there, at their point of junction, is formed the notion of the "dangerous" individual, which makes it possible to draw up a network of causality in terms of an entire biography and to present a verdict of punishment-correction.

In this sense, the paper proposes to analyse how humanitarian logic has played a central role in the configuration of current governance dynamics in Ceuta, and how it has interconnected with security logic to produce, "at their point of junction", the current governance and the borderwork taking place at the CETI.

Methodology

The ethnographic field work on which this analysis is based has been developed through multiple field stays between 2015 and 2019. My entry into the field was marked by the so-called "Tragedy of El Tarajal",[1] and by the demonstration then

organised by the APDHA. My main approach has been participant observation, working with several local humanitarian organisations (mainly Digmun, Elín, Pedagogía Ciudadana, and groups of independent volunteers) operating on the basis of "volunteer humanitarism" (Sandri 2018), with very few professionalised workers, either because of internal decisions or due to their link with the religious sphere. As a starting strategy in my ethnographic research, I have accompanied humanitarian and human rights organisations visiting Ceuta, participated in their actions as well as lived in the urban areas most frequented by migrants which allowed an informal contact with them to be established.

Depending on the context, I preferred to conduct formal or informal interviews, keeping a written record when recording was not possible. The information gathered in the interviews is triangulated with the information gathered through the documentary analysis (Quinn Patton 2014), applying a "hermeneutical approach" (Vollmer 2017) to the border as a sociocultural process. In collaboration with filmmaker Nicolás Braguinsky Cascini, I directed "Solidarity Crime: The Borders of Democracy",[2] an independent documentary on the prosecution of solidarity actors in the borderlands of Europe, including Ceuta. This artistic collaboration took place at the end of my ethnographic fieldwork, and interviews with key actors and migrants were filmed.

Thanks to the length of this fieldwork, I was able to re-interview the key informants years later. I met migrants who were blocked in Ceuta and was able to see how some managed to succeed in their migration and life projects. I was further able to interview security actors, both in formal contexts and in informal frameworks, as well as police officers who, in a personal capacity and wishing to remain anonymous, have told me what their views are on the dynamics of border control in Ceuta.

Besides the Fences, the Humanitarian Reception: Renounce the Right to Asylum or Remain Trapped in Ceuta

At the end of the 1980s and 1990s in Ceuta there were episodes of extreme violence against black sub-Saharan migrants in Ceuta (especially the episode in El Angulo Walls)[3] and the fences' construction began (Pallister-Wilkins 2017b). As Saddiki (2010:4) explains, "the fences around the two enclaves, ... [were] the first European walls that were built after the destruction of the Berlin wall".

At the same time, the government began to create the reception system, both in Ceuta and Melilla and in peninsular Spain. The "Special Program of Reception and Access to Employment for Sub-Saharan Immigrants from Ceuta and Melilla"[4] was conceived as an ad hoc solution. It was a fundamental precedent for two reasons. Firstly, it began to configure the reception model based on the geographical dispersion of migrants. The system imposed a form of "containment through mobility" (Tazzioli 2017) in which migrants were "welcomed", forced to reside in a territory to be tutored by a humanitarian organisation. Secondly, the organisations created a network of humanitarian organisations on whom the effectiveness

of the government on migrants largely depends, through a fundamental linkage with institutions from that time to the present.

> The NGOs involved in the reception were: ACCEM. ANDALUCÍA ACOGE, CÁRITAS ESPAÑOLA, CEAR, CEPAIM, CRUZ ROJA, FAIN … Once the operation that did not give the expected result of decongestion of the cities was finished, the situation was reconsidered and it was agreed that before February 22, 1998, all of them would be transferred to the peninsula, except those that were undergoing legal proceedings or those that could not do so due to illness. This extraordinary operation comprises 1,418 immigrants and the NGOs that take them in are the same as in the first one … In 1999 Operation Departures was resumed, with some changes in the conditions of reception. (Bel Adell and Gómez Fayrén 2000)

A key issue was the campisation (Kreichauf 2018), the establishment of camp-based reception. In parallel to the "Special Programme", it was decided to create specific structures for the "emergency reception" of migrants in Ceuta. The projection of urgency is a key component of the forms of government at the humanitarian borders (Ramsay 2020:392), which depoliticised the situation of destitution of migrants and "dehistorised" their presence (Malkki 1996). It also made migrants dependent on humanitarian assistance while representing a response by the government to respect their human rights (reduced to basic needs). At the end of 1995, camps were created to welcome the migrants. In Ceuta the Calamo-carro[5] camp was born, which (ironically) reused an abandoned space that was originally a camp of the Spanish Falange Youth Organisation during the dictator Franco era. These facilities were active until the CETIs replaced them.

In 2000, the CETI in Ceuta was inaugurated, a year later than its twin in Melilla. These centres were presented as a humanitarian measure to guarantee the reception and care of migrants arriving in the autonomous cities, explicitly contrasting the CETIs with the Foreigners' Internment Centres (CIEs) that operated in the peninsula and Canary Islands (Solanes Corella 2016). It is interesting to understand how this policy was carried out taking into account in a reflexive way the configuration of the milieu (O'Grady 2013), as a physical-social space. The contention of migrants was carried out because the situation of Ceuta and Melilla as an enclave did not allow free movement to other Spanish or European regions, and because the autonomous cities had received a special status, remaining outside the Schengen area. Migrants were blocked in the autonomous cities without the need to deprive them of their freedom, as Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas (2016:529) explain: "The city hence functions as the CETI's backyard. Immigrants can move freely within the city, but they cannot freely leave it. They are isolated, trapped, immobilised in Ceuta". The humanitarian reception is a strategy of containment (Tazzioli and Garelli 2020).[6] The visual image of the CETI is very similar to Fassin's (2011:138) description of another place where humanitarian and security governance were articulated: "The space of Sangatte was structured and occupied by a dual institutional presence: the Red Cross, with its offices, infirmary, and volunteers, and the French police, with its company of riot officers, overhead surveillance stations, and discreet but quite visible presence around and inside the hangar".

The creation of the CETI takes place in parallel with the intensification of the so-called *devoluciones en caliente* (push-backs for which Spain has been internationally condemned repeatedly; González García 2015; Sánchez Tomás 2018). These expulsions became a common practice in the fortified perimeters of Ceuta. The "hunter-prey" relations (Andersson 2014; Vaughan-Williams 2015) between security actors, both Moroccan and Spanish, and migrants around these border perimeters were intensifying. To escape this "hunting", the migrants had to go over the fence, bypass the agents in charge of surveillance and reach the CETI, which is far from the main residential areas and also quite distant from the points of entry. The paradox arises when we see that migrants must reach the CETI, which are humanitarian structures but are controlled and managed mainly by the securitarian actors.

However, CETI is both a place of detention and a place of resistance, where migrants can reorganise themselves and create networks to continue their migration project. This paper focuses on the dynamics of government that are exercised over migrants in border areas to show how humanitarian dynamics have been configured. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that migrant groups develop strategies, create networks, and appropriate spaces (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015; Rodriguez 2013; Rygiel 2011); in short, they are not submissive objects of government, but rather actors with their own agendas. Although this dimension is recognised as fundamental, I focus on government strategies because I believe that part of the commitment of critical social sciences is not only to give voice to the silenced, but to highlight how speechless subjects are constructed. In this case, an analysis of the differential inclusion/exclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:191) borderwork in Ceuta focusing on the humanitarian practices is proposed. Humanitarian detention is the albeit of these practices, but the production of knowledge, the production of documentation and care practices are crucial in the (re)production of differential inclusion/exclusion.

Once in the CETI, migrants had two options: (1) to apply for asylum and remain in detention until the bureaucratic procedure for their application was resolved; or (2) not to apply for asylum, remaining as an irregular migrant and waiting an expulsion procedure against them. As opposed to what we may think, the configuration of the context of Ceuta as "open-air detention center", "sweet prisons" (Migreurop 2010), led to a situation where, for years, most migrants avoided applying for asylum. The decision was mediated by two fundamental issues relating to the possibility of being deported and the length of time spent in Ceuta.

The application for asylum in Ceuta was a slow process, with a low recognition rate (according to CEAR [2020], in 2019 Spain only granted the refugee status to one in 20 applicants).[7] In addition, there was a practice of holding back asylum seekers. The government delegations of the autonomous cities applied practices whereby asylum seekers had to remain in the cities awaiting the resolution of asylum applications, imposing a restriction on the mobility of asylum seekers and limiting their freedom of movement, in breach of national and international law (Amnistía Internacional 2016). The violation of the right to freedom of movement

of asylum-seekers remains a current practice, despite numerous court victories in claiming this right (CEAR 2017; SJM 2018).

The average period of stay of an asylum seeker was of one year (according to my informants), but there have been cases of asylum seekers who have been waiting for more than two years for the decision on their file. In contrast, those who were designated as "irregular immigrants" were transferred to the mainland much faster, in usually less than six months depending on whether: (a) an expulsion order was issued against him/her, and he/she was transferred to a CIE on the peninsula from which he/she would be "free" after 60 days; (b) the CETI's "reception" capacity was exceeded by the arrival of new migrants, and some were transferred either to a CIE or to a centre run by an NGO (in many circumstances they were simply abandoned on the peninsula with indications of the NGOs they could turn to for assistance; APDHA 2019).

During this period Spain intensified its policy of "readmission agreements" with African countries (Asín Cabrera 2008; Marcu 2010; at the European level, see Cassarino 2010, 2014), especially after the "cayuco crisis" and the first Africa Plan (2006–2008) (Romero 2011). With the entry into force of the readmission agreements, nationals of countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Senegal or Mauritania (Amnesty International 2008; Casas-Cortes et al. 2016) were living a difficult situation as migrants in an irregular situation. For Moroccans and Algerians, it was absolutely necessary to apply for asylum to avoid being deported in express procedures. For others, the choice was difficult and risky: depending on the country of origin, there was a greater or lesser chance of being deported once the deportation order was received.

Governance dynamics had created a framework by which migrants were forced to choose between a long period of immobility and the renunciation of rights to international protection. This was not a matter of individual choice but a collective construction of practices, resulting from the normative framework, the day-to-day governance, the membership of national groups and the articulation of readmission policies at the inter-State or EU level, with third States/supranational institutions (such as the Cotonou agreements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries; Bialasiewicz 2012).

The Reinforcement of the Humanitarian Dimension in Border Governance

In February 2014, a group of black sub-Saharan migrants tried to enter Ceuta through El Tarajal border during the night. Before reaching the borderline, the Moroccan gendarmerie arrested the vast majority of them. The few who arrived at the crossing point found a strong police presence on the Spanish side and decided to try crossing the sea. The objective was to swim over the stretch of coast that supports the fences of the Spanish-Moroccan border. A group of 200 people were part of the attempt to enter; they were approaching the coast of El Tarajal beach (Spanish side) at dawn. The Guardia Civil (Spanish gendarmerie), on instructions from the commandant, carried out an extremely violent intervention using anti-riot material, shooting rubber balls and tear gas on the migrants

while they swam to shore.[8] 15 people were killed by this intervention. While they were drowning from the contusions caused by the anti-riot ammunition and the poisoning produced by the gas boats, a rigid boat and a Guardia Civil zodiac were with them at sea and the security agents decided not to carry out any rescue action. The survivors, once they arrived at El Tarajal beach, found the police that "push-backed" them to Moroccan territory, handed them over to the Moroccan gendarmerie.

Since the "Tragedy of El Tarajal", part of the government's strategy in relation to migration management in Ceuta was to strengthen the commitment to humanitarian assistance for migrants. The humanitarian spectacle of reception and protection intensified as a symbolic display that sought to show the compatibility between violent border control practices and humanitarian practices protecting vulnerable migrants and asylum-seekers. So, "exceptional humanitarian policies that show sympathy towards a small number of undocumented migrants temper and reinforce more widespread exclusionary immigration policies" (Williams 2015:14). The link is more evident if one connects the attempts to enter European territory with the "wave of violence" suffered by black sub-Saharan migrants since the signing of the summer 2013 Morocco-EU agreements (Gross-Wyrtzen 2020).

Three humanitarian practices took on great importance from this moment on. First, the improvement of the CETI as a place of humanitarian reception, subsuming humanitarian actors from diverse NGOs into the staff, and declaring its special vocation in defence of the most vulnerable. It meant that humanitarian organisations were able to start working in the CETI. However, the organisations that became an integral part of the centre's structural scheme were professional humanitarian organisations, many of which did not have consolidated work teams in Ceuta and hired staff to manage new requests to assist migrants in different areas. The ones recruited were generally volunteers in other organisations, which were traditionally the most politically active for migrants' rights in Ceuta (fieldwork). The result was that humanitarian organisations lost not only key volunteers but, in several cases, their leaders, project coordinators and even founders. In addition, being hired by certain humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross, imposed a contractual obligation to refrain from participating in political movements.[9]

Secondly, in response to criticism on the impossibility to apply for asylum for migrants "rejected at the border", in 2015 the government opened an office for international protection applications in Ceuta, at El Tarajal border crossing point (another office was also established in Melilla at the Beni Enzar border crossing point). The staffing of the new office was done in coordination with UNHCR, as an institutional humanitarian actor legitimised by its expertise in international protection management, at a time when the first Syrian asylum seekers were arriving in Ceuta during the "refugee crisis". However, in order to access the office, migrants had to pass through the controls at the Moroccan border crossing point. The gendarmerie only allowed people with permits to access Ceuta or Melilla (as residents or with valid visa permits), but not asylum seekers. It created a de facto exclusion of black sub-Saharan migrants (Sánchez and Sánchez 2017;

Tyszler 2019) and a web of corruption in the buying and selling of permits (authentic and falsified), as well as direct bribes to the Moroccan authorities.[10]

Thirdly, a protocol for joint action by the Guardia Civil and the Red Cross was created in Ceuta, aiming at providing humanitarian assistance to migrants before they were turned back at the border. According to this protocol, migrants were "controlled" by Red Cross agents, who provided emergency assistance and, if they detected any case of serious injury, transferred the wounded to the hospital. In this way, it was through the joint work of security and humanitarian actors that push-backs took place "with respect for the human rights of the migrants". According to Enrique,[11] a health worker who participated as a Red Cross volunteer in the ERIE (Emergency Immediate Response Team), the procedure was that, when a "jump" occurred, the Guardia Civil alerted the Red Cross so that it could send assistance. In this example of integrated security-humanitarian practices, It is very relevant to point out how humanitarianism exercises a filtering process, applying its minimalist interpretation of human rights, which are reduced to the right to life:

> We respect the principle of the Guardia Civil, who are primarily interested in the welfare of migrants. If they are in heaven [the migrants who remain perched on the fence], if they do not touch the ground, they are not in Spain, just as the migrants between the fences are not in Spain. Once they enter Spain, we take care of the wounded. The main role is to assist the injured and determine who can be taken into police custody and who should be sent to hospital because their lives may be in danger if they are sent to Morocco.

However, the connection between security and humanitarian actors generates inevitable tensions between them. Enrique referred to the contradictions that this collaboration generated. On the one hand, he pointed out, the Guardia Civil agents are the first to be concerned about migrants' security and their well-being. The officers were particularly appreciated, and it was pointed out that because of "the violence of migrants in the last jumps", they too often needed emergency health care. On the other hand, however, he noted that there were difficulties: "We volunteers are very committed to migrants and want to help them. The thing is that we cannot send them all to the hospital, because otherwise the Guardia Civil would not call us back". The case is an example of how, when integrating into borderwork, humanitarian organisations must gauge their "commitment" to the security interests of the actors with whom they are associated.

If the logic behind European border governance is a hybrid product of securitarian and humanitarian logic (De Genova 2017), it is interesting to note how the predominant organisations are generally the security ones that adopt practices, ways of generating and validating knowledge and humanitarian workers in their operations. On the contrary, the humanitarian organisations that have been best integrated into the European border regime are those that are able to link their practices and forms of knowledge to securitarian objectives, particularly by making themselves indispensable to the functioning of places of detention and by incorporating methods for identifying offenders in their process of categorising vulnerable people. These forms of hybridisation can be seen particularly clearly in the case of the CETI in Ceuta.

CETI, a Place of Humanitarian Detention

In 2018, through the project The Routes of Solidarity,[12] I had the opportunity to join a group of international observers with the then director of CETI just months before his mandate ended (August 2018), Ricardo Espíritu y Navarro. He is a military man by training, who served in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. He has been described as the "Knight Templar who rules the immigrant center of Ceuta" (see de la Cal and Ananou 2017). Before meeting with him, I had learned about the structure of the CETI through interviews with migrants and other key actors, especially humanitarian workers who regularly collaborated with some activity inside the centre. Despite my previous knowledge, this interview was fundamental, as it showed in a direct way the institutional logic of these places of humanitarian detention, the consolidation of securitarian and humanitarian hybridisation.

The staff that integrated the centre were divided into three fundamental areas. The first was the security area, composed of a variable group of agents from the National Police and the Guardia Civil, who carried out surveillance and control activities, but also intelligence activities, related to the "fight against trafficking and smuggling networks". Acquiring knowledge about trafficking networks as a definition of the main target of securitarian actors is an objective that serves to strengthen collaboration between humanitarian and securitarian actors, as has been analysed in other contexts (Garelli and Tazzioli 2018; Scheel and Ratfisch 2014). The fight against "criminal networks" can be established as a shared point, justifying confinement as a necessity for the protection of victims. As we will see in the case of women in confinement, this definition has a specific weight on migrants in their definition as subjects.

Secondly, the "social work" department was staffed by a group of workers who depended to varying degrees on the centre. In the department there were eight social workers and two health workers (a physician and a technician) as public employees; these public workers, directly dependent on the centre, were joined by teams from different organisations to which a wide range of services had been outsourced. The main organisations, whose participation was structural to the very functioning of the CETI, were: (a) the Red Cross, in charge of the "integration" sub-area, providing services in psychology, education and entertainment/sports; and (b) CEAR, in charge of the sub-area of legal assistance, a service dedicated exclusively to asylum seekers identified by the department of social work. The third and last department was the "residence" department, responsible for providing basic cleaning, food and maintenance services. This department was subcontracted to private companies.

The "reception" for people arriving at CETI involved a series of steps. First, migrants were checked by the National Police, who took their personal and biometric details, and by the Red Cross, which monitored their general health and cared for the injured. They were then distributed clothing kits, which were donated by individuals through charities. They were given a meal, and shifts were established for all new arrivals to shower. Despite the well-intentioned character, the experience was in many cases traumatic, as one young man explained to me:

> I don't speak French well, and no one spoke Wolof. A friend was acting as an inter-preter for me. I was very happy when I arrived at CETI because I was finally in Europe ... but I was very scared by the control of the police and then the doctor. I had to undress, they made me take a shower in the middle of the night with cold water, because I was already one of the last ones and there was no hot water left. I didn't understand what they were telling us and there weren't beds for everyone. I remem-ber that the first night I spent here was very hard, I was very cold and I had to sleep on the floor. I don't know ... it was a very strange feeling. I had made it but I couldn't stop thinking about what was going to happen to me now. (Young man, Cameroon)

I argue that the implicit violence of this recognition process is shaped by the incorporation of humanitarian logic and practices in the CETI. Firstly, because the importance attributed to the care of the body is a humanitarian attribution, derived from the imposition of the morality of care for life. As Ticktin (2014:276) stated, the "role of the suffering body as the best and most legitimate source for claims-making and legal and political recognition has since been illustrated in multiple contexts". Secondly, because this concern for physical protection is exer-cised through body search, the same technique that allows for the capture of bio-metric data. The moral imposition of care (Agier 2011) at the localised level reinforces the production of biometric data, which serves as a basis for the expert knowledge of humanitarian and security actors in a wide range of fields, including the legislative and high politics (Amoore 2006, 2009; Pallister-Wilkins 2016).

These forms of shared knowledge are combined, at the local level, in specific practices and devices. After this recognition process, migrants were then given an "identity card", an identification document with the photo and the data of the person: "As they usually do not bring any other documentation, the police ask them for these cards when they find them wandering around the city, to know who they are and to have a check on those who are moving around in the most problematic areas, such as some parts of the port" (Espíritu y Navarro).

The documentation—which is taken away once they are sent to mainland Spain—vehiculate different forms of knowledge and controls that go beyond the needs of knowing the residents' identity. In fact, as the same young Cameroonian explained to me, the documentation is hardly used for control at the entrances during the day (only at night). A year and a half after his departure from CETI, having received refugee status and as a collaborator of different organisations in campaigns against racism, the young man visited Ceuta; he went to CETI by him-self:

> I passed the checkpoint and entered CETI. I am black so no one asked me anything [laughs] ... so I went to the janitor, who was a very nice man and I laughed a lot with him. So I said to him: "You remember me, don't you?" Since I was well dressed, with short hair and everything, he had trouble recognising me. We laughed a lot and then he said to the policeman at the door: "Hey, you're letting anyone in here! He's not from here anymore." He said it as a joke but the policeman's face turned white [laughs]. If you want to go in they won't let you, because they don't want you to see how it is there, which is very bad. But since I'm black to them I'm just another one, they're so racist that I don't know what to make of it. We're all the same!

This case, although anecdotal, shows us how the documentation has a more relevant utility than just a means of direct control for access. It is a way to generate knowledge about the dynamics of groups in the city environment and about their relationship patterns. At the same time, it replaces other forms of documentation or, better said, it allows forms of control and knowledge to be exercised without the need to grant other forms of documentation that have legal validity at the state level and imply implicit recognition of rights.

The existence of a separate CETI documentation allowed the institutional practice of creating a "hostile environment" (Aris Escarcena 2019; Edmond-Pettitt 2019; Wardle and Obermuller 2019) for migrants, denying the possibility of access to administrative identification and limiting their rights to access any administrative procedure autonomously. The migrants cannot apply for a residence card in Ceuta, nor register in the census. The CETI's documentation stains the process of categorisation by defining who will and who will not have access to other forms of documentation through their inclusion or exclusion from the channels for recognition of their stay and rights. Characterised by the inclusion of humanitarianism in the border regime, the only way to gain access to a situation of recognition of rights is through being considered a refugee, as a victim of a tragedy (Rygiel 2016). However, despite the fact that the majority of migrants passing through the CETI will be categorised as "economic migrants" or outright "illegal", the construction of the tragedy of migration and the victimisation of those who have overcome the border's violence is of central importance. As Sciurba and Furri (2018:769) have expressed, "the humanitarian objectives ... are used to justify the proliferation of differentiated categories of migrants, rather than for bolstering the rights of each individual subject of law".

Categorise Migrants through "Biographical Appraisal"

The CETI was conceived as a border, a place of filtering where they should identify who the "residents" were, as Espíritu y Navarro insisted on calling them, "Residents, not immigrants. Everyone here is illegal". This was done through an interview with the social department, where they were asked "why do they come to Europe and how and where do they come from; this way vulnerable cases can be identified". The aim was to differentiate between victims and non-victims, between vulnerable people and people who wanted to "enter the country illegally". The aim of analysing "illegal" entry was linked to the intelligence work of finding out the "trafficking and smuggling networks", as "none of those present here [CETI] has ever arrived without paying a criminal organisation between € 3,000 and 10,000" (Espíritu y Navarro). The criminality of the "illegals" is thus connected to the forms of international organised crime in the management of "reception" spaces. In this sense, the configuration of the CETI allows for the (re) production of a "truth" by the securitarian actors "in order to give 'one' meaning to the migration referent in structuring a network of meanings with security concerns" (Bigo 2002:76). What I am interested in highlighting is how filtering and truth production have been shaped differently by the inclusion of humanitarian

actors in CETI, and in particular through the redefinition of the interview as a technique.

The "personal interview" is established as the possibility for migrants to present their personal history to the authorities. This type of practice is a central form of knowledge generation for humanitarian actors. The migrants are forced to go through a process of interrogation or, rather, a "biographical confession" (Foucault 1996), in which the agents and CETI workers evaluate the facts described on the basis of specific evidence and witnesses, but also the veracity of the evidence on some other basis, such as the way in which an event is narrated, the apparent affection of the subject in the face of this traumatic event, the consistency of it with psychological patterns of other victims, or parallels with other narratives, etc. It is not an "investigation" or an "examination" (Foucault 1996), it is a particular technique of humanitarianism that I propose to define as "biographical appraisal". The particularity of the "biographical appraisal" is best understood in relation to the objective of identifying and categorising specific groups through CETI interviews. The first distinction is that of victims and perpetrators, vulnerable and "illegals". Within the "vulnerable", three specific categories were established: asylum seekers, minors and women.

The differentiation between "illegals" and asylum seekers was made through the answers to the basic questions about why they migrated to Europe. It has already been pointed out that migrants often adopted as a strategy not to apply for asylum: "I have applied for asylum because I have been thinking about it for a long time … but most people do not do it, because this way you leave for Spain faster. I've been here for ten months already, but my friends I arrived with left after four months …" (Young man, Casamance, Senegal). However, discouraging asylum is a practice that is promoted by the CETI institution itself. As this same young man explained to me, the questions asked in the interview were often biased or asked directly to confuse:

> When you arrive they don't ask you if you want to apply for asylum, but why you come. For example, they ask you if you want to work or if you are here to help your family. We all come because we want to work. We don't understand why you can't want to work and be a refugee … you have to be lucky to find a good worker, who explains to you, because if you answer sincerely you might be saying something you don't have to say …

The exclusionary dynamic is not an accidental effect of a problem in communication, but a practice that has become structural in the dispositives of first. Like what has been analysed in the case of the Italian "hotspots", these conditional interviews seek to reduce the number of people who can access international protection through disinformation and even deception. As Ansems de Vries et al. (2016:5) point out:

> The form does not list war or persecution as an explicit option; it would fall under "other reasons" … Those giving the "wrong" answer, and/or having the "wrong" nationality, were given a so-called "seven-day decree" … without having been granted the opportunity to claim asylum.

The second vulnerable group was minors. Just as applying for asylum was problematic, as it meant being trapped in Ceuta, so it was equally problematic to declare oneself a minor, as becoming a ward of the state in this context meant entering the city's overcrowded juvenile centres and staying there until one came of age (Barbulescu and Grugel 2016; Queirolo Palmas 2019; Rinaldi 2019). There is no special program for them and many become "illegal" when they turn 18. For young adolescents it was often more interesting to declare themselves of age and to wait for the early transfer to peninsular Spain. Since bone measurement tests were not decisive, the only basis for determining their age was the young people's own declaration in the interviews. Social workers, health workers and psychologists have as one of their main objectives to detect minors who declared themselves to be of age, in order to "protect" them:

> In recent months there has been a drop in the age of migrants, in my opinion a third of the residents here are under age. We are trying to identify them so that we can put them under the guardianship of the city and state authorities … It is very difficult in most cases, because they are not children; they are already big kids with moustaches [laughs]. The only way is through interviews, looking for clues. For example: "What do you want to be when you get to the peninsula?" "Football player." That's a minor! (Espíritu y Navarro)

The third group of vulnerable people was women. Unlike the previous groups, membership of this group was automatic for all women: "100% of the women in this centre are trafficked for sex work" (Espíritu y Navarro). However, this was a statement that was not based on the women's own claim to protection: "None of them declare that they are victims of trafficking. We rely on international indicators to determine who is a victim. Women are a very minority group in CETI, in 2017 and 2018 they were only a little more than 5% of the people who had passed through the centre".

Women arriving at CETI are, from 2016, detained for their own protection: "If we transfer them to Spain, which is what was done before, we lose track of them forever. Now we have started a program in collaboration with the local authorities. So the women stay here as long as possible, six months. I want them to stay with me, especially the victims of trafficking, because I can give them support, which in the peninsula is very difficult to provide" (Espiritu y Navarro). In fact, the stay in the CETI is counted as equivalent to the maximum period in which a migrant can be detained in the expulsion centres (CIE), implicitly recognising the use of the CETI as a place of humanitarian detention.

Despite the victimisation and detention for protection, women were still being suspected and treated as "illegals". This treatment of suspicion is clearly perceived when the issue of motherhood is analysed. The concept used by the workers was "Anchor-Baby": women who arrived at the centre with a baby were not automatically recognised as being the mother of the baby, but a check was made on them. When the birth took place in the CETI, the mother's maternity was accepted (she was pregnant) but the paternity of the mother's partner was doubted. As Nina Sahraoui (2020) has shown, the humanitarian configuration of borders does not mean that women (and

minors) are automatically privileged; in this case, the link between humanitarian morality and the dynamics of gender and racialisation are intertwined and impose specific penalties on women in their process of constructing vulnerability and victimhood. In this way, "the gendered construction of victimisation denies the agency of the individual, while allowing for justification of 'humanitarian' border policies designed to restrict migration through increasingly closed borders" (Gordon 2016:2).

The fight against human trafficking, which becomes the epitome of illegal mobility and is defined by the suffering and vulnerability of the victims, is a key point in explaining the overlapping of securitarian and humanitarian logics, as well as humanitarian detention practices. Several intellectuals have recently opened a debate on the alleged passivity of trafficked persons and the agency capacity of the represented "(pure) victims", touching on the link with the construction of gender and new migration control policies (Andrijasevic 2009). In the Spanish context, the contribution of Martín Díaz (2004) and Mestre i Mestre (2004) stands out.

Beyond this debate, it is necessary to understand how the humanitarian conceptualisation of trafficking has been incorporated into the dynamics of migration governance, related to containing the threat of "illegal" migration, fighting the criminals linked to "illegal" migration and protecting the victims of these criminals. Trafficking has been of fundamental importance in creating a link not only between securitarian and humanitarian logics (Militello and Spena 2015; van der Leun and van Schijndel 2016) but also between the actors in these fields themselves, between their practices of information gathering and the generation and validation of knowledge about migration phenomena.

Conclusions

This paper has shown how humanitarianism has shaped the nature of border practices and techniques, of borderscape itself, in three ways. First, in the configuration of reception institutions, highlighting the campisation of reception and the construction of the CETI as a hybrid institution, which improved reception conditions while facilitating control. Secondly, the participation of humanitarian actors in borderline control operations. The inclusion of humanitarian practices in the militarised border controls is due to the particularity of Ceuta, but it highlights the limits of cooperation between logics, practices and actors. Thirdly, in the techniques of control and production of knowledge developed inside the CETI. These aim to analyse: (a) the body (physical and psychological) through medical examinations and biometric data records; (b) the biography, through "biographical appraisal"; and (c) the guardianship of the legal person, through the production of a special type of documentation. In all these practices, the production of knowledge about the subjects is of fundamental importance, linked to the construction of the victim and the risks.

These localised practices are especially important, as they are the concretisation of the political construction of humanitarian borderwork and migration

management. The practices and techniques analysed reveal how, at a micro level, the configuration of hierarchies of humanity and their link to the limitation of migrants' rights are produced. In their daily application, well-meaning CETI workers or volunteers providing medical assistance contribute directly to the limitation of migrants' rights. This is an effect of the ways of conceptualising, of knowing and of representing this knowledge in a series of humanitarian categories. In the case of Ceuta, the analysis of humanitarian practices and techniques reveals the flexible nature of the border as an always unfinished process in which categories of differential inclusion/exclusion and the legitimacy of physical and symbolic violence are renegotiated.

Acknowledgements

Endnotes

[1] The "Tragedy of El Tarajal" is discussed in depth further on in the article.

[2] The trailer is available here: https://youtu.be/_O6RjEiH378 (last accessed 16 June 2021).

[3] In late 1995, migrants organised a demonstration. The response was brutal: police charges against the migrants, who were also beaten by Ceuta citizens with sticks, gunshots ... (see APDHA 2014; SOS Racismo 2006).

[4] See http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/PopUpCGI?CMD=VERLSTand BASE=puw6andDOCS=1-1andQUERY=(CDP199709240103.CODI.) (last accessed 21 May 2021).

[5] The Calomocarro camp was described in the book *Las voces del estrecho* (Sorel 2000) as "the anteroom of death" and compared to concentration camps.

[6] "By 'containment', we refer to the effects of mobility disruption, spatial fixation and temporal suspension that are generated through measures of confinement that do not coincide with detention" (Tazzioli and Garelli 2020:1010).

[7] The recognition rate, according to official figures, is particularly low for sub-Saharan asylum seekers: of the 7227 asylum seekers in 2018, only 170 received protection under refugee status and 136 under subsidiary protection. It means that only 4.2% have received any kind of protection (see http://www.interior.gob.es/web/archivos-y-documentacion/docume ntacion-y-publicaciones/publicaciones-descargables/extranjeria-y-asilo/asilo-en-cifras [last accessed 16 June 2021]).

[8] For a detailed account, with numerous testimonies from survivors, see Colectivo Caminando Fronteras (2014).

[9] One of my informants resigned from his volunteer activity but also from his activity as a member of a political party because the humanitarian organisation considered it to be "incompatible" with his commitment to political neutrality. The pressure to resign from his political post came a few months after he was hired.

[10] Omar Naji, president of the Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights, Nador Section (AMDH Nador); interview filmed for the documentary project "Solidarity Crime: The Borders of Democracy" (see https://youtu.be/Ms3WZGOJk2M [last accessed 16 June 2021]).

[11] The name is fictional.

[12] I thank APDHA for allowing me to accompany them (see https://www.apdha.org/solida rity-route/ [last accessed 16 June 2021]).

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