PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

JACINTO CHOZA

PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

To my daughter Irene

To those who have shared philosophy with me,
With whom I have learnt and taught.

Jacinto Prieto del Rey (†)
Jesús Arellano (†)
Leonardo Polo (†)
Lambros Comitas
Alexander Broadie
Nicolas Grimaldi
Gorka V. Arregi (†)
María Elósegui
Daniel Innerarity
Manuel Fontán
Higinio Marín
María García Amilburu
Jesús de Garay
Javier Hernández-Pacheco
Gemma Vicente Arregui
Montserrat Negre
Manuel Pavón (†)
Ignacio Aymerich
Francisco Rodríguez Valls
Carlos Durán
Juan José Padial
Alberto Ciria
Antonio de Diego
Jesús Fernández Muñoz
Juan Carlos Polo

And the resourceful creatures see clearly
that we are not really at home
in the interpreted world. Perhaps there remains
some tree on a slope, that we can see
again each day: there remains to us yesterday's street,
and the thinned-out loyalty of a habit
that liked us, and so stayed, and never departed.

RILKE: *Duino Elegies, First Elegy*, vv. 10-17.

Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind
Cannot bear very much reality.
Time past and time future
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.

ELIOT, T.S.: *Four Quartets, Burnt Norton*, vv. 42-46

CONTENTS

FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

In this philosophical study, culture is first broken down into four primary spheres, pertaining to creative knowledge and practices: religion, politics, law and economics. Then, it is divided into four secondary spheres, those belonging to descriptive knowledge and practices: technique, art, science and wisdom.

The formation of these primary spheres amongst the hunter-gatherer tribes of the Palaeolithic era is analysed, followed by its differentiation in the Neolithic era. At the same time the differentiation between family and civil society was produced, and then the differentiation between the secondary cultural spheres during the Chalcolithic, at the same moment that differentiation between family, civil society and state was generated.

It examines the Palaeolithic mind and logic, continuing the exposition of the development of human rationality from the Neolithic right up to the end of modernity, and concludes with a description of the mind and logic in the global world, in a new opening that offers analogies to the Palaeolithic.

This research project arose during a seminar with history students at the Universidad Tres de Febrero in Buenos Aires in 2011, and was planned to be carried out in three stages. One would be dedicated to philosophy of culture, another to philosophy of art, and the other to philosophy of religion.

In 2013, the first edition of *Philosophy of Culture* emerged, followed by a second edition in 2014. In 2015, *Philosophy of Art and Communication: Theory of Interface* was published. Philosophy of religion was divided into five parts, the first of which was published in 2016, in *El culto originario: La religion paleolitica*, followed by the second volume in 2017, *La moral originaria: La religion neolitica*, and the third in 2018, *La revela-*

cion originaria: La religion de la Edad de los Metales. The fourth volume, *La oracion originaria: La religion de la Antiguëdad*, is in progress and will probably be released in 2019, and the fifth, *Religión oficial y religión personal en la época histórica*, may be published in 2020.

Philosophy of Culture, as it appeared in 2014, with its programmatical and synthetic character, offers an understanding of mankind and of humanity, bringing to life the species' entire maturation process using their expressions of self. The later studies of art, communication and religion, widen and polish the theses formulated in 2014 from the perspective of these key features of culture and of mankind.

An initial idea allows development in other ways which can have equally fruitful results, as has been demonstrated in recent studies about law and about technique.

These reasons, as well as others, catalysed the creation of an English-language edition of *Philosophy of Culture*, beginning with a group of alumni from the University of North Carolina, who completed a study abroad year at the University of Seville in 2014, and was concluded by another group of foreign students enrolled at the University of Malaga between 2015 and 2017.

I want to record my gratitude here, firstly to the translators from the University of North Carolina in Sevilla: Miranda Arias, Gabrielle Scott, Kane Hollingsworth, Emily Latham, Allison Wall and the Puerto-Rican Mónica. Secondly, I give thanks to the translators from the University of Malaga: Lea Daugaard, Julie Holt Pedersen, Emily Franco-Tobin, Yuka Chikamatsu, Juliana Baptista Sullivan, Rebecca Lawton, Stacey Roach, N. Freeman and Milena Candido Vendrasco.

Furthermore, there are those who worked on the revision and homogenisation of the texts of these translations: Daniel Gete, formerly of the University of Seville, Beatriz Caballero Rodriguez, formerly of the University of Malaga, and Witold Wolny of the University of Virginia, College at Weise. They did so selflessly and purely out of friendship, and I want to offer my deepest thanks for the hours of work that they dedicated to this work, now some years ago.

The most recent completion of the task has been enabled above all thanks to the work of Abigail Smith, an Erasmus student from Univer-

sity College London at the University of Seville during the academic year 2017-2018.

She has once again revised all of the translations, has standardised the texts according to the UK style of English, and has homogenised the philosophical terminology, in terms of the key words used by the translators coming from diverse academic specialisms and from a diverse cultural context.

Now all that remains is to hope that, once it is published in the *lingua franca* of our globalised world in the twenty-first century, the book will be useful to students of any and all languages and cultures.

Jacinto Choza
30th May 2018
Festival of San Fernando,
Patron of Seville

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

After using *Philosophy of Culture* for the teaching of material under the same name at the universities of Malaga and Seville during the courses 2012-13 and 2013-14, and for the course of *Philosophy of Religion* at the University of Virginia's College at Wise in the autumn of 2013, the first edition has been exhausted.

However, whilst explaining the text in Seville during the winter of 2014, it seemed necessary to me to modify the third and fifth chapters, and in fact to produce a new edition. The introduced changes consist of the following.

Firstly, I have found a way to establish more clearly the connection between the symbols of Palaeolithic art and contemporary writing, using the primitive Phoenician alphabet. Through the Phoenician alphabet, one can perceive the meaning of the Palaeolithic symbols in relation to the alphabet's pictographic and hieroglyphic value, on one hand, and also to its syllabic and phonetic value, which is practically identical to that of the Latin alphabet.

Secondly, I established a relationship between Aristotle's Square of Opposition along with the semiotic square, through which realities, images, actions and gestures can be represented, and the same four values of predicative language clauses. In this way, it is shown more clearly that performative language and, in general, the dances and rituals of the Palaeolithic, have as much narrative and demonstrative power as predicative language in taking charge of being and occurring, and equally in generating the transcendental order of the primordial inauguration of human intellect.

Thirdly, by devising the complete semiotic square and highlighting which, in each one of the four fields, are the four elements of rituals, namely: kinetic, graphic, symbolic or operative, and phonic, a connection has been established between the graphic elements that Marshack, Gimbutas and Harrod

emphasized, and the phonic and linguistic elements belonging to the global etymology of human languages promoted by Merritt Ruhlen in the nineties. In this way, it is possible to formulate interpretative hypotheses about Palaeolithic rituals using only the choreographic movements, the symbols and graphologies that correspond to them, the venerated icons and realities and their corresponding acts of veneration, and the voices and songs that accompanied them along with the meaning of such sounds.

Naturally, it has to do with a philosophical-semiotic construction that must be tested by archaeologists and students of Palaeolithic art and religion in order to decipher the rest of the paintings and other prehistoric expressions of art and religion.

Through what is referenced in Chapter 5, the relationship of the archetypes with their psychophysiological bases, with the mythological figures to which they refer, with their sociocultural expressions and with the ideals that they promote, has been broadened and clarified a little. In this way, one can better perceive the function of the deep psychology within the social and cultural dynamic, as had already been established by its founders, Freud and Jung.

What is more, an examination has been carried out of the 23 characteristics of the primitive mind that Levy-Bruhl highlights, and in conjunction that is characterised as illogical, mystical or magical. This allows its concordance and discordance with the Aristotelian categorical system to be seen, which can be considered the categorical system that was generated in the western Neolithic.

In this way, it is better demonstrated that differences of mentality do not originate from the transcendental order, nor from a supposed ignorance of first principles. Attributing a way of thinking to an ignorance or lack of use of the first principles makes as little sense as attributing a way of running or dancing to an ignorance or lack of use of gravity. The difference between ways of thinking, and between systems of common sense come from the difference and plurality of the categorical systems that were inaugurated during the Neolithic. These introduced retouches now define and better focus the study of the origin of the western Neolithic categorical system that will be developed further.

Finally, the epigraph § 39a. *Structure of meaning of the symbol and the sign* has been added. It demonstrates that the Neolithic categorical system largely derives from the transition from the meaning structure of the symbol to the meaning structure of the gesture.

As occurs with many other publications registered on academia.edu and other academic networks, the index and the prologue are placed online. The author reserves the right to send the text in PDF form to students and colleagues that request it.

<div align="right">Seville, 22nd March 2014.</div>

PROLOGUE

In this book, culture is confirmed to be the element which organises the social and personal lives of *sapiens*. The book recounts the development of this dynamic from the Palaeolithic era to the present moment. However, it is not depicted as having occurred only once, leaving scarcely a trace today. Instead, it is shown to have happened both in those far-flung times, and also in every single moment since. It shapes us even now, in our daily lives, in our way of being, of feeling and of understanding ourselves in this very moment. Western culture no longer begins solely in Athens, Rome and Jerusalem, because now those three great foundations of our present can be passed over in search of their most distant human origins, some 80,000 or more years ago.

When the followers of Prometheus repeated the act of obtaining fire from the lightning-struck tree, would they not have done it in a way as similar as possible to the original? When they set out into the wilderness in search of fire following a storm, would they not have repeated the exact same movements, shouts, gestures, and worn the same clothes as that first time? Would they not have experienced feelings of guilt, fear, pride and gratitude? Would they not have then used these same sites for their domestic ceremonies and later in search of fire?

Fire operates as a determining factor in the social system. It establishes a particular type of hierarchy, a choreography between those who seek it, transport it, guard it and use it, for varying purposes. The people that work with fire, in one way or another, end up in sync with each other. At the same time, fire also functions as a determinant of the cultural system.

Constructing a cultural system does not mean defining individuals in functional or operational terms, which is what the social system does. In fact, it means defining realities entitatively, substantially and qualitatively; in simpler terms, it means articulating what things are, and showing the value that they hold for the community and for individuals.

The emergence of the sociocultural system, which consists of language

and self-awareness, can be considered as instantaneous within the context of the debate around the revolution and evolution of the human language, accepting that language, as a basis of human communication, appears all at once. Contrastingly, specific speech – in other words, the syntax, phonetics, semantics etc. – used by each group of speakers forms more gradually, or at least at a slower rate than the phonetic evolution amongst groups of 200 speakers. This means that language is the communication and behaviour seen depicted in prehistoric cave paintings.

Hunting rituals can be considered to be both primordial sacrifice and the origin of culture, but it is useless to try to identify which came first. It is probable that there is no single one, just as the phenomenologists insist that there is no act of consciousness that was the very first. The birth of consciousness was when consciousness began, the birth of language was when our potentially limitless communication began, and the birth of culture was when culture began. Indeed, one could argue that the foundation of culture is sexual repression, as Freud asserts; that it is the desire for a diet rich in protein, as Harris claims, or symbolism, as maintained by Durkheim and Levi-Strauss, or the gift-giving and exchange theory espoused by Hubert and Mauss, or violence, as Girard and Burkert allege, or even the saving-investment binomial of Jacques Attali. There is no such thing as a first act of consciousness, just as there is no such thing as a first word or a first cultural act.

The Rosetta Stone of the Palaeolithic Age (according to Marshack, Gimbutas and Harrod) was a mandala which, like all mandalas, served to represent the cosmos, to indicate the space which Man occupies within it, and to mark the cyclical nature of the rituals through which all life begins and ends. A mandala is the codification of all rituals and all myths.

The model of the Rosetta Stone, or of the mandala, like that of Marshack and Harrod, reproduces or reconstructs, through a classification of different pictograms, the logical Square of Opposition used by Aristotle. In this way, the reading of Harrod's Rosetta Stone can be taken as the key to reading numerous rituals and mandalas.

A mind which has the capacity to recognise itself as infinity and totality, which can generate a symbolical and gestural language with such sequences and oppositions, is, quite obviously, capable of generating a sociocultural system like that of the Australians or the Africans, or that of whichever other hunter-gatherers from 50,000 years ago, or in the year 15 BC, or during the

twentieth century. To create a system like that is to codify the world through the construction of a mandala. This constitutes the first manifestation of *logos* and introduces *nous.*

As the Neolithic advanced, the spheres of culture developed differently but forever preserved a reference to their sacred origin in the *mana* or the *totem*, to which they always returned. As a result, there were as many gods as there were activities, and even as many gods as there were words, as researchers have observed in relation to the religions of Central America, and of Indonesia, and as Varron did with the Romans (which in fact Saint Augustine exploited in order to ridicule polytheism).

Although the worldview and the common sense are the two sides of the cultural system (in the individual and in the group), each one holds a certain degree of autonomy by virtue of which they can produce changes in one but not in the other. When this happens, an imbalance is produced between reality and the psyche. Responsibility for this is usually attributed to (a lack in) the individual psyche and it is said that they have lost their common sense, that they have been driven mad.

The descriptions of some classical studies can be organised into a model that allows one to see how the social system and personal identity are determined by a system of "professional activities" which the individual accesses through ritual. The system's structure remains constant, controlled by the cognitive and social regulation of the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction, and death. This structure remained the same for totemic Palaeolithic societies, for medieval feudal societies, and for modern state societies.

Aristotelian and Durkheimian categories, just like with the development of language's predicative function, were consolidated during the period that stretching from the beginning of the Mesolithic, 12,000 years ago, to the middle of the first millennium BC, when the use of writing proliferated.

Palaeolithic rituals conceptualised the life of an individual within the group as a) identical to itself, contingent, susceptible to alternative uses such as possession, communion, giving, virtue, culpability, retribution and pact. However, they did not represent life as b) eternal, individual, immortal, belonging to a single person, exclusive or as different to that of any other living being.

If life is known and described according to the characteristics of a) but not those of b), thus it is possible to understand the existence of repetition, the

identity of life, and, therefore, the communion in the flow of life as a cycling/ recycling of life and of blood. What cannot be understood then is a world and a lifecycle like that connected to Christian immortality.

It is possible that since the appearance of the first urban settlements, around the tenth millennium BC, the mind has composed tales about religion, politics, justice and economics, which have passed from being represented only through songs, dances and celebrations, to being immortalised in stone, walls, ceramics and tiles, at the same time as symbols, pictograms and signs were also drawn on them. It is also possible that around the fourth millennium BC, the interaction between memory, architecture and writing consolidated notions of identity, inaction, immortality, eternity and universality. It is even more probable that all of this occurred when the first megalithic constructions allowed the possibility of a new type of burial, a new type of relationship with the departed, and a new conceptualisation of the afterlife.

Thanks to rituals, myths, songs, stories, the epic and the tragedy, the whole universe is now named and, as a result, accessible in the interiority of mankind and in the dialogue between human beings. Those words that were signs were also codification, or keys, thanks to which the cosmos remained closed or locked, according to the value placed on them by different groups.

The *sapiens* first imagined and identified words in a performative language, in an imaginative and efficient way, when he had to humanize his environment – he had to construct the cosmos. Once the cosmos was constituted, then he began to categorise it in a more representative and theoretical way, or in other words, using increasingly inefficient language. Then he analysed and described it more accurately and concisely, with a tighter focus, using better measures, or perhaps more scientifically. Words do not make things, but they do measure them. They represent and then tell us what those things are. Thus, the first unit of measurement was the word.

When the human being acquired consciousness of the unique and singular nature of reality, of the universe, of eternity, of himself as unique and unrepeatable, of things changing with time, and of that same time passing by, he realised that his own life was not infinite, that one day he would die, and that death was a definitive and eternal destruction. In this manner, the self-awareness of the Neolithic man was born.

Beauty in general, and particularly the beauty of woman, appears to be artificial because of the perfect proportionality of parts of the body. By

comparing some body-parts to others, measuring against others, and testing those belonging to people of different proportions, in the fifth century BC the school of one of the greatest Greek sculptors created the figure of a woman who throughout history has been considered the epitome and archetype of beauty, the Venus of Milo. Beauty is key to understanding the birth of science in general, but particularly that of geometry.

Some philosophers have asserted that space, volume, time etc., are ways in which imagination and memory represent themselves, innate categories, or as Kant believed, "*a priori* forms of sensibility". Along the same lines, it is possible to view Aristotle's nine categories (substance, quantity, qualification, relative, position, place, time, having, action and affection) not only as categories of a given reality, the categories of phenomena that we can perceive and represent, but also as keys to human imagination and intellect, innate mechanisms or ideas, for articulating and organising the contents of the mind, to say them with words, to express them.

Daily life, common knowledge and ordinary language utilise their own "categories" that are not scientific. They are categories which must be discovered, and through them human instinct and natural language must be legitimized.

The plentiful studies concerning ordinary and predicative languages that were developed during the twentieth century, demonstrate that predicative language is not more favourable to the subject-object model than to the subject-subject model. Language is not primarily for knowledge and reflection, and secondarily, for communication, nor the opposite. Consciousness of the thing is just as original as when it is expressed in speech. The moment of reference (monologue relating the subject to the object) is not any more original than the moment of feeling (dialogue of the subject with another subject).

Since the birth of Western culture in the world of Ancient Greece, a tension has existed between the two types of language and the two structures of reasoning, which remained in existence until the beginning of the post-Neolithic era in the twentieth century. At that moment, ordinary language and practical reasoning acquired a "scientific and philosophical consciousness" of themselves, and of formalized languages and theoretical reasoning as well, but this has not brought about the end of the tensions.

The idea for this book arose during a seminar with postgraduate students of Professor Jaime Peire at the Universidad Tres de Febrero of Buenos Aires, in

June 2011. Thanks to the questions from those students, I realised that it was necessary to take from my two ongoing projects, which were Philosophy of Art and Communication and Philosophy of Religion, just what was necessary in order to not interfere with nor hinder them, and this consisted of a philosophy of culture. I focused myself immediately on the work and, as I had already completed a large part of it, I was able to finish it by the beginning of 2012. The Philosophical Anthropology course I taught to first-year students in the autumn term of 2011-2012, with all of their questions and difficulties, was also of great assistance to me.

In the latest redaction, Teresa Bejarano, James B. Harrod and Juan José Padial have assisted me with suggestions, and I wish to thank them here for their support.

Valencina de la Concepción (Seville)
Saturday, 28th January 2012
Festival of Saint Thomas of Aquinas

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

1. Animal Culture and Human Culture
    § 1. Animal Culture and Human Culture
2. Culture and Understanding the World
    § 2. Culture and Understanding the World
3. The History of Philosophy of Culture
    § 3. The history of Philosophy of Culture
4. Philosophical Criticism of Conceptions of the World
    § 4. Philosophical Criticism of Conceptions of the World
5. Culture as a Philosophical Topic
    § 5. Culture as a Philosophical Topic

«Dilthey's thought had a wider horizon than that of the theory of knowledge of Neokantianism, because it assumed its Hegelian inheritance: the theory of the objective spirit.According to that same theory, the spirit does not exist solely in the subjectivity of its current action, but also in the objectification of institutions, action systems and life systems like the economy, the law and the society, and transforms thus, just like 'culture' becomes the subject of possible understanding.»

GADAMER, H-G.: *Verdad y método* II. Salamanca: Sígueme, 2000, p. 312.

1. Animal Culture and Human Culture[1]

§ 1. Animal culture and human culture

One can, and often does, talk of an animal culture, and one can and often does, examine within this the technical order, the order of the familial and social organisation, and the order of communication, and with much greater attention amongst the hominids and the species contained in the *homo genus*. Until the development of ethology and socio-biology in the second half of the twentieth century it was not customary to study culture, neither among animals nor among hominids, although they are two sides of the same coin[2]. This is partly because of the administrative limitation of knowledge and partly because of the highly specialized approach to research[3].

Cultural anthropology, and above all philosophy of culture, are the type of knowledge most bound to broader perspectives and synthesis and therefore, the type of knowledge that cannot overlook the overall vision of culture.

For the individuals who reach the adult age, animal life consists of a cycle of being born, growing, reproducing and dying, in a fairly constant way amongst individuals of the species, and with very little variation over time. The variations in the fulfilment of the cycle are determined by environmental changes in the animal habitat, and consist of alterations or mutations. If these have adaptive efficiency the specie will survive thanks to new changes and if not, the specie will become extinct.

---

1   Translated to English by Lea Daugaard.

2   Ethology was developed by Tinbergen and Lorenz who earned the Nobel Price of medicin in 1973. Cfr. Lorenz, K., *Sobre la agressión*. Madrid: 21st century, 1976, Tinbergen, N., *El estudio del instituto*. Madrid: 21st century, 1969, and by Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., Ethology. Barcelona: Omega, 1974; the sociobiology by Wilson, E.O., *Sociobiología. La nueva síntesis*. Barcelona: Omega, 1980.

3   There are various and important intents to arrange and systemize the different approaches of the culture. In the mid 20th century, Kroeber and Kluckholm, and at the end of cfr, the works of Gustavo Bueno, Javier San Martin, Antonio Ariño in Llinares, J. B. and Sánchez Durá, N., *Ensayos de folosofia de la cultura*. Madrid: New Library, 2002.

Animals have an instinctive and genetic endowment that allows them to fulfil their life cycle through a capacity for learning that, if it increases until they ascend into the different phyla of the scale of life, is always limited.

In the case of mankind, the instinctive and genetic endowment is not enough to enable them to fulfil their life cycle, whilst their learning ability is in turn unlimited. Thanks to this capacity for learning, man can adapt with to any environment and he can adapt the environment to himself, which means that the means of the fulfilling his life cycle also are unlimited. In other words, in principle culture is infinite, and reflects or manifests, in one sense, a finite number of biological needs that have to be satisfied for the life cycle to be fulfilled (for the individuals to reach adulthood), and an infinite number of possibilities of satisfying them.

2. Culture and Worldview

§ 2. Culture and Worldview

Anthropology of the first half of the twentieth century, especially with Malinowski, explored the cycle of being born, growth, reproduction and death in the humans, establishing a correspondence between biological needs and institutions (systems of ritual behaviour) through which they are satisfied. Thereby a correspondence was established between the social functions of modern institutions and of the primitive rituals in an analogous way, just as Herodotus with his *Interpretatio Graeca* had established the functional analogy of the gods of the different peoples of the Neolithic Mediterranean, and with this, twenty-five centuries before Malinowski, had established the base of the functionalist method used in socio-anthropological study.

The functions that the different types of individuals (women, young people, elderly) fulfil in society, in all societies, constitute the process through which the needs of each individual and of the group as a whole are satisfied. These functions are intertwined, constituting a true social system, which makes the group's common goal of survival

possible. In turn, these functions enable a definition of the existence and life of every individual as he who fulfils this function, and provides knowledge about himself placing him in a fully meaningful context, which is the cultural system. This knowledge, as primitive and imperfect as it may seem, provides the individual that which he needs above all, always and everywhere: a sense of his existence and an understanding of his identity and position in the group.

Malinowski and his posthumous work *A Scientific Theory of Culture*[4], published in 1944, two years after his death, represented a certain degree of maturity in the studies of culture in the middle of the twentieth century, after a long period of ethnological studies, which were initiated in the nineteenth century by MacLennan, Bachofen, Morgan and Tylor, and have resulted in the foundation of a discipline, anthropology, which has precursors that stretch right back to Herodotus[5].

In 1952 the Americans Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckholn published *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, in which they reviewed the more than 250 cultural definitions used in the anthropological field until it was necessary to continue the expansion into the second half of the century[6]. This scientific anthropology, which developed from the 19th century according to the tenets of positivism and positive science, has provided a very detailed knowledge of the articulation of nature and culture at all levels, of the constancy of the specificity of humanity and the unlimited variation of cultures, that is to say, the ways that the humans fulfil the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death.

---

4   Malinowski, B., *Una teoría científica de la cultura*. Barcelona: Edhasa, 1981.

5   For a vision of the history of the physic and cultural anthropology in relation to the philosophic anthropology, cfr. Choza, J., *Antropologías positivas* y *Antropología folosófica*. Tafalla: Cenlit, 1985. For a wide panorama of history of the cultural anthropology, cfr., Harris, M., *El desarrollo de la teoría antropológica. Una historía de las teorías de la cultura*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978.

6   Cfr. Llobera, J. R., «El concepto de cultura en el pensamiento griego», in Llinares, J. B., and Sánchez Durá, N., (eds.) *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura*. Madrid: New Library, 2002, pp. 113-130.

3. The History of Philosophy of Culture

§ 3. The History of Philosophy of Culture

Since ancient times, culture has appeared in the field of philosophy and the humanities, studied from approaches that would not describe themselves as "scientific" in the positivist key, but as philosophical and humanistic in general, and which limit the cultural field in accordance with other keys.

In the Western world, since theoretical reflection was born in the Ancient Greece, culture has been conceived of as both a contrast to nature and a contrast between *physis* (nature) and *nomos* (law, rule), or as a contrast between *logos* of the physical nature and *logos* of the social and political life[7].

Amongst the Ancient Greeks, attention to the *physis* or to the *nomos* was contemplative knowledge, or theory, to which men who did not have to accomplish the necessary activities for material life, i.e. menial tasks or work, dedicated themselves. Theory, knowledge, science was leisure (*scholé*) and not work, and constituted an important core in the education of the citizen, what the Greeks called *paideia*.

Since the birth of Western culture in the Greco-Roman world, culture has usually been studied in three orders. The first order is the technical one (in philosophical terminology, order of *poiesis*), which ranges from the construction of houses to the wider variety of tools of wood, stone, bone, metal, etc. The second order is that of organization and the articulation of function, for example, or the one of law (in philosophical terminology, order of *praxis*), which covers the great variety of political organization, customs and moral rules. The third order is the one of words and ideas (in philosophical terminology, order of *theory*), which encompasses the great variety of religious and philosophical stories about the origin of the cosmos, of mankind and of the people themselves.

The orders of technical, law and words and ideas correspond to what the Marxist school respectively called infrastructure, structure and superstructure,

---

7   Cfr. Calvo, J., «El concepto de cultura en el pensamiento griego», in Llinares, J.B., and Sánchez Durá, N., (eds.), *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, pp. 59-80.

to what Durkheim called tools, institutions and categories and in general to the orders of having, power and knowing[8]. The relation between the three orders was conceived in a deterministic way by the Marxist school, arguing that the historical changes were produced by modifications in the economic field. The other theories have spoken rather of an interaction between the three orders.

The Greek differentiation between *theory* and *praxis* on one side, and *poiesis* on the other side, was maintained in the Roman world as the difference between leisure time (*otium*) and work (*nec-otium, labor*). Furthermore, in Rome knowledge of nature (science) contrasted with knowledge of man (letters *ad humanitatem*), and this was the knowledge that constituted the core of the citizen's education, which thereafter ceased to be named *paideia* but was instead known as humanism, letters, humanities or humanistic formation[9].

This Greco-Roman difference between nature, work and science on the one hand, and society, freedom and letters on the other, is correlative to the differentiation between two basic social levels. These two levels gave way, in the Medieval and the Renaissance ages, to the servile arts, belonging to the servants, and to all the liberal arts, belonging to the lords, which constituted a system of fine arts and humanities. In turn, this differentiation between the servile, liberal and fine arts corresponds, ultimately, with the difference between high and low culture. The term culture is reserved to designate the field of letters and the field of fine arts. This feeling of 'culture' is maintained in modern ordinary language when we talk about 'an educated person'.

On the other hand, during the Renaissance, whilst the fine arts migrated from the field of technical and servile activities to the field of theory and contemplation, the natural sciences, which were situated in the field of contemplation in the Greek world, moved into the technical and engineering field; in other worlds, the field of the activities that dominated and transformed the environment[10].

8   About the orders of the culture according to this triple division, cfr. Llobera, J. R., «El concepto de cultura en la antropología social y cultural», in Llinares, J. B. And Sánchez Durá, N., *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura*. Madird: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, pp. 113-130.

9   For a carefull exposure of this process, cfr., Marín, H., *La invención de lo humano. La construcción sociohistoríca del individuo.* Madrid: Meeting, 2007, and Choza, J., *Historía cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla-Madrid: Thémata-Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

10   Leonardo da Vinci taken by himself as «engineer», undervalued title in his time compared to the letters, and for which definition and recognition fought the Tuscan painter during his whole life. Cfr. Da Vinci, L., *Guadernos de notas*. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini, 1995.

While the Enlightenment developed a kind of philosophy as critical reflection, systematically searching for the foundation of science and of morality, philosophy of culture emerged in 1744 with the work of the Neapolitan Gianbattista Vico as a *New Science*[11]. In open opposition to the critical currents of modernity, Vico established the topic as the first moment of philosophy and of culture in general, believing that criticism is always reflective and secondary, whilst the primary thing is life, finding the places (the *topoi*), where one can meet others, come to agreement with others, think, and live.

Along with Vico, Hobbes, Rousseau and Montesquieu also carried out investigations into the origin and foundations of the human society, which would give way to the birth of sociology in the nineteenth century and which would have an impact upon anthropology and philosophy of culture.

The genesis and development of the social and human sciences began with the Enlightenment and reached maturity in Romanticism. At the core of German idealism, philosophy of culture was developed as a philosophy of history, and in the studies of Hegel as a history of spirit which is interpreted as a history of freedom, i.e. as the history of law (the system of freedom).

The highly speculative tone of the philosophy of German idealism in the second half of the nineteenth century caused a diffusion and acceptance of positivism. Into this environment anthropology as a science was born, on account of the "pre-historians" of law – Bachofen, McLennon, Morgan and Tylor. With these same positivist assumptions but within the field of philosophy, Dilthey produced *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*[12] at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Just like Vico in the eighteenth century, Dilthey and Nietzsche also based their analysis and reflections about culture in poetry and philology and used the term "culture" in the sense of "humanistic culture" or the German

11   Vico, G., Ciencia Nueva. Madrid: Tecnos, 1995, cfr., Choza, J., <<Reflexión filosófica y desintegración sociocultural en la antropología de Gianbattista Vico>>, in *La realización del hombre en la cultura*. Madrid: Rialp, 1990.

12   Dilthey, W., *Estructuración del mundo histórico por las ciencias del espíritu*. México: F.C.E., 1944. For the articulation of the work of Dilthey with the philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of the culture, cfr., Choza, J., «Hábito y espíritu objetivo. Estudio sobre la hisotricidad en Santo Tonás y en Dilthey» in Choza, J., *La realización del hombre en la cultura*. Madrid: Rialp, 1990.

expression "high culture". The production of this German philosophy also exerted influence upon Anglo-Saxon anthropology, which assumed some of its principles and categories[13].

In this period around the turn of century, while the Anglo-Saxon field was consolidated as the discipline of scientific anthropology, beginning with Boas and his followers, at the core of the neo-Kantian school, philosophy of culture was coined and institutionalized as an academic discipline, in the work of Windelband, Rickert, Ortega y Gasset and especially Cassirer, for whom the philosophy of culture and philosophical anthropology are nearly indistinguishable[14].

The German philosophy of culture developed the difference between natural sciences and human sciences, and coined the term *Weltanschauung*, which the Anglo-Saxon anthropology translated directly as *worldview*, in which the technical and the arts were integrated once again with religion, and moral and legal wisdom. This German philosophy of the culture disappeared after the Second World War, whilst some of its assumptions and ideas were conserved in the Anglo-Saxon world through the concept of culture proposed in 1948 by T.S. Eliot, who was widely embraced in the English-speaking world[15].

In contemporaneity with German philosophy of culture, the French sociological school, in particular Durkheim and Mauss, proposed the term "civilisation" to designate a wider area than that of culture and which included numerous cultures, as appeared in the expressions "Oriental culture" and "European culture".

The second half of the twentieth century, with the widespread proliferation of scientific anthropology and the eclipse of German philosophy of culture, was when *The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man* was produced and in the whole area of philosophy in general[16], which gave way to

---

13   Especially in the disciple of Boas, Ruth Benedict, whose division of the cultures in Apollonian and Dionysan are inspired from the work of Nietzsche. Cfr., Choza, J., *Antropologías positivas y antropología filosófica*, cit.

14   For the history of the philosophy of the culture, cfr. Pérez Tapias, J. A., *Filosofía y crítica de la cultura.* Madrid: Trotta, 1995 and San Martin, J., *Teoría de la cultura*. Madrid: Editorial Syntesis, 1999.

15   Eliot, T.S., *Notas para la definición de la cultura.* Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 2003.

16   Gerrtz, C., "El impacto del concepto de cultura en el concepto de hombre", in *La interpretación de las culturas.* Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992, and *Reflexiones antropológicas sobre temas filosóficos.* Barcelona: Paidos, 2000.

a convergence of cultural anthropology (or scientific positivist anthropology) and philosophical anthropology, or put in more general terms, anthropology and philosophy. Then the subject of the relationship between philosophy and the worldview emerged once again, but the two no longer opposed each other, instead acting as two complimentary levels of reflection.

This entire history of anthropology and the philosophy within the academic world is the backdrop and base upon which the new models of the cultural system and worldview which held validity at the beginning of the twenty-first century were shaped.

4. Philosophical Criticism of Worldviews

§ 4. Philosophical criticism of worldviews

When, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the study of the philosophy of culture began in the German philosophical mediums, a border was carefully drawn, a difference and an articulation between the conception of the world, or worldview, (the name which was designated to a whole culture), and philosophy.

The difference between worldview and philosophy consists of the fact that philosophy represents a critical foundation, or a founding critical reflection, of that which the worldview describes without questioning its assumptions. With a typically modern, and specifically Cartesian, attitude, philosophy holds the task of verifying the truth and plausibility of conceptions of the world.

Modern philosophy was born with an inordinate passion for criticism, which attacked the entire cognitive field and assumed the task of verifying the truth and the scientific character of any knowledge. Conjectural history was tolerated, the exercises of Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Montesquieu and the rest of the Enlightened thinkers who analysed hypothetical beginnings of the human history. This was in large part because their analyses were operating within the field of law and political and moral thought, and not in the scientific field.

Vico, as mentioned, tackled this excessively hegemonic primacy of criticism in his new science. Not even philosophy nor any other form of

knowledge, he argued, can begin with criticism. The thing being criticized is always already established, and that is where minds place themselves in order to begin something. The first thing is always this meeting point, the *topos*. All knowledge starts at the *topos*, and criticism comes second[17].

The *topos* is invention, intuition, 'poetic' and imaginative creativity, the exercise of ingenuity. Criticism comes after, and it doesn't create anything. Like Hölderlin would say a century later, "man is a god when he dreams and a beggar when he thinks"[18].

Aristotle had also said that amongst kinds of knowledge, first begin the arts that are necessary for life, and the organization of the community, and later, when there is leisure and a certain living-well for some, theory is born[19].

In the Germanic world, the legitimation of the worldview from philosophical reflection developed in the first half of the twentieth century. With the beginning of the phenomenology starting from 1900 and the discovery of the natural attitude of knowledge, with the debates between Husserl and Dilthey about the foundation of the science of the spirit, and with the publication of *Being and Time* by Heidegger in 1927, the study of the existential elements of human life, namely, anguish, healing, understanding, the project, linguistic communication and death (what Heidegger calls the existentialisms). From there, in the second half of the century, the *topos* of human existence was established and with this the existence of the culture[20].

Firstly, the legitimacy of ordinary knowledge was established. Cartesian dogma was removed from the demand for evidence, and the acceptance of any kind of knowledge and especially everyday knowledge, and the legitimacy of prejudices, tradition and non-universal discourses was established. Later, the legitimacy of the universal discourses was questioned. It was the emergence and the universalization of hermeneutics, that had its basis in the philosophical works of Wittgenstein, Gadamer and Ricoeur

---

17   Vico, G. B., *Ciencia Nueva*, §§ 494-500.
18   Hölderlin, F., *Hiperion o el eremita en Grecia*. Credos: Madrid, 2003.
19   Aristóteles, *Metafísica*, 980a 21-981b 25.
20   Crfr. Choza, J., *Habito y espíritu objetivo. Estudio sobre la historiedad en Santo Tomás y en Dilthey*, in *La realización del hombre en la cultura*. Madrid: Rialp, 1990.

and in the anthropological works of Geertz, Said and Higinio Martín[21].

In parallel, in the fields of history, anthropology and the scientific studies of culture, the Marxist theses of the determinism of the ideal world and of the social organization from the material conditions of life are discussed. Gramsci and Durkheim, amongst others, supported the interdependence of the three components of culture, but rejected the idea of a causal determinism of economics upon the others.

Marx's thesis of the causal determinism of economics upon the other components of culture was picked up by Marvin Harris, who reviewed all the theories of the culture in *Cultural Materialism* (1978), to affirm that the explicative key of the evolution of cultures is the preference for a rich diet of proteins. Despite the diffusion of the work by Harris and cultural materialism, at the end of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first, the focus was more and more on the cultural studies from the point of view of the interaction, or the synergy, between symbols and meanings, organization and the technical, without any particular weight placed on any of them.

On the other hand, the impact of the concept of culture upon the concept of man converged chronologically with this rehabilitation of the natural attitude of knowledge, with the rehabilitation of practical reason and with the emergence and universalization of the hermeneutics.

One of the consequences of the process that ran from the elimination of the Cartesian dogma of evidence as the foundation of knowledge to the hermeneutics, was the postmodern criticism of foundationalism[22]. This criticism restated the relationship between conception of the world and philosophy, now not as the opposition between two clearly differentiated knowledges, but rather as knowledges that merged, ending in an integration of philosophy with literature and with history, with how great stories create knowledge. This approach somehow suppressed the difference between philosophy and world conception and between philosophy and literature, as Derrida[23] points

21   These works are, Wittgenstein, L., *Investigaciones filosóficas*. Barcelona: Crítica, 1988; Gadamer, H.G., *Verdad y método*. Salamanca. Sígueme, 1977; Ricoeur, P., *Tiempo y narración*, 3 vol. México: Siglo XXI, 1995-96, and Geertz, C., *Conocimiento local*. Barcelona: Paidos, 1994; Said., E.w., *Orientalismo*. Madrid: Ed. De Bolsillo, 2003; Marín H., *Teoría de la cordura y de los hábitos del corazón*. Valencia: Pretextos, 2010.

22   Cfr., Rorty, R., *Contingencia, ironía y solidaridad*. Barcelona: Paidos, 1991.

23   Lyotard, J.F., *La condición postmoderna: informe sobre el saber.* Madrid: Cátedra, 1989. Cfr., Derrida, J., *Márgenes de la filosofía*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1989.

out, although it was always possible to maintain the difference and the legitimacy of all the kinds of knowledge[24].

In effect, art and poetry went further than intellect in their creation of figures and even in the invention of methods, because the imagination used all the materials and combines them creatively, whilst the intellect is an instance which floods with light and makes the imaginary content perceptible in a universal and transcendental key. The art goes farther but it does not know where it will reach, whereas the intellectual does because it is reflection, speculation.

In creative processes, there is no consciousness of moments nor of elements, only of the result, because the imagination does not reach this degree of reflection. The intellect always acts addressing infinity and the demand for totality that is inherent to its nature. Consequently, in this context of infinity and totality one finds that which has been discovered and created. Thus, it is reflection, and not just a story.

5. Culture as a Philosophical Topic

§ 5. *Culture as a Philosophical Topic*

With Hegel, philosophy, in its self-reflection, assumed its social and cultural context, and became aware of it at the same time as it did of itself as reflection. Not all thought afterwards continued this methodological practice, but following the impact of the sociology of knowledge and of anthropology in the philosophical field it has become increasingly reckless not to do it. Since the twentieth century, the reflection in which philosophy consists has taken charge of sociology and culture, which in a new way, is philosophy taking charge of itself.

Some years after having written *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, an explanation of his understanding of man as a symbolic animal, Cassirer's editor proposed he do a new edition of his philosophy of culture. Then, in 1944, he found himself without strength to finish such a task. What he did instead was a summary update of the earlier work too which he had given the title *Philoso-*

---

24   Cfr., White, H., *El texto histórico como artefacto literario*. Barcelona: Paidós, 2003.

phical Anthropology. An Introduction to Philosophy of the Culture[25]. That is where, following the Kantian concept of the imagination, and the development of the imagination of the philosophy of the German romanticism, Cassirer developed the theory of human imagination and intellect as the generators of the spheres of the culture; in other words, the display of language and the communication which took place in the Mesolithic. And that is where philosophy of culture was conceived of as a philosophy of the creation of the cultural spheres (religion, art, science, language, etc.) and of communication through these.

Until the twentieth century, one could think that culture and language were not topics of philosophy, or that they were dispensable topics, but beginning with the linguistic turn and the universalization of hermeneutics, not only have language and culture occupied preeminent places in this field, but they have also come to be key topics in philosophy[26]. Or well, the philosophy of language and of culture have become first philosophy.

«"Without the security that the *grands récits* of history offers, it is about trying to reach a new point of view from which you can reach the visual field of what happens. In the process of globalization resides an overall need. The relevance of the concept of culture lies in the fact that the concept offers it. The weakness of the concept lies precisely in the fact that it now covers all of the actual. In the actual discussion, the culture has become a *medium* necessary to the totality of thought and the human acting"[27]. »

The objection to any proposal that states "it isn't like that in other cultures", obliges one to abandon claims of an extra-cultural or transcendental basis, which are typical of modernity, in order to accept that culture is more radical than reason[28], and to reach the point where culture and reason, originally united, began to pluralise. This leads one to look for a solution to problems and conflicts that arise in amongst speakers approaching the dialogue from

25   Cassirer, E., *Antropología filosófica*. México: FCE, 1975.
26   Apel, K.O., *La transformación de la filosofía.* Taurus: Madrid, 1985.
27   Schöder, G., (Ed), *Teoría de la cultura. Un mapa de la cuestión.* Buenos Aires: F.C.E., 2005, p. 8.
28   Cfr., Choza, J., «La cultura es más radical que la razón», in Llinares, J. B. And Sánchez Durá, N., *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002; cfr. Arregui, J. V., *La pluralidad de la razón*. Madrid: Syntesis, 2002.

diverse cultural and rational configurations. The last base of this agreement is sought, more than in a transcendental subject, in ordinary language, which is a transcendental *factum* in evolution, as Apel stated, and in the plausible will of factual agreement, avoiding the obstacles of controversies[29].

Twenty-first century globalisation, the relationships between all cultures on a global scale, and the problems posed by the multiculturalism, have been brought to the foreground of philosophical and humanistic reflection upon culture, in order to study its structure, its elements and the possibility from them of structures proportional to the human psyche.

The West began its coming of age through adolescence, with both the potential breadth and the limitations of this spiritual state. It had its honeymoon with science, with freedom, equality and fraternity. It faced its parents, and reached maturity by recognizing its excesses and reconciling with its past. From this maturity, it can now speak to other cultures, whatever route they may have taken to become conversers with Western culture.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Western human spirit (and that of any other location in the world), was for the first time able to take in the entire span of the human species, from its biological origins some 200,000 years ago and from its mental origins 50,000 years ago. It is a new situation and a position of unheard-of maturity.

All historical epochs imply a new situation and an unheard-of position, and for that reason they require a full reissuing of the human self-conscience. The current novelty in regard to previous epochs is, as should be emphasized, that it encompasses the specie in its entirety.

Throughout modernity, the general visions of mankind and history have been realized from a modern view of the world and of mankind, and in the second half of the twentieth century, when the criticism of modernity took place, the general visions of mankind and of history were also realized from a modern perspective. But by the beginning of the twenty-first century this perspective had become outdated, small and rather partial. For that reason, it is necessary to develop one more consistent with the resources and perspective of the present moment, which without a doubt will also end up being unsatisfactory at a later date. But to each individual age, in the evolution of the

---

29   Cfr., Dascal, M., *Negotiation and power in dialogic interaction* (eletronic resourses), edited by Weigand, E., Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001.

specie and of the individual, belongs its own self-awareness and it must not stop expressing it.

During the twenty-first century, some facts about the development of humankind will be confirmed and others will be disposed of, and later, many more will be offered that we do not know yet. A complete and reliable timeframe of the human species, of its mental, social and communicative evolution, allows a better self-knowledge of man. More differentiated. More mature. The knowledge of the academy does, and will continue to, make contributions in that sense, and between them the philosophy of culture, also renovated, will contribute its drawn-up vision from an appropriate perspective, taken into account alongside others, and illuminating these other perspectives.

Into this forum and in this dialogue, come some key questions. Can there be just one global worldview constructed using a science and a philosophy that agree? Can philosophy and science replace the worldview? Can the current reflective awareness, of science and philosophy, replace the system of the unconscious habits, the system of the worldview? Can the text continually modify the software and the hardware, can the message modify the medium? Reflection and criticism have their place and their time, and the worldview as well.

If man is a conversation, as Gadamer insists, can the conversation, with its double participation of reflexive conscience on one side and of unconscious assumptions on the other side, take the leadership of human life, personal and collective? Can it do so in better conditions than at other moments, when this double assistance offers more modest horizons?

In response to these questions, one can put forth that in no case can theoretic reason override or replace practical reason, or as is analogous, that epistemology cannot cancel out hermeneutics, nor can hermeneutics cancel out epistemology. The system of unconscious prejudices will never substitute scientific and philosophic reflection, nor vice versa. For that reason, worldview and the arts, on one hand, and science and philosophy on the other, will always have their place.

The end of the great stories and the criticism of the foundationalism, on the other hand, will not erase the demand of the totality and the infinity of the intellect either. Criticism of modernity is in no way a renouncement of this need. The opposite, in fact. It is the disillusion of Gadamer, when facing a vision of totality, facing a theory of reality, which in the end was recognised as

incomplete; that is to say, as particular and partial, which together with other partial visions and theories also has its own legitimacy.

The great tales were not absolute because they were only those belonging to Western culture, and they did not encompass the thousands of lives of other peoples. But the story of human history as a theory of the realization of liberty, the philosophy of history as a philosophy of rights, and history as the history of human rights, achieved their universality precisely as the crisis of the great Western stories took place,

The examination of these episodes is the philosophy of the culture in its exactitude. Therefore, philosophy of culture now includes the totality of reality, and therefore it has become a kind of first philosophy.

In any case, in the twentieth century philosophy of the culture could not satisfy the requirement of totality and infinity, which is the property of the first philosophy, without being in a permanent symbiosis with the natural and formal sciences, and with the social and human sciences.

CHAPTER II

THE PROCESS OF HUMANISATION. FROM INSTINCT TO RITUAL

«That he ceases being individual man is expressed through the symbolic of the eyes, the gesture language, he speaks as satyr, as a nature being among nature beings through heightened gesture language, in the dance gesture… But with tone, he resolves the world of appearance into its original oneness, the world of Maya disappears before its magic.

When, however, does the natural man come to the symbolic of tone? When does gesture language no longer suffice? When does tone become music?»

Nietzsche. F, and Crawford, C.: "The Dionysian Worldview", in *Journal of Nietzsche Studie*s, No.13, (Spring 1997), pp. 81-97.

1. *Homo* and the First Human Societies[1]

§ 6. *From instinct to ritual*

About 200,000 years ago when the species *homo sapiens* appears, there are already four *sapiens* species other than *homo*. Of these four, there are two (*Rhodesiensis* and *Heidelbergensis*) that were extinguished 100,000 years ago, and another two (*Neanderthal* and *Floresiensis*) which lasted until the great cultural explosion of the *sapiens* 50,000 years ago.

The spread of the *homo* race in the last two million years is shown in the following table.

2 million	1.5 million	500,000	300,000	100,000	50,000 BC
			Sapiens Rhode-siensis	Sapiens Rhodesien-sis	Sapiens
		H. Antecesor	Heidel-bergensis Neander-thalensis	Heidelber-gensis Neandertha-lensis	Neander-thalensis
H. Habilis	H. Ergaster				
		H. Erectus	Floresien-sis Erectus	Floresiensis	Floresiensis

---

1 Translated to English by Julie Holt Pedersen.

Darwin was one of the first to observe the way in which some successful instinctive actions are consolidated through learning, repeated even on occasions where they serve no purpose, being associated with certain states of mind, and combined with a series of reflexive actions and genetically-determined predispositions[2]. The living, who are endowed with cognitive senses, fulfil their lifecycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death through a set of activities that are based on the knowledge which behaviour or conduct usually reflects.

According to Darwin, emotions are the result of completed actions and behaviours that, compressed and shortened, are then expressed as gestures in a synthesis of movement and sound. That is to say that the word *logos*, before being a word, something specific to humankind, is *phoné*, a voice that expresses emotions and which is common to both humans and animals[3] and, before this voice, there comes movement, action, behaviour, gesture.

The genetic programming of animals is precise enough that their actions and behaviour already have adequate instructions, in terms of natural impulses and instinctive skills. Animals have a wide repertoire of movements and gestures that are skills perfected through a relatively short learning process, particularly compared with that of the human species.

In the case of man there are attempts at behaviours and gestures, which can only be achieved with a much broader learning process consisting of either trial-and-error or the passing on of knowledge acquired by preceding generations.

In the early days of *homo sapiens*, a combination of reflexive actions, inherited physical capacities and the corresponding gestures (of fear, shock, attack, etc.), imitation of animals and other *homo* species, and successful trial-and-error (in relation to territorial actions like guarding, hunting, tracking, sexual intercourse, designing tools, using fire, etc.) can be considered the origin of the territorial domain rituals. These include the fabrication and use of fire, hunting, pursuit and abduction of women, and the construction of huts

2   Cfr. Darwin, Ch.: *La expresión de las emociones en los animales y en los hombres*. Madrid: Alianza, 1998, p.59 y ss. Sobre algunas raíces particulares de la razón y la moralidad humanas en los animales, cfr. Miravet, M. and Sanfélix Vidarte, V.: "Biología y cultura: Darwin como antropólogo", in Llinares, J.B. and Sánchez Durá, N., (eds.): op.cit., pp. 263-269.
3   Aristóteles: *Peri Hermeneias*, 2,3, 16 a 27.

and villages, etc.

An act of hunting proven to be efficient is repeated many times in the same way, even in the absence of a kill, or indeed, before the sacred representation of it appears on the walls of caves[4]. The abduction of women and the sexual copula can be repeated in the same way as a ritual action. The same thing can occur with the act of collecting the fire that remains in a tree hit by lightning or that flows as lava from a volcano, or with the act of collecting and moulding the molten metal that flows from the campfire and the chalcopyrite stones that encircle it.

These actions can be repeated many times, with an air of solemnity, respect, fear, devotion, pride, guilt, etc., until they become rites so habitual that they are eventually carried out automatically. This may well have been one of the learning mechanisms of the different species of *homo*.

2. Process of Hominization and Process of Humanisation

§ 7. *Process of hominization and process of humanisation*

There is a difference between the *sapiens* and the other animal species in that the *sapiens* doesn´t have instincts, but instead rituals. One can add the fact that culture is the combination of the *sapiens´* rites and what is produced by them. Culture is the nature as represented in these rituals. It is the set of activities through which the *sapiens* adapt to their environment and survive in it; and it is the series of effects that these activities provoke.

On one hand, the anatomical and morphological continuity between the hominids and the *sapiens* and its subsequent discontinuity can, and has been, noted, and on the other hand, the same is true of the sociocultural continuity between them and the even more pronounced discontinuity.

From Leroi-Gourhan to Graham Clark and Juan Luis Assuage these discontinuities and continuities have been charted, their theories have been corroborated by a great number of findings and they have developed

---

4   This intepretation follows the work of diverse prehistorians and palaeontologists, and especially Leroi-Gourhan, A.: *Símbolos, Artes y Creencias de la prehistoria*. Madrid: Istmo, 1984, parte III., *Hermenéutica del arte paleolítico*.

and perfected their analysis[5].

Technology and culture are not only products of *sapiens*, but the *sapiens* is also a product of technology and culture, through a process of hominization that taken place over the last 5 million years. During those years, man has gone from the bipedal position and the upright walk of the *Australopithecus*, to the application of fire and tools by the *Neanderthal* and *florescence's*, to using them for cooking and fabrication of weapons by the *sapiens* 50,000 years ago. Such cultural advances were made possible by the cranial capacity, greater average size and vocal apparatus of the *sapiens*.

Alongside this process of biological evolution or hominization process, the process of cultural evolution or process of humanization takes place[6]. In both of these processes the most pronounced discontinuities can be and are recorded. In both, the cultural *big-bang* of the *sapiens* takes place.

3. The Ritual Fire Dance

§ 8. The ritual of fire collection and its value in the social system

In his film, *Quest for Fire*, Jean Jacques Annaud describes some of the original emotions and behaviours and the acquisition of some of the primordial skills and certainties with the help of Desmond Morris in the ethological department and Anthony Burgess in the linguistic department[7].

5   Cfr. Leroi-Gourhan, A.: *Le Geste et la Parole.* Paris: Albin Michel, 1966; Tinland, F.: *La différence anthropologique. Essai sur les rapports de la nature et de l'artific.* Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1977; Clark, G.: *La prehistoria.* Madrid: Alianza, 1987; Arsuaga, J.L.: *La especie elegida.* Madrid: Temás de hoy, 1998; Campillo Álvarez, J. E.: *La cadera de Eva. El protagonismo de la mujer en la evolución de la especie humana.* Barcelona: Crítica, 2007; Rivera Arrizabalaga, A.: *Arqueología del lenguaje. La conducta simbólica en el paleolítico.* Madrid: Akal, 2009.

6   For a theoretical explanation of both processes, please see: Cfr. Choza., J: *Manual de Antropología losó* ca. Madrid: Rialp. 1989, chap. 6. For a wider explanation of the process of hominization and its consequences, consult the first part of this text: '*La constitución del hombre. Bios y psique*', and for a wider explanation of the process of humanisation and its consequences, '*El sujeto humano. Logos y praxis*'.

7   *Quest for fire*, 1981. For a reflection on this film from the point of view taken here, see, cfr. Lozano, F.: «*En busca del fuego», La emergencia de lo humano*, en Choza, J. y Montes, Ma. J.: *La Antropología en el cine.* vol. 1, Madrid: Laberinto, 2001.

The production of fire already appears as a mechanical and habitual practice in a tribe of *sapiens* and its origin has not been described. Nevertheless, the creation of a "religious" behaviour of reverence, veneration, appreciation and submission before a supreme power that can destroy or let man live, of a dominant male before his small herd of mammoths.

The main character, instead of escaping from the mammoth, and precisely because he cannot do that because he is being hunted by a tribe of cannibals, he comes towards it, throws a handful of herbs on the ground and while looking in its eyes, he comes slowly closer. Almost on his knees he raises his hand with the herbs to his mouth in a gesture of offering, he utters voices (that may later turn into words), in a low tone almost whispering, in supplication. And he waits for the animal to answer in some way. The animal takes the herb that the human offers and makes a gesture of letting him go with his friends while the bear goes on with his little herd and attacks the enemies of the human being.

Before, he took the moment with the ones who were searching for fire and tells his tribe about the episode of the meeting with the mammoths, but then this moment appears, more in the form of a religious ritual, in the form of the story of an epic gesture.

Following these indications from Annaud and his collaborators and other anthropological facts one can make a hypothetical reconstruction of the first acts of appropriation of the fire and of the corresponding ritualization including the expression of feelings related to the event.

Then, starting from the information that the anthropological studies brings us Annaud´s movie and other artistic creations like *The Ritual Dance of the Fire*, made by Falla, the ballet *The Creation of the World*, by Börlin or *Prometheus's creatures*, by Beethoven can make up a theoretical model of the appearance of the human species like Plato did in his dialogue Protagoras that came from the myth of Prometheus[8].

Fire is found spontaneously in nature in two ways. Like burning liquid that flows from the volcanoes, that calcite the earth and kills the creatures that finds its way or as a ray that falls from the sky with much noise that kills the animals, sets fire to forests and destroys vegetable formations.

The appropriation and the use of fire in the different *homo* species can

---

8   Plato: *Protágoras*, 321d-322d; Cfr. Campbell, J.: *El héroe de las mil caras: psicoanálisis del mito*. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica de España, 2005.

be described briefly as the domestication of the ray. In the way that before knowing how to make it and to use it one had to take it from where it was naturally.

The fire was found spontaneously in the lightening, it was its aftermath. The ray come from the sky, it was a manifestation of an infinite power that was capable of destroying forests, animals and men. And it rushed upon them with a deafening noise, a dreadful roar. Getting close to the burning tree after it had been cleaved by the ray was an unprecedented boldness. It meant coming close to the infinite power, to the power that destroys in a way that required caution, audacity, discretion and slyness, courage, patience and veneration.

The first time *homo* did this, he would get closer and feel the warmth as something pleasant, get burned and sense it as terrible, put it on a branch and realize that he could transport it without putting it out, check the dread this burning branch produced in the other animals… and feel together with the fear, pride, gratitude and guilt for having taken the supreme sacred power.

There was one of these *homo´*s that did something like this who the Greeks named Prometheus and they imagined him as a wise daring´, as a titan who was a friend of the mortal who was punished by the gods because of his audacity. His deed was sacrilegious: stealing the fire from the sky. Because the fire, all fire, was sacred, it came from the immortals.

But this deed had some wide-reaching results in the community of these titans and these *sapiens* and it resulted in a series of organizational processes of prefiguration of a social system, of the definition of the hominid and human relations with the supreme sacred power and the relation between them in function of who obtained the fire, who conserved, who used it, etc.

How come they didn't feel fear facing this Great Power because of this? And at the same time why didn't they feel gratitude if this meant something that beneficial for man? But at the same time, why didn't they feel guilty and proud at the same time if they took this marvellous power from the gods and handed it over to mankind?

On the other hand, when Prometheus himself and the men who he taught were going to repeat the action of collecting fire from the tree which had been devoured by the power of the ray, didn't they do it in the most similar way as possible to the first time? Hadn't they done it this way with the fire that they conserved and venerated in their caves? Hadn't they done it this way by themselves many times with the fire, out there in their caverns? And when

they went out to search for it again in the fields after the torment didn't they do it with the same movements, cries, gestures and attire as the first times? Didn't they experience the same emotions of guilt, fear, pride and gratitude? Didn't each of them assume the same places in the domestic ceremony and in the search and the capture of fire in the air?

These emotions, movements, rankings and behaviours that Darwin describes in function of some gestures that repeat themselves in cultures that are very different and far away from each other[9], they constitute the first language, the first human expressions the first tries of a social system. Before being words and social organization and at the same time they were voices and movements, song and cries, prayers and crying, genuflections and prostrations, audacity and humiliation, joy and gratitude, jumps and fuss. Expressions like these are simultaneously and indiscernible dance and prayer, communication with the divinity and the creation of a first "ecclesiastic community"[10].

§ 9. *The ritual of fire collection and its value in the cultural system*

One thing is the fire as a configurator in the social system, another thing is its value in the cultural system. It is possible that the different *homo* species utilised the fire. At least the *Neanderthals* and the *floriensis* did that. Maybe another species like the *antecessor* or the *ergaster* managed the use of the fire, too. It may be that they used it to evict other animals from its dens and to protect themselves from them, though it doesn't seem as though they used it for cooking or to fabricate other weapons like the *sapiens*.

The fire plays an important role for the *sapiens*. It is possible that they learned to take it from the volcano's´ lava or from the rays and it is possible that in addition to empowering the flames in a certain way in a ritual way, they learned to appropriate it in other ways and that they learned to produce it themselves.

For example, a ray hits a tree and destroys it leaving branches in flames

9   Cfr. Darwin, Ch.: op. cit., p. 272.
10   Dance and prayer are one and the same in numerous rituals. Cfr. The rituals belonging to the Maring of New Guinea are referred to by Rappaport: op. cit., p. 102 and ss Cfr.: especia-lly Radcliffe-Brown, A.R.: *The Adaman Islander*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

scattered on the ground. Some *sapiens* come closer, amazed by such a strange glare. One of them comes as close as to touch it and gets burned; another one of them gets badly injured. One or several die, one or several get crippled. The ones who saw what happened escape uninjured. But the second or third time they come back, they get a little closer, but not as much that they die or get crippled. They come closer to the flames. They blow on them and watch how they grow, they repeat the cries and the steps and the gestures of approach. They place their hands close to it, only feeling warmth and finally one takes a branch from where it doesn't burn and lifts it up. He feels powerful, in a certain way he proclaims himself "son of the fire". This experience has been watched by the other *sapiens* who took part in the hunting. Then the rest of the tribe repeats the cries and the gestures, and the others learn to make the same gestures and to utter the same cries.

At the same time as the fire functions as a determining factor in the social system it also operates as an establisher of a species of choreography and hierarchy in the ones who search for it, transport it, guard it, utilize it for use A, some else for use B etc. and a signal between the ones who refer to it in one way or another, the fire also functions as a determining factor in the cultural system. To be a configurator in the cultural system doesn't mean defining the individuals functionally or operatively but it means to define the realities entitatively, substantially and qualitatively saying what things are and determine the value they have for the community and for the individual.

It is not the same what things do and what things are, and it is not the same what people do and what people are, however close to the ratio between doing and being. In the vital cycle of birth, growing up, reproducing and dying it is not the same the thing men and women do neither is what the children, the young, the fathers, the mothers and the old people do. For each of these stages and for each of these groups there are rituals that show what each individual can and should do and as a result they constitute the social system.

But furthermore, for each of these individuals and different stages there is a finality, an objective which is equally as good, ordered and beautiful, useful, and realistic and sacred and it is also in the same way the failure in the consequence of the finality, it is also bad, chaotic and repulsive, harmful, and also little realistic and sacrilegious. The people and the things are good and bad, beautiful and repulsive, useful and repulsive, useful and harmful,

real and fictitious, sacred and sacrilegious and they are in a way that they contribute or impede reaching the young woman´s or man´s goal, the mother´s or the father´s, the warrior´s, the caretaker´s, the old woman´s or man´s.

For each animal species and for each individual in the different phases there are goals to reach and also the map of the environment in which they live is coloured with the peaks and troughs of good and bad, of what is useful and harmful etc. These goals are of a relatively small number and of course finite and these qualities are also of a relatively small number of modalities and are of course also finite.

In the case of the humans it is not like this. The objectives of each individual in each phase are not written in the genetic programming rather they are scarcely prefigured, and it is necessary to determine them socially through the invention and the learning process. When they have to be carried out it results that they can be determined in several ways. Because even though the cycle of birth, growing up, reproduction and death always maintains its constancy also in the human being in the way of wooing, copulating, lighting up, breast-feeding, nurturing, reaching the plenitude of the psycho-physical capacities, growing old and dying these are very different.

They are infinite, and it is enough to mention the Apices recipes or *Kama Sutra*[11]. To eat and to copulate, food and sex are not simply beautiful and useful activities or good "things". In the same way fire and hunting, the cave and the group aren't simply beautiful, useful and good "things". Each one of them is a very broad set of elements and factors that each individual discovers and articulates in reaching his or her goals in the vital stages according to what the group shows through some rituals that also get configured at the same time.

When the group configures its rituals and the actions of each individual in the vital stages, the set of people, things, events and objectives acquires the qualities of good/bad, beautiful/repulsive, useful/hurtful, real/fictive, sacred/sacrilegious in a way that from that emerges from an indifferent depth that which is indifferent is eo ipso chaotic and it comes with a sense and for that reason constitute a cosmos, that is a cultural system, a vision of the world,

11   Amongst the ancient treaties that tackled the infinite ways in which our basic biological needs can be satisfied, amongst the most known and celebrated are that of Marco Gauio Apicio: *De re coquinaria. Antología de recetas de la Roma imperial*, edition of Attilio A. Del Re. Barcelona: Alba, 2006, and *Los Kama Sutra, in Libros de amor del oriente*. Madrid: Ediciones Ibéricas, 1993.

a notion of things and from the same reality all that is ruled out about the behaviour of each individual and of the group, i.e. about the social system.

Each reality acquires sense and significance when being named and the reality is named when being executed and integrated as part of the ritual. It is then the ritualistic language that converts each indifferent and chaotic element into a communicable and communicated element in the shared sense, and for that reason what converts chaos into cosmos, what generates the cultural system as an articulation of well-defined realities. But it is not necessarily the predicative language which we use now, it can be a language in expressive and imperative ways, that is a performative language which the ritualistic one is.

This is how rituals, the social system and the cultural systems are born. This is the process and the result of the ritual of the search for fire, the bear or the salmon. This is how child delivery and fertilization rituals are constructed. Partly learning from other animals from other *homo* species, partly learning from failure and death, partly following impulses of inspiration and invention. And this is how knowledge is created that begins with the biological necessities that are most fundamental and the cycle of life and that grows and grows until filling a space that gets more and more insatiable.

4. Dance, Communication and Religious Community

§ 10. Ritual as collective dance

Manuel de Fallas ballet "*The ritual of the fire*" is also a prayer, a dance of worship and thankfulness. The dancer celebrates a Eucharist with her dance and that is what the tribes of the *sapiens* did when they succeeded in empowering fire or to fabricate it, to hunt and antelope, to fertilize their females or when they witnessed the new period of the elongation of the days after the solstice of winter every 21st of December.

The days started to elongate on that date. They searched for its pieces and offered them to the sky which was the scope of the supreme power, because from the sky came light and warmth, rain and the ray, the life of animals and of vegetation. Some places they offered animals every year or even animals of their own species, titans or mortals to the sun in the solstice of winter to make sure it would come back with strength for another spring,

that it would be propitious with them, that it would save them from the night and the darkness, from hunger and death, which van der Leeuw and Eliade among others refer to[12].

All this they expressed through dancing and these dances were prayers in which the whole body was genuflection, post-reaction, adoration exaltation of gratitude and at the same time part of a community that acted this way. The colours and graphics they painted on their bodies and the branches and feathers and the voices and cries were also the form in which the community became aware of themselves.

In these liturgical ceremonies, one can apply the thesis that Nietzsche applies to dancing in general when speaking about the "full gesture of dancing"[13] which Higinio Marín comments when describing them as the full dance and the full gesture of the concord, as the full communion[14].

If we put ourselves in the place of the modern human expressive universe where the predicative language and the written one is the dominant forms of communication and expression, dancing needs to be explained in a certain way and at the same time rehabilitated which is what Nietzsche does when looking at it as a supreme form of expression, much more than the spoken language. But if we place ourselves in the beginning of the human species before writing and other forms of predicative language and we consider it as a general form of the different rituals like Vico and Rousseau did in the eighteenth century or as G. van der Leeuw and Kimerer L. LaMothe and John L Austin and R Rappaport did in the twentieth century then dancing appears as the original and full human expression and communication. Dancing is the way that the community takes possession and becomes aware of themselves as a community in the same way that individuals become aware of themselves as members of it[15].

12   Cfr. Eliade, M.: *El mito del eterno retorno.* Madrid: Alianza, 1972, cap.2, Van Der-Leeuw, G.: *Fenomenología de la religión.* México: F.C.E., 1975, §§ 55-56.

13   Nietzsche, F.: *EL nacimiento de la tragedia.* Madrid: Alianza, 1995, p. 49.

14   Marín, H.: *Teoría de la cordura y de los hábitos del corazón*. Valencia: Pretextos, 2010, chap. 8: "El baile o la memoria del paraíso". Rappaport, R.: *Ritual y religión en la formación de la humanidad.* Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Rappaport extensively develops the relationship between dance and the constitution of the community.

15   Lamothe, K. L.: *Between Dancing and Writing: The Practice of Religious Studies.* New York: Fordham University Press, 2004; Austin, J.L.: *Cómo hacer cosas con palabras. Palabras y acciones.* Barcelona: Paidos, 1972; Searle, J.: *Actos de habla. Ensayos de filosofía del lenguaje,* Madrid: Cátedra, 2001; cfr., Navarro Reyes, J.: *Cómo hacer losofía con palabras. A propósito del desencuentro entre Searle y Derrida.* Madrid: F.C.E., 2010.

The spoken language in its predicative form and in its written form and in its present written form, are very limited when it comes to expressing the movements and rhythms of the cosmos´ reality and of the human community and even more limited when it comes to expressing the signals and the present communion of the individuals with the community itself and with cosmos. The agreement of the movements and rhythms of the cosmos with the human ones are better expressed with the corporal mimesis i.e. moving the individual organisms synchronised and in tune with the events of the cosmos.

It is precise to imitate them with the body, with the bodies of all the individuals in the group and let the body and the group be taken with them and in them and at the same time assume and take effect of these cosmic elements such as rain, hunting, fertilization or death from the bodies in movement for them to give a real knowledge, a real communication between human beings and cosmos like it is still happening in liturgical dances[16]. From this point of view dancing always appears as a Eucharist, like and action of thanking for the creation[17].

§ 11. Dance and religion

Here the point of view of the analysis isn't all religious. It is more the point of view of a possible reconstruction of the creation of the forms of communication and expression, of the creation of a social system, starting from the original behaviours that are ritualizations of actions that have had a positive result when it comes to survival and that therefore cannot not be religious behaviours. The supreme value is life. It is about a good that is maximally vulnerable and that therefore induces to gratitude towards what protects it, it makes it viable or it saves it.

These actions by which the *sapiens* saves its life are obviously saving, they are in the genetic memory and emerge by the means of some behaviours that are invented, and which let them understand the world, interpret it and get used to it. These are actions that collaborate with the sacred power in the

16   Cfr. Choza, J.: "Formas primordiales de expresión corporal. La danza como plegaria", en Choza, J. y De Garay, J. (eds.): *Danza de oriente y danza de occidente.* Sevilla: Thémata, 2005.
17   Cfr. Lamothe, K. L.: op. cit., chap. 8, "Spinning the Unity of Life. Dance as Religion".

construction of a human society that articulates with this power through what was later called religion, and which generate a set of rites and elements that was later called professional activities, social system. The thesis that society has a religious origin and foundation is not only a starting point for a particular sociological school, but it is also a common place for anthropological and sociological approaches. It is more of evidence that one offs the study of the paleontological societies which are highly sacralised societies.

One finds the meaning of the cosmic realities and the human activities and its movements and profound rhythms in discovering its utility and weaves them amongst themselves. This is what modern dance does *a posteriori*, but in the beginning, it had to do it *a priori* or a simultaneo. In doing that is when the body converts itself into the human body, the group in the human community and the environment in the human world. This is succeeded through a series of rites in which the individual defines and identifies itself through the repertoire of activities that constitute their function in the group. This is how society is configured through a set of functions of the different individuals that are made efficient through their mutual connection that is, forming a system. And then nature stops being cultivated, adored, interpreted, when it starts being the result of the social activity which is already called culture. There is no paleontological phenomenon nor isn't experimental nor behavioural that religious.

§ 12. *Dance and language*

In the beginning of the learning process of the languages the children babble and explore all the sounds their sonic apparatus can produce and they play with them. Later when they start learning the meaning of the words the semantic constitution of the words of the language a game between the many possible phonetic combinations i.e. the semantic system and the phonetic one strengthens themselves mutually. The semantics of each language has already selected its phonetics and the child forgets that initially it had every possibility. When the young person becomes conscious of himself, speaks and knows how to in the world and doesn't have memory anymore of the artificiality of the language.

The journey from the dance and the singing to the prose of walking

upright, to the prose of bipedalism, from the ordinary language, from sleeping recumbent, or from being seated or squatting when doing labour or domestic tasks can be understood according to this structural sequential model. The possibilities of the corporal movements and of the phonic apparatus are many in the beginning. The *sapiens* explore a lot, like the children who babble and crawl in all cultures. Later, the utility and the performance select the kinetic, graphic, instrumental and phonic systems of each group and these are those that they teach and transmit, because they are the ones to make survival possible.

The "kinetic, graphic, instrumental, and phonic alphabetization" and the generalization in all these orders consist in a trim of the *homo sapiens´* initial predicative language that in the beginning are undefined, to constitute a system, a set of elements that strengthen each other. Many years later the poetic artists, the sound, of the painting or of the dance, the philosophers and the scientists have to cross through the thick and fossilised layer of the usual expressions in order to reach the elemental and undefined forms of the original expressions.

But the elemental and undefined forms of the original expressions have no reason to set themselves up hierarchised in verbal and conceptual expression. One can think that way. But one can also think that the rediscovery of the originality and primordiality of the arts brings a plurality of forms of original and irreducible expressions, none of which is equal or surmountable by others and for that reason are without possibilities of pyramid characterization between them.

When it comes to dancing one can suppose that the contemporary dancing, starting with Isadora Duncan and Marta Graham[18] have taken over for the first time the essential rhythms and movements of the cosmos and of the human existence.

And one may also think that the undefined plasticity of the body of the initial *homo sapiens* body has come to recuperate what it had returned in the original moment in which man started to know about the world, of the gods and of himself in learning how to move to live and to survive.

This is the long process in which man comes to have a body of the procedure of taking possession of it, as Hegel says. This taking possession

18   Cfr. Lamothe, K. L.: *Nietzsche's Dancers: Isadora Duncan and Marta Graham*, 2006.

at the same time can be the discovery, the possession, the delivery and the development of the rhythms of the cosmos and of life, as Leeuw and LaMothe say. And at the same time, it can be discovery, possession and expressive spread that is free of these rhythms.

Then the dance can appear as a privileged place in which one gives the articulation of the world a particular purity, the gods and men, the body as the moment of the conjunction between them, as the theme of the most cordial dialogue between the gods, the world and men. In dancing the body can appear as the content and the expression of the first forms of relations between the gods, the cosmos and men. But this already belongs to the theme of the differentiation of the spheres of culture and even more specifically to the differentiation and autonomisation of the spheres of art that don't belong to this systematic moment.

§ 13. The language of bodily movement

By the time that the Eucharist had been celebrated many times, for the production of fire, the hunt of the bison, the fertility of woman, the winter solstice, and the construction of the hut and town, the number of individuals in the group who had participated in festivals and rituals was higher and higher, and the number that actually remembered the first domestication of fire, the first hunt of the bison, the first journey across the sea, was much diminished.

Therefore, one can confirm reflexively that the ritual is a behaviour codified by a different person that the one who executes it, according to the order of sacred power.

This is true not only in the case of those that inherit a ritual through tradition. It is also true in the case of Prometheus, because when he did it for the first time, he was possessed by fear, audacity, uncertainty and impulsiveness, and was guided at every moment by a sacred power. From the point of view of the participants, there is no first time for a ritual, just as there is no first moment of consciousness.

Through the further repetition of the ritual, it becomes ever more frequent that those that do not know the first form of the activity are initiated into and trained in it, like in a routine task, rather than a sacred one. Once these activities become habits, people begin to consider them natural, not

learnt, innate.

In a certain sense, this is the point of view that Darwin held about the expression of emotions in animals and in mankind, and it is also the point of view held by Marcel Mauss about the Techniques of the Body, the use of diverse movements and parts of the body as tools for particular activities[19].

Walking is a derived form of running and jumping; eating is a derived form of Eucharistic worship; copulating, giving birth and loving are derived forms of fertility and birth rituals; sleeping on one side or another are derived forms of cults of healing and resurrection, and so on.

There are some activities which are completely irrelevant to the life of the individual and the group, entirely lacking in any liturgical dimension. Through the secularisation of the rituals, and through the lexicalisation of these gestural poems, as this cultural mimicry becomes more routine, they converge with the actions that lack liturgical relevancy and fuse with them. Thus, predicative language is increasingly frequent and what can be called gestural normality surges, the kinetic prose of each human group, the normal form of speaking, gesturing and moving.

5. The Sociocultural Development of the *Sapiens*

§ 14. *Language, consciousness and intersubjective recognition*

The process of hominization and humanization which have been described narratively can be described schematically and chronologically according to the frame of the times in which the different human species lived which has been transcribed earlier (§6). The *homo ergaster* appears and evolutions in Africa and extends itself to Eurasia 1,700,000 years ago. On one side from this *homo ergaster* the *homo antecessor* and the *homo rectus* appear more than 500,000 years ago. The *homo antecessor* split into two branches. One of them appears about 300,000 years ago and splits into two *homo rhodesiensis* which locates itself in Africa and the present *sapiens* which appears in Africa about 200,000 years

19   Mauss, M.: *Técnicas del cuerpo, en Introducción a la etnografía.* Madrid: Istmo, 1971. So that rituals do not become "dead script" in a rubric that makes no sense, and so that they are not used, we must continually renew and update them. Cfr. Rappaport, op cit., p. 197.

ago and 100,000 years ago expands all over the world. The other branch of the *homo antecessor* also splits into two, into *homo heidelbergensis* and *homo neanderthalensis* which appear 200,000 years ago and extend all over Eurasia and are extinguished 100,000 and 30,000 years ago, respectively. On the other hand, the *homo ergast*er appears 100,000 years ago, the *homo erectus*, which extends itself to Africa and Eurasia and the *homo florensis* which locates itself in Asia.

About 200,000 years ago the *sapiens* lived in Africa, the *homo erectus* in China and the southeast Asia, Neanderthals in Europe. About 100,000 years ago there were some migrations of the *sapiens* out of Africa and 30,000 years ago there was only them on Earth[20]. It is estimated that about 1000 individuals, maybe one sole tribe that spoke one sole language migrated from Africa to Eurasia and multiplied themselves there[21].

Basically, there are two ways of explaining the appearance of the behaviour and the human culture, the revolutionary one and the evolutionary one. One understands human behaviour and culture by the appearance of the universals of the culture, of knowledge, language, religion, art, music, myths, cooking, games and jokes. In these universals activities are integrated such as fabrication of delicate weapons, fishing, exchange between distant groups or forms of trading, continuous use of pigments or jewellery for decoration or personal ornaments, figurative art, petrographic and graves[22].

Given that the differences between the cultural manifestations of the *sapiens* before 50,000 years ago and of the rest of the human species are not considered too relevant, one usually thinks that from this date there is some mutation between the first. The problem is centred in the question if this change was slow and gradual or very fast, if it was an evolution or a revolution[23].

To bring more light to this question, one has to examine the way the social and the cultural systems were formed from another perspective (that one

20   Mayell, H.: *When Did "Modern" Behavior Emerge in Humans?*, National Geographic News, February 20, 2003: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/200302/0220_030220_humanorigin-s2.html/.

21   Calvin, W. H.: *A Brief History of the Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, chap. 9. Williamcalvin.com. 2003-09-01. http://williamcalvin.com/BHM/ch9.htm.

22   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_modernity.

23   According to recent discoveries, the *sapiens*, which originated in Africa and left remains on the Arabian Peninsula 100,000 years ago, also left remains at other points around Eurasia, beginning some 80,000 years ago (My gratitude to James B. Harrod for these estimations).

will see later with more thoroughness) it is the process of the forming of the language of the self-conscience and of the inter-subjective acknowledgment.

The simultaneity of the language, the self-conscience and the inter-subjective acknowledgment are planted and claimed on different fronts. One hand, the it is planted in the modern theory of the mind. From Gregory Bateson in the beginning of the twentieth century to Humberto Maturana at the end of the same century, the theory of the mind has developed itself as a supposition that the mind of every man, given that he doesn't have direct or immediate access to that of someone else, has a general mind model in which he can attribute the mental stages that he finds in himself (beliefs, wishes, intentions, consciousness etc) to the other minds and that way he can understand that the other have beliefs, wishes, intentions, etc that are different than his own.

It is supposed that all have the same kind of mind that oneself has and that permits oneself to understand and explain the social interaction, the use of the language and the comprehension of the others´ actions and emotions. This comprehension has a neurological base that is becoming more and more well-known whose dysfunction permits us to explain disorders like autism and others of this analogy and on the other hand it permits us to understand the modalities of the communication between some animal species[24].

On the other hand, the problem of the knowledge of what happens in other people's minds in simultaneity with what happens in one's own is resolved in what the founder of social psychology, George Herbert Mead has called "the other generalised". Finally, on the other hand and firstly historical it is resolved in what Kant and Husserl have called transcendental subjectivity and transcendental inter-subjectivity and in the means of the phenomenological conception of the twentieth century, especially Heidegger of the man as being-with-others[25].

One may think of the spread of the sociocultural system, the language and the self-conscience as simultaneous in the context of the debate of the

24   Maturana, H.: *La realidad: ¿objetiva o construida?: Fundamentos biológicos del conocimiento.* 2 vols., Barcelona: Anthropos, 1996. Cfr. Bejarano, T.: *Becoming human: from pointing gestures to syntax.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Theory_of_mind.

25   Mead, G.H.: *Mind, Self and Society.* Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1970; Heidegger, M.: *Ser y tiempo*. § 26, México: FCE, 1974. It remains shocking that when twentieth-century philosophy initiated criticism of the transcendental subject, the theory of the mind introduced it once again into the field of positive science.

revolution or the evolution of the human language, supposing that language as a foundation of the human communication that has been hit and instead the talking that is the syntax, the phonetic the semantic etc concretely used in each group of speakers and which is formed little by little or at least in a rhythm that is no faster than that they have phonetic evolutions for groups smaller than 200 speakers.

This point of view is no different to that of linguists, who distinguish between language as capacity and foundation for linguistic communication, and speech as concrete languages, admitting that the language exists from the beginning while speech is developed little by little. Levi-Strauss is included in this position when he argues that it all started to have meaning at the same time and that language was the catalyst. The totality and simultaneity may have given rise to communication based only in expressive, imperative and performative modalities of language, just as the rituals generated the socio-cultural system, in the absence of predicative modalities. These are what basically compose our daily language and are formed much more slowly.

Put another way, language is the communication and behaviour registered in parietal art. The languages are what have arisen as the development of phonetics and graphics, of logic and syntax of other cultures, according to processes that will be seen later.

Due to what we refer to as the concrete development of these languages of the first *sapiens*, and in order to work out the speed of their formation, it is fitting to stage a series of relevant questions.

What would the language of some 1000 individuals that left Africa 100,000 years ago be like in a single group or in several groups numbering 200? If we acknowledge that groups of *sapiens* in the Palaeolithic consisted of between 50 and 200 individuals, with an average life expectancy of 20, and with the need to produce around three daughters for every fertile woman in order for the group to survive[26], what would the language that these 200 individuals spoke be like? If we deduct the children from these 200 (for example, 30%), 140 individuals remain, 70 men and 70 women, who communicate with each other about certain common topics with one gender and about other common topics with the other gender, how would com-

26   Abellán, A. et al.: *La población del mundo.* Madrid: Síntesis, 1998, p. 11.

munication amongst just the 70 men work and equally how would it work just amongst the women? Furthermore, how many individuals would there have to be in order for a language to be created and maintained, for a system of accountancy of food to be generated and developed, or for example, for a writing system to be produced?

It has been indicated that the groups of hominids were at most 50 individuals, and that to organise larger groups, language was necessary. By this logic, the *sapiens* that left Africa should already have had language. Surely, they already had language at their disposal, a language that manifested itself in speech, but what kind of speech was this? The problem is not only that in order to organise more than 200 individuals, speech was needed, it is that perhaps there was no language nor speech if there were not more than 200 individuals that used it. Or perhaps if there were not more than 1000, or more than 5000.

The number needed to secure a language is usually considered to be, according to Bernárdez, 10,000 speakers. The Indo-American languages that surpass these numbers and which are expected to survive beyond 2050 are: Cherokee, Sioux, Dakota, Navajos and Ojibwa. Those that have fewer than 10,000 speakers, and are expected to die out are: Comanche, Cheyenne and Crow[27].

One must admit that the languages of the *sapiens* maintain themselves, because from 50,000 to 10,000 BC. The human population grew from 1,000 to 6,000,000 individuals[28]. These languages grow and get diversified in the rhythm of the speakers´ demographic development. They emerge as performative languages in the sacred rites that take place in the social system starting from 50,000 BC. and which generate the modalities of the predicative language from the moment that it reaches the level of the predicative forms of the languages themselves of the hunters-gatherers of the twentieth century.

It is possible that the predicative form of the language, the ancestors of the present-day languages started to develop after the second expansion of the languages from 15,000 BC[29] or that was reached with the entry in the

---

27 Bernárdez, E.: *¿Qué son las lenguas?* Madrid: Alianza, 2004, pp. 107-108.
28 Livi Baci, M.: *Historia mínima de la población mundial*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2002, p. 44.
29 Cfr. Bernárdez, E.: op. cit, p. 67.

Neolithic.

It is possible that starting with these rites and myths that are common in all the tribes, the languages develop as inter-linguistic or as original languages, that is like "commercial" languages or as languages to treat groups of subordinates (slaves, from the moment of the Neolithic in which they started to have them). It is the kind of language that may have appeared in the commercial transactions and the trade between sets of numerous tribes with more and more individuals and with more and more contact between them, like the way Sulani appeared in Cameroon[30], some forms of Tagalog in the Philippines or like Spanglish in California.

It is plausible, finally that the developments of the languages may be gradual like the linguists think and that they may be parallel to the development of the oral language., to the forms of the written language, to the appearance of the linguistic elements (substantives, verbs, adjectives), the consolidation of different sets of philosophical categories (substance, cause, time), and different syntax's and the thought and the language may have moulded themselves reciprocally according to the life of the groups that used it[31].

Now one can number the production of the cultural elements during the 100,000 or 50,000 years of the paleontological to place the subjective conscience and the inter-subjective acknowledgment.

§ 15. *Chronological table of Palaeolithic symbols*

The process of identification of each individual on behalf of himself and the other members of the tribe has some periods and changes that cannot coincide with the changes that are registered in the sociocultural development of the group.

It is possible that the Neanderthals in having utensils in the form of stones and wood, of refuges in caves, of certain chrome ornaments, of graves and of a certain capacity to articulate sounds, got certain capacity of

30   Cfr. Barley, N., *El antropólogo inocente*. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1991.
31   These are the hypotheses of constructivist cognitivism and of the linguistic Azerbaijan School. Cfr. http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Azerbaijan_Linguistic_School Bernárdez, E.: op. cit., p. 195.

self-conscience a of course identification of the couple, of the family or of the group like several higher mammals and birds have.

Maybe one could speak of a Neanderthal religion, of its forms of verbal and non-verbal communication and of its character of an intelligent species like the *sapiens*[32]. In any case, from its appearance about 150,000 years ago until its extinction in the third millennium BC., it doesn't seem as though there has been a development and a progress like the one that appeared in the table of paleontological discoveries relative to the *sapiens*.

During the thousands of years between 80,000 and 10,000 before our era, one can classify the phases of sociocultural development in 5 stages that have been established in the paleontological art of Leroi-Gouhan in the eighties, that is 1) Prefigurative era, from 50,000 to 30,000 2) Primitive era, from 30,000 to 20,000 3) Archaic period, from 20,000 to 15,000 in which appears figures and signs 4) Classical period (Magdalenian) from 15,000 to 11,000 to which paintings such as Altamira in Spain belongs, and 5) Later period, from 11,000 to 4,000 in which the Chalcolithic begins and the first utensils and ornaments of metal appear.

It is not easy to make a synchronised chronology of the aspects of culture of the subjectivity in the paleontological even though one has enough tables of the phases of development and enough different factors. Leroi-Gourhan proposed the table of paleontological art that is used here. Campbell links it with the phase of the myths. Enrique Bernárdez and the linguists, do this with the ones from the development of language. Angel Rivera Arrizabalaga follows Popper and Eccles from the phases of integration of language into time. Karl Polanyi the phases of the universalism of the market and the economy. Jung with the individualization of the psyche. Marcel Mauss with the formation of the self-conscience. Norbert Elias added interesting observations to the phases of progress of the development of individualism.

Meanwhile, along the twentieth century the anthropologists from Robert H. Lowie and Alfred Kroeber to Geertz and Harris, discovered society and culture with all its spheres, from the paleontological hunters-gathers and contemporary. Finally, or rather, as the first table marks Massimo Livi Bacci elaborated a detailed demographic table of the paleontological and

32   Arsuaga, J. L. y Martínez, I.: *La especie elegida*. Madrid: Temas de hoy, 1998.

the Neolithic[33].

The tables with the proposed phases have been perfected since the first authors elaborated them. The combination of these tables is difficult because the dating of the discoveries and paleontological stages of the fossil register has not been established definitively.

Maybe a chronological unification of all these tables would permit one to make a chronology, also hypothetical, from the development of the personal subjectivity the way it is understood now[34]. That would permit the comprehension of some religious and psycho-pathological phenomena in the way that the religions are present in the former phases and in the way that many psycho-pathological phenomena can be understood through regression to the former stages of the formation of the psyche.

33   Cfr. Leroi-Gourhan, A.: "Cronología del arte paleolítico", in *Símbolos, artes y creencias de la prehistoria.* Madrid: Itsmo, 1984. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paleolithic_ utes Campbell, J.: *El héroe de las mil caras.* México: FCE, 1949. Bernárdez, E.: *¿Qué son las lenguas?* Madrid: Alianza, 2004. Rivera Arrizabalaga, A.: *Arqueología del lenguaje. La conducta simbó- lica en el paleolítico*. Madrid: Akal, 2009. Polanyi, K.: "Notes on Primitive Money" appendix to *The Semantics of Money-Uses,* en *Simbolic Anthropology. A Reader in the Study of Symbols and Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Jug C.G.: *Las relaciones entre el yo y el inconsciente.* Barcelona: Paidós, 2010. MAUSS, M.: *Sobre una categoría del espíritu humano: la noción de persona y la de 'yo'*, en *Sociología y Antropología.* Madrid: Tecnos, 1979. Elias, N.: *La sociedad de los individuos.* Barcelona: Península, 1990. Kroeber, A.: *Antropología general.* México: FCE, 1945; Lowie, R. H.: *La sociedad primitiva.* Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1979. Livi Bacci, M.: *Historia mínima de la población mundial*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2002.

34   http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Tabla_de_culturas_prehistóricas_del_ Viejo_ Mundo. The most frequently visited chronologies of Palaeolithic cultures are those of the British encyclopaedia and that of Wikipedia. A comparison between the English, French and Spanish versions of Wikipedia, which are updated at different speeds and use different sources, perhaps provides the most complete information about the chronology of Palaeolithic cultures.

Years	Historical Age	Species and Location	Artistic Period, archetypal symbols and places
50,000 BC	Glaciation Würm	*Sapiens* in Eurasia and America	Mousterian, Prefigurative age, Arcy; Leroi-Gourhan and Marshack's pictograms, Divje-Babe's flute, Campbell's animistic myths
30,000 BC	Upper Palaeolithic G. Würm	Nean-derthal Extinction	Style I) Aurignacian-Gravettian, Leroi-Gourhan and Marshack's feminine and zoological symbols, Hohle Fel's flute, Chauvet's cave, Campbell's animistic myths
20,000 BC	Upper Pa-laeolithic G. Würm		Style II) Gravettian-Solutrean. Leroi-Gourhan and Marshack's feminine, equine, and bovine symbols, Brassempuy Venus, Lespugue, Willendorf Campbell's animist myths
15,000 BC	Upper Pa-laeolithic G. Würm		Style III) Lower and Middle Magdalenian. Altamira, La Pasiega, Lascaux pictograms, equine and bovine. Rosetta Stone of Marshack and Gimbutas. Campbell's matriarchal telluric myths Primitive mandala, Harrod's Proto-language
11,000 BC	Mesolithic Postglacial		Style IV) Recent Magdalenian. First cities in the Near East in Aşıklı Höyük (Turkey) and Jericho (Israel) Equine, bovine and human pictograms. Currencies, Pindal, Teyjat, Sta Eulalie Campbell's patriarchal celestial myths.
9000 BC, 8000 BC, 7000 BC	Neolithic, Greece, Middle East		Ceramic, Legumes, Cows, pigs and sheep Campbell's myths of men Beginning of enunciative language

At the moment, it is possible to reconstruct some of the paleontological rites thanks to the information provided by this set of tables

6. The Ritual and its Elements

§ 16. *The ritual and its elements*

After giving some descriptions of some rites to show their meaning and their scope and after having listed the archaeological expressions and remainders that were related to them, one can pass on to their characterization through a systematic and analytic exposition. The rites are solemn, stereotyped actions that are being executed as protocols and that result in differentiation and regulation of the group´s activities and with that its organization as a community, the identification of its individuals, the definition and distribution of each person, of the times and spaces of each activity and the articulation of the individual self-conscience with the self-conscience and the common knowledge. The Unitarian goal and result of all this is the survival of the group transformed into human community[35].

The rites are the procedure to obtain a benefit that is out of the human reach, like life, like survival and which depend upon an absolute power that is unreachable to man, about a power that for this same reason is called sacred power. It is the power that Durkheim and others call "mana"[36].

The rites are therefore religious acts and the religions is originally worship that is a set of rites a set of group activities with which one succeeds in surviving through the help of the sacred power. Initially the religion is much more than what we now understand as religion. It is political organization,

35   This explanation of the ritual follows the work of diverse anthropologists and historians of religion, most of all Rappaport, R. A.: *Ritual y religión en la formación de la humanidad*. Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001, chap. 5.

36   Here the term "sacred power" is going to be used with the same meaning that Durkheim provided the term "mana" with. Cfr. Durkheim, E.: *Las formas elementales de la vida religiosa.* Ma- drid: Alianza, 1993, libro II, caps. 6-9. Although said term has been analysed and retouched since then, it maintains the most important characteristics that were assigned to it by Durkheim, and analogous terminology exists in numerous Palaeolithic religions. Cfr. Waldemar, S.: "Maná y tabú. Las religones de oceanía", en Eliade, M.: *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*. III-2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

legal order, it is establishment of an economic system, it is technological, it is art, it is science.

And the vital cycle of being born, growing up, reproduction and dying come in the animals by acquisition, maturing, weakness and extinction of the biological capacities that are programmed genetically, that get activated and get extinguished according to this programming through a certain dose of learning, like it is said.

In humans, this same vital cycle that is also genetically programmed is fundamentally activated through learning, that is, through ritualistic actions that one assumes socially and cognitively in the individual biological moments, like it is also said.

The complex activity that forms a ritual allows the articulation of the following types of elements:

1. kinetic elements, that is, movements, jumps, races, dances, etc.
2. chromatic and graphic elements, like paintings on the body, spots of colour, etc,
3. instrumental elements, like fire, branches, stones, feathers, water, etc.
4. phonic elements, like roars, cries, voices, songs, etc.

Type 1 elements appeal to the human being's motor muscular system. The ones of type 2 to the view. The ones of type 3 to the significative human action and the ones of type 4 to the hearing. The elements of the rite are sensible dates through which the unity and the relation of man-world is constituted. The classification of the elements of the rites in these 4 types manifest that for the *sapiens*, from his first appearance on the planet there aren't just mere sensations or pure sensations but all sensations are from the beginning part of a perception, of an action with meaning. That is that the pure sensations, the impression of the unknown can be taken into a familiar atmosphere that is the well-known one.

Between these four types of elements there usually is a correspondence in a way that the jumps correspond to cries, the dances to the songs, the paintings and instruments you hold in your hands, the shoulders, the head, etc. In this way, starting from a phonic element, one can identify the rite of the concrete activity, through which one can order a group to prepare for a rite using a certain form of crying. The cry in question serves to identify the activity or the set of individuals that realize it and to call every individual who participates in it,

if each member recognizes this cry and himself as participating in this activity[37].

The rites provide man with the certainties that the animals have by instinct and they provided with culture in discovery and invention the knowledge that animals have naturally from birth. These certainties that are called "irrational certainties" by Arnold Gehlen, come from the "actions one has been able to carry out", of the real operative capacities, of the dominion of oneself and the environment, of the identity and the unity of the group and they constitute the first knowledge of oneself and of the world and the incipient forms of communication and language[38].

Nature comes from the Latin verb nascor, natus sum, being born, and culture from the Latin verb coleo, colere, cultum, take care, cultivate, give religion. What is natural is what is the result of biological processes and what is cultural is the result of human learning and invention. Culture is the result of what is cultivated and of veneration of the technological-artistic and cultural-religious activity that may be considered proper to the *sapiens*. Even though there is much to be specified in this characterization of the nation of culture one may see it as a starting point for further differentiations[39].

Nature is the result of the capacities and activities of plants and animals, of the earth, of air, fire, water of the planet, of the solar system or the entire universe. Culture is the result of the capacities and activities of the *sapiens*, who can then counter-pose the whole cosmos as its owner, its despotic god or its destructor and also as its inhabitant, as its pastor and as its cultivator.

Like it has been said from the beginning the rite is then what substitutes in man the instinct of the animals, it is what provides the knowledge about oneself and of the nature that is necessary to survive, to display the cycle of birth, growing up, reproducing and dying in a way that in this one can successfully express the human essence. The rite is the spread of culture, the opening of the horizon for mankind to realize, which is what we now can examine through their steps.

37 That which Hegel called dialectic of recognition and described as the structure of human self-awareness, is re-examined in the studies of pyscholinguistics and social psychology, on concrete empirical levels. Cfr. Rossano, M. J.: *The evolution of conscious Experience: Rituals, altered states and the origins of Religion*. Nova Science Publishers, 2007.

38 Cfr. Gehlen, A.: *El hombre*. Salamanca: Sígueme, 1980, pp. 356-371.

39 For an explanation of the different definitions and theories of culture, please see: Cfr. Harris: M.: *Desarrollo de la teoría antropológica: historia de las teorías de la cultura.* Madrid: Siglo twenty-first, 2008. Cfr. Díaz de Rada, A.: *W*. Madrid: Trotta, 2010.

CHAPTER III

PRIMORDIAL RITUALS, COMPREHENSION OF THE WORLD AND THE EMERGENCE OF *NOUS*

«We must trace the beginnings of poetic wisdom to a crude metaphysics. From this, as from a trunk, there branch out from one limb logic, morals, economics, and politics, all poetic; and from another, physics, the mother of cosmography and astronomy, the latter of which gives their certainty to its two daughters, chronology and geography – all likewise poetic.»

VICO: *The New Scienc*e, **§** 367.[1]

---

1 *The New Science of Giambattista Vico: Unabridged Translation of the Third Edition* (1744) *with the addition of "Practic of the New Science.* Cornell University Press (1984).

1. The Ritual of the Bear Hunt[2]

§ 17. The ritual of the bear hunt

The ritual is the opening of the scope and of the horizon to understand the human essence. Therefore, the scope and horizon of intellect and of human liberties, generated and expressed through them their character and amplitude.

By its very nature, intellect cannot separate itself from the comprehension of the world, the emergence of the *nous* and the self-comprehension of man as a social being and the plurality of these beings to generate offspring.

Here one will use the word intelligence and intellect to give meaning to the Greek word *nous*, which is what western culture named these ideas of intelligence or intellect when they began to reflect upon her and her nature. The term has received many conclusions and has been the object of much analysis, and as a result of being subject to many studies, the term has become somewhat polyvalent. Now, to analyse more concretely still the first rituals, one will go to show that is it the first rituals themselves that express the scope and nature of *nous*.

It is thought that between 150,000 BC and 30,000 BC in Eurasia the brown bear, the cavernous bear, and the Neanderthal all lived conjointly though all struggled to live in caves, which the Neanderthals frequently inhabited thanks to their mastery of fire. There are signs that lead many to believe the Neanderthals whom resided in Darchenloch, Switzerland worshiped the bear after finding a collection of bones, especially the skulls that were placed in unique way and place[3].

For years it was believed that the *sapiens* colonized the Arctic zones toward the end of the Ice Age, circa 13,000 or 14,000 BC, but the recent discovery of artefacts made with animal bones and mammoth fangs allows us to place the colonization of the *sapiens* in the North of Russia around 40,000 BC[4].

It is possible that the first *sapiens* that arrived from Africa were scaven-

2   Translated to English by Emily Franko-Tobin.
3   15th International Cave Bear Symposium, Spiká Nová, Slovakia, 17th 20 of Sept. 2009, http://www.fns.uniba.sk/ kalendar/2009/symposium/Abstract_book.pdf.
4   http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/10/1001_arctichabiation. html/.

gers and that they feed themselves from the remains of the prey of Neanderthals or of bears or, at times, that they even that they practiced cannibalism. It seems that these practices stopped relatively soon and that it was not the cavernous bear that became a frequent prey on their hunts but instead the brown bear in southern Europe; it also seems that the worship of the bear was practiced in the Arctic since 40,000 BC.

The people that inhabited many villages in Arctic Europe in the twentieth Century still practiced a worship of the bear that contained many elements of the rituals practiced in 40,000 BC; concordantly, it was found that these villages had maintained the same myths and artistic findings over thousands of years.

«"In the "hunters' religion" preserved among the northern Finno-Ugric peoples, bear ceremonies are central. The Khanty, Mansi, Nenets, Sami, Finns, and Karelians have all been acquainted with myths and rites connected with the bear. The myths recount that the bear is of heavenly origin and is the son of the god of the sky; it descends from heaven and, when it dies, returns there. There is also a story about a marriage between a bear and a woman from which a tribe of the Skolt Sami (in Finland) is said to be descended.

The bear-killing ceremony is divided into two acts — the killing itself and the feast afterward. Killing a bear that was protected by a forest guardian spirit involved a complicated ritual, which ended with bringing the bear home. Women believed that they had to keep at a distance so that the bear would not make them pregnant.

The feast to celebrate the killing of the bear lasted two days and was full of marriage symbolism. The bear was addressed euphemistically, and a young man or woman was chosen to be its mate.

A large meal made of the meat of the bear was consumed. Finally, the skull of the bear was carried in procession to the branch of a pine tree on the top of a mountain. This was the custom in Karelia. A number of miniature dramas were connected with Ob Ugrian bear rites. Masked participants tell the bear that members of a strange tribe have killed it. There seems to be a historical connection among the bear ceremonies of Ob Ugrians, Karelians, Finns, and

Sami. Nowhere else in the wide Arctic sphere have the bear songs and dramas taken such a prominent place as in this hunting ritual."[5]»

To modernize the sense of this ritual, one can note its parallelism with one of the most well-known contemporary Western rituals, the Catholic mass. With this parallelism achieved, in one respect, it is determined that contemporary rituals are sediments from the rituals of the first *sapiens*, in line with Campbell's thesis as well as other structuralist theses about the unity and oneness of all myths and all rituals, nevertheless, another sentiment gives to this Palaeolithic cult, a fixed time and its own sense, which has approached the contemporary mentality.

§ 18. *Primordial sacrifice*

One brief narrative version of the ritual of the Catholic mass is a profession of the Catholic faith, also known as, the Creed. Seven coincidental elements between the bear cult of the Arctic villages and of the Catholic mass can be established, although any given moment or position in the ritual are subject to change, and are as follows:

1) The sky god sends his god-children to Earth
2) There is a marriage between the sky god and a human woman, born of a tribe.
3) The sent god-child is subjected to a cruel and bloody death at the hands of men.
4) The flesh and blood of the dead god-child is eaten.
5) The flesh and blood of the god-child distributes life to the entire community.
6) The death of the god-child is connected to human guilt (of all humans or of one in particular).
7) The death of the god-child is in some way an offering to the sky

---

god-parents.

8)   The dead god-child that was sent to the Earth returns to the sky.

Various contaminants of Christian or Islamic origin have been pointed out that differentiate them from the Arctic rituals of the hunt of the bear, therefore, to better conceive its concordance with the structure of the original sacrificial ritual, one can compare the ritual of the smoking pipe of the Sioux Indians of the North American prairies to "the approximate relationship of Christians to the Eucharist."[6]

The sacred pipe represents the universe. The bowl represents the Earth. The buffalo carved in the pipe represents "all that lives on four legs," or all terrestrial animals. The mouthpiece represents "all that lives standing," or all of the plants and trees. The feathers that adorn the pipe represent "all those living with wings."

On one hand, the pipe represents macrocosms. On the other, it represents microcosms because the parts of the pipe correspond to parts of the human body.

When the pipe is filled with herbs and bark, the entire universe is contained in the centre of the pipe, that is also the heart of man. Man, who fills the pipe, is identified with all that is introduced in it and takes all of it in his heart.

When man sets fire to the pipe, smoke enters the mouthpiece in all six directions of space (in front, behind, left, right, above, below), he breathes the smoke and expands, he is left to be a part of the cosmos, merging himself with the pipe, with the cosmos and becomes sanctified.

While they celebrate the ritual, the Sioux invoke Wakan-Tanka and express the relationship of the man with the world and with gods by means of the ritual.

«"Oh Wakan-Tanka, our grandfather, you are everything, yet however you are above everything. You were here before anything. You have always existed…

---

6   Rappaport, R., *Ritual y religion*…, cit. pag. 419. The complete description of the smoking ritual is taken from Brown, J. E., *The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971 (orig. University of Oklahoma Press, 1953).

Of Wakan-Tanka, You are the truth. The people of two legs that put their mouth to this pipe will transform themselves into your own truth; there will not be in them anything impure…"[7]»

The ceremony of the pipe is most widely known as part of the celebrations of truces and treaties because it is a ritual of healing, of re-establishing order, and of reconstituting original harmony (exactly like the Catholic Eucharist)[8].

Anyone living of the earth harvests, kills, presses, or burns his life, and receives through it sacred power, that spreads and gives life to everything, and he returns the sacred power, giving it back to the initial instrument from which it left. These elements, with the same or other symbols and with the same interchangeable functions, are found in the majority of sacrificial forms, analysed in the studies of Freud, Durkheim, Hubert and Mauss and René Girard in the mass of the twentieth Century[9].

If one takes the ritual of the hunt of the bear, and of the hunt in general, as a foundation in each human society, one can examine the rituals of hunting dating back 40,000 years yet still see the persistence of these rituals in the most recent cultural forms, from the Greek tragedy[10] up to the Catholic mass of the twentieth Century, so that one can give reason to each of these authors in his diverse focuses, that above all, sacrifice and its essence stand as the origins of culture (given that we have already established that essence is the communion with the mana or totem, the kinship origin, the foundation and cohesion of the community or of violence). All of these factors can be essential in sacrifice and of the rituals of the hunt, and the rituals of the hunt can be thought of as the

7   Brown, J. E., (1971, p.13), cited by Rapport, R., op. cit, pg. 420.

8   For an explanation of the Sioux religion and the significance of the name Wanka-Tanka, cfr. Bolz, P. «Bajo el signo de la danza del sol. Visión religiosa del mundo y ritualismo de los siux oglalas de Norteamerica», in Eliade, M., *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas.* III-2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

9   Cfr. Freud, S. *Totém y tabú.* Madird: Alianza, 1977; Durkeim, E. *Las formas elementales de la vida religosa.* Madrid: Alianza, 1993; Hubert y Mauss, *Magia y sacrificio en la historia de las religiones.* Estudios y Ensayos. Caracas: Lautaro, 1946; Girard, R., *La violencia y lo sagrado.* Barcelona: Anagrama, 1995. For an examination of the platforms of these authors, see, Reis, J. *Lo sagrado en la historia de la humanidad.* Madrid: Encuentro, 1989.

10   Cfr. Vernant, J. P., and Vidal-Nanquet, P. «Caza y sacrificio en la *Orestiada* de Esquilo», en *Mito y tragedia en la Gercia Antigua*. Vol I, Madrid: Taurus, 1987.

big-bang of human culture 50,000 or 100,000 years ago, when man left Africa and around the time of the supposed change that modified his brain.

If one defines culture as the series of procedures that allows *sapiens* to survive, how we can done, the *sapiens* survive by means of the hunt and its corresponding rituals (after or aside from scavenging and from cannibalism), if these rituals are of a sacrificial sort, and if they can also derive a complete social system—how one will also see—then one can say with almost unanimous consensus, that sacrifice is the origin and foundation of culture, including in this notion of sacrifice those rituals from the hunt of the bear to the Catholic mass and all of the activities of domination of the current ONGs (Organizations non-Governmental).

One can take the rituals of the hunt as the original sacrifice and as the origin of culture, but not necessarily within them lays an element or action that is fundamentally unique of all culture. Surely, there cannot be, how neither there can be a beginning of the conscience, according to phenomenologists.

The beginning of consciousness is marked by the start of the conscience, the beginning of language is marked by the start of potentially infinite communication, and the beginning of culture is marked by the start of culture. Aside from this, one can sustain that the foundation of everything is sexual repression, as Freud said; or feeding, as Harris said; or symbolic communication, as Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss said; or universal exchange and donation, as Girard said; or binomial savings-investment, as Jacques Attali[11] said. However, there is no first act of conscience, a first word, nor a first cultural act, isolable in the acts of conscience, or of words, or of rituals. From the beliefs of these twentieth Century authors, it is possible to operate the categories of substance, identity, linear causality, and hierarchical relationships from the elements consolidated in a historical period yet still allow one to feel their precision to the end of the twentieth Century. Because of this, they insist in the search of an element that is the first[12].

The rituals are sufficiently explained by the genesis and development of the social and cultural systems, as how has been indicated and how one will see more fully. For now, one tried to see the way in which these rituals are

11   Attali, J. *Historia de la propiedad*. Planeta: Barcelona, 1989.
12   Cfr. Choza, J. *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, cap. 7 & 8.

explicative of the subjective self-awareness and of intersubjective recognition.

2. Codification and Deciphering of Palaeolithic symbols

§ 19. The Rosetta Stone of the Palaeolithic era – The first mandala

In the last decades of the twentieth century, and in line with the work of Leroi-Gourham and others about parietal art, Alexander Marshack deciphered calendars of the first *sapiens* and Marija Gimbutas put forth readings on these symbols. Their works have resulted in what is called today the Palaeolithic Rosetta Stone.

This Rosetta Stone is a carved bone of the Lorthet Cave and includes various symbols and pictograms

The symbols of the of the Rosetta Stone imitate alphabetical and arithmetical signs in a table containing five rows.

1	S S S S O 0 O O O O O O S S S = =
2 3 4	/ / / / / / X X X X / / / / / / Y Y Y / / / / / / / / / DDDF F F F F T T T T DDD HHHHHH <<<<<<<< \ \ \ \ X X X X X \ \ \ Y Y Y \ \ \ \ \ \
5	/ 0 \ / 0 \ / O \ 0 0 0 O O O S S S = =

The circular signs on the first and fifth rows, which are not necessarily as regular as the zeros and Os of the alphabet, indicate concentration, origin, and strength.

The vertical signs in rows 2 and 4 inclined to the left or right and the Xs and Ys signify branching, growth, emergence, incision, and blows or strikes. Thus, it is similar in current comics that represent blows/strikes, incisions, wounds, anger, or breath (the last mentioned is usually represented by lines leaving one's mouth).

The wavy signs like an S, horizontal or vertical, or the arithmetic equal sign, of rows 1 and 5 represent flowing, winding, and extension, like water the and sea are represented in infantile drawings and comics.

The closed signs of row 3 like the D, H, greater than (>), or lesser than (<) signify branches, spine, fruit, fruit producing tree, and abundance.

The work of Marshack, Gimbutas and Harrod is better understood when the Palaeolithic symbols and signs are compared with the Phoenician alphabet and with the Latin alphabet, as shown in the following image.

Letter	Name	Meaning
⟜	alp	ox
⊴	bēt	house
⌐	gaml	camel
◁	delt	door
∃	he	window
Y	wau	fish hook
⊥	zai	weapon
⊟	het	wall
⊗	tet	wheel
⅂	yod	hand
⋉	kap	palm (of the hand)
∠	lamd	cattle prod
�	mem	water
५	nun	snake
⧧	semk	fish
○	ʾain	eye
⌒	pe	mouth
ℽ	sade	hunting
Φ	qop	monkey/ape
◁	roš	head
W	šin	tooth
×	tau	mark

This Phoenician alphabet, used between 1200 BC and 250 AD, derived from the cuneiform scripture and is closely connected to the proto-Indo-European script, hieroglyphics, the proto-Sinaiticus alphabet and the proto-Canaanite, and gave way to the Hebrew, Aramaic, Arabic, Greek, and Latin alphabets, as well as probably many others[13].

Initially the Phoenician alphabet, just like all alphabets, had a syllabic and phonetic meaning on one hand, as well as a pictography and ideographic meaning on the other, which appears in the table above.

James B. Harrod, following the procedure in which one reads Egyptian pictograms, some Chinese ideograms, and the similar pictograms of the Ojibway Indian tribe of North America (supposedly the kin most closely related to the Franco-Cantabrian *sapiens*) wrote about the Rosetta Stone as a rubric or regulation of a ritual in the following terms:

«"Break out of your shell, hatch, be born, newly alive, striving to take shape, branch out, blossom, ramify with spring thaw life! and then follow the undulating self-movement of life, wise in the ways of danger, filled with the earth-born spirit energy of life!"[14]»

Under Harrod's interpretation, one can take the Rosetta Stone as a guide for a ritual, as a representation of cosmos, as an image of the place of man in the cosmos, and as an expression of the relationship between the two, that is to say, the oldest known version of a mandala[15].

A mandala is a schematic interpretation of the cosmos, of the sky and earth and hell, of the centre of the universe and all that surrounds it. It represents man's relationship to all that which is sacred through the cosmos. It is similar to the sacred pipe for the Sioux, the Christian gospels, but in it, salvation factors are represented through elements of natural cosmos, not

13   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Phoenician_alphabet.

14   Harrod, J. B. *Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European): Part 1. The Basic Graphematics – Summary of Discovery Procedures*, Language Origins Society Annual Meeting 1998, Version 2.b, May 2004, Original Version 1987.

15   The thesis of Gimbutas, M. *El languaje de la diosa.* Oviedo: Grupo Editorial Asturiano, 1996, and Marshack, A., *The Roots of Civilization: The cognitive beginnings of man's first art, symbol, and notion.* New York: Moyer Bell, 1991. Along this line, one can interpret the assimilation of the Rosetta Stone to a mandala.

historical figures[16].

The word "mandala" is of origin Sanskrit and means *circle*. It appoints the Hindu cosmic representations, but there are mandalas in almost every culture, constructed of diverse manners and with a great variety of materials: on the shell of a tortoise, placing in each area of the surface different powers and significances, or on the shell of molluscs, fangs of animals, or pieces of wood, etc. Romantic almonds and various stained glass works of Gothic cathedrals also have the character of a mandala in that they represent the trinity, the sky, the Earth, Hell, and the redemption and salvation of man.

The Rosetta Stone, like all mandalas, functions to represent the cosmos, to indicate the place of man within those cosmos, and to point out the dynamics of rituals, from which life takes its origin and returns to it. A mandala is an encryption of every ritual and myth.

Life comes from the sun and from the sky and concentrates itself in the Earth. It leaves the Earth through each living thing and spreads over the Earth through each living thing, and after it has spent all of its living energy to the fruit of the Earth, it returns to the Earth and the sky to recollect itself.

Each ritual that its executed, whether it be of fertilization, of birth, of initiation, of marriage, of hunt, of healing, or of burying, consists to summon life, to make it emerge, to make it shine and unfold, to make it plentiful, to make complete worship from its beginning to its end.

A mandala is the schema of the universe, of all rituals and of all myths — not only Palaeolithic animistic myths, nor only Neolithic telluric matriarchal myths, nor patriarchal Chalcolithic celestial myths but of all the myths existent in all the time of man, from the Axial Age in the first millennium BC, according to Campbell[17].

Moreover, the mandala, as a symbol and a ritual, can be considered the manner in which man discovered his own intellect, once it appeared for

16   The intermediate position between sacred cosmic forces and sacred historical figures of Judaism and Christianity are found in the gods of polytheistic religions, that are personified by forces of natural, as Durkeim taught. The theoretical elaboration of the unity between sacred natural forces and sacred divine forces is developed principally by Porfirio, Plotino, and Proclo for Greek polytheism and by Dionisio Areopagita for Christianity. Cfr. Garay, J. «Politeísmo y neoplatismo: Proclo», in Choza, J. & Padial, J. J. (eds.) *Dios en last res culturas*. Sevilla: Thémata, 2012.

17   Campbell, J. *El héroe de las mis caras: psicoanálisis del mito*. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Economica de España, 1992; *Los mitos en el tiempo*. Barcelona: EMECE, 2002.

the first time. Intellect, as philosophers sustain, when it appears, appears to oneself infinitely and in totality, and it cannot appear in any other fashion. It appears how it is and it is how it appears[18]. Intellect covers everything, aspires to understand and explain everything, and intellect recognizes its own infinity, that is surpasses every possible limit and transcending every possible barrier and term. Just like that, intellect possesses in itself, itself, and it expresses itself in the communication of a social group, in all its totality and in all its infinity as represented by the circle. Thus, it is as if, suddenly, language originates and appears—called the Theory of the Mind by psychologist and neurologists but called transcendental subjectivity by philosophers[19].

Although the Rosetta Stone is thought to be from 15,000 BC, and the teachings of Harrod place it also in this period, if the elements of a mandala discovered by Marshack and Gimbutas in the cave of Chauvet[20] are actually elements of a mandala, then the intellect of *sapiens*, along with their transcendental subjectivity, their Theory of Mind, and their human language can be said to be present for 40,000 years.

§ 20. *The Square of Opposition and Palaeolithic proto-language*

The Palaeolithic Rosetta Stone has permitted a growing comprehension of the rituals, language, and writing[21] of its respective humans. Said comprehension, although still debated until recently, is understood through the interpretation of pictograms, which are both symbols and signs and that act simultaneously as the function of meaning as well as the one giving meaning, and intention can be articulated in logic structures like those of the grammar of spoken languages.

18   The apparition of intellect to ones own self is what philosophers call phenomenology, and the more complete description of the phenomena stays captured in a key work of philosophy from 1807, the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* by GWF Hegel, from which is key to understand the self-understanding of humans.

19   According to the critical development of the subjective transcendental in the philosophy of the twentieth century, neuropsychology is an empirical version of the same which is called Theory of the Mind.

20   Cfr. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grotte_Chauvet.

21   Gimbutas, M. and Marshack, A. cited footnote 12. And Crowley, D. J. *Communication in history: Technology, culture, society*. Boston: Pearson Allyn & Bacon, 2007.

Harrod worked with Aristotle's logic square, also called the "Square of Opposition"[22], and studied the relationships between significant elements according to the thesis of Saussure and Peirce.

Aristotle classified the propositions of language into four categories. A = universal affirmative, every S is a P. E = universal negative, no S are P. I = particular affirmative, some S are P. O = particular negative, some S are not P. Aristotle situated the four propositions in the vertices of a square and noted the type of relationship that exists between them.

A	E
I	O

A and E are contraries because they differ in the quality by being universal. I and O are sub-contraries because by being particulars they differ in the quality. A with respect to O, and I with respect to E are contradictories, because they differ in quality and amount. A in respect to I and with E in respect to O are subalterns because they differ in amount. A significant amount of human propositional language and grammar is based upon this logic square.

The Square of Opposition, which is founded upon "propositions," or the predicative forms of human language and, on the other hand as proposed Saussaure, the difference between signs and symbols, between meaning and the one giving meaning, has to be understood. According to Harrod, the inexistence of this difference does not cancel the logic relationship between the four types of propositions nor does it prevent the Magdalenian language of sounds and gestures from being a true language.

Indeed, semiotic squares are built with pairs of opposites, contrary or contradictory, which are not necessarily propositions of the predicative language but are more often actions, gestures, icons, realities, or, in general, opposite elements whose meaning is precisely established in opposition,

22   Aristotle, *Peri hermeneias*, cap. 6 & 7.

like good / bad, up / down, night / day, etc.[23] . These are the elements with which through the experiences and the rituals the conceptions of the world are formed. A semiotic square from this type, maximum general, is as follows:

A 1. In predicative language = Proposition UNIVERSAL AFFIRMATIVE. 2. In sign or signifier and in signified thing = Unity, totality, beginning 3. In action or in ritual action = affirm, venerate, recognize, adore	E 1. In predicative language = Proposition UNIVERSAL NEGATIVE 2. In sign or signifier and in signified thing = Different and new thing, end of the process 3. In action or in ritual action = Total decomposition and recomposition into something else
I 1. In predicative language = Proposition PARTICULAR AFFIRMATIVE. 2. In sign or signifier and in signified thing = Parts, pieces, 3. In action or in ritual action = break, divide	O 1. In predicative language = Proposition PARTICULAR NEGATIVE. 2. In sign or signifier and in signified thing = Scattered parts, completely separated parts, moving apart and moving away 3. In action or in ritual action = Get away, flow

According to Aristotle and Marshack, Harrod groups diverse Magdalenian symbols into four big classes, according to four significant genres, that correspond to those of the Rosetta Stone and exist between these relationships like those of the propositions of Aristotle. These four sign-symbol groups correspond with the four great moments or phases of vital processes

23   Cfr. Eco, Umberto: *Tratado de semiótica general*. Barcelona: Lumen, 1991, pp. 121-134.

of nature and of human rituals, of those that they could decode from human communication up to 15,000 years ago[24].

The pictograms classified by the interpretations of Leroi-Gourhan to Harrod are the processes of the *sapiens* to encrypt what they do and what happens, what happens in the world and what happens to them when they do or do not do certain things. This encryption defines what is life—its beginning, development, and its end—in four periods, phases, or moments. The points and moments from which life arises (pictograms A), the ways in which life unfolds and expands (pictograms I), the ways in which life flows and radiates through everything (pictograms O), and the ways in which life bears fruit and returns to a form so that it can return to start the process (pictograms E).

According to Harrod, the Upper Palaeolithic European language is a prototypic language to the extent that it meets all of the qualities of a semiotic system. It meets all requisites in that 1) is has a "fundamental semantic" structured by a semiotic square with semantic areas, forming in each area a semantic micro-universe with its own signs, 2) is has a "semantic narrative," structured by a rules of transformation of combinations and permutations, capable of generating formulas for rituals and prohibitions, 3) it has a "semantic discourse," a general mark that can be perceived to be situated together as actors and as actions, as a way that can rudimentarily constitute being related to myths, gods, or human experiences[25].

A model of the Rosetta Stone or mandala, like that of Harrod, can be reproduced by means of a classification of the types of pictograms that imitate Aristotle's logic square, that is, arranging diverse pictograms in the groups A-I-O-E. In this way, the teachings of Harrod on the Rosetta Stone can be key in numerous writings of rituals and mandalas.

Since the rites have four elements, four types of signifiers can be established for each of the four fields of the square:

24   Harrod, J. B. *Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European): Part 1. The Basic Graphematics—Summary of Discovery Proceedures*, Language Origins Society Annual Meeting 1998, Version 2.b, May 2004, Original Version 1987 and *Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European), Part 2: Maximal Graphematics and Correspondances to a Reconstruction of Spoken UP(E)—Summary of Phenemic-Semantic Discovery Procedures*, Version 2 May 2004, Version 1 April 1992; http://originsnet.org/upepart2247k.pdf.
25   Harrod, J. B. *Deciphering UP(E): Part 1* cited footnote 11.

1.- Kinetic elements, generally dances,

2.- Graphic and chromatic elements, such as figures and colors,

3.- Significant instrumental elements, such as actions, gestures or the same significant elements.

4.- Acoustic and phonic elements, such as screaming, singing, words, etc.

From Leroi-Gourham to Marschack and Harrod, prehistorians and archaeologists have worked with graphic and instrumental elements, but not with kinetic and phonic elements because the visual arts have been too far removed from auditory and archeology too separated from linguistics. But from the developments of evolutionary linguistics in the late twentieth century, visual and phonic elements can be referred to in an increasingly reliable way.

Through comparative studies and with an increasingly refined and accepted methodology, Merrit Ruhlen proposed the permanence of a series of semantic and phonetic roots since the departure of the sapiens from Africa 60,000 or 70,000 years ago. These roots seem to be present in the 5,000 languages spoken across the planet in the early 21st century[26].

The presence of these phonetic and semantic elements in the current languages allows us to think that they already existed with these values before the departure of the Sapiens from Africa.

A number of these Ruhlen roots correspond to the pictograms of Marschack and Harrod, so that it would be possible to complete the semiotic square of the graphic symbols with acoustic and kinetic symbols. Thus a hypothetical complete reconstruction of all the elements of the rite could be made.

The semiotic square of the symbols typical of paleolithic rituals would remain in this way

26   John D. Bengtson and Merritt Ruhlen: *Global Etymologies*, en John D. Bengtson and M. Ruhlen: *On the Origin of Languages: Studies in Linguistic Taxonomy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1994, pp. 277-336.

A) PICTOGRAMS OF VULVAS, PHALLUSES, CHESTS, CIRCLES, SUNS, MOONS, AND LEAVES. **Meaning:** concentration, origin, possession Expressed in the four elements of ritual: **1) dance:** acknowledgment of self. **2) written:** with signs and symbols similar to the letters A O V ( ) U. **3) represent:** power, mother, breasts, child. **4) sung with Ruhlen's roots 1, 8, 11, 21**	E) PICTOGRAMS OF BRANCHES, TREES, AND TREE TRUNKS. **Meaning:** new life, fruit, richness, abundance, and shapes Expressed in the four elements of ritual: **1) dance:** with jumps, composition of figures **2) written:** with signs and symbols similar to the letters T F H. **3) represent:** what is created, and what flourishes. **4) sung with Ruhlen's roots 12, 15**
I) PICTOGRAMS OF PREG-NANT WOMBS, DOUBLE AND TRIPLE BRANCHES, SPEARS, ARROWHEADS. **Meaning:** injury, sacrifice, pregnancy, growth, branching, twins Expressed in the four elements of ritual: **1) dance:** with strikes, crashes, extension of extremities, separation of dancers. **2) written:** with signs and symbols similar to the letters X Y / / P B. **3) represent:** excision, wounds, spears, distribution of riches. **4) sung with Ruhlen's roots 2, 13, 18, 23**	O) PICTOGRAMS OF SERPENTS, SPIRALS, AND VINES. **Meaning:** overflow, fluidity, running water, sea, rain Expressed in the four elements of ritual: **1) dance:** spins around oneself, spins of the group, circles, snakes. **2) written:** with signs or symbols similar to the letters mm uuu, & <<<. >>>, S s = = =. **3) represent:** river, exuberance, running water, emission, spiral. **4) sung with Ruhlen's roots 3, 4, 19, 27**

The roots of Ruhlen, with their corresponding pictogram and their position within the Marshack and Harrod semiotic square, are the following:

RUHLEN'S ROOT	RUHLEN'S ETHYMOLOGY	PICTOGRAMS	PLACE IN MAR-SCHAK SEMIO-TIC SQUARE
1 AJA	'mother, older female relative'	V, U, O	A
2 BU(N)KA	'knee, to bend'	X, F, K, T	I
3 BUR	'ashes, dust'	mm, ss, ==	O
4 ˇCUN(G)A	'nose; to smell'	mm, ss, ==	O
5 KAMA	'hold (in the hand)'		
6 KANO	'arm'		
7 KATI	'bone'		
8 K'OLO	'hole'	V, U, O	A
9 KUAN	'dog'		

10 KU(N)	'who?'		
11 KUNA	'woman'	V, U, O	A
12 MAKO	'child'	B, D, b, P	E
13 MALIQ'A	'to suck(le), nurse; breast'	X, F, K, T	I
14 MANA	'to stay (in a place)'		
15 MANO	'man'	B, D, b, P	E
16 MENA	'to think (about)'		
17 MI(N)	'what?'		
18 PAL	'2'	X, F, K, T	I

19 PAR	'to y'	mm, ss, ==	O
20 POKO	'arm'		
21 PUTI	'vulva'	V, U, O	A
22 TEKU	'leg, foot'		
23 TIK	' nger; one'	V, U, O	A/I
24 TIKA	'earth'		
25 TSAKU	'leg, foot'		
26 TSUMA	'hair'		
27 AQ'WA	'water'	mm, ss, ==	O

This decoding is carried out in the rituals and through the four elements of the rituals: kinetic, graphic and chromatic, instrumentals, and phonics.

According to these keys, the writings of Harrod about the Rosetta Stone can be transcribed as the following:

«"Break out of your shell, hatch (A), be born, newly alive, striving to take shape, branch out, blossom, ramify (I) with spring thaw life! and then follow the undulating self-movement of life, wise in the ways of danger (O), filled with the earth-born spirit energy of life! (E)".»

In the same way, a sequence of pictograms A – I –O – E can represent the ritual of the hunt of the bear and equally, the rituals of the pipe for the Sioux and that of the Catholic mass. Actually, another Christian narrative, different from the Creed of the Catholic mass, is contained in chapter 6, verses 53-58 of the Gospel John, in which the word "bear" and the words "I" and "me" can be interchanged and thus can be transcribed through the same types of pictograms in the same structure.

«"John 6:53 Jesus therefore said to them, 'Very truly I tell you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you.

54 He who eats (I) my flesh (A) and drinks (I) my blood (A) has eternal life (O), and I will raise him up at the last day (E).

55 For my flesh (A) is real food (I), and my blood (A) is real drink (I).

56 He who eats (I) my flesh (A) and drinks (I) my blood (A) remains in me, and I in him (E).

57 As the living (O) Father sent me (A), and I live because of the Father; so he who feeds on me (I), will also live because of me (O-E).

58 This is the bread which came down from heaven. Your ancestors ate the manna and died, but whoever feeds on this bread will live forever (E)."»

This version of the sacrifice of the bear, the Catholic mass, and the Sioux celebratory smoking of the pipe, can be transcribed into a mandala in the following way:

Pictograms A represent body sacrificed, flesh, blood, animals, and plants

Pictograms I represent the action of sacrifice, breaking, separating, burning, eating, drinking, smoking.

Pictograms O represent the life that comes from the sky to the sacrificed victim, and the passing of the one sacrificed to those that participate in the sacrifice

Pictograms E represent those that participate in the sacrifice and that eat, drink, or smoke the victim, they live with the life that came from the sky and go to the sky or are in the sky.

3. Representation of the Cosmos: Emergence of *nous* and of *logos*

§ 21. *Representation of the cosmos. The emergence of nous and of logos*

Naturally, if there is no difference between the meaning and the thing that gives meaning, there is neither a one to one correspondence between the two entities. Therefore, there is a possibility of various senses and interpretations for each icon and for each sequence, but this does not top the general sense of ancient rituals, just as it does not top that of the rituals of current hunter-gatherers.

If one omits the performative importance of pictograms and take them only as if they have predicative importance, one could establish the following correspondence: (A) original element, (I) growth, differentiation, and division of the original element, (O) dispersion and recombination of the original element, and (E) formation of a new element that has new forms and qualities.

If we interpret the Rosetta Stone in this way, Marshack and Harrod's square does not only performatively reproduce and predicatively describe the key moments of every ritual but also all of processes inorganic, organic, and mental, like a mandala particularly fertile. It also shows the emergence of that which philosophers have called for a very long time *logos*, more specifically transcendental *logos* or the transcendentalism of being.

In effect, the sequence A, I, O, E corresponds to the inorganic world with the sequence of "initial element" (A), rapture and dispersion (I), decomposition and recombination (O), and the emergence of a new element (E). In turn, this succession of moments describes one of the possible sequences for the genesis of inorganic realities, a possible succession and relationship of opposition between the four elements of Earth (A), fire (I), water (O), and air (E), and one of the possible relationships between the elements of witchcraft and alchemy.

Therefore, one refers to the king of the inorganic, the sequence A, I, O, E that corresponds to the process of sexual reproduction: egg-sperm unite (A), parting and dispersing of their elements (I), recombination of the genes (O), and emergence of a new being in the form of new life (E). In another view, the king sequence refers also to the process of birth, growth, reproduction, and death.

Finally, for that which refers to the mental world, the environment of logic and of the entities of reason, the sequence corresponds with the order of the first notions, such as was noted by the philosophers from Plato to Hegel: entity (A), no entity (I), division-multitude (O), and nihilistic (E), or as in Hegel's formulations, being (A), nothing (I), becoming (O), something (E)[27].

Among the significance of elements A, E, I, and O—if one takes in their predicative and performative values—there lies a relationship like that of the elements of the Aristotle's square. That is, what appears in the Marshack-Harrod Square is the transcendent of being in an imaginative version. It could

27   Cfr. Hegel, G.W.F., *Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas*. Primera sección de la lógica, La doctrina del ser, §§ 84-90. Madrid: Alianza, 2005, pp. 186-195.

not be another way.

If the transcendentalism of being is really what philosophy calls transcendent, it can be said any reality or of any entity by virtue of being alive and dynamic (from ideal entities, real and objective entities) that all realities can be fulfilled: A) that they are one unit, I) that they are different, O) that they are constituted with differentiated properties that are new and only theirs, and E) that they constitute a new form.

This is not the only form in which philosophy presents the transcendentalism of being. It is presented amongst other things because the history of philosophy is a history of the discussion of the transcendentalism of being. Because of this, one cannot give it a beginning.

 For this reason, one can think of the primitive mandala not only as the origin of language and of human art but also, as Marshack thought, as the origin of science, such as relationships between the propositions established quantitative qualities; this resulted in the values of truth and falseness belonging to the human mind and to the human language, as taught Bejarano[28].

The thesis of Marshack and Gimbutas continues to be debated, just as that published by Harrod on the Rosetta Stone, but this discussion falls upon the map of empirical approaches and may influence some methodological moments of the argumentative process. From the point of the view of the essence and sense of rituals and other living and cultural processes, one may ask "What other meaning could the ritual encoded in the caves of Lorthet have besides those given by Harrod?, or What other meaning could the rituals of the hunt, of the passing, of foundation, of burial, or any other ritual for that matter, have?" In general Marshack, Harrod, and Gimbutas assert that, a verification of the essential order of a thing does not prove a sufficient test to establish a thesis on an object's detailed empirical order but it is sufficient to sustain the validity of its essential order.

A mind that has the ability to recognize its own existence in totality and infinitude that can generate a gestural and symbolic language with the sequences and oppositions previously mentioned, can without a doubt generate a socio-cultural system like that of the hunter-gatherers of the fiftieth millennium BC or the peoples living in the fifteenth millennium BC or in the twentieth century, or any other people living in different times and places,

28   Bejarano, T., *On becoming human…*, cit.

from Australians to Africans[29]. To generate this system is to decode the world by means of the construction of a mandala, making way for the first manifestation of *logos* and to make present in oneself the *nous*.

4. The Sacred and the Secular: The *Phanum*

§ 22. *Light and the sacred: the Phanum*

Living and surviving by means of the hunt, the food, the sun that gives light to the hunting lands, the fire that lights the cave in which one hunts and cooks and eats, the blood that encourages the living and is spilled out in the hunt and in cooking, is living through all things sacred, through salvation, and through miracle.

Living through that which is sacred is living through *tremendum et fascinans*, the tremendous and fascinating, that which causes temblors and a fear particularly breath-taking, but at the same time it causes seduction and attraction over any ordinary experience, as much for Palaeolithic *sapiens* as the modern man.

A similar experience has been expressed across classic works, like Rudolf Otto's *Das Heilige* in 1917 , which describe the *mysterium tremendum et fascinas*, that is the tremendous and fascinating mystery that provokes stupor, fascination, and attraction at the same time. The same experience can be found in works such as Eliade's *Experiences of the Mysterious Light*, Batallie's *Eroticism*[30], and many others. Every culture and language has designated its own terms to this experience and living within it, but whatever the words used to describe this experience, the effect in which it has on man is the same, moving through it the same general physical postures of kneeling, humbling, adoration, prayer, surrendering, and appeal.

Living is closely related to this experience—they are those of the admira-

29   The African peoples have a socio-cultural system that is characterized as being more simple and accessible, while the Australian's more complex and elaborated. Cfr. Barnard, A. *The evolution of culture: An interdisciniplary view*, eds Robin Ian M. Dunbar, Chris Knight, Camilla Power, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 50-68.

30   Eliade, M. «Experiencias de la luz mística», in *Mefistófeles y el andrógino*. Barcelona: Labor, 1984; Bataille, G., *El eroticismo*. Barcelona: Tusquets, 2005.

tion often described in early philosophy, of the artistic inspiration, and that of mystical and erotic ecstasy.

It is right to think that the first *sapiens* experimented something like this before the sun, the besieged and dead bear, or the fire that burned its flesh, just as modern man experiments with mystical, erotic, artistic, and even hunt-related trances. Although maybe early *sapiens* concentrated experiences of these qualities alone whereas today it is more varied[31].

In another way, the magnitude of those experiences of the hunt and of the fire alive in *sapiens*, in contrast to that which lives in animals, is the magnitude of the difference between human intellect and the mental capacity of animals. The experience of that which is sacred is also the experience of intellect, as is the updating of intellect in a situation of perplexity, of fascination, or of tremendous and fascinating mystery, which reverberates and remains even in periods of daily calmness. This reverberation and opening of intellect explains exploratory behaviour, inventions, creations, the designing of the mandala, and the general perception and comprehension of a universal, transcendent intellect (i.e., the Theory of Mind)[32].

Fire, lightening, bear, bison (or the general idea of power) are appointed with an exclamation, possibly because when being named one aimed to designate these as sacred, living, or radiant.

In Greek, some of these terms are derived from the word *Phanaios*, meaning to light or illuminate; from the verb *Phaino*, meaning to reveal, discover, or shine[33]; or from the noun *fanum*, meaning temple or lamp. From these phrases, we derive the Latin words *fanum* (temple) and *pro-fanus* (what is outside or by the temple) as well as the vernacular term *fanatismo* (fanaticism)[34]. Taking this in mind, Heidegger used the German noun *Lichtung* to mean, using the metaphor of clearing a forest, the intellectual conscience and its environment[35].

---

31   There are trances and experiences specific to the hunt, which are similar to the erotic experience, that hunters know very well but cannot achieve through reading literary works, like that of Berenguer, L. *El Mundo de Juan Lobón*. Madrid: Cátedra, 2010 and other literary works of the same theme.

32   Bejarano, T. *Becoming Human: From pointing gestures to syntax*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011.

33   Liddel & Scott. *Greek-English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991, p. 854.

34   Corominas, J. *Breve diccionario etimológico de la lengua castellena*. Gredos: Madrid, 1987, p. 266.

35   Heidegger, M. *Carta sobre el humanismo*. Madrid: Alianza, 1998.

When *sapiens* carried out rituals of cannibalistic sacrifices, of bears or other related animals, they felt (as supported by the analysis of rituals by Rappaport and Marshack and Gimbutas' Rosetta Stoen) as if they were touching the origin of power, of light, of the divine and felt as transfusions of life, from a life that comes from the tremendous and fascinating mysterious.

This closeness and identification with the divine, with the totem, and with a sacrificed animal causes an individual to feel in himself the same *phanum*, and instead of divine sacrifice man could sacrifice his own blood or something similar, such as in the caves of Northern Russia is 40,000 BC, in the Greeks coast in 1000 BC, Israel in 2000 BC (with Abrahams sacrifice of Isaac), or in September 11, 2000AD in New York. This current dominant idea of fanaticism is maybe a behaviour inspired through *phanum*, which lacks cultural mediations that will later be referred to[36].

§ 23. *The sacred and the secular: organising time*

Palaeolithic societies, in that their entire sociocultural order has been generated through and is based upon sacred rituals, are the ultimate Hallowed societies. Based on this reason, an individual's awareness of conscience of himself is also the awareness of the conscience of the sacred animal and of his tribe, or the conscience of his sacredness. The conscience of oneself, as clearly differentiated from the sacred life which does not appear until the separation of civil life and divine life, is outlines at the beginning of the Neolithic Period, and it is said, as supported by Rousseau's discourses, that this conscience of self appeared at the same time with the process of secularization.

The Palaeolithic *sapiens* needed rituals to complete the vital cycle of life—growth, reproduction, and death—according to the biological and intellectual endowments in which they had; that is to say, they needed to generate both cultural and social systems. To do this required a conscience of oneself as the possessors of life, of a life transferable, and with a precarious identity different from life itself but also linked to life itself through the vital flow. All of this

---

36   Cfr. Marín, H. *Teoría de la cordura.* Cap 1. Valencia: Pre-Textos, 2010; Os, A., *Contra el fanatismo*. Madrid: Sieruela, 2003; Grimaldi, N. *Une démence ordinaire.* Paris: PUF, 2009.

appears and is shown through symbols, rituals, and myths[37].

The dances, colours and signs, instruments, and songs used in rituals are what Eliade names the sacred, while the rest of the dances, pictures, tools, and songs he names the secular. On one hand, the sacred with that which is alive, strong, real, while on the other hand the secular is that which is evanescent, without consistency, and decomposed.

Together with Eliade's conception of the sacred and the secular, there is a common trend in sociological language in which sacred corresponds to that which is religious and related to religion and secular refers to all that which is not related to religion. According to this meaning, one can say that for the Palaeolithic man, the secular did not really exist.

Indeed the Palaeolithic *sapiens*, although developed all their activities to follow the guidelines of their established rituals, were celebrating rituals all day and all night. They did other things, just as the bears and bison; they relaxed, slept, played, lounged about, etc. The life of the *sapiens* was content, and among the times of relaxation there also consisted, just as for the Neanderthal, *floresiensis*, wandering, lounging, dozing, playing, but there also consisted preparation of weapons, shelters, or caves, making of clothes, and preparation of food and drink, and exploration.

Current humans divide activities and time into holiday or extraordinary and work or ordinary. Extraordinary activities that are practiced on holidays include rituals such as baptisms, weddings, communions, funerals, sharing of food, etc., and rest. The ordinary activities, those that are called work are practiced on days designated as labor days.

This division that currently exists between holidays and workdays did not exist for the first *sapiens*. For them, there existed qualitative distinctions that created divisions between various sacred activities and time; although each activity did originate from a religious ritual. For the first *sapiens*, much more than for current man, the organization of time and space was founded upon qualitative differences. These differences for both the primitive *sapiens* and today's man correspond to the differences in the degree of conscience of self and identity[38].

In fact, during workdays, the twenty-first Century man sets out upon

---

37 Cfr. Eliade, M. *Lo sagrado y lo profano*. Madrid: Guadarrama, 1981.
38 Rappaport, R. op. cit., cap 6 and 7.

some ordinary activity, which is usually routine, and during weekends, parties, and vacations, he sets out upon extraordinary activities. The routine activities may cause boredom, agitation, anxiety, etc., but they function to achieve certain goals set out by the organization in which they work. In the extraordinary activities, lives the extraordinary because men set out on these activities for their own enjoyment.

Among group labor there is production, competency, help, envy, etc., and through these activities individuals create a connective order between themselves and their peers. Among group holidays, there are games, sports, drinking, nightclubs, sex, music, shows, and other activities in which man can live in ecstasy. When part of these group activities, an individual may lose his own identity and instead identify with a group, like when at a concert or sporting event or during sex[39].

If contemporary men and women of the twenty-first Century left leave aside the qualitative organization of the time with great imaginative or experimental efforts, and located their memories under an association of ideas and group them according to qualitative characteristics of the different parts of their lives, the result would be very astonishing[40].

For example, there would be periods of birthing and breastfeeding, which could be called the period of the milk in which hundreds of members of the tribe would dance, sing, and do determined things. There would also be the period of childhood, in which every man and woman has been, and the tribe would carry out other games and dances with mothers and fathers. There would also be a period for the mysteries of life, in which the boys and girls would separately dance, sing, and celebrate rituals that their own parents once celebrated. Later, in the period of marriage, hundreds of tribe members

---

39   Cfr. Marín, H. *Teoría de la condura y de los hábitos del corazón*. Valencia: Pretextos, 2010. Cfr. Rappaport, R. Ibidem. The most common reflection about the differences between identity and conscience pertains to the order of the sacred and of the secular corresponds to the work of George Bataille, especially *El erotismo*. Barcelona: Tusquets, 2005.

40   There are ethnological descriptions similar to the types of description that we today make, for example in Turnbull, C. M. *The human cycle*. New York: Simon and Schuster:1953, or that of Barley, N. *El antropólogo inocente*. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1989 about the Dowayos of Cameroon, among other things. There are similar cinematographic and literary descriptions, and although I do not know of any psychological experiments along these lines, I assume that if they were done my hypothesis would be materialized.

would celebrate the nuptials of a young couple ready to procreate. Perhaps in this situation, the period of youthfulness and of marriage would intermix each of the following: the periods in which juveniles learn the dances and songs of the hunt, or the periods in which they learn to fight and the songs and dances that accompany that, or the periods of healing, or the periods of feasts and feedings, or the periods of the sun and water.

In this way, the Palaeolithic *sapiens* organized their periods and people into groups of 100; some hunter-gathers of the twentieth Century were organized similarly but with groups that could exceed 500 individuals.

If an anthropologist (or an individual of an urban society of the twentieth Century) wanted to know when a certain event happened to a certain individual in a tribe grouped in this way, it would be virtually impossible, as found out by Clifford Geertz when he tried to locate a series of events in Balinese[41] history. Actually, it is possible that an individual in twenty-first Century urban society does not have the capacity to establish his personal identity without an abstract quantitative organization of time.

For a man living in an urban society of the twenty-first Century, the times of party and of work, of relaxation and of tense vigilance are clearly defined. If we wanted to follow the genealogy of these two states of conscience and feelings of identity, we would have to retrace our steps from the current man all the way back to *sapiens* living 50,000 years ago, and we would get lost along the way.

The Palaeolithic *sapiens*, like the majority of animals, had two states of consciousness—that of vigilance and necessity and that of calmness and routine. The states of vigilance and necessity correspond to a subjective situation of perplexity, one that has already been described relative to the appropriation of fire and the encountering of the sacred. The states of calmness and routine, inversely, are related to periods of calm and workings. These states of conscience, in correspondence with the previously mentioned activities, are reflected in the living spaces of the caves or huts, or little villages of 40,000 BC That is, there are work places, spaces to relax, spaces to eat, spaces to sleep, spaces to pray, and spaces for celebrate[42].

41   Cfr. Geertz, C. «Persona, tiempo y conducto en Bali», in *La interpretación de las culturas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992.

42   Cfr. Leroi-Gourhan, A. op. cit., pp. 133.

However, all of these spaces were occupied in intertwined times that make is impossible to point out which came first or second. Neither do calendars, which began in the Neolithic Period, represent an entity primarily characterized by time. Not even the most ancient forms of counting—although there existed rudimentary forms in the Palaeolithic Period—can be said to be according to the series of numbers that modern men have used to count time[43].

Although it can be said that in primitive and ancient cultures the rudimentary counting was effective in developing a system of calculation and accounting (like that found in ancient Sumerian culture), these cultures were not interested in determining quantitatively the ages of people.

The use of the personal number, i.e. the quality of age, of contemporary urban societies was not present until the fifteenth millennium BC when subjective forms of Mesolithic and Neolithic life appeared. Thus, it appears that maybe the dominance of speech of a predicative language, which is still used today, was grasped through the new emerging states of consciousness, perspective, and infinite intellect.

Throughout the Mesolithic and Neolithic Periods, *sapiens* generated and increased the scope of that which is considered secular. From the scope of the sacred, men and women increased the scope of the secular and applied such ideas as the force of the mana or of the bear or of the totem to their life and their identity.

But as the Neolithic period was progressing, it is important to note that the secular (which became its own field with its own activities) always took origin from that which was sacred in the mana or totem and always linked back to it. For this reason, there are as many gods as activities and as many gods and words, as studied by David Carrasco for Central American religions, Waldemar Stohr for Indonesia[44], Varron for the Romans, or the emperor Augustine when he called to ridicule polytheism[45].

Neolithic societies are, when compared with the Palaeolithic, each time more secular. Rousseau, a firm believer in this assertion, held that the demo-

43   The numbers that were first utilized and discovered are the two, the pair, and the whole number. A series of two natural numbers, the number line, and infinity were discovered later. Cfr. Ifrah, G. *Historia universal de las cifras*. Madrid: Espasa, 2001, cap. 1.

44   Cfr. Eliade, M. *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*. III-2, Barcelona: Herder, cit. 1999.

45   Agustin de Hipona, *La cuidad de Dios*. Books VI and VII. Madrid: BAC, 1977.

graphic increase and diverse areas of the Neolithic culture allowed for its secularization. A completely sacred society is a serious, solemn, and grave society, but when in a society there opened a path of entertainment and amusement, that caused an influx of heretics. This was characteristic of the Christian society since its beginnings until the twentieth Century, and, as von Balthasar[46] stated, these sectarian societies based in intense ideologies (i.e., sacred creeds) are what have succeeded the Islamic society and continued into the twenty and twenty-first centuries.

Within these societies, one has to open little by little the liberty of movements, actions, gestures, dances, language, and activities; one has to open, little by little, laughter, institutionalized jokes, the first carnival, and later the feast. Perhaps the first budding of comedy and institutionalized laughter was at the prototypical carnival of Babylonia during the times of Gilgamesh in the fourth millennium BC, and from here gave birth to all mutations, from Saturnalias to Carnaval in Rio de Janeiro.

---

46   Cfr. Urs von Balthasar, H. *Teodramática*. Vol. 1, Madrid: Encuentro, 1900. Cfr. Choza, J. *Historia de los sentimientos*. Sevilla: Thémata, 2011.

CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL SYSTEM, COMMON SENSE AND SOCIAL SYSTEM

«But totemic images are not only reproduced on the outsides of houses and canoes, on weapons, instruments, and tombs; the recur on men's bodies. Men do not simply place their emblem on the objects they possess but also wear it on their persons; they imprint it on their flesh, and it becomes part of them. This mode of representation is in fact, and by far, the most important one.»

DURKHEIM, E.: *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. The Free Press, New York, (1995), p.114.

1. In the beginning there was power[1]

§ 24. *Totem and power*

All that is real is operative, active. It is energy and force. The human individual is power. In one sense, it is biological power, organic capacities that update in a temporal cycle. In another, community, ecclesiastic, political power, juristic capacities that update by means of recognition and auto cognition. It comes out of this biological and social power, assumes as a function the expression of a part of this power in service of the biological and social life, and returns to heart of this power when it fulfils its life cycle, its time. Meanwhile it recognises the images of the biological and social power, in the reality of this power itself, its personal essence and its personal existence. And that is as true of the Palaeolithic as it is of the Neolithic and the post-Neolithic. These theses that can be formulated like that in the historical-cultural order, in the sociological and anthropological order, and can also be formulated, according to a strict correlation, in the transcendental ontological order. Being is the origin of man and the cosmos, that is his participation. In turn, among the many ways in which being can be understood in a philosophical sense, one of these, indeed one of the most relevant in the history of thought, is that of being as an act, as an activity, as power.

The construction of the social system and of individual identity, started with the appearance of *homo sapiens*, and with the cultural big-bang 50,000 years ago, and developed as differentiation and an increase in functions, in types of participation of the power and of kinds of identity, on one hand, and as a process of distancing of the individual in respect to its functions, on the other. The process of differentiation and increase of the functions is the process of differentiation of the spheres of the culture, and that of distancing of individual respect of its function or functions, it is the process of development of the auto-consciousness and the individual and social human freedom. The construction of the social system is, at the same time, the construction of the cultural system, with each one of its spheres initially hardly perceptible, and the construction of the personal identity.

The Palaeolithic can be perceived as this process of construction of the

---

1   Translated by Yuka Chikamatsu and Daniel Gete.

social system, the cultural system and the individual identity. The Neolithic can be perceived as the period of increase of the social complexity, of differentiation of the spheres of the culture (differentiation between religion, politics, law, economy, tactic, art, science, and wisdom) and as the period of differentiation and distancing of the human individual respect of its functions and tasks, as the period of development of self-consciousness and freedom.

One can perceive the post-Neolithic as a period in which the relationship between the differentiated spheres changed, as a period in which Neolithic relationships between each other were profoundly modified. Also, as a period in which the difference and the distance between the individual and its social functions was transformed. But this remains to be examined in each case and in each moment.

The Neolithic thought of Western culture examines the human being from four points of view. Ancient philosophy studied and analysed man from the category of "substance," medieval philosophy from the category of "persona," modern philosophy from the category of "subject," and contemporary philosophy from the category of "existence" or of "biographical time."

Palaeolithic "thought" discovers, describes and identifies the human being from the point of view of the life, of the beginning of making living. It uses the notions of life cycle and of biological-cultural process, with a sense in similar part at the one of the notions of nature, active principal, power or being, and very distant of the notions of substance, person or subject.

The birth, growth, reproduction, and death sequence, which is the sequence through which religion, politics and law consider and regulate the life of the human being, is far wider than the philosophical notion of substantial and subjective nature, at least from the merely categorical point of view.

Palaeolithic thought expresses the activity, the being, or the power in general term with names such as "mana," "wanka," or others, whose precise meaning has been shaped by the analyses achieved during the twentieth century. And it expresses with the term "totem" the diversification or participation of "mana" that manifests in each one of the human activities through which a power is exercised.

Of course, there are manifestations of "mana" in all natural beings, either they have relation with the human being or not, but they are only "totem" those natural forces that have had and have relation with the constitution of the human group and with the development of the activities by means

of which group survives. For the other part, the studies achieved along the twentieth century have also demonstrated that there are very interesting totemic systems, even though the common thing to all these are used to be the reference to a sacred power, more frequently animal, as origin of the group, from the tribe and the clan.

2. Cultural System and Worldview

§ 25. Worldview

A psyche that can be empowered by fire, and above all generate it, is a psyche that does not begin in certainty like that of the majority of animals, but is instead located in perplexity and furthermore, has an urgent need to leave it. Why it starts located in the perplexity and in the ignorance is something that will be seen later. The manner in which it leaves perplexity will now be examined.

The *sapiens* need to refer to the top and the bottom, to before and after, the living that appear here and now because this living does not arise from *homo sapiens* themselves, because it does not belong to them, and above all because they themselves depend of the living to survive. If the initial situation of the *homo sapiens* is that of perplexity, the setting in which they are located from entry is the immense hole of one here and one now that continually fulfil and empty from living and have the necessity of knowing how it fulfil and empty these actors.

Even if they are not very conscious of it, the *homo sapiens* have the necessity of deciphering the reality, its setting and its actors, of learning its customs. The animals do not have this necessity because they are not in its setting. Their situation is not that of perplexity. They know what they can ear and how to get it (even if it results difficult).

That human psyche endowed with *nous*, with intellect, comes out of perplexity organized the activities that has to carry out to survive. Putting some intersections, some limits, for which generate spontaneously a notion such as that of "to start" or such as that of "beginning." The intellect needs to find a beginning. It puts the beginning, it is to say, limits, the time and the space, sharing from here and from now. Why? Because it is the simplest. The intellect needs that notion of beginning because the thought gets lost in absence of limits, it gets lost in the unlimited and in the notion of infinity.

Said in other way, thought gets lost in itself, in its infinity. It initially perceives it projecting in the real things. Upon perceiving each one of them, it will know continually the finite of this deer, this moon, and this ground, and always go more there from this animal, more above of that star and more below from this land. The notion of infinity is the perplexity itself, implies the knowing and the comprehension. The knowing and the comprehension need an intersection, a limit.

There is a point zero for everything, that is here and now, and there are some fields/confines that circle it: up and down, in front and behind, near and far. It needs to understand how to arrive here and now the fire, the mammoth, the newly born, the rain, the sun, what are its customs, how one should try to stay here, in order to be friendly and to kill no one. This knowledge expands little by little, by trial and error, through the imitation of other animals, because of fortunate spontaneous impulses. As such, one learns what helps life and what is good and what destroys it and what is bad; what is familiar and is tidy and clean, and what is unknown and is chaotic and dirty; what allows to arrange the power and is useful and what is not allowed to control the power and is harmful. This is what one enrols in mandala and what the mandala teaches.

In agreement with (as soon as) one repeat one and again the ritual of the hunt, of the birth, of the fertilization, of construction of the cabin y the settlement, of inhumation of the deaths, the humans get used to treat with the power, to cooperate with it, to cooperate between them to cooperate with the power, to live in the land and to understand the universe. In this way one achieves to explain how it has been the beginning of all. The rituals, the dances, and the elements used in all of these activities account what has already learned, and to this collection one calls it universe. Those of what cannot account is the chaos, the bad, the danger. And the articulation of the good and the bad, the ordered and the chaotic, the useful and the harmful in function of the supreme power with what these men collaborate constructing an order that allows them to survive, is what one define like conception of the world.

Thus, the system of instincts reinforced by learning that allows the animals to embark successfully on the cycle of birth, growth, reproduction, and death, is completed in the case of the *homo sapiens* by a system of rituals that have, in a considerable proportion, a functional equivalence to the majority of the human cultures, which is what receives the name of "world view."

In the formula of Clifford Geertz, a Worldview is a single system in which

"the sacred symbols relate ontology and cosmology to a statistic and a moral"[2] which is to say, an organization of the concepts on the real and the unreal (ontology), on the sky and the land (cosmology), on the cleanly-organized and the dirtily-chaotic (statistic), on the good and the bad (moral), that ends up guaranteed by religious conceptions.

A worldview consists of the allocation of the supreme categories of valuation, that in philosophy one calls the transcendentalism of being (real, beauty, good, truth), to persons, institutions and concrete events, in correspondence with activities, faculties or 'tools' of the individual psyche, such as to perceive, to feel, to want, and to think. In effect, one perceives what is real, feels emotion when faced with beauty or horror, wants the good, thinks and knows the truth.

The systematisation reflects the correspondences between 'categories' (living substance, quality of it, space, time, etc.) and transcendental of being (good and mad, truth and false, real and unreal, etc.), with the faculties and acts of the human psyche, it is realized in the occidental culture within the scope of the Greek science for the school of Athens and especially for Aristotle [3]. In the Indian and Chinese cultures these correspondences establish between forces and positive and negative beginnings, masculine and feminine, of the cosmos and the living organisms in its mutual implication, that it picks up knowledge and therapeutic in the sacred books[4].

The things and the people, in which one expresses the original power, are what one perceives as real, what moves us as beautiful or terrible, what values and wants as good. The behaviour respects of the things judging by what the things are (judging what the world view says that is), it is, simply, the common sense[5].

2 Geertz, C., *La interpretación de las culturas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992, p. 119.
3 Cfr. Aristóteles, *Acerca del alma*. Madrid: Gredos, 1978. The entire Book III is dedicated to the differentiation of the faculties according to its actions and of these actions according to its objects. Chapter 1 and 2 are dedicated to the external senses and the categories of quality, space and time, and chapter 7 and 8, to the articulation between imagination and intelligence and to the relationship between categories and transcendental of the being.
4 Among them, in the collection of Los Kama Sutra and of *Los libros de amor del oriente* already cited.
5 One picks up here and continues the established in Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit. Chap. 1.

§ 26. A model of the cultural system

It has been said, citing Geertz, that a world view is a single system in which that "the sacred symbols refer an ontology and a cosmology to a statistic and a moral", it is to say, an organization of the concepts about the real and the unreal (ontology), about the sky and the land (cosmology), about the tidily-organized and the dirty chaos (statistic), about the good and the bad (moral), that results guaranteed for the religious conceptions.

The values and notions that emerge in the oldest rites of the *homo sapiens*, in relation with the capture of fire, with the hunt or with the fertilization of the female, to knowing, the good, beauty, sacred, useful, etc., in each one of these orders, one locates spatial and temporally around the individual and the group taken as point of first reference the corporal axis, that is the point zero, the here and the now to divide the which negotiates the life of group.

For reference to corporal axis it they establish the adverbs of place, here/there, near/far, up/down, in front/behind, and these of time, now/later, before/after, soon/later, etc., and in these places, they go situating the hunt, the sun, the blood, the sacred, the female, the death, etc. Of this way the cultural system constructs generating an axiological topic, a map of the places where they situate the valuable reality diverse and danger for the human group, in the which the positive values locate "above," because the sun the ray and the rain, all the genera life, comes from "above," and the negative values locates "below" because what lacks from life, the death, decline and situate "below" and stay lifeless.

For that "above," in the sky, is the sacred, the bright, the good, the sublime, all those of what the man does not arrange and of what more depends the life, and for that when it needs it and ask for it look at the tall. "Below" is also all those of what the man does not arrange in the negative order, and that can damage it and destroy, that provoke the death. In environment it is the world of the humans, the order of what results available for the man, a lot in a positive sense like in a negative sense.

If this topic arranges according to the systematic order of these activities and of the correspondence knowing, the result is a picture of nine columns and five lines in which the cultural system snows with certain clarity[6].

---

6   The picture is taken from the chapter 1 of *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit.

The cultural system, equal to the social system, maintains a consistent structure in the Palaeolithic, in the Neolithic and in the post-Neolithic. The axiological topic of the human being maintains a constant structure as long as these periods.

In the Post-Neolithic, and after the apparition of the scientific cosmogonies, the universe describes in scientific coordinates and the natural places disappear from it and the adverbs of place and time, and it describes in key exclusively physical without allusion to possible extra-temporal states. Said in another way, the positive science does not allude to a religious scatology nor to a state more there of the time and the physical place.

	Ontho/theology		Cosmology		Aesthetics		Ethics	
0) To-tem/ Name	1) reli-gious feeling	2) meta-physi-cal topos	3) geo-grap-hical topos	4) cor-poral axis	5) aes-thetic value	6) affective value	7) ethical value	8) tech-nical value
a) Zeus	God	Being	Sky	Abo-ve	Light	Sublime	Saint	Magic
b) Polis	Friend/ enemy	Evol-ving	Earth	Right /left	Beau-tiful/ ugly	Agree-able/ disgree-able	Good/ Bad	Useful /not usefu
c) He-phaes-tus.	Demon	No-thing	Hell	Below	Dark	Horrible	Sacrile-ge	Des-truc-tion
x)	Category. Epistemic Order						Insti-tution. Prag-matic order.	Tools. Order of Poie-sis.

Anyway, just as in these three special periods the humans continue fulfilling the cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death, whose ritual determination constitutes the social system, so too in the three special periods man remains a bipedal animal, with a corporal axis which continues determining

the axiological topic of his existence. Because of that for the humans of the twenty-first century the positive values of the food, the beautiful, the magical, the sacred and the sublime continue to be situated "above" and continue to refer to the sky, the high, whereas the negative values of the repulsive, the despicable, etc., continue to refer to that of "below," independently of that has disappeared from the common imaginary the idea of "inferior" like a religious place.

The children of the twenty-first century also have to learn to stand and to walk upright, have to learn that the son and the stars are beautiful, and they are ¨above¨ in the sky, and have to learn that the first of all the differences, in which they summarize that of good/bad, useful/harmful, truth/false (the transcendental of the being), it is the difference clean/dirty or well-organized/disorganized, that in Greek one says cosmos/chaos. This difference is with which the Spanish children learn the word "caca (poop)," that means simultaneously, in the first studies of the language, bad, ugly, dirty, false, disorganized, that mom does not want and father either. This difference is maybe the first that the more original *homo sapiens* learned when celebrated their rituals of hunt and the preparation of its lair like "home" and of its settlement as "world," because it is which opens the order of the transcendental.

The cultural system strictly has the character of system as soon as the elements of the line a) and c) are correlated between each other. The beautiful is above, it is bright and sublime, clean and holy. The disgusting is below, and it is satanic, sacrilegious, dirty, infernal, harmful. For people that live of the hunt of buffalos, and whose totem could be the buffalo, the system functions perfectly. The buffalo is an animal that hunts in a day, that mates in spring and eats fodder that are in its splendour in summer. For that the light, the son, the rain and the beauty of the spring is what generate the life of the tribe and of the population, because it is what in spring, and always, makes germinate the life of the buffalo.

For a tribe that feeds on cephalopods captured at night, for example, squids (lucifugous and fished at sunset or sunrise), and whose totem was the squid, the system could suffer changes: the source of life, the squid, could be referred to below, to the darkness, and the good and the beauty could also have connection with these values.

In the Neolithic, even though the life happens to depend on the agriculture and not on the hunt and the recollection, also the life depends, and more

than before, on the son, on the rain and on the winds, on the spring and the falls.

In the post-Neolithic even though the life depends on the autonomic human activity, on the productive activity of industry and services, emancipated of the natural rhythms of day/night and on those of spring, summer, fall and winter, by means of the electric energy, the axiological topic maintains with a part of support in these natural cycles and other part in the same language, whose contained symbolic maintains the positive values referred to the elevated and brilliant, to the sly and to the son, and the negatives referred to the below and despicable. They can vary the elements and concrete places in which they anchor and locate the values, but the structure of the axiological topic remains constant.

The cultural system of the humans, characterized this way, is perhaps already complete in the Mesolithic. If one supposes that the first testing out of the agriculture and the development of totem were produced around the tenth millennium BC, one can suppose that the social system and the cultural system were practically complete around that date. If one admits that the oldest rituals of the bear hunt date back to the fiftieth millennium BC, then one can suppose that the social system and the cultural system was generated by the rituals began in the period that stretches from the fiftieth millennium BC to the tenth. Finally, one can assume that until the tenth millennium BC there was a predominance of expressed and imperative language, and that beginning in the tenth millennium BC, predicative language starts to gain ground, until it is imposed fully with the generalization of the writing halfway through the first millennium BC, which is when the differentiation of the spheres of the culture is fully produced.

The axiological toic maintains constant in all because also it maintains the structure of the vital human cycle, that of the organization of its operative capacities, and that of the connections between the order of the tactic, the right and the economy. In the line 0 they indicate the values in philosophical nomenclature according to the order of the transcendental of the being, and in the line X they indicate the values in Durkheim's socio-cultural nomenclature. The values of the theology and the ontology of the first and second columns, they correspond with the categories of the systematization of Durkheim. The ethical values of the seventh column and the technical values of the eights column, they correspond with the institutions and with the tools in the syste-

matization of Durkheim.

In general, the articulation of the spherical diverse of the conception of the world corresponds with the articulation between categories, tools and institutions in the cultural system. It is not necessary to enter in the polemics about what factors and elements are causally determinants of which others, that how it indicated occupied good part of the energies of the Marxist school since Marx to Gramsci, and perhaps more even of the energies of the Marxist politics it is more fructified consider the system like a collection of factors in interaction and how a game of retro-feedings, in which all the elements determine and are determined for all[7].

Once analysed the structure of the cultural system in the plan of the external objectivity, (subjective exteriority or ethical perspective in anthropological terminology), proceeds its consideration in the plan of the subjective interiority, (phenomenological plan or emic perspective in anthropological terminology), proceeds to study the statute of the cultural system while shaping the individual psyche, it is to say, while generating what it calls the common sense.

3. Worldiew and Common Sense

§ 27. *Common sense*

Common sense is the operation of the world view in the individual mind. The individual mind works from the same way in all the individuals from the group, and one has gone conforming over of the learning in virtue of the activities and ritualization that have given like resulted the consolidation and survival of the community. The common sense is the collection of the certainty that fulfils the functions of the instinct in the animal species. For this reason it is a collection of knowledge that, as indicates Clifford Geertz, it characterizes for being "natural, practical, transparent, unsystematic and accessible"[8].

Common sense is not simply language, the meaning of the words, is, mo-

---

7   For the debate about the determinant factors in the cultural system, cfr., Harris, M., *Materialismo cultural*. Madrid : Alianza, 1989.
8   Geertz, C., "El sentido común como sistema cultural," in *Conocimiento local.* Barcelona: Paidós, 1994, p. 107.

reover of that and above all, the comprehension of the sense of the discourses, the common knowledge, shared, of the assumptions, of the presupposed since those who speak, of the objectives that pursue share or no, is the participation in the same prejudices, convictions and believes, like sustains Gadamer, even if there have been stated few times. It is the context of the forms of verbal and nonverbal communication[9]. Common sense is well established in the phases of the vital human cycle, in the biology, that of some way prefigures its context to the less like empty that needs to be filled. That prefiguration of the common sense is what has been analysed for the profound psychology like unconscious in general and like collective unconscious on particular, for indicating like "archetypes" the form of the existence and the human sharing[10].

Common sense is the ground where one settle the convictions and the beliefs, the place where reconcile the intelligences, the wills and the affects, the mental sites where a discourse is understood for all and can be accepted for all. The collection of these sites and the argumentations that can connect since they and between them is what Aristotle called *Topics*, matter to what devoted one of the five treaties of logic of its *Organon*, and established it like angular leg of the rhetoric, or art of generalize consensus, to come to agreement with the men[11].

Of the five books of the *Organon* of Aristotle, the first, *Peri hermeneias*, it is dedicated to the formation of the worlds and concepts, the second, the *First Analytics*, to the reasoning, much demonstrations that prove like "showing" does not prove, the third, *Second Analytics*, is dedicated to distinguish the demonstrative reasoning and the persuasive arguments, the fourth *Topics* to the reasoning that are probable and the places of which can divide (dialectic), and the fifth, *Sophistic Refutation*, to the demonstrations and false argumentations.

Aristotle dedicates more attention or more pages to the rhetoric and to the ordinary language that to the scientific demonstration, to the episteme, and reserves for other two treaties, the Rhetoric and the Poetic, the study of

9   Gadamer, H.G., *Verdad y método*. Salamanca: Sígueme, 1977.
10   For an exposition of the characteristics of the collective unconscious, see cfr., Jung, C.G., *Los complejos y el inconsciente*. Madrid: Alianza, 1983 y *El hombre y sus símbolos*. Barcelona: Caralt, 1976.
11   In reality, the five books of the *Organon* of Aristotle, *Peri hermeneias, Primeros Analíticos, Segundos Analíticos, Tópicos* and *Argumentos sofisticos*, dedicate more atention or more pages to the rhetoric and to the ordinary language that to the scientific demonstration, to the *episteme.*

the connection of the arguments and discourse with the feelings, passions and necessity more profound of the humans, it is to say, with what later one would call the collective unconscious and the individual unconscious[12].

Vico characterized the common sense as the knowledge shared by all the individuals of a community, and therefore, as the thing that maintains the cohesion of the group unchangeable certainties, as a kind of soul of the community in an almost Durkheimian sense, which is how Geertz also characterizes it. For Vico, common sense starts to decompose at the same moment that reflection begins to develop (not because of it, as Rousseau believed), until everything eventually disintegrates and society enters a new barbarism[13].

Common sense, what in the objective plan is the world view, and in the subjective plan is the way in which the individual psyche functions and the way in which it understands the world.

One can better perceive the way in which the common sense configures the individual psyche and makes possible its comprehension of the world resorting to the comparison by Peter Winch between Western culture and that of the Azande.

An Englishman can learn French and master it well without having ever gone to France and even without having frequent conversation with French people, but this is because the English language and the French language share many elements of the European common sense. One can learn and master French without being French, and even without being European. On the other hand, one cannot understand mathematics nor use with fluidity the language of mathematics without being a little mathematical.

In the same way, it is not possible to understand the witchcraft practiced amongst the Azande, as Evans-Pritchard hoped, from the assumptions of the Western scientific categories of efficient causality and lineal causality, because the Azande do not understand the world nor explain it according to these categories. They know them, but they do not use them[14].

---

12 In reality the archetypes of the collective unconscious find in the tragedy, that is the theme studied by Aristotle in the *Póetica*. For a study stopped of these connections, cfr. Choza, J., *Conciencia y afectividad (Aristóteles, Nietszche, Freud)*. Pamplona: Eunsa, 2ª ed. 1990.

13 Cfr., Choza, J., "Reflexión filosófica y desintegración sociocultural en la antropología de G.B. Vico", cit.

14 Cfr. Winch, P., *Comprender una cultura primitiva*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994.

The French and the English have a different common sense and a different world view, but this difference is almost null in comparison with the European common sense and the Azande common sense, with its respective world view. At the same time, to some levels of greater depth, the archetypes of the unconscious collective of the Europeans and of the Azande present less striking differences.

4. Common Sense and the Structure of the Human Psyche. Stages in the Formation of Speech

§ 28. The structure of the human psyche. Stages in the formation of speech

The cultural system, in its objective slope, is the world view. In its subjective slope it is the common sense. The discovery and the configuration of the world, the process of invention of the language, of denomination of the own body and of the reality of the surrounding world, it is the process of structuring of the individual psyche, in the newly born and in the first *homo sapiens.*

Supposed the anatomic-physiological developments required for the human language, the beginning of the speech, of the thought and of the language in the human species, it is, at the same time, the beginning of the organization of the human psyche. Organization of the world, of the psyche and of the group are one and the same process that that of the generation and consolidation of the language, first in the forms of the expressive language, between the *homo sapiens* that precedents of Africa occupied Europe in the fortieth millennium BC., and later in the forms of the predicative language beginning in the fourth millennium BC.

The language and the thinking begin not good make its apparition some *homo sapiens* with a cranial capacity like that of the actual man and a cerebral like that of the actual man, and with these this intellect that the Greeks denominated *nous*, more than 100,000 years ago in Africa and less than 100,000 years ago in the rest of the world.

The development of the thought and of the language can establish around the model of Popper and Eccles of 1977[15] from the younger and older

15   Popper, K.R., and Eccles, J., *El yo y su cerebro*. Barcelona: Labor, 1980.

extension of time and space that covers and represents by means of the found symbols in the registry fossil, and by means of the quantity of connections that can establish between the discovery of the registry that belong to the order of the technique, to the order of the organizational practice and to the order of the symbolic communication[16]. Some collections of symbols express and represent actions to be carried out immediately (bifaces, axes), others for actions to be carried out at a slightly more distant moment (spears, arrows), and others to be carried out in more distant times (containers, statuettes, decorations)[17].

The symbols that represent actions to achieve in a middle time and in a time very distant belong to the *sapiens* and do not come from any further back than the eightieth millennium BC. At this date, or a little before, the first expansion of the *sapiens* and of languages took place from Africa to the rest of the world, whilst the second and third expansions of the *sapiens* and their languages developed between the fifteenth and fifth millennia BC[18].

Linguists admit that the more original languages of humanity would have the following characteristics:

«"1) gestural language accompanied the oral; 2) words could represent meanings more complicated than that which is now habitual, upon referring to entities more concrete, more specific; 3) very few elements of grammatical function would exist, to any beginning; 4) the order of words would be essentially iconic of the reality; 5) the hierarchical relations between words would be equivalent to division of information in the texts; 6) the basic unities would be small unities of intonation and gestures, that would represent individual 'ideas;' the grouping of these lead to the organization in propositions, and surely much later, prayers[19]."»

To obtain an image close to these beginning of the language between the *homo sapiens* of the fiftieth millennium BC., one can review the process of learning language employed by children. After children have spent a year crawling, crying, sucking, biting, crying, screaming and babbling, they take their first steps upright between their first and second year. In this phase, their

16   Rivera Arrizabalaga, A., *Arqueología del lenguaje. La conducta simbólica en el paleolítico.* Madrid: Akal, 2009, pag. 70.

17   *Ibidem*, pp. 71 ss.

18   Bernárdez, E., *¿Qué son las lenguas?* Alianza: Madrid, 2004, pp. 88 ss.

19   *Ibidem*, p. 203.

first forms of language are the gesture of stretching the arm and the hand and expressing a sound, in order to reach a bottle, toy, or water, which, if it wants them, it designates them using the same gesture and cry, and with another it rejects them. When it learns its first words, "water," "doll," or "mama," they use them as complex orations, equivalent to "I want water," "I want that you give me the doll" or "mama I want you to come," identified the noun with the verb of will, "I want."

Evidently, in this phase there is nothing more than nouns-verbs. The voices and gestures are nouns and verbs in a unity. Later they can appear differentiated verbs and autonomous, and later perhaps adverbs and adjectives, but no prepositions nor conjugations, nor verbs in complex forms (since later, it does not appear the subjunctive of the Spanish verbs). More forward, the kid can name "spoon," "plate" and "glass" in the order in which that one put what he sees on the table, or in the order in which he learns that one puts. At the time, the kid learns that who makes table is mama, or papa, and also who put him clothes and lays him on bed.

The child learns the order of the words like order of the things, also like relation between the persons, and goes learning that there is an order in the house and in the world, and this itself is what the *homo sapiens* goes learning when starts to use the fire, to heat the food and to paint in the walls of the cave.

Initially the conscience that have the child and the *homo sapiens* of themselves is the chaos, and according to growth, according to they learn, it continues making the cosmos around: "where is mama?," "where is the fire?," "here, there." In the beginning it was the chaos, as says Hesiod in the *Theogony*. Later order arrives through those who are powerful and who can control the chaos: the fathers, the God, and the kind-hearted men, who know how they have to relate to the God. As such it occurs in the passing of the life of a human being.

By means of the voices it passes marking and distinguishing the labours of the woman and the man. The differentiation of the voices and shouts is correlative of the division of the world, and for that the elements of the middle name making appear the different genders. In some languages the word "sun" has masculine gender, and relates it with the male for the potency and the size. In others the word "moon" relates to its time with the lactation and with the menstrual periods. The language passes consolidating upon creating a universe of acoustic imagines that permit a communication also acoustic

between various individuals.

As such it is like the child and the *homo sapiens* make conscious of the time and the space, thank the day and the night, thank that they go out of the house and enter in it. As such they learn the outside and the inside, the here and there, the now and later. They learn the adverbs of place and time, learn the cosmos, and the order of the cosmos telling the suns and the moons that pass. They learn what is clean and dirty, real and fiction, and what means each one of these names, learn what is good and bad, useful and harmful, and learn the relation of the persons that they have around with these values.

Thus organization of the mind takes place. The child and the first *sapiens* realize that they are cold, and learn to give name to what they feel, and also to the hunger, the thirstiness, the fear, the hurt, the nostalgia, the anger, the compassion, the resentment. They rise the words, the sounds, the necessities, their remedies by means of the help of the others, of the adults, of the whole group. The child takes four years to learn all this if he lives in a linguistic environment, and the *sapiens*, that had that general the linguistic environment itself and the cultural environment, it is possible that it take twenty or thirty thousand years. And it is possible that the synthesis and convergence of work like that of Marshack and Gimbutas, Durkheim and Bernardez, Popper and Eccles, Campbell and Piaget, Aristotle and Pierce drive to a good comprehension of the beginning of the human species.

The structuring of the psyche is the structuring of the group and of the population, the constitution of the social system and the activities of the men, the values that have validity and how one has to respect them and achieve them. The men leave his situation of perplexity learning who he is, where he lives and how he can maintain his live, for arduous that results, and which is the sense of his life: birth, growth, reproduction and death. But the man knows that in his case the vital cycle carries much more things: have children, be rich and powerful, have animals and lands, and skins and dresses, and food and decorations, and venerate the ancestors.

In this way the psyche of the *sapiens* and the child becomes structured. Initially, when Aristotle rocks the psyche term and analyse, conceives it like original governing of living organism, like motor of the embryology process and lately of all the metabolic system and immunologic. Later, in the modern age, psyche passes to mean mental life, and also substratum of the mental life.

In the Aristotelian and Hippocratic age, a disorder of the psyche meant a

disorder of the organism, in other words, a sickness, plain and full. Beginning in modernity a disorder of the psyche meant a specific type of sickness, meaning, mental sickness.

§ 29. Normality and insanity

Even though the world view and common sense are the two faces of the cultural system, each one has an autonomous statute in virtue of which changes can be produced in one that are not produced in the other, and thus a misalignment between the two occurs, which one registers as a misalignment between the 'reality' of the group and the individual psyche.

When a misalignment between reality and the psyche is produced, the habitual thing is to attribute the responsibility (the blame) to the individual psyche and to say that it has 'lost' its common sense, that it has been driven insane.

The words 'insanity' and 'insane' exist in all languages, both primitive and developed. In Greek there exist two words for madness: *moria* and *mania*, (the case of the word *alogon*, irrational, that only exists in Greek and in the derivate culture of the Greek-Roman world, requires consideration apart).

The term *moria*, of the verb moraine, means, to be crazy, become the crazy, intent crazy things, to hurt oneself, and in passive sense, stay astonished, astounded.

The term *mania* means, enthusiasm, frenzy inspired, passion, desire crazy for something[20].

This is to say that madness takes the form of intellectual paralysis, of the mental starvation for a part, and of the frenetic excitation, for other, both ways in which the animal mind and the human can reaction before the complete perplexity. If to an animal or to a human one deprives of whatever familiar element and leave before it absolutely unknown, before the chaos, one can reaction of one of these two ways, its mind flies to state of complete dis-structuring because there is no world nor world view for it. In other words, before a situation of complete chaos it would be difficult to differentiate crazy from

20   Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., *A Greek-English Lexicon*. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus. *Mania* and *moria*.

sane. Insanity is mental chaos, independently of whether exteriority is or is not also chaotic.

The structuring of the psyche begins with the prefiguration of the rituals by means of what one can fulfil the cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death, it is to say, by means of the prefiguration of the function of father or mother, of husband and wife, of hunter and housewife, of quack or gravedigger, that they are the archetypes of the collective unconscious already mentioned. The call psychology founds study the moments older and fundamental of the human psyche, the biological races of the aspirations and the human spirit, the values that constitute theCultural system.

At the time that carries rope the structuring of the psyche by means of the emergency and the consolidation of the fundamental human types, of the archetypes, and the emergency in these of the basic qualities, of the cultural values, carries out also the structuring of than second level by means of the social system, through which they consolidate the categories of space and time, substantiality and causality, efficiency and finality, in this second level it gives a higher diversification of the cultures, because while the cycle bear, grow, reproduce, and die remains constant for all these places, environment and procedures of survival would vary more of some places to the other. For this it gives a better difference between the categorical system and instrumental of the cultural diverse, that between the archetypes of the collective unconscious that find in each one of these. From this it is a good example the study cited from Winch of the analysis of Evans-Pitchard about the Azande.

For other part, not all the cultural configurations give place to psyches equally fair and stable, nor favour for equal all the forms of exercise of the intelligence. The study of the structuring of the psyche for the cultural system has given place to spacious chapter of the studies about culture and personality, very developed in the United States in the middle of the twentieth century, that boards the phenomenon of the cognitive style of the cultures, of the cultural shock, of the disorganized psychics induced for cultural configurations or for sectary forms of the religion, etc[21].

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the phenomenon of

[21]   Cfr. Benedict, R., *Patterns of culture*. Boston: Houghton Miffin Co., 1959, and Wallace, A.F.C., *Culture and personality*. New York: Random House, 2nd ed. 1970. Cfr., Kepel, G., L*a revancha de Dios. Cristianos, judíos y musulmanes a la reconquista del mundo*. Madrid: Anaya, 1991.

the globalization, it produce a relation of all the cultures with many others, and this affects also the common sense of good number of citizens, with their repercussions not only in the order of the psychopathology, but also in that of the religion, the politics, the right and the economy.

5. The Social System and Individual Identity

§ 30. The social system and individual identity

In 1912 Emilie Durkheim published *The elemental forms of the religious life*, work in which he exposed his theory about the totem like genesis of the structure and the social organization, and that gave place to a stream of thought that flew into the structuralism and other anthropological and sociological schools[22].

Durkheim sustains that the fundamental image, notion, idea or conception that the man has is that of power for force, that first one expresses like sacred power or 'Mana' of the original Australians, later like God in the occidental theologies later like being in the old metaphysic constructions and finally like force and energy in the modern physic since Newton until Einstein.

In correlation with this thesis, Durkheim sustain that, moreover, the man understands himself and defines himself, like group and like individual, for the participation that has in this supreme power or force, and that he designs with the name of totem. The totem is, then, whatever participation of the sacred power that founds in inorganic elements, vegetables and animals, like the rain or the moon, like the palm or the acacia, like the wolf or the bear, and that serves to give name to an individual, a clan or a tribe, like already indicated. As such, "sitting bull" is the name of an individual and "cave bear" that of a clan.

The totem represents and designs by means of 1) a kinetic element, like a gesture or a movement, 2) a graphic element and/or chromatic, 3) an instrumental element and that frequently makes allusion to the portion of sacred power of that one treats, like a leaf of tree, canine of animal, etc., 4) a phonic element, that generally constitute the name of the individual, of the clan or the tribe. Durkheim does not systemize like that, in correlation with

---

22   Durkheim, E., *Las formas elementales de la vida religiosa*. Madrid: Alianza, 1993. Cfr. Harris, M., *El desarrollo de la teoría antropológica*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2008.

the four elements of the ritual, the forms of representation and designation of the totem, and Rappaport neither, but they enumerate them many times. There is correspondence between the elements of the ritual already indicated (§16) and the ways of representation to the totem, and it allows to understand the way in which the *homo sapiens* adapt to the environment, survive, name and comprehend themselves creating a world, a cultural environment. This adaptation to the environment through the organization of the group has certain correspondence with what the illustrated called transit of the state of nature to the state of civilization.

Durkheim takes the work of enumerate the forms in which the representations of the totem serve to mark places, times, instruments, housings, goods of consumption and values of exchange, liturgical objects, etc., because one of its intentions is to investigate since the totemic organization of the relationship and the society, the origin of the grammatical rules and the language in general.

For that he studied the power of the totem for pre-sign, sign and design it all[23]. Rappaport also takes the same work, but better because he has interest in showing that the ritual is the origin of the religion, the language, the auto knowledge, the moral knowledge and the culture, and Campbell also, for similar motives.

The same thing had been done before by Vico, to whom Rappaport refers explicitly, but he interested himself more in the genesis of the spheres of the culture than in the origin of the grammatical rules[24], for which Vico is considered to be the founder of the sciences of the spirit more than one of the founders of sociology or social psychology.

Despite the fact that Durkheim makes numerous comparisons between totem societies and modern societies, despite the fact that he makes a history and genealogy of the notion of force, and to think of that he considers society, the empirical unity of the human species, to be the true substance of religious belief, he does not offer a description of the forms of expression and recognition of the power, of the connection and comprehension of the human acti-

23   The analysis of the descriptions of Durkheim in relationship with the present model stayed elaborated in Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo.* Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, cap. 1.5.

24   Vico, GB., *Ciencia Nueva.* Madrid: Tecnos, 1995.

vities in function of the power, as Hobbes made in 1651 with his *Leviathan*[25].

The studies of Durkheim focus on the totemic societies, and the studies of Hobbes on the expression and the recognition of the power, which according to him operates in the same way in the state of nature as in the civil state. Philosophers have always tried to articulate human intelligence with the cosmos and both things with God, but Durkheim being a sociologist and Hobbes a political philosopher, they have focused their attention upon the relation of power, independently of the divine or human character of this power.

Taking into account the descriptions of Hobbes one can draw a genealogical and historical line of the way in which the man identifies with the supreme power, since the notions of Mana and of the Palaeolithic totem, passing for the notions of God and Neolithic and medieval King, until the modern notions of state and citizenship[26].

On the other hand, taking into account the correspondence between the forms of construction the socio-cultural regulation and the personal identity in the totemic societies, in the medieval, and in the modern one can design a systematic picture in which one shows that there is coincidence between the three[27]. In the three the social regulation and the personal identity establish according to the generalized liturgical orders for the rituals, that Rappaport analyses in the historical societies in general.

The constancy in the construction and structure of the social system in such heterogenic and prolonged periods is not too surprising, if one insists that what this system regulates is the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death, the biological process of all the livings, but which in the case of man presents the peculiarity of being greatly impacted by knowledge and learning, by discovery and invention. As a result, even though the totemic societies studied by Durkheim are not Palaeolithic societies nor even Neolithic, they can direct their elements towards the Palaeolithic side.

One has to insist in which the programmed capacities genetically, that go doing its apparition, they reach its maturity and weaken also according to

25 Hobbes, T., *Leviatan*, chaps. X and XI. The analysis of the descriptions of Hobbes in this sense stayed elaborated in Choza, J.,*b*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, cap. 6.

26 It is one of the objectives of Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla-Madrid: Thémata-Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

27 It is one of the objectives of Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla-Madrid: Thémata, Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

programming joy, they stay assumed cognitive and socially in the rituals, in a way that without this social reception cognitive the biological capacities, even if they are programmed genetically, do not arrive to update. And this is not only certain for the language, nor also for the sexual maturity and parental and for the political maturity.

Without cognitive social regulation the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death is not fulfilled. Said cycle consists of the emergence of some power that, as whatever power, can be considered sacred, but which needs the "ecclesiastic" community as an audience, that as Durkheim repeated many times, it is other power neither less relevant nor less sacred. The constancy of biology and its regulation of the powers of the individual do not impede the constancy of the social community and its own regulation of these same individual powers. Neither does this biological and social constancy impede the wide variation and interpretation that given in rituals.

Durkheim systemized the complex of activities derived from the specializations of power, of the grouping and totemic individualities, of the 'professions' of the Palaeolithic. Hobbes systemized the numerous expressions and recognitions of the power of the individuals within the groups, and Arnold van Gennep in 1909 systematized the rituals found and studied for the anthropology, in a classic work that has never lost value, *The rites of passage*[28].

For his part Rappaport systematized the collection of rituals that constitute the historical societies according to its relation with the formation and cohesion of the community, and with the maturation of the individual auto-knowledge and the moral and religious knowledge.

The descriptions of these four authors can systematize in a model that allows perceiving what way the social system and the personal identity determine as a system of "professional activities" to which one agrees by the means of a ritual, and whose structure remains constant, as soon as it comes given for the cognitive regulation and social (one could say also "free") of the vital cycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death.

28   Van Gennep, A., *Los ritos de paso*. Madrid: Taurus, 1986.

§ 31. The social system: totemic, Christian feudal, and state

In a picture of three columns they can situate the conception of the own supreme power of the societies A) Palaeolithic totemic, B) medieval feudal, and C) modern national. And in twelve lines one can situate:

1) The name that one gives to this supreme power in each one of these societies. In the totemic one can denominate mana or with an equivalent, in the Neolithic God or an equivalent, and in the modern state.

In each one of these societies be someone comes given for the ritual of the imposition of a name, that means already being recognized for the group, being identified for him, and having some keys to identify himself by the means of these. Upon being recognized for the group, to the newly born one can give already a power that is a name.

The name is a word with performative value, according to the terminology that rocks John L. Austin in the sixties and that he has passed to the posterior anthropology, a word that has efficacy in the real world, or what is analogue, a sensitive sign that causes what it means. This is the definition that the Christian theology, since Augustine de Hippo, gives from sacrament and this is exactly what happens when one puts the name to the kid in whatever society.

In the totemic society A) in the ritual of the reception in the family and the clan, the newly born receives the power of its totem, of that of its parents and of that of its clan. This name is a participation of the power, of mana, that protects in from curses, sicknesses and it makes it grow. Its name causes in what it means, "Dense oak," "soft gazelle," or "fast arrow."

In the feudal Christian society B) in the ritual of the baptism the newly born receives these same powers by means of the grace of God through the patron saint or favourite of God whose name have imposed to the baby, already be Santiago, Isabel or Teodoro. And as the Palaeolithic ancestors the Christian saints intercede for the livings since the eternal life.

Social system and personal identity in:	A) Palaeolithic Totemic Society	B) Christian Feudal Society	C) Modern National Society
0) Supreme Power	Mana	God	State
1) Personal Power	Birth Rite	Baptism	Civil registration
2) Power of Community	Rite of passage Power of Totem	Integration in Strain, Feuds.	Majority of age Citizenship
3) Clothing of Power	Tattoos and Amulets hunting, war, etc..	Badges and shields, Military standards	Cards Uniforms, Fashion
4) Tools of Power	Axe, healing amulets, etc..	Weapons, guild tools, etc.	Professional Titles Logo Company
5) Enabling new Powers	Increased Power Rites: Marriage	Sacraments religious profession	Training, career advancement
6) Power system protection	Taboos system	Moral and religious codes	Civil and criminal code
7) Effective space power	Constitution of Town and Tribe	Areas of vassalage	Constitution, private jurisdictions
8) Intensification / annulment of Power and identity	Fetishes, Charms/Rites-weakening, curses, voodoo	Consecrations, honours, titles / excommunication, exile	Awards, Tributes/ Fines, convictions
9) Places and sites of Power	Holy Mountain Animal sacred	Ark of the covenant temple	Parliament, Central Bank
10) Perpetuation of Power and identities	Rites-perpetuation, Tombs	Cemeteries, cult of heroes and saints	Museums, statues to heroes
11) Absolute power symbol	Totem image	Banner, Cruz	Flag and shield of the nation

In the state society C) in the ritual of inscription of the newly born in the civil register, it is the state which fulfils the functions that before achieved Mana and God. The inscription makes the kid person before the right and citizen before the state, and therefore, tenured of right at the attention of the sanitary system, of the educative system and of whatever other definite rights in the constitution.

2) Once that one remains a community, of the power of the totem, of God or of the State, one receives the fullness of the power and the fullness of the subjective capacities that they correspond to the kid "for nature" when, by means of the ritual correspondents, one reaches the capacity to conceive by means of the ritual of initiation of the boys and the girls, in the feudal Christian society the rituals of the sacrament of the confirmation and the civil rituals of the placing of long, the first tournaments and hunts, etc., and in the state society upon reaching the majority of age by means of the rituals of obtaining the National Document of Identity, Passport, normal account, credit card, etc.

3) Once reached the majority of age, the supreme power participate and diversify according to the activities that they go to achieve, that come defined and expressed in the rituals by means of what one acquire the capacity in question ad in the resulting "attire" that will carry which receives this power. As such in the totem society the attire of the power is of a type for the hunt, of other type for the war, of other type for the diverse worships, and of diverse type are also the tattoos, amulets, etc. In the feudal Christian society, equally the rituals of training for the war, to predict the Evangeline, or to act like notary, are different, as such like they are the emblems and shields, the military standards, or the professional attire. And in the state society of the twentieth century, the training is also diverse according to the type of activity to develop and one expresses equally in the visiting card, the uniform, or the variety of attire that the way designs for each scope. This is the form in which of way more explicit one produces the identification between social function and personal identity in the labour-centric state society.

4) The diversification of the power, moreover to keep following its own rituals of training and its own form of expression and publicity, also keeps following its own instrumental and its own tools. In the totemic society they can be the spear, axe, the herbs for the spells, etc. In feudal society they can be the sword of the knight, the mitre of the bishop, the pen of the writer, and guild instruments in general. And in the state society one can be the stethoscope for

the doctor, the universal title hanging in the office, the logo of the business, the known sign for the bank, etc. The instrumental is the true sign of the power, of the social function and of the personal identity, and a sign that causes really what it means.

5) After the reaching the majority of age and the training for diversified powers, each individual agrees to the training for new powers, and in first place for the fullness of the power not yet individual ("socio-labour" power), nor group or socio-political, to the power for the increase of the group, o could be, for the marriage. In some totemic societies, old and medieval and modern like the roman or the Jewish, only the paterfamilias has the fullness of the political rights.

In totemic society marriage is celebrated by means of a ritual that transforms the counteragents socially into married individuals. In feudal Christian societies the sacrament of the marriage has the same effects, and in the modern state societies the ritual of inscription of the marriage in the register civil is what produces the transformation of the counteragents.

But as well as the marriage rituals, in the three types of societies that are routes to the promotion of the individual through rituals to increase of power. In totemic societies the acquisition of a superior rank of warrior or of hunter, in feudal societies they are the reception of noble titles, the religious profession and the income in the "state of perfection," and in state societies the professional promotion.

What in the state societies called the "civil state" or what in sociology calls status and symbol of status, constitute the personal and social identity of each individual. Not just a few times is the content of juvenile reveries a respect for the future and for the social, ethical imagination of each youth and each adult.

6) The establishment of the diverse forms of participation of the power and the way of articulation between them, keeps following a system of protection of the ordering that defines and regulates the usage of each power according to the legitimacy of each individual to exercise it. The power cannot be exercised in any case for whom lacks the legitimate title for it, and if it occurs the transgressor receives a punishment of between one amply set already characterized.

In the totemic societies it is the system of taboos what protects the ordering, in the feudal Christian societies the moral system of sin and

punishment, and in the state society the penal code and the system of crime with the correspondents pain. In any of them an individual can use attire, tools or instruments for what is not legitimated, and to utilize those of others is characterized as cheating, impersonation of personality, falseness in public document, etc, and punishment with pain more or less serious. The personal identity and the social function have protected frontiers that they reinforce and secure them.

7) In each one of the three societies, the totemic, the Christian feudal and the modern state, one determine the scope of validity of the power in political-juridical key (what the Romans called civitas) and in political-geographic key (what the Romans called urbe). Said scope is that of the reach of the power of Mana, of God or of the State, coincides with the jurisdiction to what one extends the power, and one generates by means of the rituals of constitution of the population and of the tribe, the rituals of generation of kings and of scope of the vassalage, or the rituals of promulgation of the national constitutions of different countries.

On the other hand, within the general scope of jurisdiction of the maximum power, they also generate scope of particular powers when an important participation of the supreme power rules a series of functions. They are the particular code of laws, for example of the women or the warriors in the totemic societies, of the men and religious in the medieval Christian society, and of the military, academics or athletes in the state society.

The individual identity and the social function still acquire the reinforcement of the particularity of the force. And that of the particularity of the nation, force to the collection of the livings.

8) Moreover the articulation of the forms of participation of the supreme power, necessary for the substance and the development of the social system, the social systems also count with procedures to value the quality with what the concrete individual exercise the power-function that corresponds and defines it. Telling with forms of intensification of power and identity like award to the individual that has achieved its work well and like recognition of its worth. Also telling with forms of cancellation of power and identity like punishment to the individual that has achieved its work badly and deserves a reduction of its power, or including cancelation of it.

This is what one carries out in the rituals of reinforcement of the power and the identity, that in the totemic societies they are the donation of fetishes or

amulets, that they mean and cause more effective power in the individual, and in the weakening-rituals, as the curses, voodoo, and other forms of damage and punishment, that they mean and cause a subtraction of the power of the individual.

In feudal societies, the rituals of reinforcement of the power-identity are the consecrations, canonizations, the granting of honours, noble titles, and analogue distinctions, and the rituals of reduction or cancelation of the power-identity are the exile or the excommunication, that effectively reduce the individual to the noting social.

In the state societies, the rituals of reinforcement of the power-identity are the awards (The Prince of Asturias Award, Prix Goncourt, Nobel Prize, Order of Civil Merit etc), the tributes, the distinctions (the naming of son and heir, of the earldom, etc.), whilst the weakening-rituals are the fines, judicial sentences, expulsions, etc.

The personal identity and the social function reach in these cases the supreme altitudes of the sacred and the lowest of the infernal, and it is when it fulfills the way more noticeable the structure of exit and return of the supreme power and around the supreme power.

9) As much in the totemic society like in the feudal and the state, the supreme power stay located and represented especially in the places stores of the power at the which trail or remit the individuals for legitimate its function and its identity, reinforce it, recognize it and proclaim it. In the totemic society these sacred places and storage of the sacred power are the Sacred Mountain, the Sacred Animal, the Arcade the alliance; in the feudal Christian society they are the Temple, the hermitage, the Shrine, the place of the apparition; in the state society the places are the Parliament, the central bank, the palace of the boss of the state.

The legitimacy of the function and the identity of the individual emanate these places, that they are the centres of the being and of the sense.

10) In the same way that there is a representation and special location of the power, there are also representations and temporal locations of the same, that they constitute by means of rituals of perpetuation, as they are in the totemic societies the thumbs and relics of the ancestors, that conserve its power, in the feudal societies the mausoleums and cemeteries, with the inheritance of the ancestors, that also conserve its power, and in the state society also the thumbs and cemeteries, the squares, streets and buildings at

which one puts its name, the memorials of the heroes, and its cultural and economic inheritances.

The function carried out for these, the way of carrying it out and the power that they had, continue acting in the time after the disappearance of them.

11) Lastly, in the three types of societies there is the simple yet substantial symbol of power, in which a religious cult surrenders itself to the standard, to the cross, to the saint or to the divine image, and in state societies, the rituals of the cult to the flag, to the nation, to the days of independence as a holiday.

The social system keeps constituted like a system of liturgical orders, by means of which each individual knows who is in each stage of its existence and what it corresponds make in it, and who are the inscribed individuals in other orders and what it corresponds make in these. It is possible that a system like this would not be completed until the Mesolithic, and that in the period it had the characteristics of an incomplete ordering, stricter and completely religious, as indicated earlier (*§ 23*).

It is also possible that the system was gaining in flexibility throughout the Neolithic and arrived at its known maximum flexibility with the globalization of the twenty-first century. But it is admirable nonetheless that the collection of processes used by human being to organize and identify themselves was invented in the pre-totemic Palaeolithic societies and it has not undergone much change since then. Perhaps it is also little recognized that this system is the most important cultural inheritance that human beings have received of the Palaeolithic, perhaps even more so than spoken languages, which arose later, and derived from it.

CHAPTER V

THE PALEOLITHIC UNDERSTANDING OF SELF

«Before art had moulded our behaviour, and taught our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rude but natural; and the different ways in which we behaved proclaimed at the first glance the difference of our dispositions.»

ROUSSEAU, J.J.: *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, London, J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923, p.132.

«While men were innocent and virtuous and loved to have the gods for witnesses of their actions, they dwelt together in the same huts; but when they became vicious, they grew tired of such inconvenient onlookers, and banished them to magnificent temples. Finally, they expelled their deities even from there, in order to dwell there themselves; or at least the temples of the gods were no longer more magnificent than the palaces of the citizens.»

ROUSSEAU, J.J.: *Ibid*, p.145.

1. The Feelings of the Ritual: Blame and Forgiveness[1]

§ 32. *Unconsciousness and Innocence*

When an intellect like the human makes his or her appearance in the planet, he or she expands based on his or her strangeness and surprise in diverse dimensions or directions, of which he or she has already examined many. He or she discovers and invents the meaning of that which is perceived in the surroundings. He or she locates all spaces temporally in a construction by human scale of space, of time, and of the universe. In this way, he or she constructs firstly a cosmos apart from chaos, which is that which was had "in the beginning".

While constructing the cosmos, he or she constructs the social group and organizes it for the use of pertinent activities in order to survive. At the same time, he or she constructs the individual identity of each of the members of the group in all of his or her life stages. There are not three moments in chronological time but three simultaneous dimensions or directions of the same activity: 1) to construct the cosmos, 2) to construct the social group and organize it and 3) to construct the individual identity. And still we must add 4) to discover the light and the sacred power, and 5) to discover and construct the proper interiority.

The fifth dimension or meaning of ritual or the fifth inventory direction and discoverer of *nous* is the inner self and its dynamic, which will now be dealt with. It is also the time to explain how and why the initial scene is one of strangeness, once it has been seen how and why one comes from it.

To understand nature and to accommodate oneself to live in it without instincts, from perplexity, one must put aside whom one initially is not and whose power is essential for one's own survival, for the possible antagonist. Life must be put aside; one must win it, attract it to oneself. But this human action is not in any way innocent nor is that of taking fire from a tree, either.

Innocent is the action of hunting crocodiles, sharks, or eagles but not that of humans. The hunting of animals is innocent because it is minorly reflexive and is minorly mediated for learning, or that which is the same, comes configured by a genetic program that determines the behaviour, physiology,

---

1 Translated to English by Juliana Baptista Sullivan.

and anatomy of the animal species. No scientific or recreational document about animals has ever shown any crocodile or eagle feeling guilty as it devours its prey. Their indifference is such that, as a result, they are extremely cruel. Cruelty implies an absolute innocence.

In the *homo sapiens* species, the activity of digestion or giving birth may be innocent, but not that of hunting or abducting women, nor even that of eating or copulating. In reality and of its own, originally there are no innocent human actions, and there are none because man, mankind, has intelligence, because mankind "knows."

And what is it that they know? The first thing they know is that they do not know. Almost no action is individual, and rituals are by no means. Rituals are rituals of the group, ignorance and perplexity are of the group and knowledge too. Knowledge and actions are knowledge and actions of the group, customs of the group, collaboration between individuals in the group. And "what is that which the members of the group know?"

They know that the lightning is not theirs but that it comes from the sky. They know that the sun goes, and they know that they do not know if it will return. They know how to kill a boar, and they know that they do not know what the other boars can do. They know that they do not know if the boars came from the sky, like the lightning. They know that they can seize the power of the boars and use it to hunt other animals. They know that they do not know what the other powers, of water, of earth, of sky and of fire, will consent and will prevent, will give and will take away.

Because men have intelligence, they know all that they have done, and the way in which they have done it is the model of that which can be made and of that which others make. For that reason, intelligence universalizes and applies to all possible cases of that which has once been achieved, like Vico developed at length throughout his *New Science*.

§ 33. Knowledge, blame, and forgiveness

All this knowledge actually leads to a feeling of guilt before each successful action. For that reason, each action of this kind has put into play many powerful instances without their consent, and the intelligence of the *sapiens* permits them to know that these instances can react in unpredictable

ways. The knowledge of that which can and cannot, the knowledge within reach and the limit of its possibilities, of the link with the cosmos and with the group, is to know that they are "responsible" for their actions, is to know that they are "free." To participate in a ritual is immediate formation of a moral conscience because after the ritual one must behave according to that which the ritual itself establishes. The young must behave like the young, the married like married people, the mothers like mothers, and the hunters like hunters.

Naturally, in the first stages of *sapiens*, there is no reflexive conscience of responsibility nor of freedom but one of vital conscience, immediate, of one's tasks, enough reflexiveness for which they give feelings of guilt[2].

For that reason, it is important to worship the fire in the interior part of the cave, where it is conserved in its holy place, in its own alter, in its own sanctuary. And it is important to propitiate it, to dance around it like Prometheus did the first time under the burning tree, to whisper like the first time, to worship before it, to jump for joy before it, to yell before it.

For that reason, it is important to worship the bison in the interior part of the cave, in the bedroom, where god is celebrated, and the female is fertilized. The bison remains there in its image, in its spirit, in its power, in its vigour. The men around it jump, yell, shoot arrows and spears. And the women too. The men and women ask for forgiveness and give thanks, sometimes together, other times separately, and learn what it is to be a man and what it is to be a woman. They light the fire, sprinkle the ground with red ochre, dress in game, put the paintings and tattoos of expedition and adoration, and dedicate one full day and night to ritually reproduce the first encounter with the animal and the first ownership of it, the movements and cries of the animal and that of the hunters[3].

During the rites, the members of the group know what they have to do all together, what the group does, and what each part of the group does on its own. That which the children, the youth and the girls, the women, and the men, the warrior and the hunter, the single and the married, the elderly do. They know how the group together and each section of the group relate with the holy power, which part of the holy power the girls have that reach maturity and give birth, the part that the boys have when they can engender,

2   On the formation of ritual and moral consciousness, cf. Rappaport, cit., Chap. 4.
3   Leroi Gourhan cf. op. cit. pp. 391 ff.

the part that the hunters have and which the warriors have, which the sorcerer has, which the elderly have and which the dead have.

The life of the group begins as theft and distribution of the sacred powers and is formed in this theft and distribution, which is that of which hunting consists. Therefore, the feeling generated from it is blame. But in turn, hunting, if done properly, according to the rituals, is communion with the sacred powers of all the individuals of the group and of all between them thanks to hunting. Hunting is food, communion, celebration of life, reconciliation with the sacred powers and gratitude to them. For all that, hunting is food, is a Eucharist, a collective and individual Eucharist.

This structure of *exitus reditus*, of exit and return from the supreme power to the supreme power, is the structure of every rite, as was already indicated in relation with the mandala of Harrod. It is the assent to the cosmos; it is the consummation of mandala. The rite is not a moral duty that one can choose. The group cannot choose between cosmos and no cosmos, between survival and not survival, between understanding and not understanding. The ritual is understanding of oneself and interpretation of oneself, of reality itself, of life itself, individually and collectively. Transformation of the chaos in the cosmos, development of the cosmos. Construction of the human world and the self. Alienation, hostility and reconciliation. Culture.

2. Possession and Contingency of Life

§34. *Possession and ownership of life*

One may think that just as today's children learn to say "mine" before they learn to say "I," so too in the process of the generation of language between the first *sapiens*, the idea of conscience of possession came first and later that of the possessor. And because there is "we" before "I"[4], one can also think that "our" comes before "us".

Seemingly, the first form of possession and the first consciousness of it

---

4   Bejarano, T., *Becoming human: from pointing gestures to syntax.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011. P. 27.

is that which has to do with ingested food[5]. Primitive *sapiens* not only possess that which they have ingested, but they also identify with it. The primitive is that which he or she eats. In the rituals of cannibalism, the hunter and the community that eat the hunted game, like bear and other animals, obtain the life of the hunted game. For this reason, in the arctic rituals the hunted bear possesses in turn the life of the hunters and the community because they are going to give it life after or during the ceremony. The tribe possesses the life of the hunted bear, of the god bear father of heaven, and the god bear father of heaven receives in turn the life of the members of the tribe when they return the head of the hunted bear to him.

If the bear child of the god of heaven is male, he receives a female *sapiens* as a partner, and if female, she receives a male. The marriage is a double and mutual possession. Meanwhile, the god bear father of heaven receives the skull of his bear son as an offering, and with it the life that the community returns.

The exchange systems of this type seem to occur between Neanderthals, especially in the form of cannibalism, as already indicated. Cannibalism seems to have been excluded between the *sapiens* since 40,000 BC, probably when it was established as the first taboo. Yet, given that they lived an animism and a generalized fraternity, perhaps they also lived a generalized cannibalism, although figuratively speaking of course[6]. In any event, the *sapiens* maintain the cannibalism ritual and the incest ritual, until the first millennium BC, and in America until 1500 CE.

The continuous exchange of life between the different carriers of it and the short distance between the world of the living and that of the dead cannot dramatize the way in which the phenomenon of cannibalism is seen today. To give so much importance and so much gravity to these primitive forms of cannibalistic communion, it is necessary to have a plural and very strong sense of time, of individuality and of life, something that the first *sapiens* did not have and that they gradually acquired.

The timing delay of the possession of food seems to be when the animal,

---

5   Attali, J., *Historia de la propiedad*. Barcelona: Planeta, 1989. The book is titled in French *Au proper et au figuré*, and is subtitled "Una historia de la propiedad." There are developments of the relationship between possession and identity in the original Lévy-Bruhl, Ll, *El alma primitiva*. Barcelona: Península, 1974 and in Levi-Straus, *Tristes trópicos.* Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1976.

6   Attalí, J., *L´Ordre cannibale*. Paris: Grasset, 1979.

instead of being consumed in the present, is conserved and taken care of to eat in the future, which indicates the beginning of the nomadic livestock. Livestock thus appears as the form of food saving, as the first form of extracorporeal possession, and as the first form of time possession, namely as a form of possessing the future and the present, which is exactly what is meant by saving. This beginning of livestock occurs at the start of the Mesolithic era to 12,000 BC[7].

It seems then that the first thing that the *sapiens* is conscious of possessing is food and life. It is a consciousness different from that which the lion has of possessing the territory it watches over or that of the penguins that care for their young. This consciousness of possessing life is not the only consciousness of possession possible for *sapiens*, but additionally that life can be possessed in various ways. Sometimes they have some and sometimes others, and while they have them, they can do some things, and when they do not have them, they cannot.

§ 35. Contingency of Living

This possession of life is in itself very contingent, but it is possible that life itself may not be experienced as contingent in itself. Life was always passed from one animal to another like an indestructible flow of power very closely related to red blood. The difference between life and its owner was not so extreme as to assume that the life of the animal, its blood and flesh, or that of the grandfather that enters into old age, were assimilated also into the qualities of the holder (as continues to occur in the Catholic Mass today).

However, if the taboo of cannibalism exists already in year 40,000 BC between the *sapiens*, then there is a certain consciousness about the difference between the life of the *sapiens* and those of other living things, or if there is not a consciousness about these lives, there is a consciousness of the difference between this type of possessor of life and the other type of possessors. For the

---

7   Attalí, J., *Historia de la propiedad*. Cit., pp. 24 ff. The first animal and plant domestications, apart from the dog, are recorded in the early Mesolithic to 12,000 BC, Cf., http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domesticación. The comparison between the English, French, and Spanish versions of Wikipedia, which are updated at different rates and use different sources, is accurate and affordable information about the Paleolithic domestication.

sapiens, possessing life is not the same as not possessing it, and for this reason the taboo of cannibalism makes sense.

This difference between life, possessor of life and type of possessors, and the idea of life as "susceptible to alternative uses," if one permits the economic metaphor, appears sufficient at this moment to explain and understand the rituals, the symbols, and the construction of the cultural and social systems between 50,000 BC and 15,000 BC, without the necessity of resorting still to notions like the soul, self, immortality and eternity, all linked together, and the correspondent form of self-consciousness.

These notions and the correspondent self-consciousness seem to emerge at the start of the post-glacial era, namely in the Mesolithic era, and they seem to strengthen throughout the Neolithic era.

It is possible that the cultural and social system, as has been said (*§ 26* and *§ 30*), were constructed between 50,000 BC and 10,000 BC and that at this stage the culture was completely religious, sacred (*§23*). It is possible that the mandala of Harrod (*§19*) begins its construction for 40 years. On the other hand, it is possible that the process of secularization starts with the birth and development of the domestication of plants and animals, which carries with it a new meaning of time and of subjectivity.

3. Life Cycle, Self-awareness, and Archetypes

§ 36. Types, archetypes, and marks

It has been said that in humans, rituals take the place of instinct and that the rituals emerge by trial and error, by imitation of other animals, and by spontaneous inner impulse, by inspiration (*§6*).

The procedure of trial and error does not require explanations and neither does that of imitation. But that of inspiration and spontaneous impulse do require it and have received various proposals of clarification. One of them is that these spontaneous impulses, varied and articulated between themselves in some way, make up some internal forces to which several authors have given the name "archetypes" because they prefigure the "original types" of the ways of being of humans and are expressed in these ways of self. The set of these archetypes have been called the "collective unconscious" because it

happens equally in every human being (*§ 28*).

Archetypes are to human beings what nests are to birds, maintains Carl Gustav Jung[8]. When *sapiens* appear on the planet, and with them an intellect like that of mankind, the result is perplexity, as has been said, a crushing sense of not knowing how to behave to survive but also an enormous inner need to know how to survive, to know to survive, to realize activities with goals still unknown.

These activities with goals still unknown fall within the horizon of many goals indeterminably correct, which are those that come given by the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction, and death. The unknown is the precise way in which they will be achieved, including the act of whether they will be reached. The indeterminacy of these goals is given by the amplitude of the intellect. But the goal itself is prefigured in the *sapiens* like the building of nests is in birds.

In *sapiens* there is a desire to grow and "be greater," to engender and conceive, to have a husband or wife, to be a mother or father, to be a hunter or warrior, to breastfeed, to explore and travel, to care and experience, to touch the gods and speak with the dead, to fly with the stars and to reach the sun. Or at least there is foreshadowing of these desires.

All the desires, inclinations, and instincts for determined objectives that an animal can have, can be had by a *sapiens* with an intellect like the human. But this intellect makes the desire much more undetermined, much more "spiritual" and, for this same reason, much more animal and much more plant than the animalistic desires and the plant-like tropisms. It makes this foreshadowing much larger, that the types have much more scope and depth, and that each individual finds him or herself in some distances and heights that animals cannot accommodate. These amplitudes and these boundless distances are the infinite level of human biographies and human history, and that is where the archetypes are realized, in the Palaeolithic in one way, in the Neolithic in another, and in the Post Neolithic in another.

It is possible that the *sapiens* learned many things from the Neanderthals by imitation, like how to appropriate fire and conserve it, appropriate dens and caves, hunt, organize in familial nuclei, fertilize the females, attend to deliveries, care for the new-borns and bury the dead. It is possible that they

---

8   Cf., Jung, C.G., *El hombre y sus símbolos*. Barcelona: Caralt, 1976, pp. 53 ff. Cf., Eliade, M., *El mito del eterno retorno*. Madrid: Alianza, 1972.

also learned by imitating other animals and that they bettered the procedures by trial and error. And it is also possible that the fire, the hunt, the sexual union, the births, and the family lair produced a fascination analogous to that produced by humans today, and they experienced an inner impulse to certain related behaviours.

Fire is fascinating, and the ocean, and the star-filled sky. The hunt is fascinating. Sex is very fascinating. The birth of a child is very fascinating. The house itself is very fascinating. Also, all these realities are attractive, very attractive. Humankind feels inclined towards them because with the intellect and some affects like theirs, they protect their lives at some heights and some very high and distant futures, to the extent that they are able to articulate an ever-widening time. They imagine a lot and dream a lot about what they can live with fire, hunting, sex, the child, the family home, death, and beyond death.

It is possible to sketch a kind of system of archetypes, or of the families of archetypes, in correspondence with their organic bases, on one hand, and with their sociocultural expressions and ideals on the other. It would be a system of absent 'instincts', instincts that have been amputated. The gap they left behind has been covered by rituals, and their impulses have caused concrete developments in the fields which constitute the social system that has already been examined (*§ 31*). From this point of view, it can be said that there is an archetype, or a set of them, for each one of the social system's stages and functions. The relationship between them is shown in the following table:

Psych-phi-lology	Deep Psy-chology	Religion	Politics -Law	Customs	Moral Super-ego
Unaware Living Life energy	Unaware Collective Archetypes of	Types of rituals	Institutions	Protocols/ social roles	Moral norms and ideals
Vitality-libido	Boy child, Orestes, Oe-dipus etc.	Initiation			
Vitality-libido	Girl child, Electra, Antigone etc.	Initiation			
Vitality-libido	Virginal, Girlfriend, Athena, Ar-temis etc.	Rites of the hearth	Statute of virginity	Female ser-vices to the community	Responsi-bility
Vitality-libido	Young boy, Ulysses, Ares, etc.	Rites of war	Statute of youth	Military service	Responsi-bility
Vitality-libido	Adult son, Achilles, Neptune	Heroism, sanctity	Hunter, traveller	Service to the govern-ment of the polis	Professional excellence
Vitality-libido	Father, Abraham, Agamem-non	Enter abnegation	Pater familias	Domestic authority	Good father
Vitality-libido	Adult woman, Cybele	Marriage, votes	Feminine professions		Professional excellence
Vitality-libido	Mother, Juno, Hestia, Isis	Enter abne-gation	Mater familias	Domestic governance	Good mo-ther
Vitality-libido	Old man/ woman Tiresias	Transition to the afterlife	Testimony	Mourning	Honour the memory

§ 37. Cultural activation of archetypes

For each one of these situations humans experience dreams, fantasies, impulses, desires, and projects (as animals certainly do too), for which one can assume a starting point in correlation with its goal, which can be called imaginative universes, as Vico them, and also archetypes of the collective unconscious as do Jung, Eliade, Campbell, Kerenyi, and the school of Eranos de Andrés Ortiz Osés in Spain[9].

To the extent in which some of these desired and dreamed activities are carried out for the first time, they leave a mark on the nervous system of the person in question, which ethologists call imprinting, which facilitates the repetition of this type of actions and that generates, from the community´s point of view, a custom or ritual, and from the individual´s point of view, a habit. Possibly that which is consolidated in the individual mind is consolidated in the group member´s mind, expands the mindset in general that each one possesses, and expands the possibilities of communication.

The habit that consolidates an archetype contributes *eo ipso* to the consolidation of the social system, of the cultural system, of the common sense, and of the structure of the individual psyche. It also contributes to the consolidation of the conception of the world, of the emergence in the factors of speech present since the beginning of the communicative practices, of the communication between individuals of a group, and of the individual identity of each member of the group.

There are one or various archetypes for each of the phases of the life cycle of birth, growth, reproduction, and death. There are dreams and impulses of wanting to be older, to be a hunter hero, to have a wife or a husband, to be a mother and to be a father, to lead a group, to burry parents, to reunite with ancestors, as one becomes aware of what all this consists and perhaps before. Namely, there are one or various archetypes for each rite of passage, for each one of the sacraments of the religions, for the entrance in each one of the decisive stages of the life cycle, and there are one or many archetypes for some "professional" activities that are also heroic and define all human life[10].

9   Kerenyi, K., and Ortiz Osés, A., *Arquetipos y símbolos colectivos*. Barcelona: Ánthropos, 1994.
10   The way in which the psycho-analysis of Jung´s archetype is exposed in a single biographic narrative stream is the work of Campbell, *El héroe de las mil caras*, cit.

There is the archetype of the traveller and of the trip because life is an *exitus reditus*, an exit and return; there is the archetype of the shaman because life is to care, healing and salvation; there is the archetype of the smith-alchemist because man imitates the holy power of transforming things; there is the archetype of the prostitute, the female that receives all of the seeds like the Earth and welcomes all as land; there is the archetype of the virgin, the female that is the dawn before the sunrise[11].

In the life of the group, these are the types of individuals that integrate the community formed by the tribe. In the organism and in the psyche of each of these individuals live and act the archetypes, the fantastic universals, the roles of key figures in the community. And in the body, in the skin, and in the face of each individual, in his or her dress, and in his or her utensils, the brand is part of the type, of the archetype, and he or she associates with yells and voices; namely, he or she associates with sounds that end up being names.

In this way, similar to how a lion learns that which it can jump and that which it can run, a *sapiens* also learns how he or she can appropriate fire or even produce it, how he or she can hunt wild boars or construct a hut.

This knowledge is a knowledge of one's powers and is a power. The type of each individual is a type of power that comes from the totem and which is the activation and inauguration of the archetype. The totem, insofar as the participation of the holy power, of the cosmic power, external, connects with the archetype insofar as it activates an internal predisposition to a target. In this way, the *sapiens* is aware of him or herself upon having awareness of his or her power, like a current five-year old child is aware of him or herself upon wearing the clothes of Superman or of Leo Messi and really feels like Superman and Leo Messi.

Self-awareness comes in the self-determination to make the archetypal actions in this religious act of worship. In the moments of rest, away from the scene, in the profane times, the *sapiens* can doze or wander as unconscious of him or herself as the current child that has finished his or her games or the lion that has devoured its prey and dozes satisfied.

Vico and Durkheim, Jung and Eliade, Rappaport and Campbell can define all of the actions made in these terms as holy actions, like religious acts,

---

11   Cf., Eliade, M., *Iniciaciones místicas*. Madrid: Taurus, 1989; *Mefistófeles y el andró-gino*. Barcelona: Labor, 1984.

and the original self-awareness and self-determination of *sapiens* as religious self-awareness and self-determination, holy, as well as the identity of each one.

Those that learned to appropriate fire and produce it have marks of soot from the fire on their bodies and faces. In an analogous way, the correspondent marks are had by those that learned to hunt bear or deer, to build a cabin, to attend to women in labour. Each individual was a living craft, a living noun and verb, and the set was a social system, a system of communication, a language, a culture.

Such was the self-consciousness that could be had by that *sapiens*, in general how to be human, and basically, like shaman, warrior, midwife, married girl, such was also the Neolithic self-awareness, and such is the post-Neolithic. That which humankind knows about self is that which he or she feels in his or her organism, in his or her family and social environment, that which he or she does and can do, that which he or she protects and promises, that which he or she completes or breaches, that which he or she longs for or fears, that which he or she knows and that which he or she investigates. These contents vary from the Palaeolithic to the Neolithic, and from the Neolithic to the post-Neolithic, but the five dimensions of self-conscience (cosmos, society, personal identity, god and self, *§32*) and the correspondent formal operators, remain apparently constant.

4. Identity, Time, and Repetition

§ 38. *Palaeolithic categories and Neolithic categories*

It is possible that the human thinking has followed multiple directions in the Palaeolithic and that it has constructed in the different human communities, in the different linguistic-cultural fields, systems of classification, of transformation, of categories, systems of elements and breeds, of universalization and particularization, and of the concept of individual and of time that anthropologists have observed, described and explained in the hunter-gatherers of the twentieth century. These varied systems are those

that in turn Levi-Strauss tries to systematize in 1962 when he proposes to decipher the savage thinking[12].

There may be a historical process along the Palaeolithic, difficult to decipher, along which has arrived from initial forms of rites and languages only performatives to the languages of these hunter-gatherers of the twentieth century. It is also possible to mark a path from the beginning of 80,000 years until the Mesolithic and until the beginning of the Neolithic, to give rise to the appearance of the forms of language, of thinking and of Neolithic self-understanding.

There is also an abundance of observations, descriptions, and explanations of the forms of self-comprehension of the hunter-gatherers from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their systematizations in what would be the unity of the Palaeolithic mind, in the works of the classic anthropologists, above all from the twentieth century.

One model of the Palaeolithic mind that can be taken as a point of reference is that constructed by Levy-Bruhl in 1927 in his description of the primitive soul. Despite the differences between the Palaeolithic societies, cultures, and languages, one can design a model of Palaeolithic society, of Palaeolithic culture, and of Palaeolithic mind, as one can construct of Neolithic society, culture, and mind, and within it in reference to the West, a model of ancient society, culture, and mind, medieval, illustrated, and contemporary.

There are moreover various paths and many approaches to make this design. One can analyse the transformation of this Palaeolithic soul into Neolithic soul, in the emergence of the classic world, as have done philologists and historians of the classic world like Jaeger in 1947 or Rodríguez Adrados in 1983[13] and philosophers like Ricoeur and Gadamer[14].

In these cases, it parts from the Neolithic mind, of the millenniums 3 to 1 BC, and it tries to access from it to the previous millenniums. This type

12   Lévi-Strauss, C., *El pensamiento salvaje*. México: FCE, 1964. To see the primitive mind with a more modern approach, cf., Winch, P., *Comprender una sociedad primitiva*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994.

13   Jaeger, W., *La teología de los primeros filósofos griegos*. México: FCE, 1982, and Rodriguez Adrados, F*iesta, comedia y tragedia*. Madrid: Alianza, 1983. I have studied this process from a philosophic point of view in *Antropología filosófica*. *Las represenaciones del sí mismo*, cit.

14   Ricoeur, P., *Freud: una interpretación de la cultura*. México: FCR, 1983; Gadamer, H.-G., *Mito y razón*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1997.

of focus corresponds with the proposal of "destruction of the fundamental concepts of the history of ontology" or deconstruction of it, which Heidegger would proclaim in 1927[15] and later would systematize Derrida. There are also models not deconstructive, but more sequential like that of Frazer in 1918, or more structural like that of Rappaport in 1999[16].

Combining all these models, one can think that the formation of the cultural system, of the social system, and of the individual itself, has followed a process like that which has been described since 50,000 BC until 10,000 BC and that said process one can interpret according to the Harrod's keys of mandala (*§19* and *§20*)[17].

According to these models, the Aristotelian and Durkheimian categories, like the development of the predicative functions of language, would develop in the period that extends from the start of the Mesolithic 12,000 years ago until the mid-first millennium BC, in which the use of writing is generalized.

If the current humans did not reason about the assumptions that there are some things that change and some things that always remain, if we did not bring about that which Bergson called the logic of the solid state[18], if we did not have the programmed thinking to operate with the categories of substance and time as belonging to different orders, we could not form the idea of eternity as different from time, nor that of the soul as something that remains, nor that of immortality as a statute of the soul and of the individual apart from ordinary life that flows.

These ideas and categories appear operative for the first time in the epic of Gilgamesh, considered the oldest written document of humanity, composed between 2,500 BC, and 1,300 BC, conserved by oral tradition and put in writing mid-eighth century BC.

15   Heidegger, M., *Ser y tiempo*. Cit., §6.

16   Frazer, J., *El Folklore en el Antiguo Testament*o. México: FCE, 1981 (orig. 1918) Rappaport, R., *Ritual y religión en la formación de la humanidad*. Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001 (orig. 1999).

17   Rappaport, R., op. cit., Leroi-Gourhan, op. cit., Harrod, J. B., "Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European): Part 1. The Basic Graphematics – Summary of Discovery Procedures," 2004. Revised version of paper presented at *Language Origins Society Annual Meeting*, 1998. http://originsnet.org.

18   http://www.albertoloschi.com.ar/elhumorlocomicolarisa.htm, Bergson, H., *La risa*. México: Porrúa, 1984.

If the domestication of plants and animals begins with the Mesolithic 11,000 years ago, and it supposes an alteration in the conception of the time of the *sapiens*, so it is possible that the categories of substance and time form between 11,000 and 2,000 and that they are consolidated already when the *Poem of Gilgamesh*, *Pentateuch*, and *The Iliad* are composed between the second and first millennia BC.

The compilers of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* and of the Hebrew *Pentateuch* work with the stories composed after 11,000 BC, with myths like Campbell's matriarchal telluric, given that they utilize metaphors of pottery (Yahweh creates modelling the clay). Hesiod instead manages accounts compiled before 11,000 BC, composed between 40,000 BC and 11,000 BC, or earlier, or it is inspiring in ritual representations which are later given narrative form, with myths of Campbell's animist type. Because in his *Theogony* the only way that things can originate is through sexual union, and there are no allusions to the practice of pottery[19].

When the ceramic appears, there is also vegetable cultivation and livestock, i.e., a sense of time and of possession more differentiated, developed over the 30,000 previous years. Through them, during we know not what time, the *sapiens* did not think with these categories.

§ 39. Identity, time, and repetition. The Palaeolithic soul

The rituals of the hunt of bear are not properly myths but a story and a certain explanation of the rites that permit its participants to act as they do. If one omits the categories mentioned as properly Neolithic and tries to think with them the relation to the hunted bear, as the practitioners of the rites in correspondence with the myths of Hesiod's *Theogony* would tell it, surprising "stories" would result for a Neolithic mind but not for one prior to 12,000 BC.

It is possible that the Neanderthal worshiped the bear and that they were capable to "believe" or to "deal" with an impersonal strength univer-

19   This trait of the *Theogony* has also been interpreted as a satire or contempt of stories based on poverty, which at the time was unlikely (I credit this observation to Teresa Bejarano).

sally vivifying[20], and it is possible that there are chimpanzee behaviours that can be interpreted as religious[21], but their expressions and their behaviours are different from those recorded in the first *sapiens* from 50,000 years ago.

It would be difficult to know if for these *sapiens* the once hunted bear is or is not the bear hunted again. Perhaps they did not have criteria to know if it is different or the same, if the repetition is a test of the difference or of the identity[22], because this depends on the formalization of time and of categories of substance and individual that one can suppose are not formed yet. Space and time are principles of individualization and of identity for a Western categorical system but not for all of the categorical systems.

The Aristotelian square of opposition of the propositions, upon its adoption to the four types of symbols of Harrod, upon passage from the predictive language to a performative language, loses its values of quantity and quality and loses its values of truth and falsity, which is the bivalence of the Aristotelian logic most widespread (*§19* and *§20*). On the other hand, the problems of ambiguity that appear in *Peri hermeneias* in relation with time increase.

When the bear has been eaten, the bear has inundated with life the entire group, whose unity derives from having eaten the same life, and possesses unison between all. As the flooding of life, namely, the sun, the light, and the rain come from the sky, and the bear is seen, hunted, and eaten with the light of the sun and open sky; the bear comes from heaven, and as every animal is born from another similar animal, the second bear is the son of the first heavenly bear, and so on forever.

---

20   Cárciumaru, M. et al., "Témoignages symboliques au Moustérien," *Congrés de l'IFRAO, septembre 2010 – Symposium: Signes, symboles, mythes et idéologie…* (Pré-Actes), credit to James B. Harrod for access to this material. For a discusión of the topic, cf., Nixon, G., "Mortal Knowledge, the Originary Event, and the Emergence of the Sacred," in *Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology*, XII (1) Summer, 2006.

21   Cf. Harrod, J. B., Appendices for Chimpanzee Spirituality> A Concise Synthesis of the Literature, posted December 26, 2009. In his critique of Schleirmacher's conception of religion as a feeling of dependency, Hegel sarcastically says that if that was the case, "then the animals must also have religion since they feel this dependency" (*Filosofía de la religión*, Vol. I, Madrid, Alianza, 1984, p. 174), but precisely in this line one can interpret the behaviors of the chimpanzes as religious, Neanderthals and other Homo species, of other animals and even plants in line with the Biblical expression "*coeli enarrant gloriam Dei*" (Ps. 18).

22   Certainly, here comes into play the issue of Deleuze, G., *Diferencia y repetición.* Gijón: Júcar Universidad, 1988.

Life, which resides in the flesh and blood, passes from the bear to the group. The group knows that it does not possess it more than temporarily and that perhaps the possession properly belongs to the bear of heaven. The notions of mine-ours and yours are primary categories, and it is the way of giving life, like mine-ours and yours, like something that is owned and is transferred, as Heidegger made clear in his analyses[23].

The moment of the transfer of life from the heavenly bear to the group can live as a donation or as a thief. To the extent that the hunt of the bear implies a certain violence, to the extent that it is about a circuit of kill-to-live, to-kill, to-live, and this way successively, one can generate a vicious circle of violence that can end in death and final disappearance.

The vicious circle becomes virtuous if the kill to obtain life is carried out reintegrating the source of life where it was, to its possessor[24]. In this way, it can return more times. The vicious circle becomes virtuous when the rite of hunting, of appropriation, and execution, adopts the form of Eucharistic rite, of Eucharistic sacrifice, or of sacrifice without more, since that is the way of sacrifice.

Life and sun and light are contingent, appear and disappear, come and go. Circulate. One way to ensure the return of the bear is to reimburse the source of life of the heavenly father bear from the son bear, which is the skull. So, it takes it as closely as possible to the sky, or heaven. On a mountain, or better yet on a tree.

The taboo of cannibalism is the way in which what could be a vicious circle becomes virtuous. Do not kill the father, the mother, the sibling, and do not eat them. Do not kill the totem, and do not eat it. Or if you kill and eat the father or the bear, do it in a ritualistic matter, in key of Eucharist[25].

---

23   Cf., Heidegger, M., *Estudios sobre Mística medieval*. Madrid: Siruela, 1997, §10.

24   In this regard Harrod notes that "We know that when chimpanzees hunt and kill animals, they 'go crazy' fighting over pieces of the carcass. For humans to become scavengers and hunters without social self-destruction they would have had to ritualize the distribution of meat. In ethnography of Kalahari San peoples, I read that the first word an infant learns is 'share.' Without sharing, they would all become extinct. In many hunter cultures the hunter who kills the game must divide the carcass among kin and even non-kin and take the worst part of the animal or nothing for himself." Personal communication.

25   This is how it is done by the Massagetae that speak Herodotus and the Aztecs of which Cortez speaks.

Like all that is flooded in the earth of light and heat from heaven then generates life, women have to be careful of their proximity to the bear because they can become pregnant. On the other hand, the violence and the bad stay outside the group because it results that those who have killed the bear have been others, another tribe. The sacrifice not only returns life to the group, but also innocence.

A ritual of this type, celebrated and counted in this way, generates in the individuals of the group the idea of life, a) as identical to itself, as contingent, as susceptible to alternative uses, as possession, as communion, as donation, as holy, as guilt, as retribution, and as covenant. But not the idea of life b) as eternal, individual, immortal, own, exclusive, differentiated in each of the living.

If life is known and described with the categories/notions of the series a) and excluding the categories/notions of the series b), one can understand that there is repetition, identity of life and therefore communion in the lifeblood, cycle and recycle of life and blood. Precisely what cannot be is a world and a life cycle like that which corresponds to the concept of immortality of the Western Christian world.

Levy-Bruhl describes the primitive soul using 23 characteristics[26], which are grouped into three parts: A) the relationship of the cosmos and the living with their beginnings, B) the relationship between both, and C) the relationship of both in the time before their end. Part A corresponds to the relationship of all beings regarding that which they share, which is what philosophers call the transcendental order. Part B corresponds to the relationship between beings from the point of view of the differences amongst them, what philosophers have labelled the predicamental order, and which is governed by predicaments or categories. Part C relates the beings from the point of view of their differences and their unity at the same time.

If we apply the transcendental order, there is nothing established in it by the Palaeolithic mind that cannot be encompassed by a mind with the principles, ideas and categories of the Neolithic.

26 Lévy-Bruhl, L.: op. cit., pp. 169.

A). Relationship with the founding Principle.	Palaeolithic Category	Neolithic Category	Philosophical Concept
There is a principle, *mana*, inherent to all beings and objects	Fluid quality	Quality	Being
All existing beings live from and by this principle	Participation	Action/ passion	Power/ dunamis
This principle is present in rocks and stones that live, grow and reproduce.	Generation	Effect	Entity
This life that is found in all beings is frightening, is respected and can be assimilated.	Qualitative powers	Qualitative powers	Qualitative powers
Nothing is understood as purely material or purely spiritual.			Psyche

The relationship between the causing origin and the caused origin is not conceived of differently in the Palaeolithic and the Neolithic.

However, the relationship between caused beings, once delimited by their entitative and operative characteristics in the Palaeolithic key, presents problems when one tries to understand it using a Neolithic key.

In effect, the Palaeolithic mind operates with a basic category of fluid quality and not solid substance, which is the key to determining the entities and the relationships between them in the Neolithic, and therefore the key to the Aristotelian categorical system. These keys are one of the determinants of the formation of basic ontological concepts, which phenomenology proposed removing in the programme designed by Heidegger in *§ 6* of *Being and Time* in

1927, the same year that Levy-Bruhl published his study on the primitive soul.

In the Palaeolithic, the substance category was not yet established, nor that of "the quantity of material assigned to a substance" as Medieval Aristotelianism called it (*materia signata quantitate*), as the first sense of being, and thus as the key to public and linguistic interpretation of the reality and identity of entities[27].

The Neolithic is when these keys were established and material was defined as a principle of individualisation, but a material that at the same time comes to be determined by space and time, as understood objectively[28].

When these keys were established in the Neolithic the laws of articulation of *logos*, logic, remained a logic of the solid state, as Bergson says, which means it was a logic of "the essence of the material entities" which is what Thomist Aristotelianism highlighted as the object of human intelligence. From this point of view, Levy-Bruhl says that the primitive mind is alogical, because it is rendered incomprehensible from Neolithic logic, as can be seen in the following table.

27   Thomas of Aquinus, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q.3, 3c; q. 39, 1 ad 3 et 2c; q 56 1 ad 2, q 75 4.5c; q 85 1c y 3 ad 4; 86 1 3c; I-2 63 1c. Madrid: BAC, 1965.
28   Thomas of Aquinus, *Summa Theologiae* I q 30 4c, 3, q, 77 2c. .Madrid: BAC, 1965.

B) Relationship between the cosmos and the living	Palaeolithic Category	Neolithic Category	Philosophical Concept
Animals and humans coexist and exchange their forms and qualities.	Fluid forms	'Solid' forms	Essence
The human unit is not the individual, but rather the group, and the chief expresses this unity.	Identity as relationship	Identity as substance	Substance, subject
There is a physiological solidarity, almost organic, between the individuals of a group.	Identity as relationship	Identity as substance	
Marriage is a transaction between groups, brothers and sisters are exchangeable in extreme forms of sororate and levirate marriage.			
Possessions belong to the group.			
The belongings are that of the individual himself.			
Kidney fat is the beginning of life.			
The shadow, image, reflection and belongings of an individual are himself.			
The individuality-duality exists amongst shamans and amongst common people each one can be a man-leopard, a man-tiger, a man-shark.			
Initiation requires a death and a rebirth, and breaks down in marriage.			

The Western Neolithic culture and mind, through the use of this categorical system, carried out a very distinct separation, an irreconcilable incision, between the material and the spiritual, through which they forcefully contrasted themselves with Palaeolithic mind and culture.

The relationship between the cosmos and the living, in the transition into the afterlife during the Palaeolithic, was governed by the same principles as the two phases that came afterwards. However, Western culture and minds, through the theological developments of Christianity about the afterlife and through the worship practices that referred to the action of sacraments, to relationships with the deceased, to miracles etc., delegitimised the Aristotelian-Thomist categorical system.

C) Relationship of the cosmos and the living with death and the afterlife	Palaeolithic Category	Neolithic Category	Philosophical Concept
Death is perceived as contagious.	Decrease in the life flow	Destruction	
The dead live on in another place. They listen, they feel, they are hungry and thirsty etc.	Permanency of the fluidity	Survival of the imaginary	Immortality
The dead are present in their skull, through which they can be consulted in dreams.	Communication of spirit and material	Uncommunication between spirit and material	
The dead can work as slaves to mages, receive offerings, can be reawakened.	Complete assistance offered between the living and the dead	Solely spiritual relationship between living and dead	
The dead appear in the forms of animals, and maintain individuality-duality.	Fusion of fluids	Impenetrability of material	Principle of individualisation
The dead are one with their clan and the greatest disgrace that can befall them is to remain separated from them.	Communion and unity of the soul of the group	Communion of the saints	Eternal excommunication, condemnation
There is a definitive death for the dead. For the dead who were killed and eaten.	Variable identity	Total offering. Holocaust.	Annihilation
There are different forms of reincarnation.	Variable identity	Permanent identity	Eternity

Levy-Bruhl insisted repeatedly that "individuality is different from primitive people than it is for us."[29] This could be the way of understanding and being understood used by the *sapiens* 50,000 years ago, which is in part the way in which the world and mankind are understood if one uses only the categories and notions of A).

From this viewpoint, not only the cosmos and society are sacred, but so too are the group, the chief and each of the individuals, the animals, the vegetables, and the stones. In other words, the vision that Rousseau has of the piety of the primitives, based above all in Seneca, Cicero and Tacito, can be confirmed by the work of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and Eliade.

The cosmos and primitive soul can also be understood utilizing modern Western categories. In fact, one can adduce "explanations" and "commentary" of the Catholic Mass that are not that distant from the descriptions of Lévy-Bruhl.

The Arctic ritual of the bear can be exposed in narrative form with the text of the *Gospel of John* 6: 53-58 transcribed above, as already indicated, substituting the word "I" and "my" for the world "bear". This ritual has power to configure the social order, the personal psyche, the sense of time, the foundations, the morality, and the personal identity, as Rappaport notes, and it is possible that it was done for 40,000 years.

Perhaps during the Mesolithic, privacy appeared most strongly when conflicts began in the individual, when the population size reached particularly elevated levels, when the difference between the demands of the role and the capacities of the actor became unsalvageable. Maybe then there came about a determination of personal identity more related to the place where they lived, to the space, and to the time that passed in these places, to the time registered in calendars, which is objective time.

It is possible the amplitude of human privacy that we now know did not arise until the beginning of the Neolithic, until the moment that beauty and writing appeared, at which point there began to be time set aside for solitude amongst the multitude. Thus maybe this is when mankind had no option but to begin the believe in himself as well, when the process of secularisation

29   Lévy-Bruhl, L.: op. cit., p. 169 y ss. For more modern visions of some aspects of the 'primitive' soul, see: Cfr. Goody, Jack: *La domesticación del pensamiento salvaje.* Madrid: Akal, 2008. Cfr. Geertz, C.: C*onocimiento local*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994, y *La interpretación de las culturas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992.

began, and when identity was established above all by the here and now of each individual.

But perhaps this only occurred in the Middle East, at the point of confluence between Africa, Asia and Europe, which is where the Neolithic first appeared and where cities were born. Where this did not occur, identities, meanings, categories and logic developed in another way. Maybe in one way they only began to understand and appreciate themselves when the Neolithic came to an end in the twenty-first century, which is when science, logic and philosophy began to detach themselves from the model born in the sixth century BC, and which for 2500 years was considered the structure of 'reality,' 'human nature' itself.

Levy-Bruhl was not unreasonable when he said in 1927 that the primitive mind is alogical. Neither was Levi-Straus, when he claimed in the 1960s that the primitive mind operates using binary opposites, that there are many systems of binary oppositions, and that his analysis would allow us to understand the distribution of housing in settlements, mythical stories, body decoration, the layout of pictograms etc. Similarly, Goody's argument was rational when in the 1980s he highlighted the use of writing as a catalyst for the development of thought along lineal sequences, that express well-considered thought that is not subject to time pressure.

These observations and others belong to the era of analysis of how the categorical system arose during the Neolithic, which remained in place during perhaps more than 10,000 years of Western culture.

§ 39a. Structure of meaning of the symbol and the sign

The change in mentality, in categories, in the interpretation of the cosmos and in the understanding of oneself, on the way from Palaeolithic to Neolithic, brought about a different and more concrete understanding through an analysis of the structure of meaning of the symbol, which was the element used in the Palaeolithic for understanding the world and for communication, in comparison with the structure of meaning of the sign which was the element used in the Neolithic.

The symbol had a natural character, was an element of nature, and was used analogously in different Palaeolithic cultures. The symbols used in

parietal and portable art, which have been used as the objects of commentary and analysis previously, use natural realities as their signifiers, and also represent natural realities.

These characteristics of the Palaeolithic symbol signifiers and their meanings can be clearly seen in the following table:

Symbol	Meaning	Symbol	Meaning
Earth	Refuge/Hell	Bull	Strength
Air	Soul/life	Horse	Woman
Water	Life/fertility	Bird	Departed soul
Fire	Power/divinity	Vulva	Home/life
Moon	Menstruation	Breasts	Home/nourishment
Milk	Mother	Semen	Spring
Blood	Life	Phallus	Power/father

When there are signs, which are conventional graphisms, and not symbols, which are natural realities, the type of meaning which the signifier refers to does not belong to the real order, but rather to the new order which is the intentional, abstract or ideal order. Knowledge and life start to be organised by this new order as well. For several millennia they were organised somewhat indistinctly by the two orders, but little by little they shifted increasingly to the intentional order of signs and less and less to the real order of symbols. The meanings to which life and knowledge subscribed lost their real and natural character in order to pass over to a more ideal and objective character. The contrast between the meanings of symbols and those of signs is explained in the following table.

	Symbol		Sign	
	Characteristics of the signifier **(Natural)**	Characteristics of the meaning **(Real)**	Characteristics of the signifier **(Artificial)**	Characteristics of the meaning **(Ideal)**
1	Present	Future/ Afterlife	Present	Atemporal
2	Singular	Concrete universal	Singular	Universal
3	Empirical	Transcendent	Empirical	Objective
4	Contingent	Necessary	Contingent	Necessary
5	Chosen/ Unexpected	Real being	Chosen/ arbitrary	Identifiable essence
6	Operative	Active	Inoperative	Inactive
7	Effective	Effective	Ineffective	Ineffective
8	Polysemic	Plural effectiveness	Unambiguous	Unambiguous

With these characteristics, the symbol has value of revelation, on one hand, and of prediction, on the other. Revelation because it manifests a hidden reality in the signifier, which is that of the meaning. Prediction because it brings something to the signifier that belongs to the future or the afterlife, which is the order of the meaning. The symbol says what things have been, what they are, what they will be.

As the Neolithic advanced men constructed 'symbols', the term 'symbolon' was employed in Greece to designate the part of the bone or tablet that was given to another individual in order to reach an agreement, and to serve to make the descendants of both individuals honour the agreement when there was a reunion of the two pieces of the 'signifier' and their owners. The signifier was a natural reality broken into two fragments of equal significance,

and upon uniting, they make the meaning a reality.

In this sense, the Greek 'symbol' keeps its character of effectiveness, concrete activity, recognition and future action, maintained will etc. that the Palaeolithic symbol also has. All of these traits are entirely absent from the sign, which is an abstract idea, objective, inoperative and inefficient.

Accordingly, during the Neolithic symbols began changing into pictograms, at first, and then into abstract and conventional signs. For several millennia they maintained the characteristics of both symbols and signs at once, until they finally relinquished the symbolic.

In effect, the Hittite and Hebrew numbers of the first millennium BC are symbols (the 12 is supreme perfection), and the letters of the Phoenician alphabet stopped being symbols and became solely phonetic signs in the second half of the millennium[30].

When symbols become signs, thus the icons, gestures and shouts of the rituals, become propositions and the generalised use of predicative language. That is when the performative language of the Palaeolithic rituals passed into a second plane and remained present in the corresponding cultural spheres of creative knowledge.

This period of the first millennium is when the emergence of science took place, with all the splendour of objectivity. It is also when the 'birth of geometry' to which Derrida and Husserl alluded was produced, and when that which Heidegger called 'representative thought' was consolidated. This is the same as what Zubiri labelled 'objectuality', what Leonardo Polo called 'mental limit', and what Derrida referred to as 'différance.'

The twentieth century greatly broadened the studies of the imaginary, symbols, signifiers, and meanings, developed the semiotic, and, above all, amplified the study of anthropology. It discovered the exercise of the intellect before the consolidation of reflection. Through this discovery, it returned to the moment at which thought was also life and action – the Palaeolithic. Thus arose the moment at which thought, without abandoning science and reflection, once again returned to this state, at the dawn of the post-Neolithic.

30   Cfr. Julien Ries, *El símbolo sagrado*, Barcelona: Kairós: 2013; Militarev, Alexander, *The Jewish Conundrum in World History*, New York: Academic Studies Press - 2010 -.

CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL SPHERES AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF BEING

«"the veins of the knowledgeable subject according to Locke, Hume and Kant do not flow with blood but with the thin saliva of reason, the very essence of intellectual activity […] the most important elements that make up our view and knowledge of reality such as the personal unity of life, the exterior world, individuals other than ourselves, our life in relation to time period and our interrelations can explain every part of this seamless human being, that conducts real processes and has wants, feelings and represents no more than it's different appearances. Not a stiff hypothesis confined to our expert faculty, but the only view of the evolutionary history of development that comes from the totality of our being, can answer the questions that have been put forward to philosophy"»

DILTHEY, *Introducción a las ciencias del espíritu*, México, FCE, 1949, p.6

1. The Cultural Spheres: Narrated, Written, Eternal[1]

§ 40. The cultural spheres. Predicative language, writing and eternity

This agreement on the philosophy of culture began with the emergence of the first communities, through habitual activities, the ways in which they learnt to carry out different activities and the communication and cooperation between everyone in order to achieve group objectives that ensure the survival of not only the group as a whole but also each individual member.

Chapter 4 shows these communities as a cultural system as a universal concept and feeling common to everyone that brings the social system and an individual's psyche to life. Chapter 5 shows the way in which people within this cultural and social system communicate with one another and the cosmos within which they live. All of this is situated in the temporal framework from 80,000 years ago up until the Mesolithic 12,000 years ago or perhaps throughout the whole of the end of the Palaeolithic.

This chapter focuses on the temporal framework from 15,000 years ago to 8,000 years ago, in other words, during the Mesolithic, which is when it is thought that a differentiation between cultural spheres was made. This of the

---

1   Translated to English by Rebecca Lawton.

three following chapters looks at the period between 8,000 BC and 2,000 BC or perhaps the whole of Neolithic, as has already been pointed out, here the end of the twentieth century BC will be considered. This is the view of many sociologist, anthropologists and above all geologists. They believe this view to such an extent that they have agreed to give a name to this new geological period (although the dates are under dispute), they have named it Anthropocene[2].

The social system for the most part remained constant and the groups of individuals had a fairly unaltered way of life, with regard to their ways of producing and reproducing, as has been shown, they continued to be hunter-gatherers that formed groups of between 50 and 200 with a relatively low demographical increase.

When the Würm glacial period ended, the ice moved back, large areas of the planet were flooded, the sea level rose, there was a change in flora and fauna, the domestication of plants and animals occurred, the conditions of life changed and consequently the mobility of groups of changed, so too did the number of people in a group, the number and type of activities that they carried out, the methods of communication that they used and life expectancy. When this happened, everything changed and so too did the social system that had existed before.

It is possible that all of these cultural spheres may be found previously in animal behaviour. Religion in animals can be seen through studies on the religion of chimpanzees and other animals, politics in the social behaviour of gregarious animals, law in the relationships between individuals in herds and other groups of animals, economics in the methods of cooperation and division of work, technology in the tools and the constructions that they achieve, fine arts in their games and the designs that they create with their secretion. Science and wisdom through the constructions that they make and the ways in which they come to an agreement, the way in which they come to terms with death (as some old studies show) and through solidarity and loyalty.

It is possible that all of these cultural spheres can also be found in different species of Homo. There is sufficient archaeological data on the tools that they used, conventions of cohabiting, religious cults among Homo Ergaster and Homo Antecesor from more than a million and a half years ago, and above all,

2   The Anthropocene: A new Epoch of Geological Time?, 11th May 2011, Meeting of the Geological Society of London, http://www.geolsoc.org.uk/anthropoceneconf.

among the Neanderthals and the Floresiensis from 200,000 years ago. To think that the contemporaries of *sapiens* already had incipient forms of language as well as a rudimentary "theory of mind" among many other things.

It is possible that *sapiens* follow the rituals performed by all other species that reach a high level of animal intelligence and that at a given moment a genetic mutation occurred in these *sapiens*. This change the mental approach, that gave rise to a cultural big-bang, occurred 50,000 years before now, with the appearance of the first mandala and the first cosmology.

Cultural spheres emerged as differentiations in the character of infrastructures as, geological, climatical, faunistical, and demographical, organizational structures of the sedentary life, and psychological-intellect from the activity of creative imagination.

The social system is laid out as a division of labour based on the number of people in a given group, depending on the space occupied and based on the time period that they occupy. The different elements and values of the cultural system give rise to the joining of the cultural spheres. These spheres have different origins in the construction of the social system, for this reason anthropologists have studied them as different[3], but as the values corresponding to sacred power, political authority, to the "legal" order of cohabiting and wealth, were started by the same person, the leader, the different scopes are not as noticeable as when they are carried out by different people, in turn, they are enforced in different times and different places (at the back or entrance of a cave or the central areas of a small village).

The differentiation between the fields of culture that was required because of the increase in the population and the greater division of labour and social activities, forged new forms and complex lines of communication. Since the values of the cultural system are bound to functions and different people within the social system, they can be created and developed simultaneously in different ways and by different people, in a way that the activities of one are not known by others who are, in turn, occupied in other activities.

For the first time in human history, the activities and the knowledge necessary in life are not directly linked to one presence. For the first time life is not given in the present because it has broken the simultaneity of the present

---

3   Among the first was Lowie, R.H., *Primitive Society*. New York: Liveright, 1970, 1a ed., 1920.

from different individuals within the same group. However if the cultural system has been maintained for the survival of the whole Group and the individual, for the comprehension of the world, then it is necessary to develop a method of communication between those who create the values of the different spheres and those who do not witness it because they are creating other values. This form of communication that does not consist of making nor in presenting that which is made, that does not contain the execution of rituals is just informative language, language that is not performative, that we use only to accumulate and transmit information, and that we call propositional or predicative language.

Predicative language may have existed at first as a group of phonic expressions that accompanied gestures. Spoken predicative language did not transmit descriptions of objects or actions which nowadays are not common in everyday spoken communication. Information transmitted accurately about very specific and concrete events as has already been shown: "the leader fell" (said by someone who came from a hunting expedition) "a skin knife took him" (said by someone who having remained in the camp has suffered an incursion of a hostile tribe) "the lagoon is dry" (said by someone in a time of drought who had gone further than normal to find water). Or in the case where someone who knows what the knife did asks for the knife, or also when someone asks for the leader in the presence of someone who knows what happened to him[4].

There is good reason to think that predicative language began to gain ground and be generalised from the moment that groups began to have thousands of members that stay in the same place for increasingly long periods of time. In other words there is reason to think that it starts to gain ground with regard to the communication of *sapiens* in the Mesolithic period, and certainly by the Neolithic.

In the way that all of the rites are derived from hunting and meal rites are invocations of powerful people that give life, strengthen and maintain it, all of their rites are religious and all of their cultural spheres are derived from religion, primordial sacrifice as has already been mentioned.

Eating is the main event and is a big festival in which one must celebrate

4   I credit these observations to Teresa Bejarano, who shared them with me personally.

any event worthy of celebration more so in the Palaeolithic than the twenty-first century.

Each of the spheres comes from a rite, generated norms, an acceptance of rituals and rules, generated beliefs[5], incitation rites, and rites of matrimony qualify for some types of conduct and at the same time are forced to achieve them. They are the skills and duties of a young person, or a married person. The rites of the Coronation of a King or Military Chief appointment are to confer skills and give some duties to those who, from that moment are kings or warlords. The rites of an appointed judge, acquittal of the innocent or punishment of the guilty, teach us and force us to take responsibility for our own actions, starting with moments when rituals are celebrated, they are already judges, innocent or guilty. The rites of the acquisition of property, the contract of rent or of services, prepare and require certain conduct from people starting with rites corresponding to proprietary, lodgers or borrowers of services.

The first four cultural spheres gather performative knowledge, a knowledge that was performative in the Palaeolithic and that continued to be performative in the Neolithic and the post Neolithic. However in the Neolithic period religious, political, legal and economical knowledge was not only confined to ritual activity in intellectual memory and body of the participants in the ritual, but also came to be used for extra somatic reasons, accumulating and transmitting information.

Religious knowledge started to be found outside of religious ceremonies, at first in sacred stories and later in sacred books. Political knowledge began to be found in hymns as well as tales of the foundation and organisation of the first city, and later in constitutional writings of the city state. Legal knowledge began by being constrained to stories of customs of the creation of the first treaty and later in written laws and codes. Economical knowledge began by being constrained to stories on forms of acquisition and types of equivalence of the first beings and in accountability systems and later calculations.

Starting with the extra semantic storage of narrated information through the transition to a written form of ability and knowledge to make these four pillars of culture, it appears next to language and performative knowledge. A

---

5   Through all of these developments is the work of Rappaport, R.A., *Ritual y religion en la formación dela humanidad*. Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 1999, cited previously various times.

knowledge and a language (first narrative and later the written) on the same subject but ineffective, impotent, merely representative. Then began the generalization and the, increasingly frequent, use of written language as descriptive and representative language and for this reason completely impotent. However, narrative representation and above all written representation have other characteristics that can add up the exercise of knowledge and spoken performative language.

Written language has characteristics that are always constant, it cannot be silenced, it is immortal and eternal and as the minhirs generate knowledge and appreciation of these qualities they contribute to the formation of images and concepts of corresponding ideas, such as megalithic construction.

It is possible that the appearance of the first urban settlers, towards the tenth millennium, memory may have composed religious political, legal and economical stories, that have been passed on with the help of songs, dances and fiestas and having increasing support of stone, wall, ceramic and other material and in symbols, pictograms and signs that were sketched by them. In addition it is possible that the interaction between memory, architecture and writings that did not consolidate the notions of identity, unsilenceability, immortality, eternity and universality starting from the fourth millennium BC. All this is more probable when the first megalithic constructions were able to attain a new type of burial a new type of relationship with their ancestors and a new concept of life and beyond.

In turn, the diversification and specialization of rites and customs of social life and the increase in their number could give rise to an incipient differentialisation in the public, private and intimate domains and also give rise to an increase in the content of the three fields and in the game of diversion of the contents between them.

To further sum up, the differentiation of the cultural spheres is in itself the process of secularisation, the process of transition from a theocratic society to a society that is increasingly secular[6]. In effect all of the functions of the structuring of the social order and of the individual psyche, that were performed for religion came to be performed also for political, legal and economic organizations. Politics deals with the areas of creation and organization of

6   his thesis has been expressed before in Choza, J., y Garay, J., eds., *Pluralismo y secularización*. Madrid:Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

social order. Law deals with the assignment of individuals to various sentences and the imposing of sanctions and rewards following the fulfilment of an agreement or disagreement with order. Economics deals with the provision of goods and necessities and allows for a structure in society for divers classes and groups. Of course a lot of time passed in the Neolithic during which political, legal and economical areas were also held by religious institutions, up until the arrival of the twenty-first century, the post-Neolithic, without which the autonomy of the spheres is completely clear[7]. The other four thinkers, the descriptive individuals, also take on religious functions as we will be seeing next.

2. Creative Ability and Descriptive Ability

§ 41. *Creative ability*

The way in which cultural spheres derive from natives of sacrifice and hunting, the process of its genesis and development, including being informed of the first rights in the fundamental structure in relation to other activities, despite the fact that they have undergone a differentiation of virtue that was required due to the division of work.

Initially, the leader was the best hunter; or rather the member of the group who was the best hunter became the leader. The person who hunts and sacrifices is also the one who orders and organises and for this reason, is also the one who manages conflicts and riches, the one who has the most women, animals and weapons. The king is then, the one who makes the sacrifice official but is also the judge and the administrator of the people in the group. He, who officially sacrifices the bear, is connected to sacred ability in order to preserve future hunts. The hunters need to carry out a ritual to summon life, create it, make it flow and propitiate its precipitation in new animal forms.

In any case, whether it be managing religious, political, legal or econo-

---

7   This is not only true for Islamic regimes governed by 'secular' states, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey, whom the countries of the Arab spring of 2011 take as a model and reference, but it is also true for the Catholic area in 1965 when the Second Vatican Council proclaimed the autonomy of the temporal, after a nineteenth century of turbulent struggles for the deconfessionalization of the State.

mic activities the ritual always consists of going over Harrod's four points of mandala, a) concentration of the source of life, i) growth and rupture of that source, o) dispersion, fluency and the recombining of vital strengths and e) propitiation of its boom in new forms.

In every one of these cultural spheres, religion, politics, law and economics, every one of the four elements of ritual, through its own dynamics of the division of work and the specialization of the suitable rite, gives rise to cultural forms that at the same time diversify themselves through new forms. In this way, kinetic elements give rise to liturgy of religious and political ceremonies and to legal and economical proceedings. Graphic and chromatic elements give rise to religious images and signs, to political emblems and badges, to signs for legal sentences and accounting etc.

The instrumental elements give rise to banners, sacraments, relics, shrines and temples in the religious sphere; to crowns, centres and shields, forts and palaces, in the political sphere; to togas, edicts, and prison or prestigious uniforms, to tribunals and courts of justice in the legal sphere, and to register, symbols of alliances, titles of property, sections and houses of commerce and banks in the economic sphere.

Finally the phonic elements, give rise to linguistic creations, first in poetic form and later in prose, that are, in the religious sector myths and dogmas, in the political sector republic constitutions, in the legal sector written laws and in the economical realm forms of accountancy.

The four primary cultural spheres can be summarised in a table, in order to be examined separately.

CULTURAL SPHERES	1 RELIGION	2 POLITICS	3 LAW	4 ECONO-MICS
RITUALS THAT GENERATE CULTURE	Hunting, sacrifice, rites of passage	Founding of the village, coronation of the king	Conflict resolution	Exchange of women and goods
ELEMENTS OF THE RITUALS				
A) KINETIC	Dance, ge-nuflexion	Greetings, reverence	Fights, tour-naments	Gestures of approval
B) GRA-PHIC AND CHROMA-TIC	Ideograms of sacred-ness, ochre	Ideograms of power	Pictograms of identity, of power	Accountan-cy receipts
C) INSTRU-MENTAL	Water, unguents, blood, gold TEMPLES	Crown, sceptre, sword PALACES	Weapons, titles of legi-timacy TRI-BUNALS	Records, symbols of value MARKETS
D) PHONIC	Songs, myths	Pacts, rallying speeches, proclama-tions	Accusations, allegations	Voices of approval
600 A.C. GENERA-LISA-TION OF WRI-TING	Dogmas, exterior/ interior devotion, magic/ prayer. Civil organisation	Monarchies, Republics. Constitu-tions. Ad-ministrative organisation	Vis, fas, ius, lex, Abstract law. Procedural and penal organisation	Minting of currency. Mercantile organisation

§42. *Descriptive ability*

The other four cultural spheres, knowledge, technology, art, science and knowledge unfold and branch out in a way that means that the division of work increases with the increase of the population and social organization, cultural expressions keep all of the performative value of the Palaeolithic rites, because during the Neolithic period as well, religion, politics, law and economics are forms of configuration of the social and cultural system.

On the other hand this second set of cultural spheres, due to the fact that they weren't already used as performative language, or at least not in a direct way, expressions of capability and want weren't yet executed, they weren't a cosmos creation but instead simply a description of being and occurrences, and lasting order that could be called impotent knowledge, the order of pure knowledge, the order which latterly came to be known as theory.

In its genesis one cannot find properly established rites of the universe, but rather fragmentary rites, private and modest, whose kinetic and instrumental elements are minimal, and only linked with graphic and phonic elements, in other words, the most relevant areas of storage and transmission of information. In addition to this the unfolding of these cultural spheres and their elements can be shown in a table in order to better explain their origin and development.

CULTURAL SPHERES	5 TECH- NICAL (GOOD)	6 ART (BEAUTY)	7 SCIENCE (TRUTH)	8 WISDOM
RITUALS THAT GENERATE CULTURE	Invention of professions	Achronic and atopical rituals	Measure- ment	Adoration and contem- plation
ELEMENTS OF THE RITUALS				
A) KINETIC	Dance, and professional tasks	Mimesis, secularised dances		
B) GRA- PHIC AND CHROMA- TIC	Tool design	Make-up	Numbers, geometry	Writing
C) INSTRU- MENTAL	Fire, forging metal, sailing FACTORIES	Masks, flutes THEATRES	Instruments of measure- ment UNIVERSI- TIES	Writing
D) PHONIC	*Epos*, poetry	Rhetoric, music	Logic, calculus	Poems, sa- cred things, cosmology
600 A.C. COMMON WRITING	*Ethos*, epic, autonomi- sation of ethics	*Pathos*, tra- gedy, auto- nomisation of aesthetics	*Logos*, *episteme*, birth of science	*Sophia*, philosophy

The tables of cultural spheres do not contain any similarity to a deduc- tion, and much less a transcendental deduction of the cultural spheres that effectively correspond to an examined cultural system in *§26* and with the

transcendence of being. Vico and Dilthey already made it clear that the deduction was not a path to the knowledge of man, nor of social cultural realities and Cassier made it yet more explicit still. However if one can plan following predecessors, who give an ideal block of elements and fields of culture according to the structure of the human subject and its being in the world, place it in the empirical fact with the objective of obtaining a better understanding of it all.

The empirical facts may be lacking in some cases or given in an order that is opposite to the ideal. For example, if the diagram shown persuades us to believe that rites precede the myths and that mythical relations resulted in ritual ceremonies, which is the ideal order established by Vico, that does not mean that there are not times when the empirical plan allows for the myth to precede the rite when there is a simultaneous interaction between both. Nor here is there a predetermined precedence of any ritual element, they are both issues that continue to elucidate in the anthropology and philosophy of ritual, myth or religion, and it's not necessarily an element of the philosophy of culture.

On the other hand, beginning with the analysis of cultural spheres, one can see as well, the way in which every one of the four ritual elements bring out their own proceedings and the practices of each sphere in ceremonies, bureaucracy, rhythm etc. The types of writing, the types of tools and peaceful headquarters, and the texts and discourse of religion, politics, law and economics, technology, art, science and philosophy.

3. Religion and secularisation

§ 43. *Religion and secularisation. Cultural validity of transcendentalisms*

It causes the differentiation of the cultural spheres as well as causing the autonomy or emancipation of their origin of religious or single religious spheres. During this process, religion is made both autonomous and freed from the other social functions, and assumes an exclusivity of its own. Also during this process religion spent a large amount of time in the Neolithic period clarifying its own specific and exclusive functions and it entered into the post Neolithic without having polished all of them. This is clear later on with Islamic and

Buddhist countries where the state is also Islamic or Buddhist retrospectively but is also equally clear with Christian countries with a Christian government.

The reason why secularisation is a problem throughout the whole of the Neolithic is because religion never separates from any of the other spheres nor do the other spheres separate themselves from it. Religion returns or camouflages, as Hegel and Eliade put it[8], in part that is true and in part it is only how it appears. In a way it is true to say that religion is dissimilar, it is true because all of the institutional objectives came to be held by every one of the autonomic spheres as has already been mentioned. The exercise of global or central power is dealt with by politics, law deals with the distribution and organization of freedom, or perhaps, justice; and finally, economy deals with the distribution of goods and the availability of necessities. On the other hand though, it is not true to say that religion is dissimilar. It is not the truth because all of the spheres have a sacred dimension and carry out religious functions. This sacred element of the cultural spheres has a double foundation, a historical one and also an ontological one.

The cultural spheres are historically sacred because they more or less conserve the memory of their empirical origin through religious rites. On the other hand, they are ontologically sacred because they include the value of transcendental order, in a way that is more or less discernibly re-learnt as sacred itself. For this reason cultural spheres also have to make themselves sacred and not only for history or prehistory, but by the request of the transcendental character from the value that they have and by the functions that they perform. God, homeland, justice and the means of survival are not just holy for historical reasons, but also for ontological reasons. It's the same with nature, beauty, truth and knowledge. The double aspect of dissolution and recurrence of religion in other areas of the culture is perceived in a paradigmatic way in the first religious rite and religious act par excellence, namely the food.

Meals remain empirical (originally irreconcilable) to the primary religious rite, as they celebrate it collectively, give thanks for it, celebrate it with a toast and songs, and some of the ways of table (certain liturgical correction). For this reason, it could be said that meals are completely secular acts and without any trace of religious element. However, at the same time meals have

---

8   Eliade, M., *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosos*. III-2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999, final chap, "Creatividad religiosa y secularizacion en Europa desde la Ilustracion".

a certain holy element that injects holiness into any solemn activity situated in the epicentre of it. There are not any solemn acts and festivals aren't celebrated with a meal. Baptisms, weddings, inaugurations, triumphs, the establishment of new relationships, agreements etc. Meals are Eucharist, always maintaining a Eucharist element, for this reason the nimbus of the holiness of time, space and events in which it is centrally situated[9].

§ 44. *Specifically religious. Rites of passage*

Historically and ontologically the specifically religious is the attitude and behaviour of reverence before the beginning and foundation of life, namely, before nourishment and love, before meals and sex, for this reason, culture par excellence is the Eucharist and the effusiveness of life. If everything were reduced to a word, the specifically religious is a meal. The meal is the beginning of life, the Eucharist and the first step towards love. For this reason, the rites of hunting and dining maintain even now, several traditions of the activity of nourishment[10]. Consequently, dining has been the object of extreme religious rituals, from the most severe fasting to the most enormous banquets. Equally sex has been an object of extreme ritual, from shocking rituals surrounding virginity and celibacy to Dionysian cults and more ostentatious orgies. Specific religion, the sacred, is, as Elaide highlighted insistently, something which confers with reality, life. The process of making cultural spheres autonomous, religion assumes these relative functions to granting and giving life (new life) to every single individual, in the deepest parts of their private life and in their familiar dwelling and community, in other words, it is assumed as their own specific rite of passage, that remain converted in "sacrament". In Christianity, there are seven sacraments of baptism, confirmation, penitence, Eucharist, union of the sick, priestly and matrimonial system, in other Palaeolithic and Neolithic religions are the rites "of the door and threshold, hospitality, adoption, pregnancy and childbirth, birth, childhood,

9   Delaini, P., "cosí mangió Zaratustra", *Hiram*, 4, 2007, pp.89-98.
10   Cfr. Vernant J.-P. Y Vidal-Nanquet, P., *Mito y tragedia en la grecia antigua*. Vol I., Madrid: Taurus, 1987, "Caza y sacrificio en la *Orestiada* de Esquilo", pp. 135-160.

puberty, initiation, ordination, coronation, engagement, matrimony and funerals etc[11].

When religions of the inner self appeared in the first millennium BC, religious cults also appeared that weren't there before, and this is what came to divide the internal and external body. With this division prayer becomes both an internal and personal body on the one hand, and an exterior body on the other as well as magic, as an ignorant use of holy ability[12].

The phases of ritual of the sacrificed meal in *sapiens*, from the 50,000 BC. Until the start of the Neolithic in the 4,000 could be: 1) cannibalism (50,000 BC), 2) hunt sacrifice (from the later Palaeolithic to the Mesolithic), 3) human sacrifice rituals (from the Mesolithic until the start of the Neolithic or until 4,000 BC), 4) abolition of human sacrifice, instruction of domestic animal sacrifice and the start of the interior body in Egypt, Babylon, budding Israel, and later Greece and Rome[13].

The way in which religion is urbanised and further differentiates itself from other powers, corresponding to other spheres of culture, becomes more centralised in the rites of passage, in the interior and personal realm and, at the same time, in the rites of foundation of other spheres (politics, law and economics), that is to say, in the public institutional body.

Urbanisation is also secularisation given that, in urban cultures the only perceptible episodes of emergence of life is the childbirth of women. However, towns do not have a foundation in nature but in art (and for this reason are based more on objectivity than reality), and because life hasn't been considered in modernity as a transcendence of being religion never loses its original reference to life. For this reason, women have an affinity with religion (with births, initiation, matrimony, death and Eucharist, which are superior acts of religion) and because of this the environmental rehabilitation of nature and life within urban cultures implicates a series of religious revival.

However urban cultures also continue being a creative knowledge that

11   Cfr. Van Gennep, A., *Los ritos de paso*. Madrid: Taurus, 1986. The quoted text corresponds to the subtitle of the book.

12   Summarised in this section and throughout this chapter topics outlined in Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, chap 2.

13   This thesis is exhibited here as a general theoretical model and on a purely hypothetical basis.

generates new life, new names, new stages or forms of individual life, and that deal with higher life. Religion generates and assigns new ways of life. Although all of the known and done proceeds acquiring the form of narrative knowledge and of written knowledge, and also transmits narrative, for this reason religion does not become a descriptive knowledge. That does not occur until Greek-roman illustration, which is when atheism begins, the demonstrations of the existence of God, and all the occurrences of descriptively knowledgeable people. This will be addressed in due course.

4. Politics and the Creation of Social Orders

§ 45. *Differentiation of political power. Family, civil society and state*

In the ontological order of transcendent, creative power and organization can be different to the being yet do not differentiate themselves from the being and from love, however they may in some cases. In the empirical and chronological order, they cannot differ from both.

For one human group of between 50 and 200 people (at most), the sexual union that donates the family order, can at the same time donate the order of the "civil society", and the head of the family may assume the functions of "king" or "head of state" without solution of continuity. However temporary and spatial distention and the quantitative increase of the population forces new communicative procedures, as well as, unions and organizations, in other words, the differentiation between the religious and political systems has to maintain unity and communication through a multitude of individuals.

The differentiation between family and civil society is the fact that it occurs as a result of the formation of the new community based on contractual ties (social society), formed by elements of a communal unity which in turn are based on blood ties (families). As Hegel has explained in his famous analysis of the Antigone de Sophocles[14], blood bonds are stronger than civil ones and they can enter into conflict with them. This is the motive behind Plato's abolition of the family in his ideal republic[15].

14   Hegel, G.W.F., *Estética.* Barcelona: Península, vol 2, pp. 43 ss, 1991.
15   Platón, *República.* II, 16, 37a-b.

This is not necessarily a relationship of dialectical negation, refusal of being and of love, or of religion on the one hand, and of its affirmation on the other. It can come across, in a more general sense, as a difference[16], as an empirical sequence, that is how Aristotle perceived it. He described the sequence between families, the town as a group of families and *polis*[17]. Cicero perceived it as the searching of names and the sequence of the first kings[18] and Hobbes, Rousseau and Vico saw it as the transition from a "natural state" to a "civil state[19]". At times the dialect specialists are more interested in logical mechanisms of negation and their functioning than they are in the reality of the changed and inadvertently diminished mechanisms, that reality is confined to the non-specialists, trying to change the wonder of the mechanisms of negation. Dialect, as science, creates addiction and at times succumbs to an attractive method forgetting reality. Staring from the twenty-first century there is an old chronology and register that allows us to find all of the theoretic formulations in the sequence, it begins with the Palaeolithic and ends in the Mesolithic and Neolithic (and without doubt will be improved in the future) and in the transit from groups of less than 200 people between fiftieth and twelfth millennium BC to populations that exceed 5000 starting from the fourth millennium BC (*§69*). Dealing with the change in society from nomad hunter-gatherers to societies characterised by their economy of production before the economy of subsistence, for the urban settlement and writing, which is what Gordon Childe named Neolithic revolution[20].

The first phase of the differentiation between family, civil society and state corresponds to the Assyrian temples, Egyptian cities and megalithic constructions of Western Europe, also from the fourth millennium BC. This differentiation corresponds to one of the first phases of distinction between religious power and political power, and of a new unity of both that at the time united the family and civil society with their ancestors and habitants of the afterlife. Thereafter, religious power and political power have continued

16 For an analysis of the relation between negation and difference, cfr., Garay, J., *Diferencia y libertad*. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2a ed., 2009.
17 Marín, H., *La invencion de lo humano. La genesis sociohistórica del individuo*. Madrid: Encuentro, 2007, chap. 1.
18 Cicerón, *Sobre la República*. Madrid: Gredos, 1984, libro II, pp. 85 ss.
19 Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla-Madrid: Thémata-Plaza y Valdés, 2009, pp. 156 ss.
20 Childe, G., *La revolución neolítica*. México: FCE, 1956.

their process of differentiation and the creation of new forms of articulation.

§ 46. *The rituals of founding the village and of coronation. Polis and civitas*

Spatial and temporal slackening of human groups, in other words, quantitative expansion, whatever the cause may also generate, in a haphazard way, utility or necessity (it isn't necessary to clarify this now), a new physical and a new moral unity that were neither necessary nor occurred in the tribes of the hunter gatherers. This new physical and spatial unity corresponds to the roman concept of urbe, and the new moral or "political" unification corresponds to the roman concept of civitas.

Greek *polis* that are older than the roman ones, included in the same entity, geographical and moral unities, however the roman ones stand out with a word for every boundary, urbes and civitas. Both in Greece and Rome and in all of the cultures where urbanization had started, the birth of the city and the civitas took place through religious ceremonies. In particular, in Rome, in Japan, in china, in Mesoamerica and South America, the origin of the group in the Totem or animal divinity of the Palaeolithic moved to the origin of the city and the community of the "people", in an obviously anthropomorphic ancestor who has the traits first of a God, then later of a hero, and finally of a King, and for a long time in many places, God and King together. The rites of conquest and conditioning of the cave, construction and refurbishment of the town give way to the rites of the founding of the village or town and coronation of the king, whether it is the fusion of several tribes by agreements as if it is a question of conquest, and in both cases the rituals frequently assume elements of diverse groups.

Monarchies and theocratic empires were formed and developed from the beginning of the Neolithic (from the eighth millennium BC in early places) until well into the first millennium BC, when the monarchies gave way to the republics. Halfway through the first millennium BC, when predicative language and writing began to become generalised, when religious rites started to become myths, beliefs and dogmas on the one hand and normative liturgy, both moral and legal on the other. When political rites of foundation and coronation began to become myths, beliefs and constitutions on the one hand and parliamentary and administrative liturgy on the other (as was shown before

in a table[21]).

Politics continues to be creative knowledge, performative language, through which various things are created, new rites, new social systems, new types of activities, it also starts to be a representative knowledge and a predicative language.

The social systems and their functions are products of political power whose power comes from a religious dimension. The allocation of duties to men and women on the one hand and children, teenagers, parents of a family and elders on the other as well as peasant slaves, craftsmen, tradesmen, warriors, government workers, priests and judges, constitute the constitutional order and its development in the administrative system.

The harmony between religious and civil power is frequently in discordance, tribal or civil wars are indiscernibly, religious wars. That is why you can look at a prehistory and a history of religious and political power from the point of view of its conflict as of its congruity, and the history of the political philosophy is a good test of it. In addition to this religious-political bivalence of the civil power is expressed effectively through art in general and especially in architecture, to the extent that the new cities view civil buildings as comparable to a symbol of greatness, urban solemnity and relevance to the ancient religious buildings[22].

5. Law and the Allocation of Individuals within the Social Order

§ 47. *The administrative system, penal system, and civil code*

The creative and performative character of religious and political knowledge sustains legal knowledge. Law is the recognition and expression of the truth and reality of life. Legal activity is the constant reflection and sanctioning of actions and events conforming to a system established by religious and political power and marking actions in a civil society as legitimate or just.

21   The systematisation of the tables and the commentary on it is a development of the chapter 2 by Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones de sí mismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002. And it took elements from *Historía cultural del humanismo*, cit.
22   On the city as a place of power, cfr., Balandier, G., *El poder en escenas. De la representación*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994.

Justice is an aspect of the transcendental bonus, articulating with and inseparable from the political and administrative order, or, as Tomás de Aquino formulated, justice is on one hand commutative and on the other distributive and legal[23].

Politics creates constitutional and administrative law, on the one hand, as an establishment of social and penal systems and on the other as the protection and sanction of these orders. At the same time, constitutional and administrative law (independently from their emergence as academic discipline in the nineteenth century), recognize and express the reality of what has come to be formed by the political action, the truth of what is created, which brings with it the legitimacy of its constitution. On the other hand, civil society generates a civil order itself, that is to say, the ways of recognizing and the expression of what reality and truth became in the relationships between citizens, the benefits of reality and truth, the interchanging of services, and in general of the relationships that generate acceptable public demands. Obviously is it about a creative knowledge and performative language, that were also, in the beginning, inseparable from religious rites of passage, because the rites of passage are those that indicate the effectiveness of civil states, and the civil states are what recognize and express the reality and truth of the rites of passage, and that also in Totem societies as in feudal Christians and in modern states, as has already been mentioned (*§31*).

The structure of civil order is the structure of holy and religious order. The difference between holy and religious systems and civil registry of state began to establish itself in urban western societies in the nineteenth century AD, that is when the civil state registry was created. However, in secularised state societies. When this separation is most intense, the same civil societies and commercial entities generated their own religious ceremony for the celebration of baptisms weddings, funerals and other social events that have a religious origin as empirical as it is ontological. It is the same with the ritual of dining, the ceremonies for births, marriages and deaths, although losing their link to their empirical religious beginning (if indeed it is even lost), do not lose their connection to their ontological transcendental beginning. The need to celebrate these events is the need to express and recognize the sacred realm, the necessity to refer it to a principal of life, of a new and higher life, as

23   Tomas de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*. Madrid: BAC, II-II, q. 61,1978.

something that somehow exceeds and transcends of the particularity of each individual and each individual couple, as something deserving merit for that moment of empirical passing time, as something deserving eternity.

§ 48. The rituals of conflict resolution. Procedural system and the person

Administrative, penal and civil systems, throughout the Mesolithic, help us to see the evolution of religion and politics, in a way that means that when the individuals inner religion, and the individuality of political action during the transition from monarchies to republics as well as the emergence of subjective law and the transition to abstract law, in other words, the consolidation of the procedural system.

In effect, as Hegel has signalled, the Neolithic began without any differentiation between law and morals, between actions and man (what man does in general) and human actions (what is conducted intentionally). For this reason Oedipus is responsible for the great evils that exist in Thebes for having killed his father and marrying his mother, although he did not know that these people were his parents[24]. Horrendous crimes that are committed and atoned for independently of will and knowledge of the person responsible, in other words, independent of "guilt".

In the same line as writing and literal equivalence that appears in legal systems such as the law of Talion the saying "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" the code of Hammurabi and other primitive systems, means that there isn't a separation, an abstraction, making it possible to locate the damage and repair it in a domain of relationships more complex than that of its written equal[25].

The transition from abstract law correlates with the development of the procedural system and with it the emergence of the notion of subjectivity, both free and responsible. The legal reflection on the legal capacity, with other cultural processes, such as the development of theatre and the usage of the notion of person in verbal conjugations within grammar, which contributed to the elaboration of the ontotheology notion of person by the first Greek

---

24   Hegel, *Filosofía del derecho. §118*, Barcelona: Edahsa, 1988.
25   Lara Peinado, F., *Los primeros códigos de la humanidad.* Madrid: Tecnos, 1994.

intellectual believers of Christianity[26]. The concept of the own person in law continued to develop logically, and continued in western legal systems until the twenty-first century, allowing for legal definitions of person and contemporary civil codes[27].

The transition from abstract law is also the process of secularisation from civil law, that, with regard to procedures to resolve conflicts, often overlooked the phases that are described in the law of Rome: (1) mere confrontation with victory of the stronger, which automatically results in him having the right (in the history of the law of Rome law of force, *vis*). 2) Confrontation by observing the religious norms with the victor being the best observant. It's the trial or judgments of God (in Rome law awarded by the gods, *fas*)[28]. 3) Disputes regarding the norms of judges with the victor being the best observer. This is ruling that human judges agreed upon (in Rome, right granted by the *ius*). 4) Disputes adjudicated according to the written law (in Rome *lex*)[29]. These four phases of *vis*, *fas*, *ius* and *lex*, according to the roman model, exist in other cultures but have different names.

The passage of the *fas* to the *ius* and *lex* coincides with the transition to inner religion, constitutions and republics, the general use of predicate language and the widespread use of the writing. However, it should be noted that although law is constituted as narrative and descriptive knowledge, legal and judicial activity does not stop being performative at any time. Individuals become women, senior citizens, owners, married, guilty or deceased, through compliance with the corresponding rites, through the opinion of judges or, even without them, and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by mistake in the registry (error when it occurs is costly to remedy).

---

26   Cfr., Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Chap. 3 Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

27   "For civil purposes, only when born and having lived for twenty-four hours completely detached from the maternal body shall it be deemed that the fetus had human figure". Article 30, *Código civil Español*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1993.

28   Foucault, M., *La verdad y las formas jurídicas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992.

29   Murga, J.L., *Derecho Romano clásico II. El proceso*. Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza, Secretariado de Publicaciones, 1983.

6. The Economy and Provision of Goods and Necessities

§ 49. Rituals of exchanging women and goods. The system of necessities

During the Palaeolithic the main "good" was women, in the Neolithic it was land and by the Post-Neolithic it was money[30]. The point in the Neolithic period when the law recognised man's freedom and responsibility following his intention, the economy (and also the rite) recognised the quality of owner in various ways, between others, through the purchase of items, when the law recognised his freedom to decide what he wants and what he does not, the economy was credited with being able to meet their needs through the acquisition of purchase. In the Neolithic law emerged as a system of freedoms and economy as a system of needs.

Religious power, at the same time differs from political and legal power, it also differs from economic power, from creative knowledge and performative speech, this also creates new elements and changes in the order of being. Economic power is also initially religious power. The maximum economic power and production largely depends on life. Between groups of Palaeolithic hunter gatherers which of course includes women (as has already been mentioned, in groups of between 20 and 200 people needed 3 children to be born for every fertile woman so that the tribe survives) the hunt and the gathering depend on the replacement of the population. For this reason women love, care for and clothe the children. They have is on the one hand food, as has already been mentioned (§34), and, on the other hand women. However what is more, they also possess certain sacred elements in which the power of ancestors and the totem have a particularly strong presence, and help to attack or defend their system of survival, in other words they have amulets, fetishes, arms and ornaments.

Before the existence of money and the act of selling inheritance, dowry, and exchange, were the ways in which one could acquiring property whilst it was not food it was still useful. Inheritance and dowry has a multitude of ways. Exchange worked with the same type of goods in the same field, so that goods cold not simply be exchanged for anything, but only for goods that were

---

30   Attali, J., *Historia de la propiedad*. Barcelona: Planeta, 1989.

compatible in the field of goods in the system of exchange[31]. The development of economy and commerce came from exchange, less goods increasingly could be exchanged for more things until a single product emerged whose value equated to all other elements with useful value combined. That was the apparition of money and the universal market[32]. When this occurred there was a universal model to help provide human necessities and a universal system of exchange.

§ 50. The commercial system. Land and money

As well as the institution of political power and civil society is an administrative, penal and civil system and, as well as legal power is a procedural system, relationships of interchange in order to remedy necessities and create a merchant system. As with the other systems, it is derived directly from religious power and maintains a link with it, but there are two peculiarities with the case of the merchant system. One is that it doesn't depend on coercive power where as other systems do, the other is that, with economic power there is more autonomy in respect to everything sacred and more focus and dependence on humans. It isn't that the independence, unity and communication between groups of people don't have religious sentiment and value and much more. Money is the cause in the way that it is susceptible to alternate uses and anonymous circulation between individuals, lost before its historical reference to the sacred and divine origin of its power. Over all, wealth is a type of good that, like justice, has its ontological foundation in the transcendental bonum, and that certainly, can be adored and often it is and has been.

When during the Neolithic period the cities reached new heights of

31   The barter systems are maintained in a certain way in urban societies of the twenty-first century. For example, when you invite a few friends to dinner, they are then obliged to then invite you to dinner, and that obligation cannot be canceled in any way through money or other alternative. There are also other exchanges in the twenty-first century that require strict equality.

32   Cfr., Polanyi, K., "Notes on primitive money" appendix of *The semantics of Money-Uses, in Symbolic Anthropology. A Reader in the Study of Symbols and Meaning.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Cfr., Mauss, M., *Introducción a la etnografía.* Madrid: Istmo, 1971.

population higher than 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants[33], the spatial-temporal distention and quantitative multiplication of individuals lets the human species reach such a degree, that the communication for the exchange of goods becomes impossible without the mediation of a quantification to make homogeneous and quantifiable, in other words, without a more general method of value, which quantifies elements each time qualitatively more heterogeneous, and without a universal method continuously higher in value, in other words, without an increase of individuals integrated in the "communal Mediterranean market" of the Neolithic period.

Even in classical Greece Plato viewed it as an unnatural scandal that even land can be sold and bought. In effect, money is the measure that measures a great quantity of heterogeneous elements. He who has a lot of money can change It for many nice things, but only under certain circumstances, and is described as rich. For this reason many people want to have money and be rich. However in other different circumstances, somebody could possess a lot of money and it could be that no one wants to change their goods for other things, or that there are no good things to change for money, "wealth is strange in that it does not prevent its beholder from suffering from a lack of necessities" Aristotle commented, and Calls the wealthy whose wealth consists of money "artificial wealth" (chrematistics), and he calls wealth that is made up of nice and necessary items essential to life "natural wealth" (oikonomia)[34]. Artificial wealth can even lead to death, as the myth of King Midas shows, everything he touches turns to gold and yet he dies of hunger.

The process of the invention and the generalization of money is parallel to that of predicative language as ordinary language, not like autonomisation of graphic and phonic elements from rites, but rather the autonomisation of instrumental elements. Anthropologists and pre-historians of money have constructed a model of the development process and invention that can superimpose itself onto linguistics in order to explain language[35]. Money is the figure, the meteoric tool, that has become more accustomed to the abstract human mind, homogenised in the categorical order of quantity, and to combine heterogeneous elements in the relations of exchange. It is therefore, as Weber

33 Livi Baci, M., *Historia mínima de la población mundial*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2002.
34 Aristóteles, *Política*, Libro I, chapters 8-11.
35 Cfr., Polanyi, K., op. cit.

and later Shell[36] pointed out among others, the main factor of rationalization of social life[37].

7. The Technical and Practical Disciplines. *Ethos* and Poetry

§ 51. *Epos, poiesis and techne*

With the analysis of the forth cultural sphere, economy, the cycle of the creative knowledge closes (religion, politics, law and economics) and opens the descriptive (technology, the arts, sciences, and wisdom). Contrary to how it may appear, the technique is neither knowledge nor a performative language but rather descriptive, because the power and the effectiveness of the technical artefact does not come from the same thing, but the elements that are taken from nature.

The techniques and arts (fine arts) operate with elements taken from nature produced manually, and for that reason they were matched to physical jobs and the servile arts in the west for a long time. Arts used as a tool for predicative language, science and knowledge, on the other hand were considered to be 'humanistic' knowledge and were considered to be liberal arts[38].

The technique takes elements of nature and composes a "poem" with them; however, *poiesis* doesn't get its strength from the same thing but instead the natural elements in the composition. For example, a sailing ship is the composition of, on the one hand, a cloth that is moved by the wind, on the other hand, a set of timbers joined together floating on the water, or, an articulate game of wood that allows the direct movement of everything that is joined together in one direction or another, taking advantage of water and wind currents. The ship has a utilitarian performance, but his invention is possible because it abstracts the immediate practical effects of the water (wet, quenches thirst, refresh, flood, etc) the immediate practical effects of air (to move sheets, branches, ground, to ventilate, to stimulate fire etc) and the ways in which it is possible for the mobiles to change direction within the water, and

36   Cfr., Weber, M., *Economía y sociedad*. Primero parte, II, pp. 46-169, Madrid: FCE, 2002, and Shell,M., *Dinero, lenguaje y pensamiento*, México, FCE, 1985.
37   Cfr., Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*, cit., chap 3.
38   Cfr., Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanism*, cit., pp. 57.

compose themselves in order to build something else, something that did not exist before. Technique is a skill which uses things that already existed and forces that were already operating. In the beginning these forces, like others, were holy, and it functioned for use and human benefit was related to blame, as is the case of Prometheus, and subsequently with magic.

Fire, as Plato indicated, is the first of all the transformations and technical elements, but without it "nothing would have been possible[39]". However, Prometheus was not a mortal but rather one of the titans (possibly the way in which the epic Greek memory keeps the knowledge of the Neanderthals). The great civilised Greek hero is Hercules, Hercules, son of an immortal, Zeus, and of a mortal, for this reason he is a semi-divine being. Hercules invented agriculture, the domestication of animals, systems of irrigated land, that that defeat the enemies of men and which pave the way for the construction of cities in general and Athens in particular. As Plato's Timaeus recounts, Athens, the city of dialogue and thinking, is only possible in Heraclea territory. Either, as pointed out by Aristotle, science and philosophy appear when all the necessary Arts for life have already been developed[40]. For this reason, Vico observed that all of the villages had a Hercules, because in all of them the development of techniques is what has made an increasingly comfortable way of life possible[41].

The works and deeds of Hercules in the rites of initiation into trade union activities, whether agricultural, livestock, game, mining, urban development, shipping, port, exploratory, etc, and are reflected in the narrative version of *ethos* (ἔπος, word, history, poem), songs of the *aedos*, epic poems and tragedy.

One can always find epic poems in the vanguard of technology regarding access to the confines of the human, to the borders of the uninhabitable, where does the complete destruction of the man, either the Hades infernal, the edge of the ocean or the murky back of dark force. The epic songs that began in western culture exhibits the beginnings of navigation, the sway of the islands that move and the approach of the blocks of rock on the stretch of Messina (the two giants Scylla and Charybdis), that Is the way in which the first sailors perceived the various aspects of the sea, before they learnt its customs and

39 Platón, *Protágoras*, 320d-322d.
40 Platón, *Timeo*, 20d-26c; Aristóteles, Metafísica I,2,982b.
41 Vico, G-B, *Ciencia Nueva. §3*, Madrid: Tecnos, 1995.

discovered the phenomenon of the tides.

§ 52. Ethos, polis and tragedy

It has been said before that knowledge and creative languages also have their narrative version that is not *epos*, which sings an aedo. It is the tragedy, that an actor represents ("proto-agonist" the first fighter) front of the choir ("anti-agonist" the opposing fighter), later two actors and subsequently more. Tragedy represents the fight between the ancient gods tribes and clans that come together in order to construct a primary village and later a *polis*, with the gods that have generated the new community, civil society or politics. The confrontation between the gods of the family and those of civil society. That conflict that Plato tried to resolve through the abolition of the family, has as a direct result lead to the autonomisation of ethics with regard to religion and the emergence of the individuals subjectivity in his sovereign freedom.

In effect, the conflict between the gods generates situations among men in which they have to choose between what sends them a God and what send them another. This is the case with Orestes in Aeschylus' Oresteia, to which the God Apollo send avenged the murder of his father Agamemnon, King of Argos, when he returned from the Trojan war, at the hands of his mother, Clytemnestra, whilst with the old family gods, Erinyes, ordered the complete worship of parents. It is the previously mentioned case of Antigone in the tragedy of Sophocles, when Creon, King of Thebes, orders the bodies of killed rebels to be left unburied, among them is the brother of Antigone, Polynices, and the boy should have been buried following the mandate of the family gods. Orestes as Antigone is in the obeying of a few gods, following a religion or two, to treat two religions imperatively, the human consciousness has to choose between the two. Following a religious mandate is a religious duty but choosing between two is not. A personal selection of the best or preferable in a religious conflict. It is a selection based on ethics, thus, man is exercising his own freedom between the different gods.

It is this capacity which becomes evident in the foundation of Greek cities, which remains free from religion, and which emerges as its own theme in the tragedy: the human decision on the prevalence of religious and legal order above other orders. For this reason, if the epopee expresses the forefront of

technology in the domain of nature, the tragedy expresses the forefront of law in the domain of the society. The technical epic thus appears as the reflection of nature in its own story made possible by the utilitarian arts and tragedy as a representation of the reflection of society made possible by the fine arts, using descriptive language. The reflection of nature and society generates a type of descriptive ability that expresses itself in the fine arts, sciences and knowledge.

8. Beauty and Theoretical Disciplines. *Pathos* and Rhetoric

§ 53. *The birth of Venus. Beauty, abstraction and measurement*

The discovery of the beautiful seems to stem from the female body, and kept a relationship with the transition of the Palaeolithic, a time in which the main focus was women, to the Neolithic period, a period in which the focus was on the land, as has been said[42]. In effect, when women ceased to be the foundation of survival, and agriculture and real estate property came to be instead (in order to organize houses that harbour more than 1000 families, palaces, temples and forts) then the woman can be seen as independent from her reproductive role.

Starting from the fifth millennium BC, a new and particularly dazzling divinity appeared in the pantheons of the Middle East the Sumerian Inanna and Akkadian Ishtar the Egyptian Isis (in some invocations), Greece Aphrodite and the Roman Venus. Starting then with when myths that explain the origin of evil in the world for the beauty of a woman (myth of Pandora) big conflicts between communities for the beauty of a woman (Helen of Troy), invasions for the beauty of a woman (takeover of Europe), the creation of towns for the beauty of a woman (delivery by Abraham of the beautiful Sarah, his wife, to the Pharaoh of Egypt, and return later to her husband Abraham)[43].

When women began to be viewed independently of their reproductive role, and, when actual entities began to be viewed independently of their practical sense then began to be viewed in a different sense, namely in a theoretical

42   Cfr., Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanism*. Cit., pp. 86 ss.
43   Cfr., ibidem y Choza, J., *Antropogía de la sexualidad*. Madrid: Rialp, 1991. On the discovery of the beauty of the female body in Egypt, cfr., Giedon, S., *El presente Eterno. Los comienzos de la arqitectura*. Vol II, Madrid, Alianza 1981.

sense. They look not in order to do something but in order to not do something. They contemplate and that appears contemplating, what they call in Greece, Therein and theory. Then this activity and entities considered in this regard start to generate areas of culture that do not belong to the order of transformative knowledge, but to descriptive knowledge. They continuously generate and expand them. In effect, the theoretical sense can be a recreational sense in the case of technology, aesthetics in the case of the fine arts, reflective comparative in Sciences and reflective transcendental in philosophy.

In all of these cases descriptive knowledge consists of the urbanization of the object within the scope of representation separated from other objects that could have a productive practical connection. It consists of placement at the level of abstract representation, at the level of objectivity. In that situation the reference of the cognoscente to the object consists of the free play of the faculties (of the memory, of the imagination, of pragmatic intelligence etc.) about a liberated object also of productive performance and placed on a vacuum and potentially infinite background which is precisely the potentiality of the own intellect, as it manifests itself as abstract.

Abstract means taking the reference of something real and mixing it with other things, considering it with a reference to nothing, being as nothing is potentially the amplified infinite of intellect[44]. In this situation the object, since intellect can't be still, comes to be considered and its elements come to be compared with each other, separated, joined in other ways, analysed according to the way that each part matches or "rhymes" with another, in other words according to the way that every part "compares" to another. The ways in which some parts compare to others are known as the proportions of the object. Well, technology, art, science and philosophy consist of the discovery and invention of the proportions of parts of things stored among them. That in relation to things that exist and things that don't exist, which belong to different realities and that now allow the construction or composition of a new reality.

At the beginning of the metal ages the appearance of Venus occurred in the pantheons of the Eastern Mediterranean, the development of schematic art in the Western Mediterranean, the emergence and development of luxury and

44   That is precisely what is being done in exhibitions and museums to present works of art to the public, the removal of any possible context for them. Through this, artistic production is able to remain "sacred" as it keeps itself closed off from other things, from public contemplation.

the emergence and development of astronomy in conjunction with astrology[45]. Greek culture, like all of the others, play with units of measurement, but in a special way, and only to resolve practical issues. In some of those games, they noted that the combinations of measurements produced striking effects.

The measurement is a quantitative abstraction of qualities, measuring is the reiteration of measure, the unit of measurement. The reiteration of unity always gives homogenous quantities in terms of measurement as is evident in the case of the currency, but in terms of sensation and perception it gives heterogeneous qualities. For example a taut rope of a certain length gives a sound and if the length of the rope is half or double qualitatively different sounds are produced, but intensity is proportionate to the length of the string. Tying strings on a wooden arch can be made so that the strings make very beautiful sounds, captivating sound, even capable of taming wild beasts.

Greeks discovered that the beauty that produced these effects seemed to be generated by proportions and for this reason the beautiful arts developed at the same time as technology and science. What blessed Greek art and later all European art, its idiosyncratic nature, distinctive features that cause it to be so different in other cultures, and that allow the development that was taking hold in every direction, is that it is deliberately and consciously based on the analysis of proportions. It is not because in Greece and the west art is calculated or "deduced", as in every aspect art developed from intuition, creativity, by chance or the free game of faculties. However, one intuition has been adopted, happy expression, artistic expression that can be analysed through their actions, proportions and 'rhymes', whether space, colour, sound, or kinetic. In this analytical search expression is perfected, until they reached its peak and, in turn, the same analysis opens up new possibilities and leads to new discoveries that lead to further analysis. It is the role of the fine arts.

45   The first known representation of the vault of heaven is the celestial Nebra Sky Disk, found in Germany in 1999 and thought to be from a culture that existed around 3,600bc., cfr.http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/disco_celeste_de_Nebra.

§ 54. *The beautiful and the sublime. Eros, pathos and Peitho*

As well as Hercules is the divinity which opens the field of technique and leads the civilization of men, Venus is the goddess that opens beautiful roads to humans in the western world. Venus is often accompanied. The person who accompanies her the most is the young god *eros*, along with an entourage of three thanks *Aglaya* (splendid, brilliant), *Euphrosyne* (joy, happiness) and *Talia* (fertility, carrier of flowers), of disputed origin and whose decent is attributed to the sun. Together with the three thanks appear other divinities, which include Peitho (persuasion), the gods with which Venus relates to in particular include Dionysus, Apollo and Adonis. Dionysus and Apollo, which in Greek antiquity are not in competition, but are instead complementary; Venus and Peitho are related to the Muses, the divinities of the arts.

The early empirical history of beauty and fine arts was delayed, as was science. Dance, singing, and the flute are listed in remote prehistory, but not as arts. Aesthetics became autonomous at the same time as ethics, perhaps the beginning of the metal ages. By that time, the *epos* was anticipated, lyric poetry and tragedy, whose appearance was already consolidated in that historical era, and that is when the kinetic elements also became autonomous, for example colour, graphic, and acoustic, which foreshadow dance, singing and music as arts that are consolidated in the first millennium.

When the *ethos* emerged as the sovereignty of free will, then *pathos* also appears as affective resonance of power and be absolute in the human being, as fascination and enormity produced by the beauty and as persuasion (Peitho) and 'redemption' produced by power and the sacred being, by the Phanum. Venus appearing in her most radiant splendour is not enough to produce such a fascination. It is necessary that *eros* strikes at the right time to penetrate that splendour in the heart of man that first falls in love and later feels ecstasy. Then the infatuated man, the catch, is outside of himself, in a state in which beauty can create art, or science, or technique, or accessing the wisdom[46].

The transcendental ontological foundation of fine arts and love is beauty, which is another moment of being and power different to both good and truth. It attracts without being overwhelming and powerful without forcing the

---

46   Carchia, G., *Rétorica de lo sublime*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1994.

thing that it has been attracted, and without imposing upon us what the truth should be. It attracts freely, which is how the thanks behave, and this is how the arts inspired by muses behave.

There is a narrative way that we can refer to what is good, and it is known as ethics: a narrative track for love and the persuasion of the heart when faced with the beautiful and the sublime, which is rhetoric, and a narrative path to establish the relationship between the truth and the self, which is logic and science. In the classical era, the foundation of man in all of these areas is not completely practical because the efficiency of it is always mediated by the freedom and the ability of human individuals. The foundation is education, what the Greeks called Paideia[47].

When the society between historical times and secularisation produced a wide and profound model, when the beginning of historical and religious power, action and knowledge were not yet embedded in the remoteness of time and in the collective unconscious, then the ontological and religious fundamentals of power, action and knowledge is trying to reach through the paideia, through the spheres of culture that have been called descriptive knowledge. Etiquette and tragedy form character and will in reference to good, and good is the most divine element. Rhetoric and the beautiful arts form sensitivity and emotion with regard to beauty and beauty is the most divine. Logic and science are the reason and intellect with regard to truth, and truth is the most divine.

A debate began among the classical Greeks, it was about the supremacy of each one these three aspects of being and of the sacred elements, which continue into the twenty-first century AD. The teachers of ethics and of tragedy, like Sophocles and Socrates, put an element of principle into conflicts and in the good result that can come of it. The teachers of rhetoric and music, such as Gorgias, Protagoras, put the emphasis on beauty, which attracted and remained with those who it adopted and persuaded. Teachers of logic and dialectic, such as Plato and Aristotle, placed emphasis on truth. Almost all concurred that the principle of power, action and knowledge was, for the education of man, a perception and a sense of the three aspects of being and of the sacred[48].

47   Jaeger, W., *Paideia: Los ideales de la cultura griega*. Madrid: Fondo de la Cultura Económica, 1990.
48   For the relationships between poetry, rhetoric and logic, cfr., Carchia, op. cit.

There was a universal principal on this so that an agreement could be made.

9. Truth and Theoretical Knowledge. *Logos* and Science

§ 55. Reflection. The meeting of nous and logos

When ancient towns lost contact with fundamental sacred aspects and creative knowledge science and philosophy were born. By then man had already had such a journey, with so many memories, attending to so many tasks, so many internal processes, which began to become distant from the individual and joined with a set of social functions such as passion, and groups of feelings, like intellect and moral conscience[49]. Humans have already followed a wide enough path so as to stop and reflect, to sort ideas and memories, to seek unity, the proportions and concordance of lived experience, unity and the sense of being and life, to seek wisdom.

The first philosophers put their knowledge into writing in the form of liturgical hymns and poems about nature. It is not treated though as performative knowledge. Religion, politics, law and the economy organise and manage the life of the community, but in these areas of culture already more weight is given to the information that is transmitted through writing than in the reality of what is created by doing so. Nature and society are not created. They were created in the remote past and spoken about through the medium of myths, but nowadays these myths are not credible.

Now there are many men, cities as well as gods and customs, in addition to the increase they have also changed a lot. A few changes, some of which are still present in memory, have discovered other ways of understanding what things are, which is describing them, consequently improving what they have now become. New ways of improving the construction of cities have been discovered as well as palaces and temples; channels and ports; ships and war machines; domestic animals and agricultural crops. There are more and better maps, the discovery was made that the Sun revolves around the Earth once over the space of a year, and that the Earth is round, that the universe rotates

---

49   Topic studied in Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit. Chap. 4.

once every 50,000 years. We are able to compare proportions, distance and quantities of the stars and seas, they can be measured and relationships can be established between these measures. We can calculate. Now we are able to ask how many? What time is it? What is this? What is that? How many species? We can wonder because there are tools in place to inform us of anything that we do not know.

Names and numbers allow us to measure things; they tell us what they are and what they are like. We know what unites everything, the results and principles of things, the self and intellect have also been discovered. Intellect enquires about the self and symbols, and it does so in the confidence that these symbols meet with reality, that it draws from this and develops its own intellect says what the reality is. By using the symbols of all the truth is evident to the man, to the family, and something also has to be said about the meaning of life of men and the life of the gods. The symbol and the self are both divine, but Heraclitus knows that "the wise, who is individual and unique wants to find himself called by the name of Zeus[50]"

Nowadays there is another way and another language for understanding the universe and finding your place in it, and it is the way of science and wisdom. *Sapiens* that we now call man can be defined as beings that have language, reason, and as having started this new path that we now call history.

50   Quote 64 (32), *De Tales a Demócrito. Fragmentos presocráticos.* Madrid: Alianza, 1988.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEOLITHIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE SELF.
SCIENCE AND SELF-CONSCIENCE

«We should persuade those in the city who are going to have a hand in the most important decisions to take up arithmetical reasoning and practise it – not as a hobby, but until they reach the contemplation of the nature of numbers by means of thought alone. And it shouldn't be for the sake of buying and selling, like tradesmen and dealers. No, it should be for military

reasons, and for their very soul's sake, to make it easier to redirect it away from becoming and towards truth and being.»

PLATO: *The Republic*, VII, 8, 525c[1].

«The object of his affection was… himself. […] It was as if an inner voice reproached him: "O foolish boy! How have you fallen in love with a phantom, all in vain? Your passion is an illusion. Leave this spring and you will see just how the image disappears. And yet, it is with you, it came with you, and it goes with you … And never will you possess it!" Narcissus raised his arms to the heavens. Crying.»

OVID: *Metamorphosis*, III, 3.

1. The New Urban Order. The Narrative Construction of the Cosmos[2]

§ 56. *The original parricide and memory of the beginning*

The cultural spheres developed, differentiated and became independent, because, as previously mentioned, population increased, requiring new divisions of work, and consequently, because social complexity surged. The relation between factors is systematic, and not of linear causality. It is possible that that process was a very gradual one, since the beginning of hunting large mammals, perhaps towards the thirtieth millennium BC, which required the best possible organisation of work cooperation.

It is possible that during a large part of this period, the *sapiens* lived within the "banker's schedule" that Sahlins spoke of. With plenty of hunting, high protein diets, an average of barely 4 hours of work a day, double the amount of free time than work and a very healthy life with few diseases, which gradually extended bit by bit[3].

It is possible that after a period of these living conditions, the *sapiens*

---

1 Plato: *The Republic*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 223.
2 Translated to English by Stacey Roach.
3 Sahlins, M., *La economía de la Edad de Piedra*. Madrid: Akal, 1983.

transitioned to a new stage, characterised by the shortage of game, travelling further in search for food, the increase in the daily number of working hours, the increase in diseases and their more frequent occurrence; in other words, the "expulsion from paradise". It is possible that when in other new less pressurised living conditions, they once again had more time, and they counted it valuing and judging in the same way as they had done in the past.

Between the fifteenth and tenth millennium BC, the climate changed. Thaws produced great floods, big mammals disappeared, there began to be a short supply of hunting, and food consisted more and more of seeds and other plants, and of animals maintained for their own use. Then, settlements began to be produced by the nomadic tribes of hunters-harvesters in the east Mediterranean. The population started to grow, work consisted of longer processes and was divided up between more groups, for some of which there was more free time. They had to begin accounting for the grain that was produced, for the people that needed it, for the water shortages, for the consumption of wheat per capita and for the number of people that had to work on the fields, as well as other details.

Likewise, other things were born, such as writing and adding up. Pictograms became more diverse and abundant, more stabilised, and more and more they seemed to resemble the letters of the first alphabet. However, writing was not used just for arithmetic and communication. The tribes continued to celebrate the rites that they had always celebrated, adapting them to the new circumstances of urban life. If there were no bears or mammoths left, they instead celebrated the hunting of wild boars, or the slaughtering of sheep, or perhaps both. Other times, as well as or at the same time as celebrating those rites, they did their own dances and chants, or perhaps just chanting. Thus the chants appeared, separate from the liturgical ceremonies, as tales of what once was, in the parties that now began to be celebrated where the people settled, in children's games, in the songs of children, in the great ceremonial contests, and in stories around the fire.

Thus appeared the tales of the past – the myths. In this way they were produced and then reproduced, and continued to be repeated. Memory gathered up the events from the past that most influenced the comprehension of the world and of man, guarded them, and through repetition, interpreted them.

In those tales, they described the discovery of the Godfather bear of the sky, how they hunted and ultimately killed it, its sacrifice and the life that the

tribe achieved with that death, the fall of man as consequence of that original parricide, and the expulsion of man from the territories of hunting and life. The story was recounted, sung and repeated in the commemorative ritual of the founding of society, in the hunting rites, in the rites of the winter solstice and the new year, as well as others[4].

§ 57. *The second original parricide and the narrative construction of the beginning. The epic memory*

As urban settlements expanded and their population increased, and as the Neolithic ended and the period of metal and writing began, the memory of the Neolithic beginnings were added to that of the Palaeolithic beginnings.

To the tales of the creation of the world and man, and of the expulsion of paradise (perhaps the end of Palaeolithic), were added stories about the beginnings of agriculture and stockbreeding, and of the establishment of the first cities, which were also tales about promulgation of the first human laws, about the organisation of a more complex society. These episodes were collated in the tales of the second original parricide, namely, the murder of Abel by Cain, the murder of Aegean by his son Theseus, the murder of Remus by Romulus, and the other equivalents in different mythologies and cultures. Cain, Theseus and Romulus were the founders of cities and instigators of agriculture.

Tales about the origin of the cosmos and the original parricide (the creation, the fall and the origin of evil), about the 'expulsion from paradise' (the decrease in popularity of hunting and the end of the Palaeolithic), and about the corruption of men joined those of the second beginning. They were tales about the second divine punishment, the downpour (end of glaciations, thawing and floods), the survival of the chosen ones (Noah and the arc), the confusion of languages and the dispersion of men (tower of Babel), the origin of worshiping, human sacrifices and home ownership (departure of Abraham of Ur), the conflicts between the tribes that constituted the population of cities

4   Perhaps there was a time in which the tales that then came to be the poem of Gilgamesh and the Hebrew bible, they were narrations so simple like the villages of Sub-Saharan Africa, cfr, Beier, U., *The Origin of Life &Death. African Creation Myths.* Heinemaznn: Nairobi, 1988.

(Moses' arrival in the promised land, the Oresteia by Aeschylus).

Frazer collects these tales and their equivalents in other cultures and situates them parallel to the Hebrew bible, which he takes as an axis of the most decisive and universal Palaeolithic and Neolithic events[5].

Continuing with Frazer and with help from the less encyclopaedic work of Eliade[6], the group of Palaeolithic and Neolithic events expounded by narrative and conserved in the epic memory, can be put in relation to the chronology of fossil and archaeological records from the beginnings of the twenty-first century. From this, results a table of correspondence between episodes of the epic memory and those of the scientific chronology.

---

5   Frazer, J,G., *El folklore en el Antiguo Testamento*. Madrid: FCE, 1993, pp. 9-204.
6   Eliade, *Tratado de historia de las religions y Historia de las creencias y las ideas religiosas*. I, II y III. Barcelona: Paidós, y vol III-2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

EPISODES OF EPIC MEMORY IN HUMAN CULTURES.	SCIENTIFIC CHRONOLOGY AT THE START OF TWEN-TY-FIRST CENTURY.
Creation of the world.	Physical Big-Bang, 15,000 million years ago.
Creation of the first men. Giants and Titans. Prometheus	Cultural Big-Bang, 50,000 years ago.
First sin of man. Origin of evil. First original parricide. Eva. Pandora.	Original rites of hunting. First dispersion of languages. 50,000 years ago.
First divine punishment. Expulsion of paradise.	End of Palaeolithic. End of hunting reserves. Second dispersion of languages. Between 15,000 - 10,000 years ago.
Cain and Abel. Romulus and Remus. Theseus and Aegeus. Second original parricide.	First settlements. Birth of agriculture and property ownership. Between 10,000 and 8,000 years ago.
Second divine punishment. The Flood. Noah. Destruction of Nineveh, Sodom and Gomorrah.	End of Würm glaciation. Climatic changes. Rise in water levels. Between 8,000 and 4,000 years ago.
Third sin of man. Towers to reach the sky (Babel, etc.)	First temples-fortresses. First states. 4,000 years BC
Third divine punishment. Confusion of languages.	Third dispersion of languages. 4,000 years BC
End of human sacrifice. Abraham. Numa.	End of human sacrifice. Development of writing. Birth of science. Between 3,000 and 5,000 years BC.

As religions differentiated themselves from the other cultural spheres, they developed their own history, defined their remit, and started to depict,

firstly in oral texts and later in written texts, their procedure of intervention, which was more and more symbolic.

Ernst Gellner believes that, with the start of the Neolithic, religion stopped giving immediate support in day-to-day situations, and shifted to presenting an offer of absolute salvation, for all and for everyone[7].

This thesis can be substantiated. It is not that with the development of the Neolithic there arrived a religious totalitarianism when written documentation commenced. What occurred was really a biblical-alphabetic totalitarianism, an imperialism of subjectivity and written self-conscience which is, namely, masculine. This is what Derrida calls European phallogocentrism.

The Neolithic, as discussed, triggered a process of secularisation because it brought about a transmutation of the basic fundamentals of the social system, which was constituted through the rites of passage now negotiated by religion, and, at the same time, through political rites and the administrative penal-civil legislation that was negotiated by political and judicial power. The rites of passage, in as much as they were sacraments, continued to define the social structure and personal identity. However, this structure and this identity did not come only from religious commands derived from sacred power and its control over individuals, but also from the civil rule derived from a secularised power, which applied equally to individuals. Civil power began considering itself divine, and little by little it ended up considering itself natural, although it was not for this reason that it stopped doing performing the same functions in the maintenance of the social system.

2. Religions of Interiority and Eternity. The Myth of Narcissus

§ 58. The hegemony of writing. Numbers and immutable measurement

As the Neolithic advanced, tales about the first and second parricides, about the origin of the cosmos and of the cities, were composed verbally, and also transmitted verbally until the middle of the first millennium.

Perhaps there are myths, songs, recited short tales and other compositions that have been transmitted in this way since the Ice Age. Songs and tales

---

7   Gellner, E., *Postmodernismo, razón y religion*, Barcelona, Paidos, 1992.

sung by the hunters when they went in search of food, by the women and men when they prepared and ate said food, by the entire group when they celebrated those that joined in 'matrimony', when they celebrated burials, or by the children when they played in a circle. In some cases, the person that sung did so alone, and, thus, they developed, polished and interpreted even more of what they remembered and transmitted. The bard, the rhapsody, only remembers and describes; only sings and tells stories. It is possible that over time, the number of individuals that did this grew.

The more time a person spends with solely their memories and thoughts, interpreting what is transmitted or simply enjoying it, the longer they are able retain and articulate their memory, the more of the past is covered in their songs, the more historical value holds the epic memory. Also, as more time that a person spends with their thoughts and their memories, the more their 'interiority' grows. The correlation between megalithic constructions of the fourth millennium BC in architecture, writing, prepositional language and objectivity has already been pointed out (*§ 40*).

Interiority is constituted and developed if the memories and contents of the imagination are articulated and organised, and if that articulation and organisation remains constant for everyone; that is, if there is common sense or common knowledge, which belongs to a common past.

The social and cultural systems are memory and exist within memory. They are systems of rituals and of stories. Whilst the content of the ritual systems stays proportionally constant[8], the content of those tales and also the memory expands, so much so that there reaches a point where the task of conserving and transmitting memories, rites and other things must be distributed amongst groups.

Bards and singers arise from one of these groups. Scribes arise from others, and from others come those that compose theatrical tragedies and plays.

The *Gilgamesh*, the *Pentateuch*, the *Ilia*d and the *Odyssey* begin to be composed in the third and second millennia, and they are put in writing towards the seventh century BC. For between one or two thousand years those

---

8   The creative knowledge hardly generates new fields in the Neolithic, in comparison with the descriptive, the technical, art and science, which, being a certain novelty themselves, generate a multiplicity of species, each one inside it's own genre.

contents were transmitted orally, and were interpreted and modified by their transmitters.

Thanks to the rites, myths, songs and tales, to the epic and the tragedy, the entire universe has been named and transferred into the interiority of man, into the dialogue between men. In a process that has taken 4,000 years, what used to be incomprehensible and threatening exteriority has been transformed into a familiar cosmos on a very human scale. All this thanks to sonorous representations that humans have attached to their experiences; put simply – words. Thanks to words, all things could now be recognised. The arduous work of knowing and cultivating allowed passage to a simple and comfortable behaviour based on recognising, on learning to speak, or on that which is the same, verbal communication.

Those words that were representations, were also codes, keys, through which the cosmos remained closed, encrypted, according to the differing valuations of human groups. If they understood that each group had an entire encrypted universe at their disposal, and if they could then decipher that universe, then each one recognised the other as human.

However, the ciphers contained the power of ciphered realities. Names, which frequently arose in the rites, had the power to construct and destroy. Words were the strength of things and of spirits, before being, as seen, the measure of things.

Predicative language gained dominance and hegemony over daily life, which means that language which transmitted information became one of the more habitual parts of human conduct, much more so than the language which produced that which it represented. Put another way, language becomes increasingly ineffective, eventually belonging more to the descriptive sphere than the active, less to the creative sphere.

Linguists believe, as do philosophers, that a change in language occurred when it passed from the use of natural symbols to conventional signs. This change signified a great freedom on the part of the imagination and intellect in order to compose fixed groups of diverse qualitative elements (words), to relate things and organise them and to describe the cosmos.

Conventional signs, whilst still conserving the content of the extramental, reflect more the nature of the imagination and intellect than do natural

symbols, as Hegel observed[9]. Therefore, language became more impotent, because it was made more intellectual and creative in the mental order. It then became more representative, and the performative dimension weakened until it almost disappeared.

The *sapiens* imagined and identified the world in a performative way, brilliantly and effectively, when they first had to humanise their environment, when they had to construct the cosmos. Once the cosmos was constructed, they identified it more representatively and theoretically, in an increasingly impotent way, and that is when they analysed and described it more precisely, in a simpler way with better measurements, or perhaps, more scientifically. Words do not make things, but they do measure them. They represent and communicate what they are. The first way of measuring was with words.

In the last phases of language development, according to the development model of linguists, which corresponds to the moment of greatest breadth of time that language integrates, and according to the model of Popper and Eccles, which consists of the ordinary spoken language and scientific languages which we use now, the cosmos could be constructed and depicted using lot of different narratives and could be explained in divergent scientific ways, increasingly in accordance with the phenomena that occurred within the real-life scenarios encountered by all[10].

At the same time as the creation of words as conventional signs, the invention of numbers and units of measurement occurred, with corresponding written notation, transcribed by other means, or noted with the corresponding mnemonic proceedings, as illustrated by George Ifrah[11].

Numerical representations can with difficulty be symbols, and therefore those that we know are always signs. They have had a more 'theoretic' character than 'poetic', more abstract, and more adequate than words for achieving more precise measurements. Numerical signs are differentiated from words in that they isolate themselves absolutely from all qualities of the extramen-

9   Hegel, *Enciclopedia*, *§ 458*, nota., Cfr., Derrida, J., *Márgenes de la filosofía*, Madrid: Cátedra, 1989, pp. 119-121, cfr, Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla-Madrid: Thémata-Plaza y Valdés, 2009, pp. 213-219.

10   Sobre los modelos de desarrollo del lenguaje de los linguistos y los neuro-filosofos, cfr., Choza, J., *Historia cultural del humanismo*, cit., cap. 5.

11   Ifrah, G., *Hisrotia universal de las cifras*, Madrid, España, 2001.

tal, keeping only one of them, the *quantum*, as also observed by Hegel[12]. With the *quantum*, different qualitative units of measurement can be created: of time and space (longitude and surface), of weight and volume, which were the most necessary for calculating the amount of grain and other agricultural products that could be produced per unit of surface, to calculate the number of individuals that could be fed per unit of time, and to calculate the amounts and forms of stone to construct silos, warehouses, tombs, temples and palaces.

The practice of measuring space by comparing the earth with various parts of the human body (the foot, the elbow, etc.) and time by observing the sky (the turning of the sun and the moon for days, weeks, months and years), allowed the resolution of problems in everyday life and improved conditions of living in all cultures, more or less without exception.

With the increasingly frequent use of predicative language and numerical measurements, one of the most notable features of intellect also arose and consolidated itself in culture and in individual minds. It is a symptom of the growing impotence of both, and is, namely, the immutable nature of intellect and its contents, or indeed, the notion of eternity, as aforementioned (*§ 40*).

Ideas are eternal because they do not change nor can they be changed. They do not belong to the order of time and therefore they are eternal, because they are impotent. They are not alive and they cannot live nor die. The contemplation of ideas, like the contemplation of menhires, and of stone inscriptions, was, for men of the first, second and third millenniums BC, the contemplation of eternity.

§ 59. *The discovery of eternity. The myth of Narcissus*

As discussed, the more time the bard spent alone with his poems, the scribe with his numbers, the hunters with their hymns and the children with their songs around the circle, the greater and richer the memory became, the more their 'interiority' grew, and the more intimately related the intellect of

---

12   <As much as this is a thought of exteriority, numbers are at the same time the abstraction of simple diversity; it has not kept anything simple, but of the abstract determination of exteriority itself; it's what is found in the closest to thinking; it is pure thinking of one's own extracting of the act of thinking> Derrida, op. cit., p. 142; Hegel, *Ciencia de la lógica*, I, cap. II de la 2a sección «El quantum» (el número, n. 11).

the singer was to the immutability of its content, the more intimate the relationship between individual thinking and eternity.

For this reason the discovery-invention of eternity appeared more and more in songs and tales, firstly in the third millennium BC, in the *Poem of Gilgamesh*. Before this, man had never said that he wanted to be immortal. Perhaps death didn't seem so terrible was life was communicable, transferable and recoverable, if the certainty of a transmigration of the 'spirit' of individuals kept the idea of a 'definitive annihilation' far from them. (*§35*). Familiarity with stones and inscriptions on walls, with the inscription of one's own name, familiarity with one's own identity, permanent and eternal, familiarity with ideas, without anything else, promoted a conceptualisation of death that was also eternal, and consequently, the idea of and desire for an eternal immortality, of which there are testimonies from the fourth millennium.

This constellation of related ideas (identity, immutability, immortality, eternity) matured and was consolidated with the increasingly habitual use of writing, and another element was incorporated that appeared in more and more cultural products, and maybe firstly in the religious reform of Amenhotep IV in the middle of the second millennium BC: the idea of universality.

Amenhotep IV, the first religious reformer to be documented, was also the first to preach about the universality of God[13].

The diffusion of the idea of universality of God is also the living and understanding of that which in time philosophers would call the transcendental character of being and thought, the vital nature of unity, which is what brought the first Greek philosophers to search for a beginning of the cosmos and of all reality, and only one: water, air, the unknown, numbers or intellect.

When the human being acquires consciousness of the unity and singular nature of reality, of the universe, of eternity, of himself as unique and unrepeatable, of things changing with time, and of that same time passing by, he realises that his own life is not infinite, that one day he will die, and that death is a definitive and eternal destruction.

One of the ways of guaranteeing immortality (not transmigration, nor any other type of survival), which was especially recurrent between the Greeks, was to find fame. To be famous is to exist for forever in the memory of other people, in tales or in writings. This is not the immortality in which

13   Eliade, M., *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*, vol. I, cap. IV.

Socrates believes when he takes the hemlock, but it is that which obsessed Herostratus during the mid-fourth century BC when he burnt the Temple of Diana in Ephesus.

With that, he was assured to be remembered throughout history as the author of an act, if not glorious, then at least terribly great and, of course, memorable.

There remains an important quality, in the pursuit of immortality by achieving the ideal entity, that more than equals the notion of eternity in the myth of Narcissus, just as Ovid recounts in *Metamorphosis*, and that is beauty.

Ovid composed his *Metamorphosis* in the first century BC. A version of the Narcissus myth was already known some forty years previously, of Greek origin, which means the myth refers to an event belonging to a moment of ancient history in which theoretical thinking and writing were evidently consolidated. It belongs to the moment that Roman enlightenment reached its absolute peak, and can thus be considered as one of the first criticisms of this enlightenment.

Criticising and teaching are learning the lesson that an image, however perfect and beautiful it may be, can never be superior to life or to reality, and that if this confusion incurs, the consequence is death[14].

To the qualities of identity, immutability, eternity, universality and objectivity that the intellect confers to its objects, the myth recounted by Ovid adds another quality that, in conjunction with the others, produces the disturbance and subjective self-fascination of Narcissus, and that is beauty. Beauty, as has been indicated (*§ 53-54*), is also a discovery that was produced at the start of the Neolithic and consolidated as it drew closer to the historical period.

14   This interpretation of the myth of Narcissist is taken from Choza, J., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002, pp. 92-96.

3. Theory and beauty. From Praxiteles to Euclid

§ 60. Theory and beauty. From Praxiteles to Euclid

As indicated (*§ 53-54*), beauty, immutability and measurement are Neolithic discoveries that began in the Metal Age around the fifth millennium BC, and fully developed with the writings of the first millennium. We must now take what was previously stated and continue it in order to examine the joint birth of fine art and science in the world of Ancient Greece.

Whilst there are no archaeological remains or direct mythologies of the invention-discovery of identity, immutability, universality and eternity, which are all qualities that intellect confers immediately (and 'inadvertently') to its objects, there are those of beauty, which initially seems a quality of objects and of actual entities more than of intellect itself.

In general, beauty is a quality, in virtue of which the perceived produces happiness, rapture, fascination, seduction and even ecstasy, an inclination in the perceiving subject to devote itself to praise and service of the perceived thing, to come together with it and to possess it, an inclination which later received the name of *eros* between the Greeks and love between the Romans[15].

Beauty in general and that of women in particular, as has been said (*§53-54*), seems to be produced by the proportions of the body parts. By means of a comparison of parts of the body with others, and by guesswork searching for figures with some proportions and with others, in the middle of the fifth century BC, the sculptor Phidias and his school constructed a woman's figure that forever passed through history as a measure or archetype of beauty, the Venus of Milo.

Phidias' measure seemed unsurpassable until a century later. Praxiteles discovered that a human figure that measures the head seven times is more pleasing and more beautiful than one that measures the head six times[16]. Thus, Praxiteles' measure emerged as a system of proportions that directed the construction of the Aphrodite of Knidos and other models of the feminine body.

---

15   Rousseau had observed that in the natural state there is not a feeling of love, nor a sense of beauty. Cfr., *Discurso sobre el origen y fundamento de la desigualidad entre los hombres*. Madrid: Alianza, 1985.

16   For a more detained version of the calculation of the Greek structure, Cfr. Boardman, J., *La escultura griega*. Barcelona: Destino, 1999.

Praxiteles' model in turn also seemed unsurpassable until 1648 when Diego de Silva Velázquez discovered the 90-60-90 model and embodied it on the Rokeby Venus. Velázquez's proportions between the diameters of the chest, waist and the hips of the feminine body, was reused by later artists such as Rodin or Romero de Torres, and by professional models, especially by Claudia Schiffer, who established it as the ultimate standard of feminine beauty at the end of the twentieth century[17].

The theory, in terms of how it plays around with proportions – in other words, using complex calculation – is also the basis of science, which in itself can be considered a form of proportionality of proportions, as a reflection on measurement. That is what Euclid and his school did with space more generally, a century after Praxiteles, establishing the very foundations of geometry

4. Counting and Measuring. Numbers

§ 61. Counting and measuring. Numbers

We must now resume what was advanced in *§53* and *§58* about beauty, measurement and numbers in order to understand the birth of science, and, more concretely, that of geometry.

The activity of encoding consists of relating broader ideas to one of the ritual elements, either gestural, graphic, instrumental or acoustic, manageable and comfortable in all possible senses, which functions as a sign or code that mentions, makes present, changes, and, in general, operates alongside the idea in question.

All rituals are ways of encoding and deciphering, codifying and de-codifying, life and the environment. Life in its relation to the environment. The theory of signs and codes was developed in the twentieth century beginning with the work of Saussure and Peirce as semiotic, as a science and a philosophy of signs that entailed a theory of culture and communication[18].

A code is a conventional sign, more or less arbitrary, and differs from the

17 This thesis is taken from Choza, J., «Estilización del cuerpo y de la tierra. Euclides y Praxiteles» en *Fedro*. Sevilla: Número 8, marzo de 2009.

18 Cfr. Eco, U., *Tratado de semiótica general*. Barcelona: Lumen, 1991.

symbol wherein the symbol is a natural sign, as smoke is to fire, and as plants are to water.

The most classical and universal codes are gestures (for example, to turn the head to symbolise affirmation and denial), tools (for example, a stone axe, or a shell to symbolise value), graphics, letters and numbers (for example a diagram of a vulva or a letter 'V' to signify the beginning), and voices, songs and words (for example the declaration 'I' to refer to oneself with a personal pronoun).

Words are sounds and graphics that, just like the other codes, represent a plurality of qualities of a certain type of thing. The word rain is code for various elements and qualitatively different phenomena: water that falls from the sky in diverse ways, that allows plants and animals to live, and that at times drowns them. The word deer is code for other qualitatively different elements, for many different animals of different sizes that run a lot, that have different kinds of antlers, or do not have them at all, and that can be hunted and eaten.

Rain is different each time, as are deer, but a code collates and keeps constant those qualities that most interest the *sapiens*, to the point that when repeating it, the *sapiens* are in fact referring more to the commonalities than to the differences amongst rains, amongst deer. In this way words and perceptions form, and slowly, concepts too. The *sapiens* name what they perceive, and, like all human beings, they perceive what they know. If they see deer running they say that they see deer. If they see beings that they have never seen before, they say that they do not know what they have seen, or that they have seen something and they do not know what it is.

Words are the type of code that represents, in a meaningful unit, a plurality of qualitative elements of things. Numbers are the type of code that represent only one qualitative element, namely the number of times that the combination of those diverse and shared qualitative elements appears within the parameter of the *sapiens* (real or mental). In other words, the number of times that deer are seen or the number of deer that are seen. This is the definition of number as formulated by Frege, and it indicates that number does not belong to reality, that there is no such thing as 'two' or 'four' in reality, but that it belongs to the concept of rain or of deer when it occurs, or when we say that

within the parameter, real or mental, rain or deer appear twice or four times[19].

We don't say one time, and another time, and another time, and another time, a deer, but rather one, two, three, four deer. Where, two, three or four, is not something that happens to the actual deer, it does not refer to the actual deer, but it does happen to the concept or the mental image of the deer and refers to that. What happens to the concept is that reality represents it once, and another time, and another. If it is represented in a way that encompasses all of them at once, thus it can be said that there are three deer, and the activity through which one says and knows that there are three is called counting.

To count is to put what is seen simultaneously, all at the same time, in a temporal sequence, in which each element retains the previous and at the same time declares itself different, but only different in as much as the ordinal moment at which it occurs or is considered, and in comparison, to the times at which the earlier ones occurred. Therefore all the other differences that exist between the deer are not taken into account in this process[20]. Effectively, this deer is counted at the third moment, that one in the fourth moment, and thus the numbered moments indicated an order and it is said that these numbers are ordinal ones.

For this reason, one of the ways in which Aristotle defines time is by saying that it is the measurement of movement according to the before and the after[21] and Kant says that number is the pure experience of time. If someone were unable to count, if numbers could not be arranged in order, we would not be able to have a sense of time, nor a concept of time, nor many forms of interior time. To count is to express succession, incidents, time, as much if counting what fire does, as if counting bear hunting, or the quantity of bears hunted over the winter period, or simply numbers: one, two, three, etc.

There is another type of code that, as already mentioned *(§ 53)*, represents two and only two qualitative elements of something real, namely, the number

19   «A numerical announcement stated affirms some subject about a concept» Frege, G., *Fundamentos de la aritmética, (investigación lógico matemática sobre el concepto de número).* Barcelona: Editorial Laia, 1972, *§ 70*.

20   That type of moulds, differences, features, positions and contents of the intellect can be represented by a graphically from the system of logical signs created with such an effect by Frege. Cfr., Frege, G., *Conceptografía. Los fundamentos de la aritmética.* México: UNAM, 1972.

21   Time is "the number of movement according to the before and the after", Aristotle, *Física*, 219 b.

and one other quality. This figure is the measurement. A measure of weight represents a piece of weight and amount of times that the piece occurs in any given entity. A measure of length represents a piece of length and the amount of times that this length occurs. A measure of economic value represents a piece of economic value and the amount of times that this piece of economic value occurs.

In turn, and on the other hand, it results that numbers are all different amongst themselves and have many different qualities, and can be combined very easily in different ways amongst themselves in mental scenarios, on walls, boards or on paper.

Measurement is the homologation, the equation or the equivalence, of sets of extramental qualities, of sensations, with an image, image-idea, or idea; in other words, it is a code. The immediate of effect of measuring is that the extramental realities, that are always changing and heterogeneous, acquire the qualities of codes, of imaginary or idealised entities, which are always identical and which do not change when repeated.

All cultures count and measure. All of them make note of the number of times that the sun rises and sets, that the winter starts and ends, that a rabbit is eaten (probably the most consumed animal in the Palaeolithic), that they eat an apple, or a whole bag of mushrooms, and of course, the number of people that they are.

Measuring allows the creation of diverse interior worlds, because each unit of measure opens a new and different world, such as the world of sounds and music, of construction and architecture, and of the exchange of goods and trade. Those interior worlds, the ones in which we carry out activities that are then reproducible in the exterior reality, produce in man a tremendous sense of sovereignty over things, and perhaps even over people. Perhaps even over all of reality. The man that measures and constructs can feel superior to everything measured and constructed.

Indeed, the invention of science that took place in the Greek world, like that of technology or fine art, consists of the formation of the ideal world, more perfect and controllable than the real one, in such a way that a constant exchange of application and mutual commensuration can be produced between the ideal and real world. What happens in the real world can be 'counted' and

'measured', using the ordering of numbers and ideally constructed measures[22].

In this way, new ideal worlds were generated for the spheres in which human activity develops; that is to say, theoretic models were created. Hippocrates created a theoretic model of the organism, Tales and the other Milesians created a theoretic model of the cosmos. Pythagoras a model of the relationship between numbers, of the relationship between numbers and geometric figures, Phidias and Praxiteles' a theoretic model of beauty, Aristotle a theoretic model of *logos*. Eratosthenes created a theoretic model of the Earth's surface and meridians, and Euclid created a theoretic model of space, and so on.

Initially, perhaps they did not suspect that they were creating theoretic models. They believed that maybe they were simply observing and describing reality. Philosophy was 2,000 years late in discovering the similarities and differences between describing what one sees and creating theoretic models. Of all of these, the most beautiful, spectacular and fascinating was the theoretic model of space, which Euclid elaborated and consecrated as a supreme model of science, that which they called geometry.

No other theoretic model offered man the possibility of seeing how a point generated a straight line, how a straight line generated a plane, how a plane generated volume, and how in this way the totality of the visible and conceivable phenomena of the universe and the mind arose. No other knowledge allowed man to assist at the right hand of the creator, in the creation of the cosmos from nothing (from a point, which is the spatial representation of nothing, the spatial denial of space), according to supreme wisdom.

Science and, above all, geometry, is so fascinating that it becomes addictive; it creates addiction, in a lot of cases, and for some people, more than the beauty of the feminine body and more than sex. Therefore, since a specific moment, the birth of modernity, philosophers have wanted to create an *Etica more geometrico demonstrata*, like Spinoza; a *Teodicea* to justify God and his creation scientifically, like Leibnitz; a scientific *Religion Within the Limits of Reason*, like Kant, and culminating in scientific socialism, with Marx.

In modernity, science became the only legitimising key of the popular interpretation of reality, until the twentieth century criticism of modernity and scientific reason, and science's consequent self-reflection, began to lay down

22   Of course, that also happens with technology and beautiful arts, with city buildings and with a woman's body.

the difference between describing what is seen and theoretical model, between reality and objectivity, and the intellectual versatility that had remained restricted since the Neolithic advanced was recovered.

5. The Birth of Science. Geometry

§ 62. The birth of geometry. The straight-line theory

To count and measure are practical activities that are carried out in all cultures, and all cultures make note of amounts, because it is not possible to operate by simply remembering them. The results of different operations must be made note of in order to then be able to relate them to each other in more complex ways. The development of diverse relationships between the counted and measured quantities, or even the calculated qualities, ends up being more or less beneficial depending on the fortune of the method of recording the amounts.

It is not the same to add up, subtract, multiply and divide, writing figures underneath others on a piece of paper, as it to combine and separate pieces of string with so many knots as days and years have passed by since a determined moment, which is how shepherds used to count in the Peruvian high plateaus[23].

The practical necessities of life provoke the development of the measuring procedures. Measures of length and surface, in order to calculate the wheat that a field can give according to the land's size, measures of volume, in order to calculate irrigation waters which need the biggest and smallest surfaces, or to calculate the amplitude of silos used to store wheat, measures of weight for the trade of food, for bearing floors and ceilings.

The birth and development of geometry is related to the development of surveying, for which, in numerous primitive cultures they used parts of the body as units of measuring distances. An inch is the length of the thumb phalange, a foot is the length of a foot, and an elbow is the length of an arm, resting upon a table, from the elbow to the end tips of the fingers.

These measures were used in Ancient Egypt, Ancient Greece and by other

---

23   Ifrah, G., *Historia universal de las cifras*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2001, p. 185.

Mediterranean peoples. For larger measures, in Greece they used the 'surveyor chain', of 60 feet = 17,760 m, and the stadion, which was 600 feet = 177,60 m. In Ancient Egypt, they used to call surveyors 'rope stretchers' because they used to measure land by tightening and straining rope of 17,76 m in length and calculating the surfaces afterwards.

A series of operations of geometrical calculus allow an area, regular or irregular, to be found. To calculate using the angle between a stair against a wall and the floor, and between it and the wall, considering the floor and the wall, can be useful for finding the side and the surface of a wall within a cuboid, on which a smaller cuboid can be placed, and then an even smaller one, until a pyramid is formed. It can be useful when calculating the surface of a wall, the volume of a cube with six sides equal to the wall in question, and to calculate the amount of earth that is needed to completely fill the bucket if one wants to construct a pyramid, or the amount of grain that fits into it, if one wants to store grain. These practices enabled the invention and discovery of the Pythagoras Theorem, and of other numerical properties. But it is not possible to derive geometry from these practices, or at least not only from them.

One scholar, who investigated the origin and foundation of arithmetic and geometry at the same time as Frege was Edmund Husserl, who continued his analysis in a rather more philosophic direction. In the third section of *§ 9* of Part II of *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1936) (first published by M. Nijhoff in 1954), Husserl sustains that geometry was born in the game of pure understanding with its own objects, numbers and figures. In 1962, in the prologue of the French translation of *The Crisis of European Sciences*, Jacques Derrida developed Husserl's thesis and hence elaborated his own theory of the difference between real and ideal order. The aforementioned prologue is frequently published as an independent work of Derrida with the title *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*[24].

In those studies, it is argued that geometry was generated in pure understanding, and that it acquired its perfection as science when in 300 BC, Euclid, in the books of *Elements*, organized that knowledge, basing it in 5 theses that have passed into history known as "Euclid's Postulates".

24   Derrida, J., *Introducción a «El origin de la geomtría»* de Husserl. Buenos Aires: Manantial, 2000.

Euclid arranges the postulates in the following way:

1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To extend a finite straight line continuously in a straight line.
3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance (radius).
4. That all right angles are equal to one another.
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the inferior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles"[25].

The more common formulation by which the postulates are known are the following:

1. Only a straight line can be drawn through two different points.
2. All rectilinear segments can be prolonged indefinitely.
3. With a given centre and radius, only a circumference can be drawn.
4. All right angles are equal.
5. For an exterior point to a straight line, a parallel can be drawn, and only one parallel.

If one attempts to derive these five postulates from the practices of the rope tensioners to see the empirical foundation of each one of them, or tries to redirect each one to its own original 'praxis' exercising a kind of deconstruction of the postulates, it turns out to be impossible.

This impossibility brings to light an ideal order with more suitable characteristics, and the lack of correspondence between this ideal order and the real order of the postulates. Put another way, what is exposed, amongst other things, is the falsity of each one of the five postulates.

We are so familiarised with the postulates that it annoys us to have to call them 'postulates' in this way, as if they were something that can merely be postulated rather than proven, and not 'axioms' – a thesis that does not need proof because it is self-evident.

Accordingly, the five theses are not only not axioms, but if they also refer

25   Euclides, *Elementos*. Madrid: Gredos, 2007, pp. 11-12.

to the practices of the rope tensioners then they appear to be false, as much in what is said about straight lines as in what is said about circumference and about angles. Just as 'two' or 'four' are not predicates that can be applied to any reality, but only to concepts, the idea that "only a straight line can be drawn through two different points" cannot be applied to any reality either.

If tensioners take a surveyor chain of 17,760m in length and tighten it, the chain curves towards the ground away from the hands of the tensor. To avoid any inconveniences of a "flexible" definition of a straight-line, which is based in the notion and reality of force, it can be given an optical definition like that of Plato: a line seen from one of its two extremes is reduced to a dot. However, that definition can only be maintained when the distance is sufficiently short, because when it is long enough to measure a meridian the optical definition is no good either. Euclid and the geographers of the third century BC already knew that the Earth's surface was round.

The same thing occurs with the second postulate as it does with the first. The second statement that "all rectilinear segments can be prolonged indefinitely" is not true. If a tensioner did that, he would fall into the sea, or leave the earth and fall into astral space. On the other hand, physicists of the third century did not only know that the earth was spherical. They also knew that the cosmos are finite. If a straight line can be extended indefinitely, it is because the cosmos are spherical, and thus the straight line is also spherical, or curved.

The other possibility is that the extension of a straight line always means exiting the cosmos in order to exit the sphere. The idea of the extension of a straight line does not have any empirical foundation, and it is possible that it resulted from an unseen transposition to the spatial order from the temporal order, which took place in the sequence of the natural numbers. Or perhaps, it is possible that the second postulate is a result of a geometrical calculation not advertised by Euclid.

These postulates reveal that the definition of a straight line is not entirely sufficient, or that in the real order a straight line is not distinguished from a curve sufficiently, or that indeed it is not produced in reference to the real order.

When a preposition or judgement says things about reality without having observed or studied it, and what it states is true in and of itself without reference to anything external, it constitutes a particular type of reasoning, which Kant called synthetic and *a priori*. Kant believed that 2+2 =4 is a synthetic

a priori judgement because it does not need to be proved empirically to know that it is correct. This was equally true for "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points".

Frege believes that 2+2=4 is not a synthetic *a priori* judgement because he does not believe that it states anything about reality, but he does think that "the straight line is the shortest distance between two points" is a synthetic *a priori* reason, because he believes that it states something that exists in reality, and that we do not need any prior experience to verify it.

Nowadays we do not think that that is a synthetic *a priori* reason either, nor do we think that it says anything about reality, about real space. The same thing occurs with the other postulates.

6. Plane theory

§ 63. Plane theory

If we go by the order of circumference, and pass from the one-dimensional field of the line to the two-dimensional field of the plane, it can be said that "with a given centre and radius one can only draw the circumference".

If once again we go to the tensioners and ask them to trace a circumference with their surveyor chain of 17,760m in length, with that radius, the resultant area and the amount of wheat that can be planted would vary a lot from one plot of land to another.

The greater the number of small valleys and hills that a piece of land has, the more wheat will be able to be planted in it, because it will have more actual land. What's more, if the surveyor chain was the length of a stadion, 177,60m, and the land was very irregular, a large quantity of wheat could still be harvested.

If they created circumferences that had the radius of a stadion in order to measure very flat surfaces, others that had the radius of a surveyor chain in order to measure undulating land, and others that had the radius of an elbow to measure very rugged lands, if those measures were applied to the corresponding plots of land, the measures would correspond with the always flat surfaces, and if they integrated the area of those circumferences, the biggest and the smallest, one would have to do a more realistic calculation, a more

true one, of the land dimensions and the wheat that can be planted in it. This type of calculation was named integral calculation by its discoverers, one of whom, Leibnitz, also dedicated a lot of time to thinking about the difference between reality and the measures that we use to do calculations of it.

The fourth postulate says that "all right angles are equal". Euclid knew, as did all the geometers of the third century BC, about angles constructed by means of the intersection of curves or of curves and straight lines. The influence of the fourth postulate upon the practices of the surveyor could have been that they took rectangles and squares that they had actually measured and used them to calculate the amplitude of a piece of land and the amount of cultivated soil it would hold and the harvest it would yield. They projected its angles using the equivalent angles of the square, translating them or multiplying the figures by the relevant number, and were able to provide exact calculations because these angles did not change.

But the same thing occurs with angles as it does with the circumference. If the land is very uneven and has small hemispherical hills, in the "north pole" of the hill, a right angle can be drawn formed by the intersection of two 'meridians', and at the base of the hill, those two meridians would cut through the 'equator' of the hill, at the time forming an angle of 90°. It would be a triangle; the sum of whose angles would be 90x3 = 270°.

If the land were level, one could make projections of figures, movements etc., and do the calculations safe in the knowledge that the calculations would be reliable and true. However, what if it is not level? If it is not level but is close to being level, then the calculations will give slightly different results, and if it is very uneven, the calculations will give results that are very far from the actual measurement. If one wants to achieve exactitude with the calculations, they would have to sharpen up the measurement process, by measuring better, by inventing new ways of measuring.

Newton's classical physics gave way to relativistic and quantum physics when in-exactitudes in the calculations were discovered and attempts were made to correct them. The relativistic model of physics of the twentieth century was in danger of collapsing at the beginning of the twenty-first century because some certain particles were nanoseconds faster than light.

Roberto Saumells said in his cosmology classes at Madrid University in 1963 and 1964 that the progress of science always consists of learning to measure a little better. To measure a little better frequently involves perceiving the

similarity and difference between ways of measuring and measured realities, and this improvement in measuring is intrinsically related to the scientific discoveries of the twentieth century.

7. Parallel to a Straight Line through an Exterior Point

§ 64. Parallel to a straight line through an exterior point

The history of mathematics links the birth of non-Euclidean geometry to the modification of Euclid's fifth postulate, which in its more general form, states that "from an exterior point to a straight line, one can draw a parallel, and only one".

There is a practice that has analogy of mentioned imaginary surveyors. They are the measurements of planet Earth, which began in France from 1789 and culminated with the adoption of the metre as a unit a measure by the French Academy in 1891. These measurements are related to the understanding of curved spaces and the peculiarities of the measurement carried out on them.

One mathematician that dedicated himself to studying those curved spaces was Carl Friedrich Gauss. Based on his work, the shortest line between two points in a curved space became known as the "geodesic." His colleagues Lobachevski and Riemann, who are considered, along with him, the creators of non-Euclidean geometry, developed studies on curved spaces.

The fifth postulate seemed different from the others because at first sight it was not as clear as the others. There were already entire libraries dedicated to ways of proving it by Gauss' time, but none of them were adequate.

To a beginner the fifth postulate can seem like a way of defining space as absolutely level. If alternatively it was considered to be a concave space, like the surface of the earth, then it would be impossible to draw a parallel meridian through an exterior point to the first meridian, because meridians bisect each other in the Poles.

However, if we were to look more carefully at the previous postulates, it is found that space is already defined as level in the third one. Taking a straight-line segment as a radius, one can draw one and only one circumference if the space is level, because if, as already indicated, space has holes, a circumference

could not be formed. It could be, for example, a hyperbolic paraboloid, the shape in the form of a saddle, which Einstein said was the shape of the universe.

If space always randomly had holes, a lot of irregular hyperbolic paraboloids would come out with the same radius. In this way, to maintain that one can draw one and only one circumference is the same as saying that space is absolutely flat.

However if we still look at the second postulate, it works out that a straight line can always be extended further, if and only if the space is level, which means that the second postulate define the properties of a straight line as equal to the properties of space.

The first and second postulates define one-dimensional level space, the third and fourth postulates two-dimensional level space, and the fifth postulate… it probably defines space in the same terms as the other two pairs of postulates. This is the question that, although already studied by Euclid himself, started to be developed systematically and to generate new geometries beginning in the nineteenth century.

Until then, it had been thought that geometry was the discovery of ideal space, of the ideal world in general, and that the ideal world represented true reality. Consequently, on the façade of his academy Plato had inscribed the motto, "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here" and thus in the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*, where the myth of the cavern is recounted, he highlights that arithmetic and geometry are propaedeutic for dialect and philosophy, for the understanding of the truth of things.

From Plato's point of view, the empirical world was the obvious one, and it remained this way up until Gauss. Mathematics states the truth; it is the language in which the book of the universe is written. If errors are registered during the application of some of the laws of mathematics of nature, like that of Boyle-Mariotte's perfect gases, that of Newton's gravity, or of the distribution of errors of Gauss, it is because reality has gone wrong.

If the law of Boyle-Mariotte is not realized, it is because the gas temperature is not as it should be. If calculations are done well, then when in some cases reality does not agree with them, it can be concluded that the difference of opinion must not be due to an error in the calculation or the mathematic model, but instead to 'empirical impurity', and that those empirical impurities can be attributed, also by means of calculation, to realities that are first postulated, like the planet Pluto or the Higgs boson, and then 'verified' or

'experienced' in some way.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Kant continued investigating the relationship between the theoretical and the empirical. He believed that the conditions that made knowledge possible were the same ones that made reality possible, and therefore we can do geometrical and arithmetic calculations in our minds that 'function' when applied to reality. For this reason, he believed that a lot of arithmetic and geometrical formulas are synthetic *a priori* reasons, as had been said before.

But Plato's conviction about theory as the true nature of reality was maintained by mathematicians of the twenty-first century, even though neither the mathematicians nor the philosophers know in what exactly this certainty is based[26].

For scientists and philosophers, what seemed clear at the beginning of the twenty-first century was that reality was one thing and objectivity another, that the relationship between objectivity and reality, which in a certain sense can be called 'true', is so problematic, as are all the measures. Science and philosophy, more than offering us reality as it naturally is in itself, offer it by means of culture, through theoretical models of organisms, space, time, cosmos, language, or of reality in general.

This conclusion does not raise the issue of agnosticism in terms of reality. The question "But how is space real in its own right, as Euclid, Gauss, and Riemann say it is?" has the same answer as the question "But how is the body of a woman real in its own right, as Phidias, Praxiteles and Velázquez say it is?".

The subjective situation of finding oneself opposed to these questions is known as doubt. Doubt is the absence of certainty in terms of the surrounding environment, to the extramental realm. When doubts are plentiful and affect a wide portion of the cognitive and volitional horizon, the doubtful being frequently falls back on itself and questions itself.

As Plato explained very well, the conception of the world, science, general knowledge, is something that occurs 'in the soul', but not just in any old way, but in the soul that has been made familiar with true reality. This is the soul that has received a suitable education. In a way, education is an art that

26   At least those who I have encountered. That is to say, the mathematicians with whom I have spoken about some of these problems believe that mathematics is one because nature is one.

looks not only at the visible and true world (science), but also at the soul, and the proportionality between the world and the soul.

However, this happened to the Palaeolithic *sapiens*, to the Neolithic man, and to the Greco-Roman person. In effect, since the appearance of the taboo of cannibalism, the *sapiens* have understood that there has to be proportionality between the gift of sacred power and what men assign to it, between the power that man receives and the respect with which they use it.

Equally, since the discovery of eternity and the aspiration to eternal immortality in the Neolithic, it has been understood that there must be proportionality and correspondence between divine life and the immortality to which man aspires. And in the same way, since the discovery of religions of interiority, and of interiority itself, it is understood that there must be proportionality and similarity between divine virtues and those of humans that come from the benevolence of the Gods[27].

8. Neolithic Self-awareness. Personality and person

§ 65. Neolithic self-awareness. Personality and person

It has been said before (*§ 59*) that Neolithic self-consciousness formed because the Neolithic socio-cultural order was constructed amid the differentiation of the cultural spheres and the newfound familiarity with the unchanging nature of things, with eternity, beauty, measurement and number, as qualities of things (above all of stones, rock constructions, and inscriptions in stone). It has been said that it then acquired consciousness of itself as unique and unrepeatable, of the expiration of life, and of its aspiration to life itself as unique and unrepeatable beyond the limits of time.

Although numerous changes were registered within these parameters, they themselves did not change, and constituted the Neolithic period of science and self-consciousness, just as the collection of rituals, performative knowledge and multiplicity of qualitative time constituted the parameters of Palaeolithic science and self-consciousness.

It is possible that the first form of differentiation between the social role

---

27   Aristotle, *Ética a Nicómaco*, book VIII.

and 'personal' individuality was the taboo of cannibalism. Possibly, the taboo of cannibalism belongs in its own right to the differentiation between life and the possessor of life, and the comprehension that life is something that 'one has', as already has been indicated (*§ 34*).

It is very possible that the formation process of personal pronouns and three 'persons' of verbs (first, second and third, in singular and plural) corresponded to the process described by Mauss of the formation of the notion of 'person' and of 'I'[28].

The more time man spent with his memories, and the more his life depended upon his memory, the more he lived in his interiority, and the more his interiority was projected towards the exterior, constructing his villages and cities as a copy of his science and consciousness. He stopped living in the open, immediately within nature, and lived in culture, in exteriorised human interiority, in humanised nature.

Following the appearance of architecture, each time man entered a crisis in terms of the environment in which he lived, he no longer also entered a crisis about nature, nor questioned nature. Instead he entered a crisis about himself, and questioned himself. A crisis about his position in the world, which is to say, in culture.

Consciousness of death and immortality, of the afterlife, accentuates consciousness of the difference between oneself and the historic and social activity that one carries out.

A sequence of experiences, categorization of these experiences and of ways of life, provokes a self-consciousness basically given by the model of duality between actor and personality, or between person and personality. But that duality does not simply consist of a theatrical or aesthetic metaphor, nor of a difference between appearance and reality. It is a difference founded ontologically, between reality given in empirical time and reality given in a different way, as is the case of the intellect, which in turn confers its type of reality to some of its products, like numbers and measures. Its superior efficiency compared to that given in empirical time is made clear.

The duality between actor and personality in the Neolithic period was ontologically founded in two types of reality. This duality could perhaps have

28   Cfr. Mauss, M., «Sobre una categoría del espíritu humano: la noción de persona y la de 'yo'», en *Sociología y Antropología*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1979.

also served for the Palaeolithic period science and self-consciousness, but it is possible that they did not operate with two types of reality but rather with more, and these could also be ontologically founded.

In this Neolithic period of science and self-consciousness, enabled by the duality between actor (itself, substance, subject) and personalities (social functions, intersubjective recognition, history), the consecration of social recognition and history, which better belongs to the order of reality given in empirical time, weakens the consciousness of death and of life after death, and the Neolithic self-consciousness oscillates between taking one type of reality and another as their fundamental reference point.

There is a well-established ambiguity surrounding Neolithic self-consciousness in the history of philosophy. A few years after Ovid wrote his *Metamorphosis*, Epictetus wrote his *Enchiridion*, and a bit later Marcus Aurelius wrote his *Meditations*. In both works the two Stoic philosophers theoretically developed the metaphor of the great theatre of the world and human substantiality begins to be conceived of and described as interiority.

A few centuries after this work, Greek theologians elaborated the notion of a person[29] and in the fifth century AC, Augustine of Hippo broke down the immensities of that newly discovered world of interiority. Plato's soul, Aristotle's self, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius' actor and Augustine's interiority were aligned in service to the notion of person that the theologians constructed, and were used throughout medieval Christendom and modernity.

It was modernity that picked up all these theoretic materials once again, all of that Neolithic science, in order to define the infinite dignity of man, to create a base for human rights, and to construct new models of the cosmos and universe[30].

The ambiguity between these two types of reality, despite being ontologically founded, did not prevent the definition and subsequent consecration of one of them by mankind.

When 'eternal reality' is consecrated and made absolute, forgetting the other, contempt prevails for the world of Manichaeism, the gnosis, Neo-Plato-

---

29   About the theoretical developments since Sócrates to Augustín de Hipona in relation with the notion of person, cfr., Choza, J., *Antropología filósofica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Madrid. Biblioteca Nueva: 2002, cap. 4.

30   These thesis are developed in *Philosophic Anthropology. The representations of the self.*, cit., caps. 9 and 10 in *Historia cultural del humanismo*, cit. Caps. 2 and 6.

nisms and religious fundamentalism. When 'temporal reality' is consecrated and made absolute, forgetting the other, contempt prevails for the eternal, the forms of which Heidegger calls 'falling' or 'inauthenticity', and which Augustine had called forms of 'temptation' (the 'concupiscence of the flesh', the 'concupiscence of the eyes' and the 'pride of life').

The fall into inauthenticity, Heidegger points out, is all the more frequent when one pays attention to that which they fall into, in order to achieve self-realisation. In effect, the taste for 'having' everything that provides pleasure, enjoyment and luxury, which is what Augustine called 'concupiscence of the flesh', is not easily distinguishable from the attainment of convenient commodities. The pleasure of the 'power' to get resources which enable control, like information, influence and authority, which is what Augustine called 'concupiscence of eyes', is not easily distinguishable from attaining the necessary things for life in the natural and social environment. And the pleasure of reaching recognition, which corresponds to the triumph of a full life, of 'valuing' oneself, which is what Augustine calls 'pride of life', is not easily distinguishable from appreciation for having understood one's own self.

In effect, Heidegger insists, it is easy to lose the equilibrium in which Kant places the three passions of 'having, power and valuing' and be carried away by them, often one forgets to be oneself, which is finite and mortal.

Rousseau brought to attention addiction to social recognition and the three Augustinian concupiscence, one of the most energetic proponents of this in modernity.

> «"Always asking others what we are, and never daring to ask ourselves, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity and civilisation, and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness."[31].»

31   Rousseau, J.J.: *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, London, J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923, p.237.The commentaries, from Heidegger to Augustine and the first formulations about the 'fall' and the authenticity are in the reading *Agustin y el neoplatonismo*, given in the university og Friburgo in the summer semester of 1921. This relation between Augustine, Rousseau, Kant and Heidegger, speaking of authenticity, is previously exposed in Choza, J., *Historía cultural del humanismo*. Sevilla: Thémata, 2009.

Nonetheless, the specific pathologies of the Neolithic man, and derivatives of the presence and permanent activity in the order of objective representation, are not only those pointed out by Rousseau and Heidegger.

9. Pathologies of the Theoretical World. Narcissism, Fanaticism, Celibacy

§ 66. Pathologies of the theoretical world. Narcissism, fanaticism and celibacy

The pathologies of the theoretical world are more than just those highlighted by Rousseau and Heidegger, and although neither of them are going to be explained in great depth here, at least three types of pathologies that affect life on a social and personal level will be mentioned. This relates to the absolutisation of the theoretical world in opposition to the empirical world and at the margin of the real world, which gave way to different forms of narcissism; the absolutisation of one part of the theoretical world in opposition to the other parts, which gave way to fanaticism, which is the absolutisation of the construction of the theoretical world, in opposition to the more specific ways of constructing the empirical world, which are extreme forms of contempt for food and sex.

There are three forms of rejecting real time. By affirming the entity of reason against the real entity, achieved in narcissism and fanaticism, and by affirming the priority of impotent objectivity against the power of real life, as found in celibacy. The three forms are connected to each other and each one involves the other two, in the affirmation of the absolute supremacy of theoretical attitude of consciousness.

When Husserl and Derrida, speaking of the origin of geometry (§ 62), pointed out the insurmountable difference between the real and the theoretical order, although they were conscious of the repercussions that the introduction of said order could and does have in existential order, they did not perceive, as would be logical, its significance in this order and in the sociocultural one too.

But previously, when the discovery of eternity was spoken of, the myth of Narcissus was mentioned (§ 59), as well as the passion for existence in the theoretical order in order to triumph over the brevity of time. In other words, a passion for fame, and thus the figure of Herostratus was also alluded to.

The desire for fame and recognition is not merely a passion for existence, as clearly shown in the evident case of Herostratus. As Freud pointed out, it is also a subjection to the tyranny of the super-ego, and as Sartre later pointed out, a paralysation of real life in the face of the imperative of static objectivity[32].

The reference to the theoretical can signify access to more elevated forms of self-realisation. However, excessive subjection to it can lead to the sacrificing of real life, of our own very real potential, to ideals that are less valuable than our own empirical reality. Everybody know people who are bitter about not having reached their goals and who are therefore incapable of enjoying the goals reached by others, and that is so much in power, richness in knowing what is beauty and grace. The number of women who suffer because their figure does not match the ideal Claudia Schiffer is no less than that of men who have not reached the level of recognition or wealth that they aspired to or that corresponds to the idea that they have of themselves. In no small number of cases, a dictatorship is produced, of aestheticism and status symbols, that becomes an existence based in martyrdom or, quite literally, a disease that requires psychiatric treatment.

There were times when the desire for identification with the ideal adopted the form of Messianism, and thus the self-sacrifice or destruction of groups and institutions could be perceived as the procedure to realization, not yet of one's individual good, but of the common good or even universal good. Likewise, cases of religious and political fanaticism arise, from which come expressions like 'the wrong cannot have the same rights as the right', or the desire to kill or to die for a nation. Three thousand years of Western history are sufficient testimony of the number times that Westerners have killed in the name of ideals.

Finally, when the specifically religious aspect was addressed (§ 44), and things such as sex and food were highlighted, it was also shown that both affirmations and negations had been produced, exacerbated by extreme forms of religiosity. In reference to sex Western culture had, since the appearance of the virginal goddesses in the Mediterranean Pantheons until the abolition of academic celibacy in English universities in the nineteenth century, continually produced surprising displays of celibacy, even if it is something that may not

32   Sartre, J.P., *El ser y la nada.* Madrid: Alianza, 1984, Tercera parte, cap I-Iv, «La Mirada».

be shocking in itself[33].

When Plato said that one must exercise intelligence and apply it 'to the great easiness with which the soul itself can go back to the generation of truth and essence'[34], he means to say that the soul and intellect must be educated so they can be exercised upon arithmetic, geometry and dialectics. Even if he himself did not think to impose the discipline of celibacy, some Platonic schools did do; specifically, some Gnostics and Cathars (*kátharoi*, the pure ones) during Antiquity and medieval times, as well as some of the modern sects.

It is possible that the Post-Neolithic does not oblige mankind to maintain such difficult balances, and that it instead forces them to face different kinds of pathologies.

---

33   In some western catholic cultural mediums they do not end up 'surprising' ways of celibacy accepted by the catholic church, but in other mediums, so many catholic are not like catholic, those ways are the ones that end up 'surprising' ones.

34   Platón, *República*, VIII, 8, 525 c.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM NEOLITHIC CULTURE TO POST-NEOLITHIC CULTURE

«[the breakdown of common sense] … "What for anthropology, that most foxlike of disciplines, would be but the most recent in a long series of shifts in attention, could be, for philosophy, that most hedgehoggish, a plenary jolt".»

GEERTZ, C. *Local Knowledge*. Basic Books, 1983, p.93.

1. The Cultural Unit of the Palaeolithic. The Infinity of Reason[1]

§ 67. *Imagination and intellect, symbols and signs*

Throughout the Palaeolithic period, the mandalas show the way in which intellect can understand the cosmos and express itself, and throughout the Neolithic period, the scriptures and numbers equally show another way in which intellect can understand the cosmos and express itself.

Although there are characteristics of nature and intellect which appear equally in both modes of expression, the differences between these modes broaden their knowledge. And it is possible that the comprehension and expression of the cosmos in the Post-Neolithic period broadens this knowledge furthermore.

The Palaeolithic *sapiens* believed that the cosmos possessed the power of life, the divine power, and often based reality on divinity. The Neolithic people believed that the cosmos was written in a mathematical language, and often based reality on objectivity.

Both fusions/confusions have their foundation and have served for a better understanding of the relation between divinity, objectivity and reality.

The Palaeolithic *sapiens* created human languages based on symbols by means of gestures and movements, graphic markings, instruments and voices; as if to say that they created rituals by imitating other animals, from organic impulses and by means of trial and error, as explained earlier (*§ 6*). These rituals, also shown, made sense of and explained the world, and adapted human life to be able to survive in that world, assigning to each man a function and defining his identity (*§ 30*).

It is possible that during the entire Palaeolithic period communication was based mainly on the symbols of the physical languages of the rituals, and barely on a spoken language based on nouns and verbs.

With those cognitive resources it is possible to construct the first mandalas, in which there are already the two elements belonging to the nature of human intellect; totality and infinitude. The mandala represents both the totality and infinitude of space and of time, and the most important divisions of space and time with the functions of such parts. The mandala can go around

---

1   Translated to English by N. Freeman.

an infinite number of times, and a man can experience, perhaps on building it and of course on spinning it round, that he is only as much a part of that cosmos as he is of any other.

The mandala also represents the cultural system; the good, the useful, the clean and ordered, the accessible and inaccessible, the holy, the heavenly and the hellish. It represents the first version of the transcendentals of being and of the first principles; in which intellect and the human being in general, are recognised as fish in the water and as birds in the air, that is to say, as in their natural habitat.

That symbolic language is not easily identified because the symbols aren't conventional, they are natural. For that reason, there are fewer differences between the symbols of the parietal art of the five continents than between the pictograms of schematic art, and less between these and the first hieroglyphics and alphabets. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the first expansion of languages around the fiftieth millennium BC or earlier, the difference between languages is less than in the second and third expansions in fifteenth and fourth millenniums BC[2]. As there are abstract signs among the oldest realist and symbolic representations, it can be considered that there are conventional elements (elements of freedom and accordance) in the oldest rituals and forms of communication.

In those rituals and forms of communication there is differentiation and relation between activities, things, events, colours, visual markings, aural markings, actors, etc. That is to say, differentiation and relation between the required elements for the existence of a true language; which perhaps could exist in some similar but more precarious form in the other *homo* species[3].

It could be thought then, that until the Mesolithic period around the fifteenth millennium BC (to which Harrod's mandala is dated (*§19*)) communication was based on a language above all performative and symbolic, and scarcely predicative, and that as of the Mesolithic period the proportion of the two types of language in human communication starts to be reversed.

2   The maps and chronologies of the expansions of languages are taken from Bernárdez, E., *¿Que son las lenguas?*, cit., chapter. 3.

3   About the languages of the other *homo* non-*sapiens*, Bernárdez, cit., chapter. 7, cfr., Arsuaga, J.L., y Martínez, I., *La especie elegida*. Temas de Hoy, 1998, and Liebermann, PH., *Uniquely Human. The evolution of speech, thought and selfless behaviour*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1991.

The fact that communication is based more and more on the conventional means that it is based more and more on freedom, on agreement and cooperation. On the other hand, as also indicated, the increase in understanding is linked, in the epic memory of the human population, to another experience of freedom, that of sin, and to the "expulsion of heaven." (*§57*).

§ 68. *Mesolithic and Neolithic languages. Stages in the formation of writing*

In the same way that babbling and crawling express the infinite phonic and kinetic possibilities (*§12*), the Palaeolithic systems of communication (the fiftieth to the fifteenth millennium BC), the Mesolithic proto-languages (the fifteenth to the fourth millennium BC) and the Neolithic languages, express the infinite possibilities for the deployment of discursive-expressive intelligence, for the human language, or equally, reason. And this wealth will remain in the languages of the surviving hunter-gatherers of the twenty-first century, until they become the dead languages of extinct cultures.

Naturally, the Palaeolithic systems of communication have more potential for linguistic creation than the Mesolithic proto-languages; these more than the Neolithic languages, and amongst these, the Indo-European language has more phonetic and syntactic potential than Latin.

It is as if to say, that the potentials of human reason strengthen as they define themselves in determined languages, just as the possibilities of freedom strengthen in the life of the defined individual as the individual lives on and makes more choices. Human reason and freedom, considered in an essential nature, do not diminish in practice, but considered in the nature of temporary existence they do, if the existence in question is finite. The individual human existence, is of course that, and so is the existence of cultures and languages. Perhaps the existence of humanity as a whole is also finite.

It is possible that a comparison of cave paintings of human beings and animals, with abstract symbols and signs corresponding to the developmental stages of language, illustrate the thesis of the increase of freedom and conventionality as an increase in the differences between the types of signs.

Linguists tend to divide the evolution of language into the following

stages[4]:

0)   Non-linguistic symbolic systems of communication, which include non-linguistic elements such as paintings, maps and mathematical signs.

All unrealistic parietal art would be introduced into this group, and the elements of Harrod's mandala which do not incorporate a linguistic make-up would be included too. Harrod's mandala[5] would be included in this section if it were to have a proto-linguistic make-up.

1)   Linguistic symbolic systems of communication, which include elements of spoken language which are associated with a text in order for their comprehension, like glyphs that represent objects, ideas and situations. In the development of these linguistic symbolic systems of communication 3 stages are identified:

1.1) Mnemonic phase: comprising of glyphs that have the function of recording something.

1.2) Pictographic phase (Pictograms): comprising of glyphs that directly represent an object and objective situations, of the following types: A) chronological, B) informative, C) communicative, D) totems, titles and names, E) religious matters, F) matters of tradition, G) historical matters, and H) biographic matters.

1.3) Ideographic phase (ideograms): comprising of glyphs that directly represent an idea or an ideational activity.

The most well-known cases of linguistic symbolic systems of communi-

---

4   Daniels, P., T. and Bright, W., eds, *The World's Writing Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_writing.

5   Harrod, J. B., *Deciphering Upper Palaeolithic (European): Part 1. The Basic Graphematics – Summary of Discovery Procedures*, Language Origins Society Annual Meeting 1998. Version 2.b, May 2004, Original Version 1987.

cation, of the three stages, are:

The collection of Jiahu symbols, engraved on a tortoise shell, dug up in China in 1999 and dated to 6,600 BC.

The Vinca symbols, engraved on medallions of clay, dug up in Romania in 1961 and dated to around 5,300 BC. Marija Gimbutas and other archaeologists considered them to be the first European scriptures.

The Dispilio tablet, a collection of symbols engraved on a kind of tablet, dug up in Greece in 1993 and dated to 5,260 BC.

The symbols of the schematic art of the southern Spain, paintings and engravings on cave walls, studied and interpreted in 1929 and in 2008, dated to the fourth millennium BC[6].

	Vinca Symbols Clay amulet, one of the Tărtăria tablets unearthed near Tărtăria, Romania, and dated to ca. 5300 BC

6 Breuil, H. and Burkitt, M.C.: *Rock Paintings of Southern Andalusia. A description of a Neolithic and Copper Age Art Group*, Oxford University Press, 1929 and Ramos Muñoz, J., «La ocupación prehistórica de la campiña litoral y banda atlántica de Cádiz», *Aproximación al estudio de las sociedades cazadoras – recolectoras, tribales – comunitarias y clasistas iniciales.* Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, 2008.

	Dispilio Tablet
	The markings on the Dispilio tablet, 5260 BC.

2) "Proto-script" or systems of transition towards script itself: comprise of glyphs that not only refer to objects or ideas, but which also represent their names. They also comprise of phonetic systems: glyphs that refer to sounds or spoken symbols regardless of their meaning. In this second phase three stages are identified:

2.1) Verbal stage: glyphs (logograms) which represent a whole word;

2.2) Syllabic stage: glyphs which represent a syllable

2.3) Alphabetic stage: glyphs which represent an elemental sound

3) The written systems themselves, developed in the Middle East and Europe at the beginning of the bronze age, in the fourth millennium BC. Included in this third phase are:

3.1) Archaic cuneiform Sumerian script

3.2) Egyptian hieroglyphics. The two systems emerged between 3, 400 and 3,200 BC, and they had coherent texts dated to 2,600 BC[7].

3.3) Zapotec Mexican script, developed with complete independence from the systems of the old world, around 600 BC.

---

7   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_writing.

	Script of Zapotec Mexico Monument 3 at San Jose Mogote. The two shaded glyphs between his legs are likely his name, Earthquake 1 600 BC

	Egyptian Hieroglyphics Egyptian hieroglyphs, which have their origins as logograms. 2600 BC

Roughly speaking, it could be said that the non-linguistic systems of communication correspond to the Palaeolithic period, the "proto-languages" to the Mesolithic period and the languages themselves to the Neolithic period. If Maria Gimbutas is correct, the Vinca symbols of Romania could have been the first traces of the Proto-Indo-European language and the seed of the Indo-European languages in around 4,000 BC. Still, the discussion over her theses does not refer to whether those elements belong to the forms of communication of the Indo-Europeans of that time, but as to whether those elements already constitute a proto-language or not.

The same could be said about Harrod's mandala. If it relates to a pro-

to-language, then there is already a proto-language before the Mesolithic period begins, and if not, there isn't, but surely it relates to a system of communication which, of course, the *sapiens* had since the fiftieth millennium BC or earlier, however much of it (without the slightest doubt) was made up of predicative language.

The thesis of Husserl and Derrida about the field of objectivity and the ideal world, in relation to the origin of geometry and writing, could be partially applied to all the Palaeolithic systems of communication of the *sapiens*, but only partially, because a mandala is not a representation of the ideal world in its eternal consistency, but a mobile representation of totality.

So empirically, the Mesolithic and Neolithic languages, their make-up and their development, show the infinite wealth of reason *a posteriori*. They show the number of signs that have been used to signify things, events and abstract elements; the number of ways of fitting some events within others, some before others, at the same time as others, or after others.

The numeral system and the system of accounting could be the first way in which the *logos* of/for time are discovered or built, by means of aligned markings in space. But languages and proto-languages are the ways of organising the totality of the realistic, also through the arrangement of figures in space.

The organisation of time, of sometimes within others, and of some activities within others, can be illustrated with the "Chinese box" method, "embedded within each other, which is the basis of syntax in all languages:

[[my [cousin's [car]]]] [ran [seven [red [lights]]]]]"[8]

Chinese boxes also illustrate the spatial organisation of periods of time, given that "my cousin's car" can be part of "my cousin's car which he had bought in Barcelona", and "ran" can be part of "it ran this morning."

To place the phrase in a more Mesolithic context, it can be composed in this way: "the rain of the half-moon consumed two of God's dogs" to express that some rain from when the moon was in waxing crescent dragged into its waters two of the dogs that guard the tombs, but keeping in mind that the 'rain', the 'dogs' and perhaps the 'dragging' are all equal divinities, that is to

---

8   Bernárdez, E, *¿Qué son las lenguas?* Madrid: Alianza, 2004, Pag. 177.

say, active principles, sponsors of life or death, or of both.

[[the [rain [of [the half-moon]]]] [consumed [two [of God's [dogs]]]]]

The elements inside the boxes are, firstly, ways of metaphorizing and categorising, and secondly ways of organising concepts, or if you like, ways of reasoning.

With the progression into the Neolithic period there was the dominance of a few metaphorizing and categorising systems and the marginalisation of the remaining systems, and with the departure of the Neolithic period, that is to say, the globalisation of the twenty-first century, the dominance of an even fewer number of metaphorizing and categorising systems.

From this perspective of the gradual formation of languages, the theses of a native language (monogenism) and of a multitude of them (polygenism), makes them perfectly compatible, as suggested by Bernárdez[9].

2. The Cultural Unit of the Neolithic and its Breakdown

§ 69. Architecture, writing and accountancy

The Neolithic revolution stems from the parameters that were already pointed out by Gordon Childe in 1939, i.e. the change from a survival economy to a production economy, the passage of the nomadic/semi-nomadic life of the hunter-gatherers to the life of the urban settlements, and the birth and use of the more and more widespread scripture[10].

The Megalithic constructions and, in general, the architecture, configure and consolidate the notion of stability, as has been observed already. The first constructions were burials, that is to say, housing for ancestors or similar, fields for eternity; permanent; which stay forever; a constant reference point. Those are the characteristics spoken of by the Gods, that are written in stone

---

9   Bernárdez, E, *¿Qué son las lenguas?*, cit., pag. 205.

10   Childe, G., *La revolución neolítica*. México: FCE, 1956, and *Los orígenes de la civiliza-ción*. México: FCE, 1992. In these epigraphs the theses of the second half of Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo are brought together and are completed in some aspects of the comparison between the Neolithic *logos* and the Postneolithic *logos*.

because the words and commands of the Gods are as eternal and consistent as they and the stones are.

The stability that architecture provided was now the feature of the dwellings of the ancestors and the Gods, of the place where the family resides, lives and works; of the true reality. For that reason, the higher form of being is being stable, having a firm foundation, built on rock and not on sand, being solid, being subsistent. Therefore, being could be spoken of in the 'literal' sense of solid things that are maintained forever, of what is seen and touched, of endurance, of substance.

For more than 50,000 years stone hadn't been discovered as being enduring, nor that this was the supreme form of being. On the contrary. Life was a flow. It came and went. It arrived and left. It flowed like rivers, rain, blood, milk and semen. Now instead life is permanent, it is refuge, defence, food, eternity.

In that situation of sedentarism, of stability, people and things are taken from place to place. They are left there and later put in another place. Some things fit in some places and not in others. Some can stay for a long time and others can't. In some places things last longer and in others less.

Chinese boxes, and the way in which things are placed inside them, in some cases imitate the way in which some things are put within others in cities, or upon animals in order to be transported, or the way in which they go together with people, or the way in which the oldest can carry the small in their hands.

It is important to take into account that this development in language takes place among human populations that are increasing from a number of 1,000 inhabitants to a number of 100,000 in a period of 8,000 years.

In reality, Jericho appeared around 9,400 BC, and had some 70 houses and around 1,000 inhabitants. It was destroyed and rebuilt without delay.

Knossos, in Crete, was founded around 7,000 BC, and in its second millennium it reached 100,000 inhabitants[11].

Byblos was founded around 5,000 BC and had more that 20 houses in an area of 12,000m².

Memphis was founded around 3,000 BC, and around 2250 BC it had

11   http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingsListsEurope/GreeceMinoans.htm and the populations of the different cities are taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.

some 6,000 inhabitants.

Troy was founded around 3,000 BC and was destroyed and rebuilt 9 times. Homeric Troy/Troy VII (between 1300 BC and 1190 BC) had an area of 200,000m² and a population of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.

Nineveh (currently Mosul, north of Iraq) was founded around 1,800 BC, and in the times of Sennacherib (VII century BC) it had more than 100,000 inhabitants, double the population of Babylon at that time.

Los Millares, in Almería, remained from 4,000 BC until the end of 2,000 BC, with a population of some 1,000 inhabitants.

While they didn't have a linguistic demographic, or one that was sufficient, they had to work with hypotheses and inaccurate data. These populations developed their own languages and started to have their first written documents between the 3rd and 2nd millenniums BC. Specifically, the first Indo-European languages with their first written documents date back to: Indo-Iranian descendant of Proto-Indo-Iranian in the 3rd millennium BC, Ancient Assyrian in the 19th century BC, Hittite in the 16th century BC, Mycenaean Greek in the 16th century BC, Proto-Celtic and Tartessian in the 8th century BC, Latin and its descendants (romance languages) in the 7th century BC.

It is estimated that the global population was 6 million in 10,000 BC, which with the development of agriculture doubled every 2,000 years and reached 252 million in the year 0. In Asia the population went from 95 million in 400 BC to 170 million in the year 0, and in Europe from 19 million to 31 million in the same period[12].

When the human population was formed of more than 5,000 people, they had to count the quantity of grain harvested each year, the time in which it took to be consumed by 5,000 people, and they had to organise time according to a single numerical system for all.

Therefore, the internal time of the 5,000 inhabitants was the same and the way of representing it, telling it and living it was the same as well. Predicative language, which was used for accumulating and transmitting information in foreign systems, was more and more necessary, more common, more familiar. In town life, and in the lives of families and of individuals. Work had to be organised like a huge web of the activities, coordinating the activities of some

12   Livi Bacci, M., *Historia mínima de la población mundial*. Barcelona: Ariel, p. 45.

with the activities of others.

Durkheim believed that syntax had something to do with this way of dividing work, of organising functions, of counting according to the series of natural numbers. The notion of substance and the substantive nouns (and all words to this effect), could be in correlation with the stability of architectural-urban development; that the categories of the reversible and changeable could be in correlation with the peculiar tool of universal change that is money; and that a linear and one-directional sense with which collective and personal time is organised could be in correlation with the linear and one-directional sense of writing.

In addition to Durkheim, a few pioneers of social and human sciences such as George Herbert Mead, Ferdinand De Saussure and Jean Piaget also believed this, yet with different approaches and to varying extent[13].

§ 70. Measurement and classification

The urban settlements which existed at the start of the Neolithic period increased the number of individuals directly, surviving by means of developments in agriculture and cattle breeding, and organised through writing and the linear and one-directional structuring of time.

For that reason, some philosophers have thought that time and space, the extent to which real things stretch, the whole universe, are not only the fields of an extramental reality, they are not only dimensions of reality that man learns of, but also the scope itself of imagination and human memory, the internal fields in which the human being stores its images and memories, which combine and organise their coexistence. That is to say, that some philosophers have thought that they are forms in which imagination and memory appear for themselves, innate categories, or as Kant believed, "previous forms of sensitivity."

Along the same lines, it could also be thought that the nine categories of Aristotle (substance, quantity, quality, relation, position, position in space,

---

13   Bernárdez, op. cit., cfr., Durkheim, E., *Las formas elementales de la vida religiosa*. Madrid: Alianza, 1993, Sausurre, F., *Curso de lingüística general*. Madrid: Alianza, 1991, cfr. Piaget, J., «Las operaciones lógicas y la vida social» in *Estudios sociológicos*. Barcelona, Ariel, 1977.

position in time, habits, actions and passions), aren't the only categories of reality, the categories of phenomena that we can perceive and that can exist, and which humans learn in the way that he believed, but also keys to human imagination and intellect, innate mechanisms/ideas, in order to link and organise mental content[14].

In a similar way, some linguists think that linguistic categories and the basic principles for the use of language, speaking, are built on the invention and evolution process of language, and others, such as Chomsky, believe that there are some innate ideas/principles of language which produce language in all human beings.

In the cultural process of language formation, there is still something more that give a human population more stability than stone, cities or temples, and this is measurement. Measurement, and numbers in general, are more stable than substance, because the most ideal entities are the most permanent, consistent and invulnerable entities that man can find. Perhaps rather, in the first few thousand years of the Neolithic period and the Bronze age, it could be thought that fixed stars were as fixed a substance as numbers were, and without a doubt Plato believed this. Numbers and measurements are firmer, more authentic and more stable that words and categories. It is not by chance that the Hebrew word for 'truth', i.e. 'emet', also means stone.

The simultaneity and interaction of all human activity in the process of generating a social system, a cultural system and a common sense, from the moment in which the parameters of the Neolithic revolution pointed out by Gordon Childe were consolidated, is the context in which a specifically adapted communication system for transmitting information is generated, i.e. predicative language.

A language suitable for transmitting information, in a relationship of communicative interaction, is not the mythical language depicted in

14   Aristóteles, *Catergorías*, (1b25-2a4): «Sustancia o cantidad o cualidad o relación o donde o cuando o posición o tener o actuar o ser afectado». "Of the things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, fivefoot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned» (Akrill).

rhapsodies, *aedos* in *epos*, epics, epic poems, romances, etc. Neither is it the language used by scribes and merchants to count grain, the amount of cultivatable earth or the capacity of silos and warehouses. It is, in fact, the language used by the magistrates and senators in the courts, (that is, rhetoric, the language adopted by Aristotle for his description/definition of man as an animal with language) in order to come to an agreement in respect to what is good and fair for the town.

It is in relation to this rhetoric language, with which Hermagoras of Temnos (in the first century BC) established seven principles/questions which have to be met in order for clear and precise information to be transmitted through communication, which are: "Quis, quid, quando, ubi, cur, quem ad modum, quibus adminiculis." These seven key questions, formed in different ways by Cicero, Quintilian and other distinguished rhetorical Roman and Medieval thinkers, in the twentieth century are established in the journalism departments of North American universities as fundamental points which have to be met and clarified in journalistic information, that is, "Who, what when, where, why, in what way, by what means"[15].

If said system of rhetoric categories was set out in a table with seven columns, in correspondence with the journalistic, philosophical, linguistic and cultural categories, a table could be obtained which helps to understand the interaction between them, since the start of the Neolithic period, in the consolidation process and the development of predicative language and writing.

15   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Ws.

Latin rhetoric	Quis persona	Quid factum	Cur causa	Ubi locus	Quando tempus	Quo-modo	Quibus auxiliis
Periodical informative system of 7 Ws	Who	What	Why	Where	When	How	With, What
Aristotelian categorical system	Substance	Actio/ passio	Relationship	Ubisitus	Quando	Qualitas	
Linguistic system	Subject	Verb/ complement		Place adverbs	Time adverbs		Complements
Cultural system	Totem, god, state, person, natural forces	Good/ bad, useful/ toxic, beatiful /ugly	Blame, merit, interest, destiny, luck	Sky, earth, hell			Tool

These systems of rhetoric, informative, philosophical, linguistic and cultural categories come together in the consolidation of a predicative language and in a social, dialogical, linguistic and rational coexistence, very typical of the dawn of Western culture. This linguistic coexistence has the potential to configure Western reason into two forms; theoretic rationality and practical rationality, which distinguish the Western culture from all others and which have very marked characteristics.

3. The 'Onto-theo-logical' Paradigm and the Theoretical Attitude of Knowledge

§ 71. Calculus and metaphors

When Augustine of Hippo accused Varro of defending a religion that believed in 4,000 Gods, Augustine was speaking of the Roman people who still held onto many of the characteristics of a Palaeolithic mentality, i.e. a paganism which links inherently with the pantheistic animism of the first few thousand years of *sapiens*.

Anthropologists that have studied African, American, Asian and Oceanian cultures are astonished, just like Varro, at the excess of Gods in all of them. They don't reach 4,000 but frequently come to a few hundred, and some cases have shown that there are nearly as many Gods as there are words[16].

It is estimated that in the learning of a foreign language, when it involves the European languages of the twentieth century, on attaining a vocabulary of 4,000 words it can be spoken in a comprehensible manner and be understood by native speakers. This coincidence allows us to think that a language of an historical period, which is already a predicative language, basically consists of some 4,000 elements which have been added to the language throughout the Neolithic period, distinguishing them from between 200-400 elements belonging to the Mesolithic period and to the Palaeolithic period, where they had a sacred nature.

Those sacred elements were integrated into the rituals of the Palaeolithic *sapiens*, which they called for in performative language, in such a way that the table of (§ 70), admitted one more row which corresponds to the elements of Harrod's mandala, but ordered according to a sequence corresponding to performative language.

Throughout the Neolithic period those performative elements were kept for the creative languages of (§ 41), which are those of the priests, kings and magistrates, whereas the languages of ordinary life, in which the number of

16   As commented by Carrasco, D., «Ciudades y símbolos. Las antiguas religiones centroamericanos», Stöhr, W., «Diversidad y totalidad. Las religiones de Indonesia», Stöhr, W., «Las religiones de Oceanía» and Peter Bolz «Bajo el signoi de la danza del sol. Visión religiosa del mundo y ritualismo de los sioux oglalas de Norteamérica», in Eliade, *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*. III-2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

people increased more and more, were developing further towards the limits of creative knowledge, more and more like powerless languages, that is to say, with a predicative language, similar to what we now call ordinary language. In ordinary language the names of Gods are secularised and lexicalised, and categorial systems are generated in correspondence with the linguistic categories just as they are configured in contemporary languages.

Edward Sapir, in 1921, illustrated how easily linguistic elements pass from one category to another[17], from verbs to substantives and vice versa, from adjectives to adverbs and vice versa, and at the end of the twentieth century Roy Rappaport also illustrated how easily a performative expression, a liturgical ritual, gave rise to a proposition of faith in terms of predicative language[18].

Ordinary language, since its beginning in the Mesolithic period, was homogenised with a common sense, which is, as Geertz said, "natural, practical, transparent, asystematic and accessible"[19]. For that reason ordinary language is full of metaphors and figures of speech, new expressions, polysemous terms and linguistic categories which continually change as observed by Sapir and Rappaport.

The language of everyday life, imprecise, polyvalent and full of rhetorical devices, isn't, however, the language which around halfway through the first millennium was consolidated in the Greek world as knowledge (*episteme*), neither as wisdom (*sophia*). Wisdom had been developed in Greece as a type of knowledge, like the supreme knowledge, and in its time, knowledge had been developed upon measurement and numbers, and upon the proportions and relations between measurements, i.e. on calculus, as said in (*§§ 58-64*). Metaphors and calculus make up the basis of the two kinds of language and the two forms of reason, namely, ordinary language and practical reason on one hand, and mathematical/formalised languages and theoretical reason on the other.

Since the beginnings of Western culture in the Greek world and based on the Greek culture, there was tension between the two types of language and the

17   Sapir, E., *Language. An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949.

18   That is to say, the way in which the rituals gave rise to the "fundamental sacred postulates." Cfr., Rappaport, R., *Ritual y religión en la formación de la humanidad*. Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001, chapter 9.

19   Geertz, C., «El sentido común como sistema cultural», in *Conocimiento local*. Barcelona: Paidos, 1994, p. 107.

two configurations of reason, which was maintained until the start of the Post Neolithic period in the twentieth century. In that moment ordinary language and practical reason acquired a 'scientific and philosophical conscience' in themselves, and formalised languages and theoretical reason also, but as we see next, this didn't make the tensions disappear.

The tensions between the two types of language and the two types of reason were produced because although predicative language was the language of the people, ordinary language was also the language of the authorities, and the predicative language of the authorities was the heir to the powerful performative languages, to the powerful religious, political and judicial languages. Formal language and theoretical reason were the language and reason of the wise, which weren't the authorities of society, nor had any immediately obvious or decisive power in everyday life. But on the other hand, mathematical language and reason had a bearing on the people who were trying to understand and pass on the true reality of things.

Effectively, from the point of view of Plato, the empirical world is that of the apparent, and this is backed up by Gauss. At the end of the eighteenth century Kant still continued believing something similar. He believed that the conditions that knowledge makes possible are the same conditions that reality makes possible, and that therefore we can make arithmetical and geometrical calculations in our mind that later applied to reality 'work'. For that reason, he believed that many arithmetical and geometrical formulas are synthetic trials *a priori*, as said earlier (*§ 64*). But Plato's conviction about the idea of the true nature of reality, as we see, was kept up by the mathematicians and philosophers of the twenty-first century.

On the grounds of philosophy, at least in one of its important theories in the history of Western culture, which originated from Aristotle and which he followed, an intermediate position between ordinary language and formalised language has been maintained, on one hand affirming the legitimacy of ordinary knowledge and the senses, and on the other the truth of the ideal world, whilst ever remaining in the dilemma of whether it could and should declare itself a science. And that problem worried Aristotle, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, all of whom tried to create a formalised language for philosophy, it worried Kant, Hegel, Dilthey and Husserl, and it seemed to have been resolved once and for all by Frege, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Gadamer in the twentieth century. From then on philosophy was aware of which type of language it was using in

each case, which type of categorial system, and what its possibilities were.

Perhaps the tension and ambivalence in Western philosophy between normal life and science was due to the ambivalence that was probably typical of Aristotle's categorial system, which was strongly rooted in the structure of human language (Western and Neolithic), and in the way in which the substance-accident concept corresponded with the subject-predicate concept[20]. The categorial system was established by inductive means, empirically, and completely based on ordinary language, in everyday life. Therefore, previous philosophers have tried to establish the categorial system by deductive, demonstrative and scientific means, well they have tried, as did Kant, a transcendental deduction of categories.

It is probable that the substance-accident outline and its logical correlate of the subject-predicative, that is to say the structure of predicative language, has in itself the ambivalence that philosophy had and still has now.

§ 72. Outline of theoretical and practical knowledge

If now put in a table; in the central column all that has been said about signs, numbers, calculations, science, theoretical reason and formalised languages, in the right-hand column what has been said about symbols, metaphors, common sense, practical reason and ordinary language, and in the left-hand column the cognitive structure of the human individual such as has been described in the West by Aristotle and Kant, the cultural expressions of those cognitive functions and the knowledge of oneself that is obtained by means of those cultural expressions; a certain outline of the socio-cultural and logical foundation of Western culture will be obtained.

By means of this outline, a collective vision is also acquired of the two configurations of reason in Western culture from the Neolithic period up until the Post Neolithic period, and of the two poles between which philosophy has oscillated; an affinity for science on the one hand, and for life and wisdom on the other[21].

---

20   Tugendhat, E., *Autoconciencia y autodeterminación*. Madrid: F.C.E., 1993.
21   Cfr., Chapter 8 of Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo, cit. The outline can be completed with the table of the structure of the subjective spirit from *Manual de Antropología filosófica*, Madrid, Rialp, 1989.

1. Empirical self A)	Modern and classical Western culture B)	Medieval and Post-Neolithic Western culture C)
2. Transcendental self. Transcendental nature.	Intellect and theoretical reason	Intellect and practical reason
3. Predicamental nature.	Understanding and categories	Understanding and topic
4. Elements and structure of intellectual activity. Imagination. Common sense.	Signs and calculations. Ideation, temporalization. Temporal thinking. Formalised languages. Subject-object outline. Epistemology. Scientific approach of knowledge. Determinant trial. Outlining (ontotheological paradigm, forgetting of being)	Symbols, analogy, difference. Figures of speech, metaphors. Spatial thinking. Ordinary language. Subject-subject outline. Hermeneutics. Natural approach of knowledge. Reflective trial. Symbolisation (Post-Neolithic paradigm, opening up to being)
5. Cultural cognitive products	Fulfilment, conception and expression of subjectivity and of being in a temporary and internal tone. Science, dialect, great accounts. Predominance of organisational pyramid structures.	Fulfilment, conception and expression of being in a spatial tone. Communication, understanding. Predominance of reticular organisational structures.
6. Forms of self-comprehension	Cognitive production on the inside. Formalisation of the outside and of the inside: sciences, biography, history.	Cognitive reference to that which cannot be formalised: God, life, being, being able, nothingness, chaos, freedom, evil.

Calculation, as already mentioned, is the combination and the establishment of relationships between measurements. Kant called this type of the functioning of reason determinant trial, and identified it as a way of homogenising, of 'measuring' heterogeneous elements, which he called 'outlining', supposing that it involves an imaginative task. Determinant trial is typical of science and involves secure and exact knowledge.

Metaphors, the creation of and use of metaphors, as in the example put forward when saying "the water of the moon consumed two of God's dogs", is not the homogenisation of two heterogeneous elements, but the organisation of two heterogeneous elements; attributing to each one the qualities of the other and keeping their heterogeneity intact. Kant called it 'symbolisation' and he called the type of intellectual operation through which it is brought about 'reflective trial.' The ancients called reflective trial and symbolisation 'analogical' thinking, and Kant pointed it out as being typical of artistic creation. It involves an immediate, polyvalent, insecure and very practical knowledge, as does common sense and ordinary language[22].

It is not difficult to notice that ordinary language is based more on symbolisation and analogy than on calculation, but neither is it difficult to notice that there is an aspect of everyday life in which calculation has more importance than anything else; the economic aspect. In order to exchange goods and services, and in order to buy and to sell, there has to be calculation. That calculation had to be exact calculation from the moment in which the universalisation of salaries and the use of money took place, which was the industrial revolution of the second half of the XVIII century.

Well, since minting began in the VI century BC, until halfway through the XVIII century, the 'scientific mentality' was gaining ground in Western everyday life in such a way that calculation was more and more necessary for that everyday life. That partly helped to emphasise the 'scientific' mentality which prevailed in Western culture from the mid-XVIII century until the mid-twentieth century. But it did not explain scientificism and, much less, its decomposition and the emergency for new ways of thinking.

The outline of the functioning of reason in Western culture lasted some

---

22   Kant, E., *Crítica del juicio*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 197, *§§ 1-29*, cfr. *§ 29*, «Nota general a la exposición de los juicios estéticos reflexionantes», cfr., *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit., chapter 8.

2,500 years. The Neolithic mind had a better understanding of it, on showing its decomposition and on comparing it with the Post Neolithic culture and mind of the twenty-first century, which links to 'the primitive soul' and opens to reason the infinite wealth of possibilities which the soul contained.

The growing dominance of the scientific use of reason was not only supported in the growing use of money and monetary calculation. It was also supported in the rationality and 'measurement' which abstract law established, in the rational organisation of Roman administration and in the administrative structure of the modern state, as Max Weber pointed out[23]. And of course, it was supported in the great development of modern science and of the industrial revolution, which changed the living conditions of what Gordon Childe had called the Neolithic revolution, eliminating the basic parameters that the Australian historian had shown.

As a result of all this, in the second half of the twentieth century the production economy vanished and was substituted for a service economy, the town disappeared and was replaced by metropolitan areas or by the organisation of regions, and alphabetic writing as a base for the accumulation and transmission of information disappeared to be replaced by measurements based on the waves and algebra of Boole[24]. The last meant that the totality of that given in empirical nature and in conceptual nature could be accumulated and transmitted instantly (at the speed of light) through a coding and decoding in codes of 0 and 1, i.e. it could be digitalised and converted into information.

The dominance of the scientific use of reason, with the Kantian search for a philosophical categorial system as clear as the numeral system and the search for a complete formalised language which was achieved after Frege, is what Heidegger characterised as ontheological paradigm, and what Nietzsche earlier criticised as essentialist and Apollonian Platonism and Christianity.

The criticism of this dominance of scientific reason, the perception of the limits of the scientific use of reason, is what was developed in the twentieth century as criticism of the Enlightenment, criticism of the modern age, or criticism of scientific rationality, and is what Heidegger did from 1927 calling it "phenomenological destruction of the fundamental

23   Weber, M., *Economía y sociedad*. Madrid: F.C.E., 2002, Second part, chapter X, «Sociología de la dominación».
24   This matter is exposed in *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit., chapter 7.

concepts of classic ontology"[25].

4. Rehabilitation of Practical Reasoning and of Common Sense

§ 73. *Phenomenology and the legitimisation of common sense*

Western culture, since its Greco-Roman beginnings is a humanist culture, in the sense that its people and political organisations have set out to achieve the peak of what is human, the fulfilment of man, by means of education and knowledge[26]. It involves a culture which has pinned its highest values on education, i.e. in learning. First in Greco-Roman learning with the Greek ideal of *paideia* and the Roman ideal of *humanitas*, and later in European learning with the modern ideals of emancipation, science, morals and universal laws. Those ideals were highly related to the scientific use of reason in the way in which law, morals and politics had had to be rationally established, i.e. scientifically and philosophically founded and tested. The task of being human remained committed to the task of making science.

The twentieth century started with a series of discoveries and reactions, for which it realised that the 2,050-year study of reason, as a fundamental attribute of man, had incurred the fault of particularity, believing that it stated what was universal. It realised that the reason and the knowledge that had been studied was 'scientific' knowledge and reason, that which scientists put into play, and of which there was not natural human knowledge. That was the great discovery of Husserl and the beginnings of phenomenology.

As is obvious, this type of discovery is not the isolated occurrence of a genius, even if it does involve a knowledge that is as broad as philosophy itself. It has as its conditions of possibility all of the history of philosophy and science, all the political changes and legalities of that period, all of the previous, simultaneous and further economic and technical changes, and all of the contemporary parallel artistic changes. That is to say, the great historical changes (and also the small ones), are simultaneously changes in the fields of infrastructure, structure and superstructure, or, speaking in Aristotelian terminology, in the field of technology and economy, in that of law and politics, and in that of art and science.

---

25   Heidegger, M., *El ser y el tiempo*. Mexico: F.C.E., 1974, § 6.
26   Cfr., *Historia cultural del humanismo*, cit., chapter 2.

Also, it has something to do with the universalisation of ordinary language and its arrival at the centre of creative knowledge by means of the universalisation of democracy, well accounted for by the works of G.H Mead and American pragmatists[27].

Husserl's discovery and the birth of phenomenology, initiated the task of analysing and legitimising ordinary knowledge. Husserl believed that this task had to be done scientifically, and that phenomenology allowed philosophy to be moulded into a strict and rigorous science. But for various reasons this did not come to fruition.

This task was brought about, and in absolute independence of one another, by Wittgenstein and Heidegger, and they did it completely without science. Everyday life, common awareness and ordinary language, have and use their own non-scientific 'categories'. These are categories which have to be discovered and with which natural human knowledge and spontaneous human language have to be discovered and legitimised.

The stance of Wittgenstein and Heidegger was interpreted as a nihilistic criticism of all previous philosophy, more like legitimisation that something natural hadn't been studied. Partly because the scholasticism called 'post-modernism', which like all scholasticism operated along already opened paths of which they obtained only some corollaries but in which they did not give way to new perspectives, put all of its efforts into the simple destruction of classic concepts.

Little by little it was noticed that the performance of the scientific use of reason had been very high, and absolutely un-renounceable, and the approaches of the Neo-enlightenment tradition rose. In any case, the impact of phenomenology wasn't reversed, and it imposed the certainty that, contrary to what had been believed in the modern age, science was not the only form of knowledge and, of course, was not the only path to wisdom[28].

Kurt Gödel, one of those who continued the work of Frege, established his theorems of incompleteness in 1931, about the impossibility of a self-sufficient, reliable construction in terms of consistency and completeness, with which closing the possibility of a complete and dependable foundation of logic

27   Mead, G.H., *Espíritu, persona y sociedad*. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1972 and Sánchez de la Yncera, I., *La mirada reflexiva de G.H. Mead: sobre la socialidad y la comunicación*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1995.
28   Husserl, E., *La crisis de las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental. Una introducción a la filosofía fenomenológica*. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1991.

and mathematics[29]. For his part, Husserl, who like Frege had worked on the foundation of arithmetic towards the end of nineteenth century, arrived at the conclusion that ordinary language is the basis of the foundation and verification of formalised languages, and so did Wittgenstein[30].

But ordinary languages are ultimately based on metaphors, as Nietzsche said at the end of the nineteenth century[31], and as was reinforced to a greater extent by Derrida at the end of the twentieth century[32]. At the same time that ordinary languages and metaphors were established in the everyday life of particular individuals, the objective language of science subsided, ultimately, in the point of view of the particular individuals, and is in turn a particular language.

The philosophy of particular points of view, of a singular point of view, is the philosophy of understanding, which Gadamer developed from Dilthey and Heidegger as hermeneutics. Understanding isn't a necessary, universal and demonstrable knowledge, like that of science, but a contingent, singular and indemonstrable knowledge, that on top of the characteristics of what is warranted and guarantee able has the characteristics of what is free, those of grace.

In this perspective, philosophy is not only a science, but results from a fairly different knowledge. For that reason, it does not only have mathematics, logic and, in general, science as a subject, but also ordinary language, and doesn't need to become a science in order to describe and legitimise itself. It needs to go to the foundations of ordinary language, of metaphors, of art.

Analogically, anthropology doesn't need to become a science in order to examine the foundations of cultures. It needs to go into the foundations of the processes of symbolisation and symbols, which is the path that was opened by the work of Clifford Geertz.

The abundant studies about ordinary language, about predicative language, developed throughout the twentieth century, show that predicative language isn't any more favourable to the subject-object outline than to the subject-subject outline. That language is not primarily knowledge and reflection, and secondly communication, nor the contrary. That the awareness of what is said is as native

29   Díaz Estévez, E., *El teorema de Gödel*. Pamplona: EUNSA, 1975.
30   Cfr. Arregui, J. V., *La pluralidad de la razón*. Madrid: Síntesis, 2004, chapter 2, «Pragmatismo y antifundacionalismo», pp. 39-65.
31   Nietzsche, F., *Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral*. Valencia: Diálogo, 2002.
32   Derrida, J., «La mitología blanca. La metáfora en el texto filosófico», in *Márgenes de la filosofía*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1989.

as speaking, and the other way around. That the moment of reference (monologue with the object) is no more native than the moment of feeling (dialogue with another subject)[33].

§ 74. *Forgetting about being and life*

In his dialogue *Time*, Plato made a comparison between the form of knowledge founded on evidence which bore truth, and the form of knowledge based on the persuasiveness of deception[34]. Knowledge based on evidence is illustrative, typical of geometry, in which intellect depends solely on itself in its relationship with an idea and turns the idea around until discovering all of the truth (or falsity) that it contains. The cognisant subject is alone with the known object and there is no other interference. The process and the act of knowledge is executed in all of its purity.

Knowledge based on persuasiveness is typical of agreements, by which means men reach cooperation for the nature of what is good and right for the city, as Aristotle said some years later. In dialogue and conversation, attention to the achieved objective can distract attention from the truth of what is said. The multiple aspects of life interfere in the process and the act of knowledge, which now is not executed in all of its purity.

The more knowledge is fulfilled in all of its purity the more it moves away from what is a vital action, and the more it is integrated into the roots of life the greater the clarity of knowledge is lost. Knowledge according to the subject-object outline registers certain polarity with knowledge according to the subject-subject outline.

It finishes by saying that language and awareness are no more certain in one sense than in another, that the aspects of knowledge and communication, of truth and of sense, are equally essential.

But when polarisation is excessive in the sense of knowledge the human being stops resisting. All of Romanticism is a protest against the exclusion of life from modern and ancient philosophy. This protest has a decisive point in Nietzs-

33   Bernárdez, E., *¿Qué son las lenguas?*, cit. Chapter 9.
34   Platón, *Timeo* 48 a – 51 e., cfr. *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit., chapter III, 2.

che's criticism of Socrates and Euripides.

"Its artistic character, almost non-Greek, can be summarised with all of the conciseness of Socrates' concept. 'Everything has to be conscious to be beautiful,' is Euripides' thesis which is parallel to that of Socrates 'Everything has to be conscious to be good.'[35]"

The double aspect of the Western configuration of reason has been recorded and examined since ancient times and other thinkers have expressed it as opposition between awareness and life, between science and virtue. This was also done by Seneca, Cicero and Tacitus, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau, on taking power, life or a state of nature as opposed to a civil state, or to culture, as a key topic of their thinking. Nietzsche stressed this opposition between mathematics and music even more, between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, between science and art, and also, he made it appeal to Greek tragedy as reminiscent of ancestral rituals and dances, as a plea to the Neolithic period.

This plea, in the analyses of Heidegger, becomes an appeal to the pre-conceptual phases of human history as phenomenological destruction of concepts, and an appeal to the pre-linguistic phases of human communication, that is to say, an appeal for chaos and for *phanum* (*§§ 21-23*), an appeal to the phase in which intellect appears for itself for the first time and is found in the process of building the first mandala (*§§ 19-20*).

Language is firstly art, metaphors, and then measurement, homogenisation. Then concept, formalisation and ideation, just as Kant and Hegel indicated, and sometimes temporalisation, the construction of an ideal, objective and intemporal nature[36].

But for that reason precisely, predicative language, in the case that it makes conceptual language, loses access to the aspects of reality and subjectivity that are irreducible in formalisation. It loses reference to extramental time, to its own time outside of and within its awareness, it loses reference to life. In general it loses reference to that which cannot be formalised and, therefore, it loses reference to what is sacred, to being, freedom, chaos, nothingness and evil.

Heidegger called the loss of these references the forgetting of being, and in order to overcome it he appealed to poetry and proposed "becoming accustomed

---

35   Nietzsche, F., *El nacimiento de la tragedía*. Madrid: Alianza, 1981, p. 220.
36   cfr. *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*, cit., chapter VIII, 4.

to living in the nameless"[37], that is to say that he proposed holding one's gaze on that which cannot be formalised, that which has been excluded by the official forms of being, by science and scientific philosophy and has taken refuge in art and literature, as was said by Nietzsche and Dilthey. It shows the insufficiency of a thinking that has taken the principle of noncontradiction too dogmatically and strictly as the first and most transcendental of the first principles and establishes difference like the first and most transcendental of the first principles.

As has been said, he was therefore considered an iconoclastic nihilist, until his allegation was understood that his criticism of humanism did not signify anti-humanism, nor his criticism of irrational logic, nor his criticism of immoral ethic, nor his criticism of atheist God[38].

They meant the deconstruction of humanism, of logic, of ethics and of established theism, deconstruction which did not try to wipe out or eliminate their validity, but to propose others which are not contrary but different, and which have come to be called alternatives in media language and ordinary language. Effectively, that which is not 'something', something which can be formalised, is not therefore 'nothing', because it could be something which cannot be formalised, such as life, chaos, power, etc. (*§ 72. Columna* C *fila* 5). The ideas which open the field of that which cannot be formalised do not designate in any way 'something', but the limits of formalised understanding, and even of ordinary language, the authorities and powers which make something formalizable or not, comprehensible or not, susceptible or not to scientific handling, to reproduction into terms of the theoretical model, and expressible in terms of ordinary language or not.

His arrogance and his oracular style hindered Heidegger in appealing to the Palaeolithic rituals, to anthropology and to Frazer's work, something which Wittgenstein had done in search of the many linguistic possibilities and rationales of the primitive soul. In any case, Wittgenstein also came to be an iconoclastic nihilist.

In reality, he did not refer to nihilism nor to the destruction of the most basic principles of Western culture. He referred to the fact that the theoretical use of reason, which had served to build science and establish the dignity of man and

37   Heidegger, M., *Carta sobre el humanismo*. Madrid: Alianza, 2000.
38   Choza, J., «Lectura de la 'Carta sobre el humanismo'», in *Thémata*. Sevilla: nº 32, 2004.

human rights, generally had its limitations, and in particular in relation to that which cannot be formalised. Scientific language, much more so than ordinary language, has especially and precisely limited itself with God, being, power, freedom, nothingness, chaos and evil, matters to which, on the other hand, men have access, and with which relates to the nature of their everyday life, from their personal individuality which cannot be formalised.

This legitimisation of the point of view of the singular individual, in reference to the most important matters of life, and in terms of everyday living and ordinary language, is what remains being examined and legitimised by philosophy of the twentieth century, which stops being hermeneutic, and by anthropology of the twentieth century, which brings forms of Palaeolithic life into the present, and with them the fascination that they exert, the power, life, nothingness, chaos, etc in the primitive soul and in the souls of the men of the twenty-first century.

5. The Unit of Nature and Intellect. The True Reality

§ 75. The unit of nature and intellect. The true reality

Naturally, the emergency of hermeneutics and the legitimisation of ordinary knowledge does not mean in itself an overturning of theoretical reason and science, but a more suitable awareness of its scope. And a more suitable awareness of its scope does not mean less appreciation for science nor for ordinary knowledge, but more. A knowledge that is better informed of the confusion between objectivity and reality into which scientific reason sometimes falls, and of the confusion between reality and the power of life/divinity into which practical reason sometimes falls.

In *§ 64* it says that the platonic conviction of which the concept is the true nature of reality, maintains the mathematics of the twenty-first century, even though neither mathematics nor even philosophers know what exactly this certainty could be based on. But although we don't know this well, or precisely because we don't know it, intellect feels challenged and provoked by this question.

The question to clarify is what science has got to do (the theoretical models) with reality, and why when it is ascertained through calculations about the theoretical model applied to reality, the result is that it works.

The question could show even more assuming that the proposition 2+2= 4 is not a synthetic trial *a priori*, but an analytic trial derived from the conceptual nature of numbers, and that for that reason when it is applied to reality it expires. But, even if it were a synthetic trial *a priori*, the problem would still be there. Also it could be illustrated by saying that the proposition "through an exterior point to a straight line one, and only one, parallel can be drawn" is not a synthetic trial *a priori*, but an analytic trial derived from the conceptual construction of plane space, and therefore when applied to the reality of plane spaces it expires just the same. But also, even if it were a synthetic trial *a priori*, the problem would be identical.

Whether synthetic trials or analytic trials, the problem is why the calculations and mental mathematical constructions, which are done completely without experiment, agree with reality when applied to it. The cartoon-like description of mathematics as these peculiar wise men who don't know of what they speak but are not bothered by it either, states the reason for which mathematics does not need special references to reality in order to develop itself. But it leaves out the reason why, with the development of empirical sciences, it always ends up discovering to which reality each mathematics corresponds; the ins and outs and the peculiarities of the real universe that could be put forward in this particular mathematical language. The caricature does not express the conviction of these peculiar wise men, of which one is mathematics because one is nature, and of which one is nature because one is mathematics. This is what the mathematicians state, at least those whom I have dealt with[39].

39   I have dealt with these theses with my colleagues Professor José María Montesinos Amilibia, from the Complutense University of Madrid, and José Luis Vicente Córdoba from the University of Sevilla. José Luis illustrates this thesis very well; that mathematics is for things that haven't been suspected: "The unit of mathetmatics is at the opposite pole of a scientific 'syncretism'. Let me give you a rough example. Mathematics is like a workshop where all types of apparatus are repaired (= problems are resolved): from a car to a television, a kitchen table or a Swiss wristwatch. These objectos are there and they are what they are: we cannot relate a watch to a chimney poker. The owner of such an extravagant workshop is one of the most ingenious guys. One fine day he discovers that his plane, which he uses for kitchen furniture, can be used successfully to repair a high-precision cronometer. In short, the unit of Mathematics can be described as the availability and use of whichever technique in order to resolve a problem which our narrow-mindedness qualifies as specialised (that is to say, everything is available, not only the typical field of speciality). The mathematical genius is he who knows about everything, and in depth. This is possible; I know some" (personal communication).

What seemed to be clear and accepted by scientists and philosophers at the start of the twenty-first century was that reality is one thing and objectivity another, that the correspondence between objectivity and reality, that is to say, which in a certain sense is called 'truth', is as problematic as all of the measurements, and that science and philosophy, more than offering us reality as it is in itself, nature as it is in itself, give them through culture, through theoretical models of Organic Realism, of space, of time, of cosmos, of language or of reality in general.

This conclusion does not explain agnosticism in respect to reality. The question "but what is real space itself like, as Euclid said, as Gauss said, and as Riemann said...?", has the same answer as the question "but what is the real body of a woman itself like, as Phidias said, as Praxiteles said, as Velázquez said...?"

A mathematician would say that this question cannot be answered while the notions of 'reality' and 'existence' are not sufficiently defined. The precise definition of these notions always attracts the attention of two professors: Francisco Canals from the University of Barcelona and Leonardo Polo from the University of Navarre[40].

Of course, philosophers have dealt with specifying both notions throughout history. As far as Kant and Hegel are concerned, existence is that which is given in empirical space and time, that which can be observed and verified by the senses. The true reality, as far as Kant is concerned, is imperceptible in itself, and in Hegel's opinion the 'true reality' is the synthesis between what is given empirically and the concept, the unity of the existence and the idea. There are other definitions of both notions, but these are sufficient for now.

From the Hegelian point of view, the true reality of *logos* is perhaps Aristotle and Frege's models of reason in a current synthesis, and from the Kantian point of view that which is hidden from and imperceptible to human intelligence.

The true reality of numbers, in Hegel's opinion, is perhaps the model which ends up integrating the definitions of Pythagoras, Archimedes, Gauss

40   I want to pay homage to both professors and to bear witness to the fact that I was able to chat about this matter with both professors before Professor Canals died. http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardo_Polo   http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francisco_Canals_Vidal.

and Frege into a contemporary synthesis, and in Kant's opinion that which is imperceptible to numbers.

The true reality of the Universe, in Hegel's opinion, is perhaps the model which results from the integration of the proposals of Newton, Einstein, Plank and Higgs, and in Kant's opinion, that which is imperceptible to the Universe.

The true reality of the human organism is perhaps, in Hegel's opinion, the integration of the models of Galen, Avicenna, Harvey and Claude Bernard,and in Kant's opinion, that which is imperceptible to the organism.

When perceived as empirically existing of reason, numbers, the universe and the organism do not fit with the theoretical model and in Kant's opinion it could refer to the fact that true reality shows signs of not being known in its entirety. As far as Hegel is concerned, it could also relate to this, but it could also relate to the fact that there are "empirical impurities" in what has been observed.

If instead of taking the human organism from an anatomical and physiological point of view, it is taken from an aesthetic point of view, the question can be clarified a little more. If we go back to the question of what the true body of a woman is like, whether the model of Phidias, of Praxiteles, or of Velázquez, from Hegel's point of view it would have to be said that the 'true reality' of a woman is Claudia Schiffer, or Naomi Campbell, because what exists empirically in them fits with the ideas of Praxiteles and Velázquez. And from the Kantian point of view...as appearance is the only thing typical to aesthetics, the coincidence between appearance and reality, the true reality of a woman would also have to be Claudia Schiffer. Because although the hundreds of catwalk models do not have any more intelligible or perceptible content than the hundreds of models shown on television or than one hundred imagined girls, their 'true reality' is precisely that of the catwalks and isn't on the television screen or in the make-believe girls.

The meaning of the expression 'true reality' can be illustrated even more completely in taking the human being, not from an anatomical or physiological point of view, nor from the aesthetic point of view, but from the point of view of its physical, psychic and spiritual peak (which is the definition of health established by the World Health Organisation). In that case, the 'true reality' of man would be, in Hegel's opinion, Jesus of Naza-

reth[41], and also for Kant in the case that according to him (a Christian like Hegel), the peak of human reality is imperceptible.

In that case, Kant and Hegel's points of view, both Protestant Christians, would agree with those of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, both Catholic Christians[42], in the case that for both of them the 'true reality' belongs to the nature of that which cannot be formalised. In general terms, it seems that in this case Wittgenstein and Heidegger's points of view match with Kant's, and Hegel's moves away from all three.

This point of view could be supported if Hegel's criticism of Kant were considered to insist that the difference between phenomenon (appearance) and something in itself ('true reality') belong to awareness and not to reality. But this criticism is not Hegel's only view regarding whether it has been taken into account that for him individual intimacy "the seat of merit and blame" always remains removed, even from the process of "fulfilment of the universal idea in history"[43]. Finally, in order to illustrate the meaning of the expression 'true reality' in everyday life and in ordinary language, in reference to common human beings from the point of view of a common human being, I have to uphold that personally, in my opinion, the true reality and the pinnacle of what is human is my daughter, my father and my mother (although they have died), and my brothers, because their 'empirical impurities' do not make them lose an ounce of their character in real-life realities that pass on reality and life, and in the same sense I am also the true reality.

This, from the points of view of Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. And probably, also from the point of view of Jesus of Nazareth, in the way in which his broadcast teachings are equally expressions about 'true reality' in the same sense[44].

41   Hegel, *Historia de Jesús*, Madrid, Taurus, 1981.

42   Wittgenstein and Heidegger are considered Catholic here given that of their own will they died Catholics and were buried as Catholics, without entering into the relationship between their religious thinking and the official teachings of the institutional church of their time.

43   Hegel, *Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal*, Alianza, Madrid, 1980, pg. 99.

44   The expression "then anyone who doesn't love his brother, whom he sees, cannot love God, whom he doesn't see" (1 Jn 4, 20) refers to the identity of the empirical, the intelligible, and that of man which cannot be formalised and of God given to the common man in the act of 'seeing', dealing with, his 'brother'.

Effectively, the expression "then anyone who doesn't love his brother, whom he sees, cannot love God, whom he doesn't see" (1 Jn 4, 20) refers to the identity of the empirical, of the intelligible, of that of man which cannot be formalised and of God given to the common man in the act of 'seeing', dealing with, his 'brother.'

The relationship between parents and children, brothers and friends, is based more on performative knowledges and languages than on predicative knowledges and languages, more on creative and transforming rituals than on the transmission of information. The rituals of getting out of bed, getting into the shower and showing how to use it, eating breakfast, getting to school, eating, showing how to eat, helping with homework, giving a snack, giving dinner, dressing, taking a walk, giving kisses, arguing, punishing, sending to wash hands, eating well, going to bed on time, telling a story, playing on the computer, watching films, etc take up more time than transmitting information through predicative language.

These rituals, on the other hand, are integral elements of the fundamental and total ritual of life, of receiving life and giving life, which since the early times of the Palaeolithic period they had the bear for reference, for father, mother and children (§§ *17-18*), from which they derived all the other rituals that arrange space, time and values (§§ *25-26*), they structured the psyche (§§ *27-28*), determined identity (§ *30*), and established the empirical level, of predicative language, of the formalizable and of what is susceptible to scientific handling.

Precisely because this 'true reality' of what is human and what is divine, of being and of life, of chaos and of evil, given in the nature of creative and transforming knowledge, always remains separated even from the process of 'fulfilment of the universal idea in history' and removed from the roar of what is formalizable and from science, it has an autonomy and an independence that is guarded on the other side of a well distinguished border.

But the fact that the border between the individual and culture is well distinguished does not mean that there is no continual transfer from one side to the other. The individual is always contributing new creations to culture and culture is situating the individual in a different cultural climate each time (in the succession of historical time).

6. Epistemology and Hermeneutics. The Question of Sanfélix

§ 76. Epistemology and hermeneutics. The question of Sanfélix

In 2001 Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte, head of the Philosophy department at the University of Valencia, published a study titled "Hermeneutics of Epistemology?", in the volume edited by Maria del Carmen Paredes Marín, *Mind, awareness and knowledge*[45]. In it he posed the question of the way in which the two forms of philosophy at the end of the twentieth century, epistemology and hermeneutics, could each become aware of the other and take charge of it.

In his study, Sanfélix leaned more towards the sense that while scientifically it could involve interpretation and making a science of itself, a *traditio* is not totally viable, a transmission and interpretation of the past without situating it at the level of the science which it receives, and that in this sense there is no transmission of science without its actualisation, without transforming it into science.

Sanfélix's study has more meanings and aspects than what has just been mentioned, but this is the most relevant in regard to the thesis of cultural philosophy. In his view what is key to hermeneutics is the transmission of tradition, here, however, the transmission of the legitimacy of the particular point of view, and even of the singular point of view. Hermeneutics and science can be considered, among other perspectives, from the point of view of content, of object. They can also be considered from the point of view of the singular activity of the thinker.

From this second point of view science has a performative, ritual aspect. Not only in the sense of the academic rituals involved in the obtaining of a college degree or a PhD, nor in terms of the rituals of obtaining the *venia docendi*, the post of head of department or the freedom which it brings. But, above all, in the sense of reaching a consensus or acceptance on behalf of the scientific community.

Even before the consensus of the scientific community, the most important ritual in the activity of an investigator is that of obtaining at least the

---

45   Sanfélix Vidarte, V., «¿Hermenéutica de la epistemología?» in Paredes Marín, Mª C. (Ed.), *Mente, conciencia y conocimiento*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2001, pp. 129-140.

acceptance of a colleague, although only one. The ritual which finishes with the expression, explicit or implicit, "yes, I see it too" or "yes, I agree."

Zubiri said that the condition of the philosopher is that of solitude, because he dares to think in untrodden territories. And solitude brings with it strangeness and insecurity, manifested in soliloquies of "this has to have happened to somebody before, how can it have only happened to me", "and if this hasn't happened to anyone...although to me it seems obvious...will it be true?" Roger Penrose, in a passage of *The new mind of the emperor*, makes a phenomenology of an act in which a mathematician registers in his awareness, like an act distinguished from the rest, the perception that this step, this conclusion, is truth. What Penrose analyses exists, and is how he describes it.

Well, as strong as the evidence produced by the subject-object relationship is, if this evidence is kept isolated, the subject experiences solitude and insecurity. Gödel adopted this himself. Leonardo Polo also repeated "who can be sure that they are in reality when they are alone?"

While Husserl insists that ordinary language is the final field of clarification and foundation for formalised languages, he also insists that the final criterion of objectivity is intersubjectivity. This means that the final validation criterion of what is established in predicative and formalised languages are the rituals of intersubjective agreement, in which what is said 'is', the intersubjective coincidence in being, the intersubjective meeting in the field of what cannot be formalised, the overcoming of individuality in communion with the life of another, which Nietzsche thinks is only given in the rapture of music and dance.

From this point of view it is most plausible that science, epistemology, the subject-object relationship, is not the first. The subject-object-subject relationship is equally original and fundamental, or communication, or perhaps the subject-subject-subject relationship. And it could also be thought that this relationship, as much as it could be defined as *parousía* or as *escatología*, as a manifestation of the absolute for itself and for all, as Hegel thought and as Derrida mentioned, it also had its place and its moment in everyday life and in the ordinary language of common men. Because intelligence unites in truth and will unites in good, and if not every day, at least sometimes normal men will reach agreement with other normal men over various things.

7. The Plurality of Reason. The Question of Jorge V. Arregui

§ 77. The plurality of reason. The question of Jorge V. Arregui

In 2004, one year before his death, Jorge V. Arregui published *The Plurality of Reason*, a book in which he faced up to the problems posed by Sanfélix after various years of professional relations with him[46]. This work deals with many of the topics examined in the philosophy of culture and with very similar conclusions from a more analytical perspective, not only from the perspective of the analytical philosophy of language, but also from the perspective of analysing concrete topics of philosophical anthropology and of anthropology.

Throughout its 287 pages, in dialogue with colleagues of Spanish philosophy, and with the most prominent figures of analytical thought and of international anthropology, the reason that appears as an undertone over and over again, is always the question of whether pluralism is a fact or a value. The predominant answer is that pluralism is a value. Particularly a value of the psyche and of human reason, understanding by human reason what is understood by human intelligence in ordinary language, and understanding that in each historical phase and in each level of development reason is pluralised in numerous senses.

It was not only human intelligence that was configured in Greece as scientific reason and developed in the West as theoretical reason, as well as practical reason and as natural use of reason. In the spheres of culture, reason was also configured as religious, political, judicial, economic, artistic, scientific and philosophical reason. But furthermore, in each one of these fields it was also pluralised in the sense that Galeno, Harvery and Claude Bernard's theoretical models of Organic Realism, accept and have on their side Hanemann's model of Organic Realism, and the corresponding conception of illness and homeopathic therapy, which is incomparable with the general pathology of conventional medicine.

This immeasurability, on the other hand, is not a statement of relativism because the two models of Organic Realism have defined the criterions of health and illness well. What is immeasurable is therapy, that is to say, the process by which illness becomes health in each case.

---

46   Arregui, J. V., *La pluralidad de la razón*. Madrid: Síntesis, 2004.

The universality of reason is the universality of intelligence as the natural capacity of the human psyche, and the human psyche itself. The value of pluralism and plurality is what it was called before the infinite wealth of reason and the linguistic possibilities of the Mesolithic period (*§ 68*), the infinite capacity for the creation of signalling systems, and, with that of categorial systems.

On the other hand, and as has already been pointed out (*§ 67*), the capacity for the creation of signalling systems is smaller because while the signs are conventional and arbitrary, they are natural. If still taken into account that the first symbolisation was the empirical start of the transcendental nature, from the historical and transcendental points of view, then it is possible to connect with the *sapiens* of Altamira or Chauvett in order to consider them as our first giants, at least in a historical nature. As classic as Homer and Cervantes, in the sense that, from their unrepeatable singularity, they locally and singularly open the transcendental nature, from which they start to build, like the previous *sapiens* had always done, the predicamental nature of the categorial systems and linguistic-alphabetical.

The value of pluralism is not alone in highlighting the infinite wealth of reason, but also in highlighting the infinite means of access to the understanding of the transcendental nature, of that which cannot be formalised.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIVE EPILOGUE

§ 78. Post-Neolithic understanding of self [1]

The Neolithic was the period of differentiation between the cultural spheres: religion, politics, law, economics, art and technical, science and philosophy. This is not to say that they were not differentiated in the Palaeolithic era, as anthropologists at the beginning of the twentieth century (particularly Lowie) suggested they were. However, that differentiation could not be expressed through specific institutions that were represented urbanistically, delimited administratively and cared for professionally by functionaries, also differentiated, and, thus it was not rendered quite so obvious.

Palaeolithic cultures grew out of a religious nucleus, in which the interaction between religious and political power allowed them to be characterised as sacralised cultures. Neolithic cultures developed out of an urbanistic, administrative and professional differentiation between the spheres, and from the autonomisation and growing predominance of political power over the religious, generally perceived as a process of secularisation.

The Neolithic trend of differentiation carried a growing human self-awareness and individuality into the historical period, a developing awareness of the unit of humanity. All of this is what Durkheim called the increase of organic solidarity, derived from a division of labour, and what Weber claimed was an increasing rationalisation of work, derived from bureaucratisation.

The Neolithic has been interpreted as a progressive process that, upon achieving its goals of global humanism, ceased to be a process and prompted the end of history, the end of art, and the end of religion. This was the vision not solely of Hegel, who believed firmly in history and progress, but also that of those who believed in involution and regression, the well-nourished

---

1   Translated to English by Abigail Smith.

group of apocalyptics spanning from Oswald Spengler to Ernst Gellner. In general, the second half of the twentieth century reproduced the depression and desperation last seen as Antiquity came to an end. Augustine gazed upon the decay of Rome as if it represented the end of the world, and equally the last thinkers of Modernity in the twentieth century, and also a good many belonging to postmodernism, viewed the end of the Enlightenment as the end of the world and of the ideals of Western humanism.

In spite of this, during the twentieth century there were also many perspectives which recognised that, although the Neolithic yielded its own cultural fruits, this did not mean a decaying of the humanist values of the Palaeolithic, nor of those of the Neolithic. Rather, it represented the inauguration of a new stage which has not yet been sufficiently analysed or understood.

Between these two perspectives lay the philosophical work of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who welcomed both a new cultural era and a new humanism, that of Dilthey which acknowledges the undefined character of progress, and, of course, Hegel, who speaks of the fusion between the cultural spheres and all the values of humanism, which occurs in civil society and which receives the peculiar name of 'State'.

Philosophy is not concerned with the future. It is reflexion and it reflects only upon that which has already happened. In this way it directed how man understood himself in the Palaeolithic, in the Neolithic, and in the historical period, according to the schemes and categories of the cultural paradigm.

But after the historical period, when the age which we call the post-Neolithic began, philosophy was no longer mere reflection, and much less critical and foundational reflection, but instead a conversation, as if the future itself could converse.

When the historical period ended, philosophy, which had become increasingly critical since the beginning of modernity, exercised its new-found criticism upon the notion of criticism itself, and also upon reason and reasoning.

Thus, it was once again accepted that criticism is a derived secondary form of thought, wherein the first is speech, and that speech takes place after the pact of discourse has been established. That is to say, the philosophy born in Athens after Hercules had taken the territory and overthrown the invaders from Atlantis. Philosophical thought was born out of the peace

reached through conflict and agreement. The first moment of thinking was not criticism, but rather topica, the meetings of men in places where they could reach agreements (although this was not always possible). Philosophy only began in the Neolithic, and criticism only at the end of the historical period, when what Vico called the barbarism of reflection was generalised. After barbarism, there was a new beginning, which was conversation, and in this conversation to speak about the future was legitimised.

The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed a good number of conversations about the future. On one hand, these conversations constructed whining, elegiac, and apocalyptic utopias, imagining an overly defined and beautified future. On the other, they sketched out utopias in which cultural and technological resources created a panorama in which the human individual recognises himself with difficulty as adaptable and capable of maintaining his identity. There were no conversations that described utopias in which human problems were resolved technologically, in spite of the fact there were more than enough elements to do this.

Although culture experienced numerous changes over the three phases that have been explained here – the Palaeolithic, the Neolithic in its prehistoric and historic phases, and the post-Neolithic – there is reason to believe that some parameters remained the same throughout all three phases. On one hand, the stages offered by the biological lifecycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death, and on the other, the cultural spheres that are generated by the interaction of these stages with the psyche of an intellect that operates on two levels: the transcendental or that of the informal, and the categorical, or that of the formal.

There is reason to think that in the post-Neolithic the four stages or moments of the biological lifecycle will remain the same. That is to say, there is reason to believe that human beings will continue being born and will continue dying. At the same time, it is plausible that the two levels of intellect will also produce semiotic and categorical systems, although they will be different from those of the two previous phases. In other words, it makes sense to think that human beings will continue speaking and communicating with each other. And these are also a sufficient metaphysical base from which to draw a basic certainty about the essence of humanity.

In other words, although it is possible that human reproduction will be rendered obsolete through technological or industrial processes, and that

human life expectancy will be extended, it could be that reproduction will continue to take place largely through the artisanal processes of previous centuries that are so dear to us, and it is also possible that humans will continue to die and their love ones will remember them and do something with their remains. There is reason to think that the *sapiens* will carry on perceiving life, power, chaos, freedom and evil as things that cannot be disposed of nor escaped, as things that cannot be scientifically and technologically formalised. However, they will perceive many of humanity's problems as issues that can be treated and resolved. Since the age of Plato, it has been proven repeatedly that a philosophical king is no less likely to make erroneous political judgements than a farmer king or a businessman king, and there is no reason to believe that an engineer king or computer technician king would fare any better.

These four biological moments or stages have been carried out culturally, in the Palaeolithic, through a limited repertoire of symbols and with a great variety of categorical symbols. In the Neolithic, this was a through an enormous range of sign systems and with a relatively limited repertoire of categorical systems, as much in the West as in the small number of great hegemonic cultures.

Given that culture is based in and is the result of these biological moments and their impact upon a psyche whose intellect opens these two different spheres, there is no reason to think that the fundamental parameters of culture are going to change.

But within these constant parameters, change can be considerable. Taking into account what has long been considered the primordial factor of change, in other words, shifting demographics, imagining the lives of 20 billion people on this same planet now represents a considerable challenge.

This is not because there may be insurmountable technological and economic problems, because, as the history of the twentieth century has shown, these can be resolved, although doing so might require an imaginative effort on the part of science-fiction writers. The problems that will be more difficult to resolve will be psychological and political.

Within the disciplines of philosophical anthropology and of philosophy of culture, it is equally stimulating to imagine the post-Neolithic, dispersed and shared on social media, as it is to think of the Palaeolithic, spread out amongst its webs of qualitative time.

When the surface of the planet, in other words, the surface covered

by land, sea, and cities, has been criss-crossed by a network of space-time coordinates that allow us to locate an individual in a sailing boat at any point in any ocean, or in any suburb of any city, and when this network is as equally fixed as the land and the sea, thus there occurs once again a dispersion of subjectivity on a twenty-first century stage, just like that of the individual living in the qualitative times of the Palaeolithic.

The phenomenon of intercultural fusion expands upon the technological and economic homogenisation brought about by globalisation. African-American culture is no exception. Indeed, there are also Canadian-Asian and French-Algerian cultures, amongst others. However, there are also urban tribes which are multicultural, national etc. Cosmopolitan groups also exist. Geographical and cultural mobility is a tide that never stops rising. Cultural populations and currents look more and more like maritime waters and currents than they do like the Neolithic and historical mountains and cities.

In all these changing cultural landscapes, if approached from the point of view of analysing the ways in which mankind understands itself, unexpected categorical and semiotic systems can present themselves, which is the most important thing from the perspective of anthropology.

As has already been noted, the totality of what occurs in the empirical and conceptual orders can be accumulated and transmitted instantaneously (at the speed of light) through a codification and deciphering in binary keys 0 and 1. It can be digitalised, transformed into information and transmitted in real time, if the meaning of the expression "real time" can be established. And this will mean a change in the borders between creative and descriptive knowledge and its geography.

The line between individual and culture can become more porous, or more impenetrable, but there will continue to be transfer from one side to another. The individual constantly contributes new creations to culture, and culture always places the individual in one or more different cultural times. These observations have little to do with the prophecies of science fiction nor the apocalyptic predictions of negative utopias. They are modest warnings that we should prepare methodological strategies for understanding the phenomena that could be produced, which would not be well-understood using current categories and semiotic systems. However, they are also references to certain human constants that serve to orient, as references to what philosophers call essence and definition. In the last 100,000 years, and in the perspective of the

twentieth-first century, after the experienced changes, the definition of the essence of humanity that seemed most resistant and most fixed, was that which makes reference to the lifecycle of birth, growth, reproduction and death, in other words to animalism and sexuality, and which refers to social networks and communication – language. In other words, it seems that the most resistant definition of mankind is "animal that has language" (Zoón échon lógon). From the perspective of the twenty-first century, animalism seems like the empirical and transcendental foundation of culture (*§§ 6 - 7*) and language, which as well as animalism has liberty, equality and solidarity at its empirical and transcendental base, seems like the empirical and transcendental foundation of society and of human rights (*§§ 14* and *21*).

In any case, changes always disconcert and unsettle, but nonetheless, cognitive and technological mediums always seem adequate in the moment and, what's more, in several places at once. In several different cultures and in several individual brains, all at the same time. *Logos*, which is the collection of relationships amongst the real elements, sieves through all the real processes and appears according to the theory that the Gestalt called the "law of good form". This was in the real configuration of inorganic, organic and cultural processes, and in the mentality of those that live with and witness these processes.

Language knows more than we do, and *logos* knows more about reality. One could say that man is the pastor of the being, that if it carries on, the being will always reach good pastures, or will come home, that the happy and salvational occurrences that appear at the same time in unconnected minds are like messages about true reality, delivered to the human intellect like the news of messengers that Plato called a field of truth. One can be certain that mathematics is one because nature is one. One can be certain that the being becomes man through culture.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

AA VV.: 15th International Cave Bear Symposium, Spišská Nová Ves, Slovakia, 17th 20th of Sept. 2009, http://www.fns.uniba.sk/ leadmin/ kalendar/2009/symposium/Abstract_book.pdf.

AA VV.: *Los Kama Sutra, en Libros de amor del oriente*. Madrid: Ediciones Ibéricas, 1993.

ABELLÁN, A. et al.: *La población del mundo*, Madrid, Síntesis, 1998.

AGUSTÍN DE HIPONA: *La ciudad de Dios*. Madrid: BAC, 1977.

ANNAUAD, J.: *Quest for fire*, 1981.

APEL, K.O.: *La transformación de la losofía*. Madrid: Taurus, 1985.

AQUINUS, Tomás de: *Summa Theologiae*. Madrid: BAC, 1965.

ARISTÓTELES: *Sobre la interpretación*. Madrid: Gredos, 1988.

— *Categorías*, Madrid, Gredos, 1988.

— *Física*, Madrid, Gredos, 1995.

— *Acerca del alma*, Madrid, Gredos, 1978.

— *Política*, Madrid, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1970.

— *Metafísica*, Madrid, Gredos,1987.

ARREGUI, Jorge V.: *La pluralidad de la razón*. Madrid: Síntesis, 2004.

ARSUAGA, J. L. y MARTÍNEZ, I.: *La especie elegida*. Madrid: Temas de hoy, 1998.

ATTALI, J.: *Historia de la propiedad*. Barcelona: Planeta, 1989. – 273 –.

ATTALÍ, J.: *L'Ordre cannibale*. Paris: Grasset, 1979.

AUSTIN, J.L.: *Cómo hacer cosas con palabras. Palabras y acciones*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1972.

BALANDIER, G.: *El poder en escenas. De la representación del poder al poder de la representación*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994.

BARLEY, N.: *El antropologo inocente*. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1991.

BARNARD, A.: "Modern hunter, gatherers and early symbolic culture", en *The evolution of culture: an interdisciplinary view* editado por ROBIN IAN MACDONALD DUNBAR, CHRIS KNIGHT, CAMILLA POWER. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: 1999.

BATAILLE, G.: *El erotismo*. Barcelona: Tusquets, 2005.

BEIER, U.: *The Origin of Life & Death. African Creation Myths*. Nairobi, Heinemaznn, 1988.

BEJARANO, T.: *Becoming human : from pointing gestures to syntax*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2011.

BENEDICT, R.: *Patterns of culture*. Boston: Houghton Mif in Co., 1959.

BENGTSON, J. D. and RUHLEN, M.: *Global Etymologies*, en John D. bengtson and M. ruhlen: On the Origin of Languages: Studies in Linguistic Taxonomy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1994.

BERENGUER, L.: *El mundo de Juan Lobón*. Madrid: Cátedra, 2010.

BERGSON, H.: *La risa*. México: Porrúa, 1984.

BERNARDEZ, E.: *¿Qué son las lenguas?*. Madrid: Alianza, 2004.

BOLZ, P.: "Bajo el signo de la danza del sol. Vidión religiosa del mundo y ritualismo de los siux oglalas de Norteamérica", en ELIADE, M.: *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*, III, 2, Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

BREUIL, H. y BURKITT, M.C.: *Rock Paintings of Southern Andalusia. A description of a Neolithic and Copper Age Art Group*. Oxford University Press, 1929.

BROWN, J. E.: *The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971 (orig. University of Oklahoma Press, 1953).

BURKERT, W.: *Homo necans. Antropologia del sacrificio cruento nella Grecia antica*. Torino: Boringhieri, 1982.

CALVIN, W. H., *A Brief History of the Mind*. Oxford University Press, 2004.
http://williamcalvin.com/BHM/ch9.htm.

CALVO, J.: "El concepto de cultura en el pensamiento griego", en LLINARES, J.B., y SANCHEZ DURÁ, N. (eds): *Ensayos de loso a de la cultura*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

CAMPBELL, J.: *El héroe de las mil caras: psicoanálisis del mito*. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica de España, 2005.

— *Los mitos en el tiempo*. Barcelona: EMECE, 2002.

CAMPILLO ÁLVAREZ, J. E.: *La cadera de Eva. El protagnoismo de la mujer en la evolución de la especie humana*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2007.

CARCHIA, G.: *Retórica de lo sublime*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1994.

CÂRCIUMARU, M. et al.: "Témoignages symboliques au Moustérien", en *Congrès de l'IFRAO, septembre 2010 – Symposium : Signes, symboles, mythes et idéologie...* (Pré-Actes).

CASSIRER, E.: *Antropología filosófica*. México: FCE, 1968.

CHILDE, G.: *La revolución neolítica*. México: FCE, 1956.

— *Los orígenes de la civilización*. México: FCE, 1992.

CHOZA, J.: *Antropologías positivas y Antropología filosófica*. Tafalla: Cenlit, 1965.

— *Conciencia y afectividad (Aristóteles, Nietzsche, Freud)*. Pamplona: Eunsa, 1990 (2a ed.).

— *Manual de Antropología filosófica*. Madrid: Rialp, 1989.

— "Reflexión filosófica y desintegración sociocultural en la antropología de Gianbattista Vico", en *La realización del hombre en la cultura*. Madrid: Rialp, 1990.

— "Habito y espíritu objetivo. Estudio sobre la historicidad en Santo Tomás y en Dilthey", en L*a realización del hombre en la cultura*. 1 Madrid: Rialp, 1990.

— *Antropología filosófica. Las representaciones del sí mismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

— "La cultura es más radical que la razón", en LLINARES, J. B. y SÁNCHEZ DURÁ, N.: *Ensayos de loso a de la cultura*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

— *Historia cultural del humanismo*, Sevilla-Madrid, Thémata-Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

— "Formas primordiales de la expresión corporal. La danza como plega- ria", en *Fedro*,(6) 2007.

— "Lectura de la 'Carta sobre el humanismo", en *Thémata*, no 32, Sevilla, 2004.

— *Historia de los sentimientos*. Sevilla, Thémata, 2011.

CHOZA, J. y GARAY, J. (eds.): *Pluralismo y secularización*. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2009.

CICERÓN: *Sobre la República*. Madrid: Gredos, 1984.

CLARK, G.: *La prehistoria*. Madrid: Alianza, 1987.

Código Civil Español. Madrid: Tecnos, 1993.

COROMINAS, J.: B*reve diccionario etimológico de la lengua castellana*. Madrid: Gredos, 1987.

CROWLEY, D. J. y heyer, P.: C*ommunication in history: technology, culture, society*. Boston: Pearson Allyn & Bacon, 2007.

DA VINCI, L.: *Cuadernos de nota*s. Barcelona: Planeta-De Agostini, 1995.

DANIELS, P. T. and bright, W. (eds.): *The World's Writing Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ History_of_writing.

DASCAL, M.: *Negotiation and power in dialogic interaction* [Recurso electró- nico] / edited by weigand E., Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2001.

DELAINI, P.: "Così mangiò Zaratustra". *Hiram*, 4, 2007, pp. 89-98.

DELEUZE, G.: *Diferencia y repetición*. Gijón: Júcar Universidad, 1988.

DERRIDA, J.: *Márgenes de la filosofía*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1989.

DÍAZ ESTÉVEZ, E.: *El teorema de Gödel*. Pamplona: EUNSA, 1975.

DILTHEY, W.: *Introducción a las ciencias del espíritu*. México: FCE, 1949.

— *Estructuración del mundo histórico por las ciencias del espíritu*. México: F.C.E., 1944.

DURKHEIM, E.: *Las formas elementales de la vida religiosa*. Madrid: Alianza, 1993.

EIBL-EIBESFELDT, I.: *Etología*. Barcelona: Omega, 1974.

ELIADE: *El mito del eterno retorno*. Madrid: Alianza, 1972.

— *Iniciaciones místicas*. Madrid: Taurus, 1989.

— *Mefistófeles y el andrógino*. Barcelona: Labor, 1984.

— *Lo sagrado y lo profano*. Madrid: Guadarrama, 1981.

— "Experiencias de la luz mística", en *Mefistófeles y el andrógino*. Barcelona: Labor, 1984.

— *Tratado de historia de las religiones*. México: Ediciones Era, 1992.

— *Historia de las creencias y las ideas religiosas*, I, II y III. Barcelona: Paidós,

— vol III-2. Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

ELIAS, N.: *La sociedad de los individuos*. Barcelona: Península, 1990.

ELIOT, T. S.: *Notas para la definición de la cultura*. Madrid: Encuentro, 2003.

Enciclopedia Británica, http://0-www.britannica.com.fama.us.es/, ver- sión académica on-line, Universidad de Sevilla, 2010.

FOUCAULT, M.: *La verdad y las formas jurídicas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992. *Fragmentos presocráticos. De Tales a Demócrito*. Madrid: Alianza, 1988.

FRAZER, J.: *El Folklore en el Antiguo Testamento*. México: FCE, 1981.

FREUD, S.: *Totem y tabú*. Madrid: Alianza, 1977.

GADAMER, H. G.: *Verdad y método*. Salamanca: Sígueme, 1977.

— *Verdad y método II*. Salamanca: Sígueme, 2000.

— *Mito y razón*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1997.

GARAY, J.: "Politeísmo y neoplatonismo: Proclo", en CHOZA, J. y PADIAL, J. J. (eds.): *Dios en las tres culturas*. Sevilla: Thémata, 2011.

GEERTZ: *Conocimiento local*. Barcelona:Paidós, 1994.

— *La interpretación de las culturas*. Barcelona: Gedisa, 1992.

— *Reflexiones antropológicas sobre temas filosóficos*. Barcelona: Paidos, 2000.

GEHLEN, A.: *El hombre*. Salamanca: Sígueme, 1980.

GELLNER, E.: *Postmodernismo, razón y religión*. Barcelona: Paidos, 1994.

GIMBUTAS, M.: *El lenguaje de la diosa*. Oviedo: Grupo Editorial Asturiano, 1996.

GIRARD, R.: L*a violencia y lo sagrado*. Barcelona: Anagrama, 1995.

GOODY, J.: *La domesticación del pensamiento salvaje*. Madrid: Akal, 2008.

GRIMALDI, N.: *Une démence ordinairel*. Paris: PUF, 2009.

HARRIS, M.: *Materialismo cultural*. Madrid: Alianza, 1989.

— El *desarrollo de la teoría antropológica. Una historia de las teorías de la cultura*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1978.

HARROD, J. B.: "Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European): Part 1. The Basic Graphematics — Summary of Discovery Procedures", in *Language Origins Society Annual Meeting* 1998, Version 2.b, May 2004, Original Version 1987.

— "Deciphering Upper Paleolithic (European), Part 2: Maximal Graphematics and Correspondences to a Reconstruction of Spoken UP(E) — Summary of Phememic-Semantic Discovery Procedures", Version 2 May 2004 Version 1 April 1992; http://originsnet.org/upepart2247k. pdf.

—*Appendices for Chimpanzee Spirituality: A Concise Synthesis of the Literature*, posted December 26, 2009.

HEGEL, G. W. F.: *Enciclopedia de las ciencias filosóficas*. Madrid: Alianza, 1995.

— *Fenomenología del espíritu*. México: FCE., 1981.

— *Filosofía del derecho*. Barcelona: Edahsa, 1988.

— *Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal*. Madrid: Alianza, 1980.

— *Lecciones sobre filosofía de la religión*. Madrid: Alianza, 1984.

— *Historia de Jesús*. Madrid: Taurus, 1981.

HEIDEGGER, M.: *El ser y el tiempo*. México. F.C.E.: 1974.

— *Estudios sobre mística medieval*. Madrid: Siruela, 1997.

— *Carta sobre el humanismo*. Madrid: Alianza, 2000.

LIDDELL, H. G. y SCOTT, R.: *A Greek-English Lexicon*. versión on-line: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus.

HESIODO: *Teogonía*. Madrid: Alianza, 2000.

HIGINIO, M.: T*eoría de la cordura y de los hábitos del corazón*. Valencia: Pretexto, 2010.

HOBBES, T.: *Leviatan*. Madrid: Alianza, 2009.

HÖLDERLIN, F.: *Hiperion o el eremita en Grecia*. Madrid: Gredos, 2003.

HUBERT y MAUSS: *Magia y sacrificio en la historia de las religiones*. Estudios y Ensayos. Caracas: Lautaro, 1946.

IFRAH, G.: *Historia universal de las cifras*. Madrid: Espasa, 2001.

JAEGER, W.: *La teología de los primeros filósofos griegos*. México: FCE, 1982.

JUNG, C. G.: *El hombre y sus símbolos*. Barcelona: Caralt, 1976.

— *Las relaciones entre el yo y el inconsciente*. Barcelona: Paidós, 2010.

KANT, E.: *Crítica de la razón pura*. Madrid: Alfaguara, 1997.

— *Crítica del juicio*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1977.

KEPEL, G.: *La revancha de Dios. Cristianos, judíos y musulmanes a la reconquista del mundo*. Madrid: Anaya, 1991.

KERENYI, K. y ORTIZ OSÉS, A.: *Arquetipos y símbolos colectivos*. Barcelona: Ánthropos, 1994.

KROEBER, A.: *Antropología general*. México: FCE, 1945.

LAMOTHE, K. L.: B*etween Dancing and Writing: The Practice of Religious Studies*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.

— *Nietzsche's Dancers: Isadora Duncam and Marta Graham*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

LARA PEINADO: *Los primeros códigos de la humanidad*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1994.

LEROI-GOURHAM, A.: *Símbolos, Artes y Creencias de la prehistoria*. Madrid: Istmo, 1984.

— *Le Geste et la Parole*. París: Albin Michel, 1966.

LEVI-STRAUS, C.: *Tristes trópicos*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1976.

— *El pensamiento salvaje*. México: FCE, 1964.

LÉVY BRUHL, L.: *El alma primitiva*. Barcelona: Península, 1974.

LIDDELL & SCOTT'S: *Greek- English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991, p. 854.

LIVI BACI, M.: H*istoria mínima de la población mundial*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2002.

LLINARES, J. B. y SÁNCHEZ DURÁ, N.: *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura*, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

LLOBERA, J. R.: "El concepto de cultural en la antropología social y cultural", en LLINARES, J. B. y SÁNCHEZ DURÁ, N. (eds.): *Ensayos de filosofía de la cultura.* Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

LORENZ, K.: *Sobre la agresión.* Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1976.

LOWIE, R. H.: *Primitive Society*. New York: Liveright, 1970. (LOWIE, R. H.: *La sociedad primitiva*, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1979).

LOZANO, F.: "En busca del fuego. La emergencia de lo humano", en CHOZA, j. y Montes, Ma J.: *La Antropología en el cine*, vol. 1. Madrid: Laberinto, 2001.

LYOTARD, J. F.: *La condición postmoderna: informe sobre el saber*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1989.

MALINOWSKI, B.: *Una teoría científica de la cultura*. Barcelona: Edhasa, 1981. MARCO GAVIO APICIO: *De re coquinaria. Antología de recetas de la Roma imperial*. Edición de Attilio A. Del Re. Barcelona: Alba, 2006.

MARÍN, H.: *La invención de lo humano. La construcción sociohistórica del individuo*. Madrid: Encuentro, 2007.

— *Teoría de la cordura y de los hábitos del corazón*. Valencia: Pretextos, 2010.

MARSHACK, A.: *The roots of civilization: the cognitive beginnings of man's first art, symbol and notation.* New York: Moyer Bell, 1991.

MATURANA, H.: *La realidad: ¿objetiva o construida?: Fundamentos biológicos del conocimiento*. 2 vols. Barcelona: Anthropos, 1996. http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Theory_of_mind.

MAUSS, M.: *Técnicas del cuerpo, en Introducción a la etnografía*. Madrid, Ist- mo, 1971.

— "Sobre una categoría del espíritu humano: la noción de persona y la de 'yo'", en *Sociología y Antropología*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1979.

MAYELL, H.: "When Did 'Modern' Behavior Emerge in Humans?" en *National Geographic News*, February 20, 2003. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/200302/0220_030220_humanorigins2.html/.

MEAD, G.H.: *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1970.

MIRAVET, M. y SANFÉLIX VIDARTE, V.: "Biología y cultura: Darwin como antropólogo", en LLINARES, J. B. y SÁNCHEZ DURÁ, N.: (eds.) *Ensayos de filosofñia de la cultura*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002.

MURGA, J. L.: *Derecho Romano clásico II. El proceso*. Zaragoza: Secretariado de Publicaciones Universidad de Zaragoza, 1983.

NAVARRO REYES, J.: *Cómo hacer filosofía con palabras. A propósito del desencuentro entre Searle y Derrida*. Madrid: F.C.E., 2010.

NIETZSCHE, F.: *El nacimiento de la tragedia*. Madrid: Alianza, 1995.

— *Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral*. Valencia: Diálogo, 2002.

— "La visión dionisiaca del mundo", en *El nacimiento de la tragedia*. Madrid: Alianza, 1981.

NIXON, G.: "Mortal Knowledge, the Originary Event, and the Emergence of the Sacred", in *Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology*, XII(1) Summer, 2006.

OS, A.: *Contra el fanatismo*. Madrid: Sieruela, 2003.

OTTO, R.: *Lo santo*. Madrid: Alianza, 1985.

OVIDIO: *Las metamorfosis*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1992.

PÉREZ TAPIAS, J. A.: *Filosofía y crítica de la cultura*. Madrid: Madrid: 1995.

PLATÓN: *La República*. tr. de J.M. Pabón y M. Fernández Galiano. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1969.

— *Timeo.* Madrid: Gredos, 1997.

— *Protágoras*. Oviedo: Pentalfa, 1980.

POLANYI, K.: "Notes on Primitive Money" apéndice a T*he Semantics of Money-Uses*, en *Simbolic Anthropology. A Reader in the Study of Symbols and Meaning.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

POPPER, K. R. y ECCLES, J.: *El yo y su cerebro*. Barcelona: Labor, 1980.

RADCLIFFE-BROWN, A. R.: *The Adaman Islander*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

RAMOS MUÑOZ, J.: *La ocupación prehistórica de la campiña litoral y banda atlántica de Cádiz. Aproximación al estudio de las sociedades cazadoras - recolectoras, tribales comunitarias y clasistas iniciales*. Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, 2008.

RAPPAPORT, R.: *Ritual y religión en la formación de la humanidad.* Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

RICOEUR, P.: *Freud: una interpretación de la cultura*. México: FCE, 1983.
— *Tiempo y narración*, 3 vols. México: Siglo XXI, 1995-96.

RIES, J.: *Lo sagrado en la historia de la humanidad*. Madrid: Encuentro, 1989.

RIVERA ARRIZABALAGA, A.: *Arqueología del lenguaje. La conducta simbólica en el paleolítico*. Madrid: Akal, 2009.

RODRÍGUEZ ADRADOS: *Fiesta, comedia y tragedia*. Madrid: Alianza, 1983. rorty, R.: *Contingencia, ironía y solidadridad*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1991.

ROSSANO, M. J.: *The evolution of conscious Experience:Rituals, altered states and the origins of Religion*. Nova Science Publishers, 2007.

ROUSSEAU, J. J.: *Discurso sobre las ciencias y las artes*. Madrid: Alianza, 1985. SAHLINS, M., *La economía de la edad de piedra*. Madrid: Akal.

SAID, E. W.: *Orientalismo.* Madrid: Ed. De Bolsillo, 2003.

SAN MARTIN, J.: *Teoría de la cultura*. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 1999.

SÁNCHEZ DE LA YNCERA, I.: *La mirada reflexiva de G. H. Mead: sobre la socialidad y la comunicación*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1995.

SANFÉLIX VIDARTE, V.: "¿Hermenéutica de la epistemología?" en PAREDES MARÍN, Ma del C. (Ed.): *Mente, conciencia y conocimiento*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2001.

SAPIR, E.: *Language. An Introduction to the Study of the speech*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949.

SCHÖDER, G. (Ed.): *Teoría de la cultura. Un mapa de la cuestión*. Buenos Aires: F.C.E., 2005.

SEARLE, J.: *Actos de habla. Ensayos de filosofía del lenguaje*. Madrid: Cátedra, 2001.

SHELL, M.: *Dinero, lenguaje y pensamiento*. México: F.C.E., 1985.

The Geological Society of London, http://www.geolsoc.org.uk/anthropoceneconf.

The Anthropocene: A New Epoch of Geological Time?, 11th May 2011, Meeting of.

TINBERGEN, N.: *El estudio del instinto*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1969.

TINLAND, F.: *La différence anthropologique. Essai sur les rapports de la nature et de l'artifice*. Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1977.

THOMAS OF AQUINUS: *Summa Theologiae*. Madrid: BAC, 1978.

TUGENDHAT, E.: *Autoconciencia y autodeterminación*. Madrid: F.C.E., 1993.

TURNBULL, C. M.: *The human Cycle*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1953.

URS VON BALTHASAR, H.: *Teodramática*. vol I. Madrid: Encuentro, 1990.

VAN DER LEEUW G.: *Fenomenología de la religión*, México, F.C.E., 1975.

VAN GENNEP, A.: *Los ritos de paso*. Madrid: Taurus, 1986.

VERNANT, J.-P. y VIDAL-NANQUET, P.: "Caza y sacrificio en la Orestiada de Esquilo", en *Mito y tragedia en la Grecia antigua*. vol I. Madrid: Taurus, 1987.

VICO, G-B.: *Ciencia Nueva*. Madrid: Tecnos, 1995.

WALDEMAR, S.: "Maná y tabú. Las religones de oceanía", en ELIADE, M.: *Historia de las creencias y de las ideas religiosas*, III, 2. Barcelona: Herder, 1999.

WALLACE, Anthony F.C.: *Culture and personality*. New York: Random House, 2nd ed. 1970.

WEBER, M.: *Economía y sociedad*. Madrid: F.C.E., 2002.

WHITE, H.: *El texto histórico como artefacto literario*. Barcelona: Paidós, 2003.

WILSON E.O.: *Sociobiología. La nueva síntesis*. Barcelona: Omega, 1980.

WINCH, P.: *Comprender una sociedad primitiva*. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994.

WITTGENSTEIN, L.: *Investigaciones filosóficas*. Barcelona: Crítica, 1988.

WEB PAGES:

http://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Azerbaijan_Linguistic_School.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioral_modernity.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paleolithic_ utes.
http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsEurope/GreeceMinoans.
htm.

COLECCIONES Y TÍTULOS DE EDITORIAL THÉMATA, 2020

1. Colección Pensamiento

Directores: Jacinto Choza, Juan José Padial, Francisco Rodríguez Valls

Ensayos y estudios sobre ciencias y técnicas, ciencias naturales, ciencias sociales y ciencias humanas. Investigaciones personales y de equipo, memorias y, en general, toda aportación que contribuya a un mejor conocimiento y una mejor comprensión del cosmos y de la historia.

1. *La recomposición de la crisma. Guía para sobrevivir a los grandes ideales.* Satur Sangüesa

2. *Locura y realidad. Lectura psico-antropológica del Quijote.* Juan José Arechederra y Jacinto Choza

3. *Aristotelismo.* Jesús de Garay

4. *El nacimiento de la libertad.* Jesús de Garay

5. *Historia cultural del humanismo.* Jacinto Choza

6. *Antropología y utopía.* Francisco Rodríguez Valls.

7. *Neurofilosofía: Perspectivas contemporáneas.* Concepción Diosdado, Francisco Rodríguez Valls, Juan Arana

2.- Colección Problemas Culturales

Directores: Marta Betancurt, Jacinto Choza, Jesús de Garay y Juan José Padial

Investigaciones y estudios sobre temas concretos de una cultura o de un conjunto de culturas. Investigaciones y estudios transculturales e interculturales. Con atención preferente a las tres grandes religiones mediterráneas, y a las áreas de América y Asia oriental.

1. *Danza de Oriente y danza de Occidente*. Jacinto Choza y Jesús de Garay

2. *La escisión de las tres culturas*. Jacinto Choza y Jesús de Garay

3. *Estado, derecho y religión en Oriente y Occidente*. Jacinto Choza y Jesús de Garay

4. *La idea de América en los pensadores occidentales*. Marta C. Betancur, Jacinto Choza, Gustavo Muñoz

5. *Retórica y religión en las tres culturas*. Jesús de Garay y Alejandro Colete

6. *Narrativas fundacionales de América Latina*. Marta C. Betancur, Jacinto Choza, Gustavo Muñoz

7. *Dios en las tres culturas*. Jacinto Choza, Jesús de Garay, Juan José Padial

8. *La independencia de América. Primer centenario y segundo centenario.* Jacinto Choza, Jesús Fernández Muñoz, Antonio de Diego y Juan José Padial

9. *Pensamiento y religión en las Tres Culturas*. Miguel Ángel Asensio, Abdelmumin Aya y Juan José Padial

10. *Humanismo Latinoamericano*. Juan J. Padial, Victoria Sabino, Beatriz Valenzuela (eds.)

11. *Los ideales educativos de América Latin*. J. Choza, K. Rodríguez Puerto, E. Sierra

3.- Colección Arte y Literatura

Directores: Francisco Rodríguez Valls, Miguel Nieto, Juan Carlos Polo Zambruno, Ernesto Sierra y Alejandro Colete

Obras de creación literaria en general. Novela, relato, cuento, poesía, teatro.

Guiones y textos para creaciones musicales, visuales, escénicas de diverso tipo, montajes, instalaciones y composiciones varias. Traducciones de textos literarios de los géneros mencionados.

1. *La Danza de los árboles*. Jacinto Choza

2. *Cuentos e imágenes*. Francisco Rodríguez Valls

3. *El linaje del precursor y otros relatos*. Francisco Rodríguez Valls

4. *Filosofía y cine 1: Ritos*. Alberto Ciria (ed.)

5. *Cuentos completos*. Oscar Wilde. Edición de Francisco Rodríguez Valls

6. *Poemas del cielo y del suelo*. Francisco Rodríguez Valls

7. *II Certamen Literario Dos Hermanas Divertida*. Ayuntamiento de Dos Hermanas

8. *Al otro lado de la muerte. Las elegías de Rilke*. Jacinto Choza

9. *III Certamen Literario Dos Hermanas Divertida*. Ayuntamiento de Dos Hermanas

10. *Museu da Agua*. Miguel Bastante

11. *Museu da Electricidade*. Miguel Bastante

12. *El réquiem de Weltschmerz II. Crisálidas de cristal*. Alejandro G. J. Peña

13. *Por los siglos de los siglos, Amor*. Marisa Tripes

4.- Colección Obras de Autor

Directores: Juan José Padial y Alberto Ciria

Obras de autores consagrados en la historia del pensamiento, del arte, la ciencia y las humanidades. Obras anónimas de relevancia para una cultura o un periodo histórico. Clásicos del pasado y de la actualidad reciente.

1. *Desarrollo como autodestrucción. Estudios sobre el problema fundamental de Rousseau*. Reinhard Lauth
2. *¿Qué significa hoy ser abrahamita?* Reinhard Lauth
3. *Metrópolis*. Thea von Harbou
4. *"He visto la verdad". La filosofía de Dostoievski en una exposición sistemática*. Reinhard Lauth
5. *Lecciones sobre la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. I. Introducciones*. G.W.F. Hegel. Edición de Juan José Padial y Alberto Ciria

6. *La exigencia ética*. K.E.Ch. Logstrup
7. *Lecciones sobre la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. II. Antropología.* G.W.F. Hegel. Edición de Juan José Padial y Alberto Ciria

En preparación

8. *Lecciones sobre la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. III. Fenomenología y Psicología*. G.W.F. Hegel. Edición de Juan José Padial y Alberto Ciria

5.- Colección Sabiduría y Religiones

Directores: José Antonio Antón Pacheco, Jacinto Choza y Jesús de Garay

Textos de carácter sapiencial de las diferentes culturas. Textos sagrados y sobre lo sagrado y textos religiosos de las diferentes confesiones de la historia humana. Textos pertenecientes a confesiones y religiones institucionalizadas del mundo.

1. *El culto originario: La religión paleolítica*. Jacinto Choza
2. *La religión de la sociedad secular*. Javier Álvarez Perea
3. *La moral originaria: La religión neolítica*. Jacinto Choza
4. *Metamorfosis del cristianismo. Ensayo sobre la relación entre religión y cultura*. Jacinto Choza
5. *La revelación originaria: La religión de la Edad de los Metales*. Jacinto Choza
6. *Rābi'a de Basora. Maestra mística y poeta del amor*. Ana Salto Sánchez del Corral
7. *Vigencia de la cultura griega en el cristianismo*. José María Garrido Luceño
8. *Desarrollo doctrinal del cristianismo*. José María Garrido Luceño
9. *La oración originaria: La religión de la Antigüedad*. Jacinto Choza

6.- Colección Estudios Thémata

Directores: Jacinto Choza, Francisco Rodríguez Valls, Juan José Padial

Trabajos de investigación personal y en equipo, específicos y genéricos, instantáneos y prolongados, concluyentes y abiertos a ulteriores investigaciones. Textos sobre estados de las cuestiones y formulaciones heurísticas.

1. *La interculturalidad en diálogo. Estudios filosóficos*. Sonia París e Irene Comins (eds.)

2. *Humanismo global. Derecho, religión y género*. Sonia París e Irene Comins (eds.)

3. *Fibromialgia. Un diálogo terapéutico*. Aymé Barreda, Jacinto Choza, Ananí Gutiérrez y Eduardo Riquelme (eds.)

4. *Hombre y cultura. Estudios en homenaje a Jacinto Choza*. Francisco Rodríguez Valls y Juan J. Padial (eds.)

5. *Leibniz en diálogo*. Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez y Miguel Escribano Cabeza (eds.)

6. *Historiografías político-culturales rioplatenses*. Jaime Peire, Arrigo Amadori y Telma Liliana Chaile (eds.)

7. *Afectividad y subjetividad*. Calisaya L., Choza J., Delgado P., Gutiérrez A., (eds.)

8. *Platón y Aristóteles. Nuevas perspectivas de metafísica, ética y epistemología*. Jaime Araos San Martin (ed.)

9. *Filosofía de la basura. La responsabilidad global tecnológica y jurídica*. Jacinto Choza

10. *El sexo de los ángeles. Sexo y género desde las bacterias a los robots*. Jacinto Choza

7.- Colección Cielo Abierto

Directores: Francisco Rodríguez Valls, José Julio Cabanillas, Jesús Cotta

Colección de poesía antigua y actual en lengua española.

1. *Lengua en paladar: Poesía en Sevilla 1978-2018*. José Julio Cabanillas y Jesús Cotta (eds.)

8.- Colección GNOMON. En coedición con Apeadero de aforistas

Directores: José Luis Trullo y Manuel Neila

Textos de creación y análisis en torno al aforismo. Traducciones de clásicos. Reedición de libros descatalogados. Antologías de autores contemporáneos.

1.*El cántaro a la fuente. Aforistas españoles del s. XXI*. José Luis Trullo y Manuel Neila (eds.)
2. *La ignorancia. Las siete bestias, I.* Emilio López Medina

Este libro se terminó de imprimir
el día 2 de febrero de
2021, festividad de
la Candelaria.