

TITLE: “Rhetorical Strategies in the British and Spanish
Parliaments”

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RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN THE BRITISH AND SPANISH PARLIAMENTS

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1. Introductory remarks

Among the studies oriented to the analysis of conversation, it is essential to include a new approach called “Discursive Psychology” (Edwards and Potter 1992). This new perspective “... approaches the mind-world relationship as a participant’s common sense basis for talking” (Edwards 2004a). Edwards (1999: 273) also claims that “A major theme of discursive psychology is the rhetorical design and use of emotion categories.” And he also points out that one of discursive psychology’s key concerns is the way in which talk manages subject-object relations, or mind-world relations (Edwards 1997, 2007).

Taking all this into consideration, this chapter has a double aim: (1) to illustrate Discursive Psychology (DP) and its methodology by examining eight extracts from two different parliamentary contexts; and (2) to show some of the strategies used by MPs from two different countries when building the factual status or objectivity of their own versions of a single common reality: the Iraqi conflict.

This methodology has already been used when analysing institutional settings (Potter 2005 and McHoul and Rapley 2002). Potter (2005: 25) explains that:

In this paper I want to push forward the discursive psychological project by considering how it might develop a specific approach to (some features of) institutions (building in part on Edwards & Potter, 2001). That is, how far can discursive psychology start to provide a new way of understanding concrete organisations and their operation?

In fact, Antaki and Leudar (2001) and Every and Augoustinos (2007) use DP as their framework of analysis when studying parliamentary exchanges in *The House of Commons* (Antaki and Leudar 2001) and the *Parliament of Australia* (Every and Augoustinos 2007).

To be precise, I will study British and Spanish parliamentary discourse practices during a Question Time devoted to the discussion of the Iraqi conflict. In this way, we can see what rhetorical strategies are used by British and Spanish MPs when dealing with a common reality. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that the main reason why I have selected parliamentary extracts from two different countries is not to present general claims about Spanish and British parliamentary styles but to gather a heterogeneous corpus which may show a wider variety of strategies. Needless to say, this may reveal some possible similarities and/or differences, but these will only lead us to tentative conclusions.

As I said before, the single common reality which all these MPs share is the Iraqi conflict. According to Joseph Nye (a US political analyst), there are

two different types of power: the hard and the soft power. Whereas the first one is related to the military and economic power, the second is defined as the power of “getting others to want what you want” (Nye 2004: 5). Nye also explains that the “effective study of international politics depends today upon our understanding of the interplay between ...the politics of territory, guns or money and the language of narrating the world in coherent and persuasive stories.” (Chouliaraki 2005: 2). There were two crucial stakes of controversy in the Iraqi conflict: (1) the legitimacy of the war and (2) the international community’s role. In this context, every single MP will be absolutely determined to use all his/her rhetorical weapons (“soft power”) in order to build the factual status of his/her own interpretation of this common reality. According to Chouliaraki (2005: 1) “This war split the international community, including the European Union, and challenged the status of international institutions, such as the UN, in an unprecedented manner.” It is for this reason that I decided to analyse parliamentary exchanges dealing with this conflict.

2. Aim and Material

In order to reach extensive conclusions I have selected parliamentary speeches from two different parliaments: The House of Commons (British Parliament) and the *Congreso de los Diputados* (Spanish Parliament). The extracts I have chosen for analysis in both languages come from the Question Time section. The reason for this selection is that the language used in this section is highly conversational: when an MP is not satisfied

with the answer s/he has received s/he may add a supplementary question which is an ad-hoc question. In this way, the conversational approach I am going to use will prove to be very useful and advantageous. In fact, I will try to demonstrate that DP is a useful tool which will help us to discover and analyse the rhetorical strategies used by Spanish and British MPs when building the factual status or objectivity of their own versions of a single common reality: the Iraqi conflict.

These extracts share the following characteristics:

- They are exchanges that took place during the so-called Question Time at The House of Commons (British Parliament) and at El *Congreso de los Diputados* (Spanish Parliament).
- They include questions to Members of Parliament and Prime Minister/President (Mr. Tony Blair and Mr. José M^a Aznar).
- They took place almost in the same dates (5th March 2003, 12th March 2003, 19th March 2003, 25th March 2003, 26th March 2003 and 2nd April 2003) and dealt about the same issue: Iraq conflict.

Specifically, I am going to analyse eight different extracts: four from the House of Commons (Table 1) and four from the *Congreso de los Diputados* (Table 2):

“@@ Insert Table 1 here”

“@@ Insert Table 2 here”

3. Methodological approach

Discursive Psychology (DP) implies a great step forward in the field of traditional psychology. Up to then traditional psychology had analysed interviews and conversations as simple developments of specific topics, that is, it was interested exclusively in what people felt and thought about certain topics. In this way, any answer which was not connected with the topic they were investigating was considered a “noise”. However, discursive psychology defends that people really carry out actions when they talk. So, no single component of the conversation or interview should be discarded because when people converse, they are really constructing a reality with their words.

There are three major strands in DP (Edwards 2004b):

- Investigations of how everyday psychological categories are used in discourse;
- Respecification and critique of psychological topics and explanations; and
- Studies of how psychological business (motives and intentions, prejudices, reliability of memory and perception, etc.) are handled and managed in talk and text, without having to be overtly labelled as such.

a) *Everyday psychological categories used in discourse*

This strand of investigation is related to the description and analysis of different cognitive and emotional states (to get angry, to believe, to know, to feel jealous, etc.). DA tries to explain why and how these mental and emotional states become relevant in discourse. Discursive choice is a key factor in the building of an individual's social relationships. Your social relationships will be greatly determined by the types of words you select to express your feelings or your ways of thinking.

The following extract (Edwards 2004b: 264) has been taken from the tabloid *The Sun* (1st September 1997). It comments on Earl Spencer's (Princess Diana's brother) remarks the previous night. Mr. Spencer said: "I always believed the press would kill her in the end":

- 1 **DON'T BLAME THE PRESS**
- 2 **THE SUN SAYS**
- 3 In the depths of his grief, Diana's brother
- 4 is entitled to be bitter about her death
- 5 (...)
- 6 At such a harrowing time, we can
- 7 understand his emotional outburst.

As Edwards explains, there is a clear difference between the words used by the newspaper and the words deployed by Mr. Spencer's; the discursive choices have been radically different. On the one hand, the newspaper talks about feelings ("grief") and Mr. Spencer about beliefs ("believed"). On the other hand, whereas the newspaper describes the grief as an "ad hoc" feeling due to the sorrowful situation, Mr. Spencer uses the adverb "always" to highlight that his belief was previous to the death. Apart from that, the use

of the adjective “bitter about” (line 4) shifts the focus of attention: instead of the press’s behaviour the focal point is Diana’s death. In fact, Mr. Spencer feels “anger” and not just “grief/bitterness” about his sister’s death. In this way, the use of “bitter about” not only shifts the reader’s attention but it also “apologises” Mr. Spencer’s behaviour. So, in this extract we can see to what extent the discursive choice of a specific word shapes our interpretation of the reality. Edwards (2004b: 264) adds that: “These are discourse options, ways of talking and writing, ways of constructing the nature of events one way rather than another, and of avoiding or countering alternative senses of events that may be alive at the time.”

b) Respecification and critique of psychological topics and explanations

DP criticizes a current tendency in psychology and social psychology which has the goal of studying the investigation of cognitive representations using especially designed texts for that purpose. Instead of that, respecification “... involves reworking psychological topics as discourse practices” (Edwards 2004b: 260). One of the points under respecification is the study of the scripts. Traditional psychology states that scripts are mental representations we normally use in order to recognise the world we live in. According to Edwards (2004b: 260):

Rather than people having memories, script knowledge, attitudes, etc, that they carry around in their heads and produce on cue (or in research interview), people are shown to formulate or work up the nature of events, actions, and their own accountability, through ways of talking. These “ways of talking” are constructive and action-oriented.

The main idea underlying this quotation is that we build the world we live in via the descriptions we make of it. Sometimes we describe some events as more or less repetitious or expected (“script formulations”) or as exceptional (“breach formulations”) because they deviate from the habitual. Breach formulations are normally followed by accounts which justify their deviations from the scripted¹. For this reason, Edwards describes these script formulations as “constructive” and “action-oriented”: “. . . they are constructed in ways that perform actions in and for the occasion of their telling.” (Edwards 2004b: 260). Just by means of the words you select to refer to something or somebody you are expressing your agreement or disagreement or even manifesting your point of view or your feelings about the person you are talking to.

c) Psychological business in discourse

Finally, the third strand of investigation is related to the way an individual’s evaluations and descriptions mirror his/her own stance. One example is the use of what Pomerantz calls (1986) “extreme case formulations” (ECFs). Edwards (2000: 347-8) explains that ECFs are “...descriptions or assessments that deploy extreme expressions such as every, all, none, best, least, as good as it gets, always, perfectly, brand new, and absolutely.” Pomerantz (1986: 227) summarises the three main uses of ECFs in the following way:

- to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings,
- to propose the cause of a phenomenon,
- to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice.

It is really interesting to note that these ECFs are very weak in the sense that it is easy to refute them. If somebody mentions just one counterexample, the validity of the ECFs is in jeopardy. For this reason, it is very common to find a softer version (“a softener”) right after the attack to an ECF. The order is: ECF - challenge - softener.

Therefore, I will analyse to see if British and Spanish MPs:

- show a similar or different reality through their discourse choices;
- describe the same events as more or less repetitious or expected (“script events”);
- deploy the same type and number of extreme expressions.

4. Parliaments as democratic institutions

The U.K. Parliament has always drawn considerable attention and been widely studied, perhaps because it is the oldest one of its kind -the first British Parliament was formed during the reign of King Henry III in the 13th century. In contrast to the Westminster system which favours a two-party system where each district elects one representative (“first past the post”), Spanish parliament uses a list system which favours multi-party system (a kind of proportional representation).

Nevertheless, “*Las Cortes Generales*” (i.e. the Spanish parliament) and “The House of Commons” (i.e. the British parliament) share many common characteristics. One is that both are bicameral, that is they are formed by two houses. “The United Kingdom Parliament” consists of: “The House of Commons” and “The House of Lords”. “*Las Cortes Generales*” consists of “*El Congreso de los Diputados*” and “*El Senado*”. Both parliaments are the highest legislative authority in Spain and the United Kingdom respectively – the institution responsible for making and repealing Spanish and UK law – and is also responsible for scrutinising (checking) the work of the Government.

It is interesting to mention the physical description of both parliaments because they differ greatly. In the House of Commons The Speaker, who controls proceedings, sits on a raised chair at one end of the Chamber with the government party to the right and the opposition to the left; in this way, Government MPs and Opposition MPs are facing each other. In contrast, *El Congreso de los Diputados* has a semi-circle shape (also called “*Hemiciclo*”) with The Speaker sitting in the centre. So, we may deduce that The House of Commons fosters confrontation and *El Congreso de los Diputados* common agreement.

There are two publications which should be mentioned here: the Hansard (www.parliament.uk) and the *Diarios de Sesiones* (www.congreso.es). Both of them are the official reports of the proceedings of the U.K. and the Spanish Parliament. Every single piece of linguistic or paralinguistic

information displayed by the MPs is included in these reports. In the case of paralinguistic features such as clappings, inaudible mutterings, laughs etc., they are given in brackets.

When we analyse parliamentary discourse we are studying a specific type of political discourse which is divided in several subgenres: ministerial statements, speeches, debates, oral/written questions and Question Time. Spanish and British parliamentary questions can be (1) written or oral and (2) addressed to any Minister or to the Prime Minister. Questions to Prime Minister (often referred to as PMQs) have a fixed day and time in the House of Commons: they start at 12:00 noon on Wednesdays and last half an hour. In contrast, there is no such PMQ in the *Congreso de los Diputados*: questions addressed to the Prime Minister or to any Minister are mixed.

An MP who wishes to pose a question to a Minister will have to hand it to a Clerk at the Table or to the Table Office beforeⁱⁱ it will be read at the House or *Congreso*. During this time, the Minister will prepare his/her answer. So, this means that it will be a well-structured and studied answer, far from what we normally find in real conversations. If the process ended here, there would be little of interest (from a conversationalist analyst's point of view). However, there is a place for spontaneity: if the MP who posed the question is not satisfied with the answer, s/he may add a "supplementary question" not previously included in the Notice Paper. There are two important differences between Spanish and English supplementaries. First, whereas in the House of Commons there can be as many supplementaries as the

Speaker considers appropriate, in the *Congreso de los Diputados* we can only find one single supplementary. Second, whereas there is no explicit length for these supplementaries in the House of Commons (it depends on the Speaker), there is an explicit limit of time in the Spanish supplementaries: no more than five minutes.

The dialogues we observe at Parliaments are very different from the dialogues we sustain in an ordinary conversation: the length of each turn, the type of language to be used, the layout of the questions, etc. In fact, the rules which specify the discursive behaviour of the MPs are published in Parliamentary Journals or Factsheetsⁱⁱⁱ and books^{iv}. Factsheet number 46 specifies that (page 2): “The Minister then reads out the answer which he has prepared to the Question ... From that point further exchanges are unscripted.”

It is also interesting to mention that Spanish and British parliaments also differ in the way MPs address each other. Whereas British MPs use the third person pronoun or “the (Right) Honourable Gentleman/Lady”, Spanish MPs use the polite second person pronoun of address “*usted*” (“*vous*”) or “*su señoría*”. The second person pronoun is only used in the House of Commons (a) to refer to the Speaker or (b) to threaten or interrupt an MP who is speaking (it is negative). (For more information about parliamentary discourses see Ilie (2006) and Van Dijk (2000) and for more information about parliamentary procedures see Silk and Walters (1987)).

5. Rhetorical strategies in the House of Commons and the Congreso de los Diputados

When analysing these eight extracts, I discovered several rhetorical strategies related to: discursive choice, script formulations, and ECFs. My purpose here is to discover to what extent different MPs from different nationalities and different political ideologies deploy these strategies in order to build the objectivity of their own versions of a single common reality: the Iraqi conflict

a) Discursive Choice

Following Edwards' (2004b) definition of discourse option we can say that each parliamentarian will choose specific discourse options which will help him/her to depict his/her specific interpretation of reality. Therefore, if we compare the Government's and the Opposition's discourse options we will probably discover important differences directly related to their ideologies. Similarly, it will also be interesting to look at the differences and/or similarities between Spanish and British parliamentarians' discourse options: Is there any difference and/or similarity between the way Spanish and British MPs try to depict their common reality? For this purpose, I will analyse the four English extracts (Appendices A, B, C and D) and then the four Spanish extracts (Appendices E, F, G and H). It is also worth mentioning that whereas the British government party was a moderate left wing party (Labour Party), the Spanish government party was a moderate right wing party (*Partido Popular*).

In relation to the first extract (Appendix A), the first thing which attracts our attention is the discursive choice. Whereas the conservative MP's (A. Turner) speech focuses on "reconstruction costs" and "oil revenues", C. Short (The Secretary of State for International Development) uses words such as "oil-for-food-programme", "poor shape" and "handouts". Clearly, whereas the position adopted by Mr. Turner is similar to an economist's position who is analysing the profits-costs of a business, The Labour Secretary of State for International Development's attitude seems more social and humanitarian.

Additionally, the use of words such as "colleagues" and "trouble" in the same question means that Turner's feelings about his European colleagues are very suspicious. In fact, we all know that countries such as France or Germany did not back the war.

It is interesting to note the contrast between "economic" terms such as "oil revenues" or "reconstruction" (Mr. Turner) and more "humanitarian" expressions such as "oil-for-food programme" (Mrs. Short). Additionally, Mrs. Short deploys the verb "to modernise" instead of "to reconstruct" (Mr. Turner). The difference between these two verbs is obvious: if you "reconstruct" something, you just "build it again"; but if you "modernise" something, it becomes "less old-fashioned as a result of new methods, equipment, or ideas". So, the first one implies leaving everything as they were before the war and the second suggests an improvement. Using verbs such as "to modernise" and not just "to reconstruct" the Government

justifies its military intervention because it proves to be a “necessity” previous to the war rather than a consequence of the war.

It is also interesting to note the temporal division in Mrs. Short’s speech. When she uses two different tenses: the present tense to describe the actual situation and the future with “will” to refer to a forthcoming situation. This division is even clearer in Mrs. Short’s first answer: the connector “thereafter” neatly divides both sections. In this way, Mrs. Short first shows a present situation in which Iraq is in need of humanitarian help and immediately after and in an irrefutable way (using “thereafter”) she describes what has to be done.

In the second extract (Appendix B) there is a clear contrast between the Prime Minister’s and Mr. Kennedy’s (Liberal Democrat) discursive choices. Whereas Mr. Kennedy deploys terms such as “post-military conflict”, the Prime Minister prefers to use terms such as “conflict”, “the process of transition” or “any transitional arrangements”. There is a clear difference between “a post-military period” and a “transitional period”. A “post-military period” is supposed to be a period of destruction, poverty and hunger. In contrast to this, when you refer to this period as a “transitional period” you are thinking about a better period of peace. In fact, it is not a mere coincidence that Mr. Blair (i.e. the Prime Minister) uses in an iterative way the term “transition/al”. One of the main reasons he backed the war was to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to the Iraqi people. So, for a liberal democrat^v like Mr. Kennedy, the Iraqi people are enduring a “post-

military conflict”; for the Prime Minister, they are living a transitional period.

The United Nations did not back the war and for this reason some people called this war an “illegal war”. This means that there are three sides: the coalition forces, the United Nations and the rest of the countries. Mr. Kennedy’s views are that this is an illegal war and that the coalition forces are directed by the United States. He rejects both and that is why he asks about the United Nations’ and the United States’ roles after the war. It is very interesting to look at the way Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Blair refer to the United States: Mr. Kennedy personalise the reference and uses “the President of the United States” or “President Bush”; instead, Mr. Blair deploys “the United States”. In this way, Mr. Kennedy tries to make us believe that the war was brought about by a single person’s interests and not a whole country’s benefit. Instead of highlighting the existence of three different sides, Mr. Blair uses the word “partnership”:

- “the proper partnership between the coalition forces, and countries and the United Nations” and
- “what it wants is the ability to work with us, in partnership, to make sure that ...”

Mr. Blair is trying to depict a situation of partnership and harmony, something very different from what Mr. Kennedy is trying to make us believe.

It is interesting to note Mr. Ancram's (Conservative Party) discursive choice in the third extract (Appendix C). When talking about Iraq's new government, Mr. Ancram uses terms such as "permanent and subjugated minorities" and "surrogate for rule by America, Britain or both". In contrast, Mr. Straw deploys words such as "to establish good, representative governance". Whereas "subjugated" is a term related to dictatorship and oppression, "representative" is a word normally used in democratic contexts. So, Mr. Ancram is depicting a situation where Britain and America will be in charge of Iraqi government and so Iraqi people will not be free because they will not be governed by Iraqi people. But Mr. Straw uses the term "representative" which is a democratic word which refers to a form of government where people vote for politicians who represent their opinions.

It should be highlighted the difference between "conflict" and "war". It is a matter of lexical choice, but why? Whereas government MPs prefer to use the term "conflict" (Mr. Straw says "to endorse an appropriate post-conflict Administration for Iraq), Opposition MPs opt for "war" (Mr. Ancram says "the effects of the war"). The difference is clear, a conflict is a situation in which people are involved in a serious disagreement or argument, but the word "war" suggests more serious consequences such as destruction, death and sorrow.

Additionally, when Mr. Straw is enumerating the functions of the new UN Security Council resolution, he mentions three points:

- (1) “to affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity”;
- (2) “to ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian aid”; and
- (3) “to reflect and endorse an appropriate post-conflict Administration of Iraq”.

This is a three part list because he manages to reduce (Atkinson 1984) the advantages of the UN Security Council Resolution to three points. These three points refer to Iraq’s main problems: territorial integrity, humanitarian aid and administration.

This is a persuasive strategy normally used by speakers in general and politicians in particular (“list of three”). Atkinson (1984: 57) explains:

In speeches, conversations and most other forms of communication, the most commonly used type of list contains three items, and an example of such a list has just been used to start this sentence. One of the main attractions of three-part lists is that they have an air of unity or completeness about them. Lists comprising only two items tend to appear inadequate or incomplete.

The Prime Minister also uses the word “conflict” (three times) in the fourth extract (Appendix D). Additionally, the Prime Minister and Mr. Rendel (Liberal Democrat Party) use the word “reconstruction” in quite different ways. The word “reconstruction” comes from Latin (“*construo*”) and the prefix “re-” is normally added to verbs and abstract nouns with the meaning “again, back” (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973). And according to the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, “reconstruction” means “the process of putting something back into the state it was before”. There is no possible ambiguity in the meaning of this word. So, we may wonder: to

what previous situation are the Prime Minister and Mr. Rendel referring to? According to Mr. Rendel it is before the war and according to the Prime Minister it is before Saddam Hussein. So, for Mr. Rendel the war was the cause of the destruction and for the Prime Minister it was Saddam Hussein. If we keep in mind that the Liberal Democrats were against the war and that the Prime Minister was against Saddam Hussein, differences in the use of the word “reconstruction” are now clear.

In the Spanish corpus there is also a remarkable discursive choice. For example, in the fifth extract (Appendix E), there is a highly singular iterative use of the terms “*responsabilidades*” (“responsibilities”) and “*responsabilidad*” (“responsibility”) in Aznar’s speech, and a repetitive deployment of the word “*guerra*” (“war”) in Llamazares’s (*Izquierda Unida* Party, i.e. a communist party) speech. These selections are not accidental but are a clear reflection of their cognitive and emotional states. For Aznar, the reason for Spain’s involvement in the war is a matter of “responsibility”; in his multiple appearances on TV he has always defended his position stating that it is Spain’s responsibility to fight against terrorism wherever it is. When somebody has a responsibility to do something that means that s/he has a moral duty to behave in a particular way. So, the war against Iraq is depicted as a moral duty and so morally unavoidable. On the other hand, Llamazares, instead of using the word “responsibility”, deploys the word “war”. This is a key word which is clearly avoided by Aznar; in fact, he does not use this word -not even once- in his speech. There is a

straightforward reason for this selection (Llamazares) and avoidance (Aznar): the word “war” is related to words such as “destruction, death or suffering”. So, the script situation begotten by these words are radically different: whereas one of them (“responsibility”) is related to “moral duty”, the other is connected to “destruction”. These two script situations correspond to two different ways of experiencing and portraying one single reality.

Another word which is repeated up to four times in Llamazares’s speech is “*promover / promotores*” (“to promote / promoters”). This word is the cognitive link between the word “*guerra*” (“war”) and the government; the government is depicted as the “promoter” of the war and so the promoter of a situation of “*conmoción y espanto*” (“shock and horror”). In the same way, Aznar repeats the verb “*dedicarse*” (“to devote to”) up to four times. When somebody is devoted to something s/he works very hard at something s/he thinks is important; this Spanish verb is normally used when you describe the type of job somebody has. It is typical of the question “¿*A qué te dedicas?*” (“What is your job?”). Aznar uses this verb once to refer to himself; in this case, the verb is related to “jobs” which require responsibility. In contrast, the first time that Aznar uses this word to refer to Llamazares’s “job” he uses the indefinite and generic word “*cosas*” (“things”). When Aznar uses this verb again, it is used to refer to activities such as “*coaccionar, moral o violentamente*” (“coerce morally or violently”). The subject of “to devote to” in this case is “those people”,

again Aznar is using an indefinite and generic word. This relationship between Llamazares' party and the act of devoting to coercion is finally made explicit when Aznar says

(4) *“y ustedes tienen, les guste o no, una responsabilidad en ello”*

(“like it or not, you have got a responsibility in all that”).

Again, thanks to the repetition of certain words the politicians construct a “script situation” in their listeners' minds, and that situation corresponds to a new image they want to introduce in their listeners' minds. Additionally, the persuasive force of the repetition has been widely recognized (Cockcroft and Cockcroft 1992, Roiz 1994, Echeverría 1995).

Again, two key words are deployed in this quotation: “manipulation” and “emotive language”. It is obvious then that the discursive choices that these politicians are making are oriented to one very important discursive strategy: the persuasion through the manipulation of their listeners' feelings. We can also see a couple of examples of three-part list in Llamazares's speech in this extract. The first one is uttered when he is describing the reasons why Spain feels ashamed; he enumerates up to three Spanish resources which are to be used by U.S.A.:

(5) *“las bases militares, el espacio aéreo y a nuestros propios ejércitos”* (“our military bases, our air space and our own army”).

Similarly, Llamazares also lists three groups of people who are being denied the right to demonstrate:

(6) “*a nosotros, a los jóvenes y a los pacifistas*” (“us, the young and the pacifists”).

In this enumeration Llamazares has included himself and his party in a reference group which comprises young people and pacifists. Bettinghaus (1973: 78) defines the term “reference group” in the following way:

The term 'reference group' is used to describe any group to which a person relates his attitudes. An understanding of reference groups is necessary to persuasion because frames of reference are built up as the result of contact with or membership in particular groups.

So, Llamazares and his political party's attitudes are the same as young people and pacifists' attitudes. In this way, it is implied that those who do not belong to that reference group (i.e. his reference group) are non-pacifist or even a military people. Evidently, the inferences are straightforward and clear: “It is a positive and reliable reference group and everyone should love to belong to it.”

Atkinson (1984: 151) adds that “Contrasts and three-part lists are widely used not just by political orators and their speech-writers. They are also regularly found in other spoken and written materials where the aim is to persuade an audience.” In this sense, Aznar's speech is a clear example of contrast. The first part of his answer to the supplementary question contrast with the second part. In fact, this second part starts with “Sin embargo” (“However”). Whereas the first part is full of “*quiero*,” “*creo*”, “*me parece*” (“want, think, believe”), the second is loaded with expressions such as “*coaccionar moral o violentamente*” (“to coerce morally or violently”);

inaceptable^{vi} (“unacceptable”); “*injurias, coacciones, los ataques y los problemas*” (“insults, coercions, attacks and problems”). So, the lexical field of the first half is a “cognitive one” and the second an “emotive one”. In the first part, Aznar has preferred to use a smooth style where he exposes what he thinks about the issue they are talking about and then he decides to finish in an emotive way full of negative and regrettable feelings. As Edwards (1999: 271) explains: “Discursive psychology is defined and illustrated in terms of how people describe and invoke emotions in everyday talk and text.” Words such as “insults, coercions, attacks” imply the agentive action of an external force and this means that there must be a subject or subjects responsible for these actions. The implicature becomes an evidence when at the end of his speech Aznar says:

(7) “*y ustedes tienen, les guste o no, una responsabilidad en ello y yo le llamo a ella seriamente, señor Llamazares*” (“and, like it or not, you have got a responsibility in all that and I summon you to it, Mr. Llamazares”).

It is also interesting to note that in the sixth extract (Appendix F) Mr. Caldera’s (*Partido Socialista*, i.e. a moderate left wing party) and Ms. Palacio’s (*Partido Popular*, i.e. the government party) discursive choices are totally different. On the one hand, Mr. Caldera uses words such as “invasion”, “immoral”, “disastrous”, “hate”, “indignation”, “terrorism” or “insecurity” to describe the war’s outcomes. On the other hand, Ms. Palacio concentrates on Iraq’s previous situation (“humanitarian emergency for 20

years”, “murders”) and Mr. Caldera’s political interests (“vote-catching”, “banners”, “slogans”).

Additionally, there are important contrasts. Mr. Caldera deploys the word “unilateral” to describe the position of those who backed the war and Ms. Palacio uses the word “multilateral”. Mr. Caldera also says that:

(8) “there is a unilateral war without legal or moral legitimacy” and

Ms. Palacio answers that:

(9) “the Spanish Government’s goal has always been to restore the international legality”.

So, it is interesting to note that even though they are both living the same reality, they are offering different script formulations of it because their psychological realities are different. A conservative and a labour member’s set of beliefs and experiences are radically different and this is reflected in their discursive choices.

Mr. Caldera uses the word “war” up to 21 times, while Ms. Palacio deploys it only once. And it is even more curious that the only time Ms. Palacio uses this word, the message is abandoned because she is interrupted and when she resumes her speech she uses different words. The word “war” refers to a script situation which is highly negative and destructive. For this reason, Ms. Palacio prefers to avoid it and tries to deviate the listener’s attention describing a different situation: the labour party’s vote-catching goals. In one year (14th March 2004) there will be General Elections in Spain.

In relation to the discursive choice in the seventh extract (Appendix G), Mr. Caldera uses words such as “war” (“*Guerra*”), “attack” (“*ataque*”), “invades” (“*invade*”) and “make profit of” (“*explota*”). In contrast, Mr. Rajoy (*Partido Popular*, i.e. the government party) uses none of these words, instead, he deploys terms such as “weapons of mass destruction” (“*armas de destrucción masiva*”) and “terrorism” (“*terrorismo*”). This is highly related to the kind of world each one depicts. Mr. Caldera’s words show the result of the Government’s policy and Mr. Rajoy’s words the reason for the government’s behaviour. The terms used by both depict situations similarly negative which correspond to the sad and gloomy reality that the whole world is living.

Mr. Caldera and Mr. Rajoy also use common words such as: “peace” (“*paz*”) and “disarmament” (“*desarme*”). They both claim that they want a peaceful world but they differ in their positions towards the disarmament. There is a change in Mr. Rajoy’s use of the word disarmament. In his first answer he claims that Iraq has to disarm, so we guess that Iraq is full of weapons of mass destruction and sustains a negative policy towards UN’s legislation. Then, Mr. Caldera says that Iraq has got rid of some of their weapons of mass destruction and so is stating the process of disarmament. Mr. Rajoy recognises this in his supplementary answer but he claims that this process of disarmament should be complete. This process could be summarised in the following way:

- Mr. Rajoy's ECF: Iraq has to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction.
- Mr. Caldera's challenge: Iraq has already got rid of some weapons of mass destruction.
- Rajoy's softened version: Iraq has already got rid of some weapons of mass destruction but should get rid of all of them.

Finally, the first thing which attracts attention in the last extract (Appendix H) is Mr. Llamazares's discursive choice. He has used sentences such as:

(10) "tell us once and for all the truth" (*"díganos usted por una vez la verdad"*).

(11) "masks must be removed" (*"hay que quitarse las mascarás"*).

(12) "Nobody believes you" (*"nadie les cree"*).

(13) "Nobody believes you" (*"nadie les cree"*).

(14) "Do not deceive people" (*"no engañe a los ciudadanos"*).

So, Mr. Llamazares is accusing Mr. Aznar of lying and so putting his credibility in jeopardy. According to Huici Módenes (1996) a very important factor in persuasion is "the credibility of the source" (*"la credibilidad de la fuente"*). Herreros (1989) also states that credibility is among the most important factors of persuasion and explains that (1989: 218): "... *la credibilidad de quien comunica es consustancial con los efectos persuasivos. Esta credibilidad referida al emisor cristaliza en múltiples aspectos. Uno de los más importantes anida en el prestigio de la fuente"* ("the communicator's credibility is an inherent persuasive effect. The

speaker's credibility crystallizes in multiple aspects. One of the most important is the source's prestige").

In this sense, it is very interesting to mention that Mr. Aznar uses "I believe" ("*creo*") up to six times. So, we may wonder why Mr. Aznar deploys "believe that" rather than "affirm that" or "state that" or "claim that" etc. "Believe" has three main meanings: (1) to feel certain; (2) to think possible; and (3) to have opinion. In all these six cases Mr. Aznar is giving his opinion. Obviously, to give an opinion is less radical than to affirm or to state something. In this way, we can say that Mr. Aznar is being tentative rather than conclusive. This contrasts with Mr. Llamazares's behaviour because he has just seen that he has used up to four ECFs. So, we can conclude saying that whereas the Opposition's behaviour is radical and demanding, the government's manners are more moderate and cautious.

If we compare questions to the PM in both languages, the first thing which attracts our attention is that both PMs (i.e. Mr. Blair and Mr. Aznar) avoid using the word "war". Instead, Mr. Blair deploys the term "conflict" and Mr. Aznar uses nothing because he does not mention the war. Nevertheless, there are more differences than similarities:

- British MPs are much more interested in Great Britain's relationship with the USA and the rest of the coalition forces than Spanish MPs.
- Spanish MPs in the Opposition focus their attacks on the Government political behaviour.

So, whereas Spanish MPs' discursive options are much more related to "domestic" matters such as the political behaviour of each other, British MPs' discursive options are more "international" in the sense that they are interested in Great Britain's role in the Iraqi conflict and its relationship with other countries. In this way, it can be stated that Spanish discussions are more "partisan" because it seems that their goal is to discredit the Government or the parties in the opposition, while British exchanges are more "nationalistic" because their aim is to discuss British responsibilities and relationships.

For those interested in the field of lexical choice it is worth seeing Bayley's (1999) paper about the lexis and collocation patterns in British parliamentary debates.

b) Script Formulations

A widely used persuasive strategy is to lead somebody to believe that you share the same feelings and ideas. This is the main goal of the so-called script formulations: to construct a common socio-psychological reality based on a set of beliefs and experiences shared by speaker and listener. Edwards (1995) names a series of grammatical scripting devices to describe a script formulation and we can find some of them in these extracts. For example, in the first extract (Appendix A) there are two instances of the pronoun "we" in the "supplementary question – answer" sequence. One of them is used by Mr. Turner and the other by Mrs. Short. When Mr. Turner says:

(15) “why are we having such trouble agreeing with our European colleagues how much they will contribute?”,

and when Mrs. Short utters:

(16) “We need to keep that running and modernise their economy so that the oil industry is better and their economy can grow”

They both use a kind of “we” which has as its referent the group of countries which want to help the Iraqi people. It is a way of patronising, “we” depicts their referents as “savours”. In this sense, it is a “we” which is trying to unify people against terrorism, and is attempting to narrow the distance between the speaker and his/her listeners. Additionally, both “we_s” are followed by “are having” and “need to keep”. According to Edwards (1995), the iterative aspect is a grammatical scripting device to describe a script formulation. So, both “we_s” describe a common and repetitive reality known by speaker and listeners. Anyway, they are different types of “savours”, the first ones (Mr. Turner) are “economic” savours and the second one (Mrs. Short) are “humanitarian” savours: whereas Mr. Turner is worried by the economic indebtedness, Mrs. Short is distressed about humanitarian needs.

Similarly to British MPs, Spanish MPs also use the pronoun “we” (“*nosotros*”) as a scripting device. In fact, in all Spanish extracts we can see a difference between “*nosotros*” (“we”) and “*usted/es*” (“vous”). Again, this dichotic view goes hand in hand with the situation in the *Congreso de los Diputados*. As it has been pointed out previously, Spanish MPs are mainly

concerned about their partisan conflicts. So, in this context a division between “we” and “you” is a reflection of a partisan reality.

The way Mr. Caldera concludes his supplementary in the seventh extract (Appendix G) is interesting because he uses the proverb:

(17) “with art and trick you live half the year and with trick and art the other half” (“*con arte y engaño vive usted la mitad del año y con engaño y arte la otra*”).

According to Edwards (1995) idiomatic expressions are script formulations which describe actions and events as having recurring, predictable, sequential patterns. For this reason, this proverb fulfils the following function (Edwards 1995: 324-5):

If a description identifies an event as part of a regular pattern, something that happens often in a regular way, then that helps to bolster such a description against refutation. It solidifies it as part of a recognizable external world rather than a product of wrong or biased reporting. Formulating events as routine, and as recognizable on that basis, is therefore especially useful as a rhetorical device precisely when the credibility of a speaker, or the external reality of a description, may be in doubt.

In contrast, there are no proverbs in the English corpus. If we want to know the reason, we have to take a closer look at the idiomatic expression: its content is related to the Government’s behaviour in general. In fact, Mr. Caldera is saying that the Government has always behaved in a deceitful way (i.e. with art and trick you live half the year and with trick and art the other half). So, again, it seems that the problem is not the Iraqi conflict but the Government’s behaviour in general. As we can see, there is a great

contrast between the Spanish and the British exchanges: whereas British discussions are much more concerned with the Iraqi conflict, Spanish discussions are focused on the relationship between the Government and the Opposition.

c) Extreme Case Formulations

As has been stated before, ECFs are expressions such as “every, all, none, etc.” which describe a given situation in a radical way.

We can find three ECFs in the first extract (Appendix A):

(18) “Some 16 million people are **completely** dependent on handouts and are not economically active”

(19) “Iraqi oil is sold under the oil-for-food programme and **every scrap of** money that comes from legitimate sales goes into a UN trust fund to purchase food and medical supplies and to patch up water supplies and so on to keep everyone fed”

(20) “Iraqi oil is sold under the oil-for-food programme and every scrap of money that comes from legitimate sales goes into a UN trust fund to purchase food and medical supplies and to patch up water supplies and so on to keep **everyone** fed.”

All of them are uttered by the same person (Mrs. Short), in the same situation and for the same goal: the description of an extreme necessity situation. This supports Mrs. Short’s strategic goal: to describe the Government’s actions as purely humanitarian. As has been previously mentioned, ECFs are rhetorically weak because it is very easy to challenge

one ECF, all you have to do is find one counterexample. Although its use is quite common in ordinary conversations (Edwards 2000), it seems that MPs deploy them in a much more limited way. The reason is that whereas we are “allowed” to speak in a non literal way in ordinary conversations, it is very dangerous to speak non literally at Parliament, first of all because that way of speaking can put MPs in jeopardy and second because they can be accused of perjury. However, this specific situation^{vii} lets Mrs. Short deploy these ECFs because everybody knows the extreme necessity conditions of the Iraqi people. Mrs. Short strategically uses ECFs to illustrate an extreme situation.

Additionally, in the fourth extract (Appendix D) the Prime Minister uses the ECF “all” in his answer to a question posed by Mr. Rendel:

(21) “Secondly, I would say to him that, yes, we will ensure that the funds are available—indeed, funds have already been earmarked for the purpose—and the Secretary of State for International Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury are doing **all that they can** to make sure that we co-ordinate with American allies and also with other UN partners to ensure that the funds are available and also that the programme is available, so that in the post-conflict situation in Iraq the people of Iraq are given the future that they need.”

In this case, the PM is speaking for the rightness of a practice (Pomerantz 1986): the availability of funds.

Nevertheless, there are important differences:

- Mr. Rendel mentions neither the US nor the UN. In contrast, the PM does not only mention them but he also uses the words “allies” and “partners”. Obviously, the PM is trying to (a) improve the damaged image of the United States because in this way this country is related to something positive like the reconstruction of Iraq; and (b) make us believe that the US is an ally (i.e. a country that has agreed to help and support British people) and the UN countries are partners (i.e. countries you do a particular activity with).
- The PM ignores the term “swiftly”. Mr. Rendel has just said that Afghanistan has only received less than half the necessary funds for its reconstruction, so, in this context, it would sound ridiculous and unbelievable if the PM said “swiftly”. Wisely, he prefers to ignore the word.

Similarly, the Spanish MPs Mr. Llamazares and Mr. Aznar uses three ECFs in the fifth extract (Appendix E). They use three superlative adjectives: “*gravísimas*” (“very severe”) and “*sumarísimo*” (“very brief”) (Llamazares); and “*me alegro muchísimo*” (“I am very happy”) (Aznar):

(22) “*Por tanto, son promotores de la guerra y de sus **gravísimas** consecuencias, humanas y materiales, pero en primer lugar humanas.*” [So, you are promoters of this war and of its very severe consequences, human and material, but first of all human].

(23) “*Pero lo que usted no puede hacer es un juicio **sumarísimo** a los grupos políticos de esta Cámara.*” [But what you cannot do is to offer a very brief judgement to the members of the House].

(24) “*Señoría, le quiero decir que tampoco creo que haya un problema de libertad de manifestación en España y para usted, especialmente para usted, no creo que haya un problema ni de libertad de expresión ni de libertad de manifestación, especialmente para usted, de lo cual me alegro **muchísimo**.*” [Your honour, I want to tell you that I don’t even think that there is a problem of freedom of speech in Spain and for you, especially for you, I don’t think that there is a problem either of freedom of speech or of freedom of demonstration, especially for you, that is something I am very happy about].

In Spanish you have two types of superlatives: relative and absolute. The first one is formed with “*el más X de*” (“the most X in”) or “*el menos X de*” (“the least X in”). Example: “*Juan es el niño más alto de la clase*” (“John is the tallest boy in the classroom”). The absolute superlative can be formed in 3 different ways: (1) using the adverb “*muy*” (“very”): “*Juan es muy alto*” (“John is very tall”); (2) adding the ending “*-ísimo*”: “*Juan es altísimo*” or the ending “*-érrimo*”^{viii}: “*Juan es un hombre celeberrimo*”. When talking about ECFs, Edwards (2000: 349) explains that:

Pomerantz (1986) defined ECFs by example rather than by logical or grammatical rule. In fact, they cut across a variety of grammatical categories, notably the “superlative” forms of adjectives (best, most,

biggest, least, etc.); a collection of other semantically extreme adjectives (total, absolute, whole, etc.); and various adverbs (always, never, perfectly, completely, etc.), nouns (nothing, everybody, etc.), and phrases (as good as it gets, forever, brand new, etc.). I argue that it is an important feature of how ECFs work that they are generally identifiable in this way, conceptually and out of context (whether by rule or example), as being semantically extreme.

Pomerantz (1986: 227) describes three uses of ECFs: (1) “to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings”; (2) “to propose the cause of a phenomenon”; and (3) “to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice”. In relation to the second, Edwards (2000: 348) adds that the aim is “to propose a phenomenon is “in the object” or objective rather than a product of the interaction or the circumstances”. In other words, when Llamazares talks about the war and “*sus gravísimas consecuencias*” (its very severe consequences”) or when he accuses Aznar of doing a “*juicio sumarísimo*” (“very brief judgement”), he is (a) presenting something as “objective” and not based on his own point of view; (b) calling everybody’s attention to the fact that what he is saying is right; and (c) defending against further challenges. As Norrick (2004: 1728) states “ECF is a sub-category of hyperbole” and “Political speeches are, at least stereotypically, often characterized as having a good deal of exaggeration and extravagant statement. In other words they are hyperbolous” (Swartz 1976: 100). Swartz (1976: 100) goes on explaining the reason why hyperbole is a common figure of speech in political language:

(...) hyperbole provides a means for focusing attention on specific aspects of reality (whether social or physical) in such a way as to bring about awareness of values and norms associated with those

aspects in an emotionally charged way. In focusing attention on some aspects of reality rather than others, it structures that reality in ways open to manipulation by users.

We can find two examples of ECFs in the seventh extract (Appendix G) and both of them have been uttered by the same person: Mr. Rajoy. The first one is “nothing” (“*nada*”) when Rajoy says:

(25) “Others are working for nothing” (“*Otros no están trabajando para nada*”)

and the second is “in no case” (“*en ningún caso*”) when Mr. Rajoy says:

(26) “in no case have they been due to the pressure of the *Grupo Socialista*” (“*en ningún caso como consecuencia de la presión del Grupo Socialista*”).

It is very interesting to note that both of them make reference to the same topic: the usefulness of the *Grupo Socialista*'s efforts to stop the pressures against Saddam Hussein. This is a way to weaken and deteriorate the *Grupo Socialista*'s image: it is depicted as a group of useless people who are complaining all the time but they really do nothing. In the case of the first ECF, Mr. Rajoy says “others” (“*otros*”) because he wants the audience to infer the real subject of the sentence. It is obvious that the subject is the *Grupo Socialista* but Rajoy knows that it is persuasively more effective from the psychological point of view that the audience works out the real meaning or intention of the sentence. When talking about the persuasive power of rhetorical questions, Zillman (1972: 161) states that:

It may be argued that the assumed covert agreement response elicited by a rhetorical question, as compared to the relatively passive decoding of an assertion in statement form, raises the individual's level of awareness.

That is, when the audience has to work out the intended meaning of an utterance the level of awareness raises.

Finally, in the last extract (Appendix H), Mr. Llamazares uses an ECF to make this statement stronger and even more persuasive: “nobody” (“*nadie*”):

(27) “*Ya nadie les cree, señores del Partido Popular, nadie se cree que sean centristas, ni que sean pacíficos*” [Nobody believes you, MPs of the Grupo Popular, nobody believes neither that you are a centre wing party nor that you are pacifists].

As it was previously stated, these ECFs have three main uses (Pomerantz, 1986: 227): (1) to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings, (2) to propose the cause of a phenomenon, and (3) to speak for the rightness (or wrongness) of a practice. In this specific case, it is crystal clear that Mr. Llamazares's words anticipate Aznar's (and *Popular* MPs') non sympathetic hearing. And it is also obvious that Mr. Llamazares is (a) proposing the cause of a phenomenon (i.e. the government's behaviour) and (b) speaking for the wrongness of a practice (Iraq war).

Mr. Llamazares uses two more ECFs:

(28) “We are going to cry for every single victim” (“*Nosotros vamos a llorar por cada una de las víctimas*”).

(29) “We all are going to demonstrate” (“*movilizándonos todos*”).

It is interesting to note that in both examples the subject of the sentences is an exclusive “we”, that is, a “we” which does not include the hearer. This “we” only includes those who cry for the victims (i.e. those who do not support the war) and demonstrate against the war. In fact, Pennycook (1994: 175) describes this pronoun as a pronoun of “... solidarity and rejection” and “... communality and authority” (ibid.: 176). So, Mr. Llamazares is offering a dichotic view of the world where we find on the one hand those who cry and demonstrate and on the other those who do not cry and do not demonstrate and Mr. Llamazares and his group of MPs are in the first group. In a recent study carried out by Íñigo-Mora (2004), I try to discover any type of relationship between (a) the scope of reference of “we” and (b) the intentions of the MP who uttered it at the House of Commons. I conclude that the type of “we” mostly used at the House of Commons was the exclusive “we”. She claims that this high number of exclusive “we” is highly related to one of Brown and Levinson’s (1987) negative politeness strategies: to impersonalise speaker and hearer avoiding the pronouns “I” and “you”. So, I explain (2004: 45) that: “Thus, it can be said that in the House of Commons: (a) it is preferable to keep a distance between speaker and hearer; and (b) Members of Parliament favour an “I” + power” form.”

As Edwards (in press) explains DP examines

... how people use terms such as “angry”, “jealous”, “know”, “believe”, “feel”, and so on ... We are interested in how these words are used, what they are used to do, and how they are used in

alternation or contrast to other words, in the construction of accounts of persons and their actions.

Finally, I have compared the number of (1) ECFs produced by British and Spanish MPs; and (2) ECFs produced by the Opposition and by the Government in both British and Spanish parliaments. The results are shown in the following tables:

“@@Insert Table 3 here”

“@@Insert Table 4 here”

“@@Insert Table 5 here”

If we have a look at the results, the first striking difference is related to the number of ECFs used by British and Spanish MPs: the number of ECFs deployed by Spanish MPs (8) doubles the number of ECFs used by British MPs (4). There may be two explanations for this difference:

- British MPs are more cautious than Spanish MPs because, as we have already said, ECFs are expressions easily refutable.
- Spanish style is more hyperbolic than British style because ECFs are nonliteral, exaggerated interpretations of the reality. (See McCarthy and Carter 2004).

It is also interesting to note that whereas British MPs in the Government produced the 100% of all the ECFs, Spanish MPs in the Government only uttered 37'5% of all the ECFs. As Pomerantz (1986: 219) explains, one of the uses of ECFs is to “... defend against or to counter challenges to the legitimacy of complaints, accusations, justifications, and defenses.” In this

sense, we might argue that (1) the British Government is much more on the defensive than the Spanish Government and (2) Spanish MPs in the Opposition are less cautious (used 62'5% of all ECFs) than British MPs in the Opposition (used 0% of all ECFs).

And finally, it seems that Mr. Blair and Mr. Aznar used less ECFs than their colleagues. One reason for this behaviour is that PMs have to be politically more cautious because what they say may have widespread repercussions throughout this country.

6. Conclusion

The goal of this article was twofold: (1) to illustrate Discursive Psychology (DP) and its methodology by examining eight extracts from two different parliamentary contexts; and (2) to show some of the strategies used by MPs from two different countries when building the factual status or objectivity of their own versions of a single common reality: the Iraqi conflict.

On the one hand, Discursive Psychology has proved to be a very useful and advantageous approach in the sense that it has helped us to discover and analyse some of the tactical devices used by Spanish and British MPs, namely the strategic use of (1) discursive choices, (2) script formulations, and (3) ECFs (Extreme Case Formulations).

On the other hand, it has also been shown how these strategies have been widely used by Spanish and British MPs in order to build their own "objective" depictions of the same reality:

- When comparing the Opposition's and the Government's discourse options in both parliamentary contexts, we could observe important differences directly related to their ideologies. For example, whereas Opposition MPs used phrases like "oil revenues", "to reconstruct", or "post-military conflict", Government MPs uttered expressions such as "oil-for-food-programme", "to modernise" or "the process of transition". Each parliamentarian chose those discourse options which could better help him/her to depict his/her specific interpretation of this reality.
- These politicians also made use of some grammatical scripting devices to describe a script situation. The main goal of this strategy is to construct a common socio-psychological reality based on a set of beliefs and experiences shared by speaker and listener. For example, both (Opposition and Government MPs) used "we_s" in order to describe a common and repetitive reality known by speaker and listeners (i.e. they used a kind of patronising "we" which had as its referent the group of countries which wanted to help the Iraqi people). They also used idiomatic expressions such as proverbs in order to describe actions and events as having recurring, predictable, sequential patterns.
- Additionally, Opposition and Government MPs very often described a given situation in a radical way by means of ECFs. For example, when Llamazares talks about the war and "*sus gravísimas*

consecuencias” (its very severe consequences”) or when he accuses Aznar of doing a *“juicio sumarísimo”* (“very brief judgement”), he is (1) presenting something as “objective” and not based on his own point of view; (2) calling everybody’s attention to the fact that what he is saying is right; and (3) defending against further challenges. As Edwards (2004b: 269) has pointed out “The speaker-indexical property of ECFs trades on their potential to be heard not only as extreme but as going to extremes and thus as saying, perhaps, more than mere accuracy would require.”

Finally, we can also arrive at some tentative conclusions regarding the similarities and/or differences between the British and Spanish parliamentary discourse practices. Even though there are some similarities (for example, both Blair and Aznar avoided using the word “war”), there are some striking differences. For example, British MPs used a less exaggerated style than Spanish MPs because the number of ECFs deployed by Spanish MPs (8) doubled the number of ECFs used by British MPs (4).

Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this article to present general claims about Spanish and British parliamentary styles but rather to show the different strategies used by parliamentarians when they try to build their own “objective” interpretation of a single common reality.

Endnotes:

ⁱ See Edwards (1994).

ⁱⁱ Ten days before in the House of Commons. In the *Congreso de los Diputados* the question should have been handed in before the Thursday (before 8 pm) previous to the Session in which that question will be answer.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Factsheet number 46* is about Questions at the House of Commons and the *Boletín Oficial del Congreso de los Diputados*, Series E, number 25 (19/06/96) is about questions at the Congreso de los Diputados.

^{iv} See *Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament*.

^v Liberal democrats did not back the war.

^{vi} This word is repeated up to three times.

^{vii} That is, Iraqi poverty.

^{viii} This is an old-fashioned form.

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Appendixes

Appendix A

- i) **Mr. Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight):** If she will make a statement on the proportion of reconstruction costs in Iraq that will be met by the use of Iraqi oil revenues.

The Secretary of State for International Development (Clare Short): The Iraqi economy is in very poor shape and most people are dependent on handouts provided through the oil-for-food programme. Some 16 million people are completely dependent on handouts and are not economically active. The programme spends \$10 billion each year and is funded by the sale of Iraqi oil. The immediate challenge is to get the oil-for-food programme up and running again. Thereafter, a UN-mandated transitional Government will need to agree an economic reform programme, which will need to address the problems of debt, reparations, building a modern economy and modernising the oil industry.

Mr. Turner : I thank the right hon. Lady for her reply, which I notice did not answer my question. Is she aware that the Foreign Secretary said last Tuesday:

"we shall propose...that every single cent and penny of those oil revenues" —[Hon. Members: "Reading."]—of course I am, I am quoting—

"are . . . used for the benefit of the Iraqi people . . . when that happens, the costs of reconstruction to the rest of the world will be remarkably insignificant"—[*Official Report*, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 899.]?

If the costs will be insignificant, why are we having such trouble agreeing with our European colleagues how much they will contribute?

Clare Short: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not listen to my answer. Iraqi oil is sold under the oil-for-food programme and every scrap of money that comes from legitimate sales goes into a UN trust fund to purchase food and medical supplies and to patch up water supplies and so on to keep everyone fed. The basic programme for looking after the people of Iraq is funded by their oil. We need to keep that running and modernise their economy so that the oil industry is better and their economy can grow. The oil sector will make Iraq a wealthy country, but there will have to be reform. The first stage is to fund humanitarian aid. Once the reforms are in place, the economy will be strengthened and will grow. The money goes through a trust fund.

Appendix B

ii) **Mr. Charles Kennedy (Ross, Skye and Inverness, West):** Going back to the earlier exchanges, given the Foreign Secretary's proposal that there should be a post-military conflict United Nations-led conference on Iraq, can the Prime Minister clarify whether that idea has the active endorsement of the President of the United States?

The Prime Minister: Of course it is the case that we will need the UN to be involved, because it is a matter of agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that any Iraqi interim authority has to be UN-endorsed. The exact way in which we do that is what we are debating at the moment. We managed to do it highly successfully in Afghanistan, and I believe that there is no difficulty at all in getting the proper partnership between the coalition forces and countries and the United Nations.

Mr. Kennedy: Given that within just the past few days the Prime Minister has been to see President Bush on precisely this matter, can he be more specific about what the thinking is? Do he and the President of the United States envisage that the post-conflict Administration will be UN led or American led? Which will it be?

The Prime Minister: As I was trying to say before, we want to ensure that it is led by Iraqis—by the Iraqi people themselves. The process of transition from the conflict to that should be done by both the UN and the coalition forces. That is the necessary thing to do. The coalition forces will be there in the country; there is no way that they will suddenly disappear from the ground. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, of course the coalition forces will be there. The UN has made it clear that it does not want to lead an Iraqi Government; what it wants is the ability to work with us, in partnership, to make sure that we assemble the broadest possible representation from within Iraq itself. I understand why people want to put those differences between ourselves and the United States, but the most intelligent way of proceeding is to recognise the basic principle that any transitional arrangements and the Iraqi interim authority must be UN endorsed. The rest is a matter of working in partnership with the UN, which, if we behave sensibly, we should be able to do easily.

Appendix C

- iii) **Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes):** May I first associate the Opposition with the Foreign Secretary's condolences to those who have lost loved ones in action in Iraq?

Can the Foreign Secretary assure the House that post-Saddam Iraq will be run by a genuinely representative Administration, who will preserve and foster new democratic systems such as that in northern Iraq, will avoid creating permanent and subjugated minorities and will not be seen merely as a surrogate for rule by America, Britain or both? How confident is he that the United Nations will become involved in the reconstruction of Iraq and the stability of its Administration? The liberation of Iraq is being won by America, Britain and the rest of the coalition, despite the French and the European Union. Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that any UN participation in reconstruction will actually reflect that fact?

Mr. Straw: I am confident that the Iraqis will be able to establish good, representative governance. That confidence is based on the innate talents of the Iraqi people, but specifically on the agreement that was reached in the Azores between Prime Minister Aznar, President Bush and the Prime Minister, who agreed—this was reflected in the motion passed by the House a week ago—that we would seek the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that would affirm Iraq's territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian aid and reflect and endorse an appropriate post-conflict Administration for Iraq. There are differences in the EU about the conflict, as is well known, but I am glad to say that a constructive approach to the provision of aid and humanitarian relief was shown by our EU colleagues at the European Council meeting last Thursday and Friday.

Mr. Ancram: What assessment has the Foreign Secretary made about the effects of the war on the wider region? What information has he received about the possibility of disruptive intervention in Iraq by Iranian militia, and what plans are there to forestall that? What hope is there that Turkey as a friend and colleague in NATO will work, if not under the coalition, at least with the coalition in any use of its armed forces in or around northern Iraq? What steps is the Foreign Secretary taking to persuade Iraq's Arab neighbours that a benign and prosperous Iraq, instead of pumping poison into the surrounding region, could help to spread prosperity and peace throughout the Arab world?

Mr. Straw: To take the last point first, it is well known that, in public, Arab leaders—for example, at the meeting of the Arab League in Cairo yesterday—with the single exception of Kuwait have taken a public position of criticising coalition action. However, that public position disguises a very wide range of private opinions held by those leaders and, indeed, by those on the street as well. I think that once the coalition action has been successful, we will see a very significant shift, both by the leaders and by those on the street.

On the reports about Iranian militia incursions into Iraq, we have no basis of evidence at all to substantiate what we regard as poor reports in the media. I have seen no evidence about that whatsoever. Moreover, we have good relations with the Government of Iran, and only last Thursday I was in touch with the Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, talking about this and other matters.

On Turkey—well, Turkey is an important NATO ally, and it has faced its own difficulties about the extent of military co-operation, which we understand. At the same time, its Parliament has agreed to overflight facilities for US and UK forces.

Appendix D

- iv) **Mr. Rendel (Liberal Democrat):** Now that it seems inevitable that, sadly, there will be immense destruction in Iraq over the next few weeks, and given that the Select Committee on International Development reported earlier this year that less than half the necessary funds for the reconstruction of Afghanistan had been contributed, can the Prime Minister assure the House that he, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for International Development will ensure that sufficient funds for the reconstruction of Iraq are provided swiftly?

The Prime Minister: First, I should say to the hon. Gentleman that the purpose of the reconstruction programme post conflict in Iraq is not, in fact, primarily to do with the consequences of any military conflict, but is actually to do with reconstructing the country after the years of Saddam Hussein and his rule. Secondly, I would say to him that, yes, we will ensure that the funds are available—indeed, funds have already been earmarked for the purpose—and the Secretary of State for International Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury are doing all that they can to make sure that we co-ordinate with American allies and also with other UN partners to ensure that the funds are available and also that the programme is available, so that in the post-conflict situation in Iraq the people of Iraq are given the future that they need.

Appendix E

- v) *El señor LLAMAZARES TRIGO: Señor presidente Aznar, después de esta conmoción y espanto, ¿piensa usted contribuir al fin de la guerra o piensa usted trasladar la lógica de la guerra a esta Cámara y a este país? (El señor Llamazares Trigo exhibe un cartel que dice: Los 1.000 primeros muertos.)*

La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias. Señor presidente, tiene la palabra al objeto de dar respuesta a la pregunta que figura en el orden del día.

El señor PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO (Aznar López): Lo que pienso hacer exactamente es cumplir las responsabilidades que estamos cumpliendo, y desde luego no dedicarme a las cosas que se dedica su señoría. (Aplausos.)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor presidente. Señor Llamazares.

El señor LLAMAZARES TRIGO: Señor presidente, veo que usted sigue empeinado en promover esta guerra (Rumores.), en promover esta guerra en palabras de su señora ministra de Exteriores. Ustedes son promotores de la resolución que abre paso a esta guerra. Por tanto, son promotores de la guerra y de sus gravísimas consecuencias, humanas y materiales, pero en primer lugar humanas. Son también responsables de haber avergonzado a este país. Este país está avergonzado de que ustedes hayan puesto las bases militares, el espacio aéreo y a nuestros propios ejércitos al servicio de una mascarada, que se dice humanitaria, de Estados Unidos y que es otra cosa bien distinta, que es la participación en una guerra.

Pero sobre todo ustedes están trasladando la lógica de la guerra a las relaciones políticas.

Señoría, nosotros tenemos derecho a manifestarnos, lo reconoce nuestra Constitución. Tenemos derecho de expresión y criticamos a todos aquellos que los niegan, a aquellos que les niegan a ustedes el derecho de expresión y aquellos que nos niegan a nosotros, a los jóvenes y a los pacifistas, el derecho de manifestación. Pero lo que usted no puede hacer es un juicio sumarísimo a los grupos políticos de esta Cámara. Usted no puede utilizar datos falsos, usted no puede acusar en falso a esta organización ni a otras organizaciones democráticas, porque si no empezaré a pensar que usted se parece bastante a aquel régimen que imponía el miedo para acabar con la movilización (Rumores.), que consideraba a los ciudadanos súbditos y no ciudadanos libres. Y para ello quiero recordarle algo muy fácil, señor Aznar, una frase que dice: A la masa se le puede hacer que respalde a sus líderes. Es fácil, lo único que hay que hacer es decir que están siendo atacados, denunciar a los pacifistas por su falta de patriotismo. Esto funciona igual en todos los países. ¿Sabe usted quién dijo esto? Herman Goering en el juicio de Nuremberg. (Aplausos.)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor Llamazares. Señor presidente.

El señor PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO (Aznar López): Señoría, le quiero decir que no creo que en nuestro país haya un problema de libertad de expresión, afortunadamente garantizado desde el punto de vista constitucional. (Rumores.) El mismo problema que había antes cuando algunas de SS. SS. eran miembros de la mayoría del Gobierno y estaban exactamente con el mismo Reglamento, el mismo. Lo que pasa es que ahora, a diferencia de lo que ocurría antes, se comparece bastante más en el Parlamento. Bien. Señoría, le quiero decir que tampoco creo que haya un problema de libertad de manifestación en España y para usted, especialmente para usted, no creo que haya un problema ni de libertad de expresión ni de libertad de manifestación, especialmente para usted, de lo cual me alegro muchísimo. En cuanto al derecho a manifestación, que haya tanta gente que se manifieste o que pueda salir a la calle o que no se manifieste sencillamente porque quiere o para manifestar una creencia o un sentimiento, me parece magnífico. Sin embargo, que haya quienes se dedican a coaccionar moral o violentamente a los demás me parece inaceptable, y se lo vuelvo a decir, señoría, inaceptable. (Aplausos.) Y son inaceptables las injurias, las coacciones, los asaltos y los problemas que está teniendo la gente del Partido Popular; es algo inaceptable y ustedes tienen, les guste o no, una responsabilidad en ello y yo le llamo a ella seriamente, señor Llamazares. (Varios señores diputados: ¡Muy bien!-Aplausos.)

Translation:

Mr. Llamazares Trigo: Mr. president Aznar, after this shock and horror, do you intend to contribute to the end of this war or do you intend to transfer the logic of this war to this House and to this country? (Mr. Llamazares shows a poster which says: The first 1,000 dead.)

Ms. Speaker: Thank you very much. Mr. President, you have the floor in order to answer the question which is included in the agenda.

Mr. President (Aznar López): What I intend to do is exactly to fulfil the responsibilities which we are fulfilling, and of course not to devote to the kind of things which your honour devotes to.

(Clapping)

Ms. Speaker: Thank you very much Mr. President. Mr. Llamazares.

Mr. Llamazares: Mr. President, I can see that you are still determined to promote this war (rumours), to promote this war in the words of your hon. The Foreign Affairs Minister. You are promoters of the resolution which opens the way for this war. So, you are promoters of this war and of its very severe consequences, human and material, but first of all human. You are also responsible for having put this country to shame. This country is ashamed because our military bases, our air space and our own army are at a masquerade's service which it is said to be humanitarian, of the United States but it is something completely different, it is the participation in a war.

But, overall, you are transferring the logic of the war to the political relationships. Your honour, we have the right to demonstrate, it is stated in our Constitution. We have the right to speak and we criticise those people who deny us those rights, those people who deny you the right to speak and those people who deny us, the young and the pacifists, the right to demonstrate. But what you cannot do is to offer a very brief judgement to the members of the House. You cannot use false information, you cannot accuse neither this organization nor any other democratic organization falsely; if not, I will start to think that you are very similar to that regime which imposed the terror to finish with demonstrations (rumours), which considered the citizens subjects and not free citizens. And for that reason I want to remind you something very easy, Mr. Aznar, a sentence which says: The mass can be forced to back its leaders. It is easy, the only thing which has to be done is to say that they are being attacked, to denounce the pacifists for their lack of patriotism. This works identically in all the countries. Do you know who said this? Herman Goering in the Nuremberg trial. (Clapping).

Ms. Speaker: Thank you very much, Mr. Llamazares. Mr. President.

Mr. President (Aznar López): Your honour, I want to tell you that I don't think that there is a problem of lack of speech in our country, fortunately guaranteed from a constitutional point of view. (Rumours). The same problem existed before when some of your honours were members of the Government and followed the same Rules, the same. The problem is that now, unlike what happened before, it is more common to appear in Parliament. Well. Your honour, I want to tell you that I don't even think that there is a problem of freedom of speech in Spain and for you, especially for you, I don't think that there is a problem either of freedom of speech or of freedom of demonstration, especially for you, that is something I am very happy about. In relation to the right to demonstrate, I think that it is excellent that there are so many people that demonstrate or that take to the streets to protest or that do not demonstrate simply because they want so or to make public a belief or a feeling. However, I think that it is unacceptable that there are people who devote to coerce morally or violently; and I repeat it, your honour, unacceptable. (Clapping). The insults, coercions, attacks and problems which are enduring the members of the Partido Popular are unacceptable; it is something unacceptable and, like it or not, you have got a responsibility in all that and I summon you to it, Mr. Llamazares. (Some MPs: Very well! Clappings).

Appendix F

- vi) *El señor CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: Gracias, señora presidenta.*
Señora ministra: guerra, estamos en guerra. Finalmente, hay una guerra unilateral, sin legitimidad jurídica ni moral, o, dicho de otra manera, esta guerra no se justifica desde ningún punto de vista, ni moral ni político. ¿Sabe quién dice esto? El presidente del Parlamento de Canarias, del Partido Popular. Esta guerra no se justifica desde ningún punto de vista, ni moral ni político. Se desarrolla, además, señoría, en la peor de las hipótesis. Esta guerra es una invasión, no es una guerra de liberación. Créame si le digo que jamás hemos lamentado tanto los grupos de la oposición acertar en el diagnóstico. Todo lo que dijimos que iba a ocurrir está ocurriendo. Ustedes votaron a favor de la guerra, han apoyado esta guerra, sus diputados han votado a favor de la guerra (El señor Albendea Pabón y el señor Martínez-Pujalte López: ¡No es verdad!), ayer votaron a favor de que continuara la guerra... (Rumores.)
La señora PRESIDENTA: Guarden silencio.
El señor CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: ...y hoy hemos visto al señor Aznar defender la guerra, le hemos visto defender la guerra, señorías. Ustedes votaron a favor de la guerra, despreciando actuaciones de la comunidad internacional para conseguir una solución pacífica. Déjense ya de hipocresías y al menos díganlos en esta Cámara por una sola vez: ¿piensan hacer algo para parar esta guerra? (Aplausos.— El señor Martínez-Pujalte López pronuncia palabras que no se perciben.)
La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor Caldera.
Señora ministra, como siempre —y recordando el Reglamento—, tiene usted la palabra a los efectos de contestar la pregunta cuyo tenor figura en el orden del día.
La señora MINISTRA DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES (Palacio Vallelersundi): Señora presidenta, recuerdo que era sobre qué íbamos a hacer para que Naciones Unidas recupere su papel fundamental en la solución pacífica de la crisis. Esa es la pregunta. En contestación a la misma quiero decir que el Gobierno entiende que la respuesta a la actual situación sólo puede ser de naturaleza multilateral y seguirá siéndolo. En este sentido, el papel de Naciones Unidas es fundamental. Así lo señala el texto de las conclusiones del último Consejo Europeo de primavera, que el Gobierno suscribe por haber contribuido esencialmente a su redacción. Por cierto, como ha recordado además el presidente del Gobierno y S.S. conoce muy bien, España ha comprometido 50 millones de euros, de los que una parte serán canalizados directamente a través de diferentes organizaciones de Naciones Unidas.
La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señora ministra.
Señor Caldera.
El señor CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN:
Señora ministra, le he dicho solución pacífica, es decir que se acabe la guerra ya. ¡Se han equivocado tanto ustedes, tanto, el Partido Popular pero usted especialmente!
Todo lo han hecho mal. Esta guerra es inmoral, pero además es un gravísimo error, señorías. Todos sus análisis han sido desastrosos: cálculos sobre la guerra y su duración, erróneos; sobre la seguridad, erróneos. Esto va a levantar una oleada de odio y de indignación que va a favorecer la inseguridad y el terrorismo. Decían que era una guerra de liberación. No, es una guerra de invasión donde España tiene 1.000 soldados, señoría. España tiene 1.000 soldados en apoyo logístico, como acaba de decir el señor presidente del Gobierno. Ojo de lince — que es el presidente del Gobierno según el señor Alcaraz— le ha contagiado sus dioptrías. Mire, señoría, no han dado ni una; por tanto déjense aconsejar y, al

menos, ya que ni política ni estratégicamente ni desde ningún otro punto de vista es razonable esta guerra, apelo a su sensibilidad humana para que diga una sola cosa: ¡que se pare la guerra! ¡Díganlo de una vez! Si no seguirán siendo responsables de ella. (Aplausos.)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor Caldera.

Señora ministra.

La señora MINISTRA DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES

(Palacio Vallelersundi): Señor Caldera, el Gobierno y el Partido Popular estamos ya curados del hostigamiento que están llevando a cabo (Rumores.), hostigamiento que sólo tiene fines electoralistas. (Protestas.)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Señorías, guarden silencio.

La señora MINISTRA DE ASUNTOS EXTERIORES (Palacio Vallelersundi): Esta guerra... (Varios señores diputados pronuncian palabras que no se perciben.) No, no, el objetivo del Gobierno de España en todo momento ha sido restaurar la legalidad internacional como ha recordado el presidente del Gobierno. (Rumores) Dicen ustedes que si votamos a favor o votamos en contra. Mire, señor Caldera, el problema de ustedes es que, como decía también el presidente del Gobierno, se han quedado solos. Ya ni Francia, ni Alemania.. (Risas.—Varios señores diputados: ¡No!) Sí, sí, sí, en el mundo; se han quedado solos (Protestas.) defendiendo el régimen de Irak, cuando todos los países, como Francia, Alemania.. Ya se han quedado sin rumbo. Antes era que teníamos que hacer como Francia y como Alemania. Ahora ¿qué es? Ahora se han quedado detrás de la política de pancarta, de la política de eslogan. Yo, señor Caldera, le insisto en que el único responsable de las tribulaciones del pueblo iraquí es Saddam Hussein, el único responsable de la situación en que se encontraba el pueblo iraquí, de auténtica emergencia humanitaria durante 20 años, es el régimen de Saddam Hussein; régimen que es culpable de asesinatos sin fin como ha contado el presidente del Gobierno (Varios señores diputados pronuncian palabras que no se perciben.), además de la situación en la que tiene sumido, económica, social e internacionalmente, al pueblo iraquí, y esto es algo, señor Caldera, que yo todavía no les he oído decir. (Aplausos.)

Translation:

Mr. CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: Thank you Ms. Speaker.

Ms. Minister: war, we are at war. Finally, there's a unilateral war without legal or moral legitimacy, or, in other words, this war cannot be justified from any perspective, neither moral nor political, do you know who says this? The president of the Canary Islands Parliament, from the Popular Party. This war cannot be justified from any perspective, neither moral nor political. It is developed from the worst of the hypothesis. This war is an invasion, not a liberation war. Believe me when I tell you that we, the opposition parties, have never regretted so much having been right in the diagnosis. Everything we said that it was going to happen, it's happening. You voted in favour of the war, you have backed the war, your MPs have voted in favour of the war (*Mr Albendea Pabón and Mr. Martínez-Pujalte López: That's not true!*), yesterday you voted in favour of the continuation of the war . . . (*murmurs*)

Ms. Speaker: Keep quiet.

Mr. CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: ... and today we have seen Mr. Aznar defending the war, we have seen him defending the war, your honours.

You voted in favour of the war, you despised the performances of the international community to get a peaceful solution. Stop being hypocritical and tell us just once: do you intend to do something to stop this war? (*Clappings.— Mr. Martínez-Pujalte López says something which cannot be understood.*)

Mr. SPEAKER: Thanks, Mr. Caldera

Ms. Minister, as usual –and remembering the Rules-, it's your turn to answer to the question included in the agenda.

Ms. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Palacio Vellersundi): Ms. Speaker, I remember that it was about what we are going to do so that the United Nations recover its fundamental role in a peaceful solution to the crisis. That is the question. To answer that question I want to say that the Government assumes that the answer to the present situation can only be one of a multilateral nature and it will ever be so. In this way, United Nations' role is fundamental. The text of the conclusions of the latest European Council in spring shows it, the Government endorses it because we have contributed to its writing. By the way, as the president of the Government has reminded and your honour knows very well, Spain has invested 50 millions of euros, part of which will be channelled through different organisations of United Nations.

Ms. SPEAKER: Thanks, Ms. Minister

Mr. Caldera

Mr. CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: Ms. Minister, I have told you a peaceful solution, that means that the war must be over. The Popular Party is so wrong, so wrong, but especially you!

Everything you have done is wrong. This is an amoral war, but also a very serious mistake, your honours. All your analyses have been disastrous: calculations about the war and its length, wrong; about the security, wrong. This is going to raise a wave of hate and anger which is going to favour the insecurity and terrorism. You said that it was a war of liberation. No, it's a war of invasion where Spain has 1,000 soldiers, your honour. Spain has 1,000 soldiers for logistic support, as the president of the Government has just said. Eye of lynx –it is the president of the Government according to Mr. Alcaraz- they have transmitted you the dioptrics. This war is not either politically or strategically reasonable, I appeal to human sensibility and I hope you say only one thing: Stop the war! Say it just once! If not, you will go on being responsible for it. *(Clappings)*.

Ms. SPEAKER: Thank you, Mr. Caldera.

Ms. Minister

Ms. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Palacio Vallelersundi): This war . . . *(several MPs utter some words which cannot be understood)* No, no, the Spanish Government's goal has always been to restore the international legality, as it has been reminded by the president of the Government, *(Murmurs)* You say whether we vote in favour of or against. Look, Mr. Caldera, your problem is that, as the president of the Government also said, you are alone. Neither France nor Germany *(Laughters – Several MPs: No!)* Yes, yes, yes, in the world; you are alone *(Protests)* defending the Iraqi regime, when all the countries, as France, Germany... You are aimless. Then, it was that we had to do the same as France or Germany. And now, what is it? Now you are behind the politics of banners, the politics of slogans. I, Mr. Caldera, insist that the only responsible for the tribulations of the Iraqi people is Saddam Hussein; the only responsible for the situation of the Iraqi people, of real humanitarian emergency for 20 years, is Saddam Hussein's regime; a regime that is guilty of endless murders, as it has been mentioned by the president of the Government *(Several MPs utter some words which cannot be understood)*, apart from the economic, social and international situation in which the Iraqi people were, and this is something, Mr. Caldera, it has not been said by you yet. *(Clappings)*

Appendix G

- vii) *La señora PRESIDENTA: Preguntas dirigidas al señor vicepresidente primero del Gobierno. En primer lugar, la número 11, que formula el diputado don Jesús Caldera Sánchez-Capitán.*
- El señor CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN: Gracias, señora presidenta.*
- Como se ve, las grandes preguntas lamentablemente quedan sin respuestas. La interpretación que hacemos del debate de esta tarde es que el señor Aznar, de forma clara, ha dicho: No hay que dar más tiempo a los inspectores, de una parte, sería un flaco favor; y de otra: el régimen iraquí ha incumplido la legalidad internacional. Por tanto, la única salida consiste en la resolución que ustedes aprobaron ayer, que estaban muy satisfechos con ella, pero es una resolución que abre las puertas a la guerra.*
- Señor Rajoy, si hubiera usted estado hoy en la Puerta del Sol, donde estudiantes y personalidades del mundo de la cultura se manifestaban a favor de la paz, habría visto que la primavera ha llegado a Madrid y que la gente quiere que acabe la primavera en paz. Por eso le pregunto a usted la gran pregunta: ¿si hay un ataque de Estados Unidos en Irak lo van a apoyar, sí o no?*
- La señora PRESIDENTA: Mu chas gracias, señor Caldera.*
- Señor vicepresidente, al igual que en casos anteriores, al objeto de contestar el tenor de la pregunta que figura en el orden del día, que es lo que prevé el Reglamento.*
- (Rumores.)*
- El señor VICEPRESIDENTE PRIMERO, MINISTRO DE LA PRESIDENCIA Y PORTAVOZ DEL GOBIERNO (Rajoy Brey): Muchas gracias, señora presidenta.*
- Nosotros vamos a seguir trabajando para que se cumpla por parte de Irak la legalidad internacional, para que se cumpla la Resolución 1441, para que, en consecuencia, Irak elimine sus armas de destrucción masiva, para que también, en consecuencia, Irak deje de colaborar con el terrorismo y vamos a intentar que todo esto se haga pacíficamente, y hay una salida: es que Irak cumpla las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Para eso estamos trabajando, para que pacíficamente Irak se desarme. Otros no están trabajando para nada, que es lo mismo que trabajar para que Irak no se desarme, incumpla las resoluciones de Naciones Unidas y, por tanto, siga siendo un peligro para la paz, la seguridad mundiales y sus propios nacionales. (Aplausos.)*
- La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor vicepresidente.*
- Señor Caldera.*
- El señor CALDERA SÁNCHEZ-CAPITÁN:*
- Señor Rajoy, lo hacen ustedes imposible porque cada vez que se da un paso a favor del desarme dicen que es insuficiente. Acabamos de escuchar que el señor Blix plantea efectivamente esta misma tarde que Irak está cumpliendo con sus obligaciones de desarme. ¿No les parece suficiente? Señor Rajoy, si el señor Blix pide hasta el verano de tiempo, ustedes qué van a decir ¿sí o no? Vuelvo a la pregunta, si ignorando la petición del señor Blix y la necesidad de una segunda resolución Estados Unidos ataca, ¿ustedes van a apoyarlo, sí o no? Si Estados Unidos invade Irak y nombra un nuevo gobierno y se mantiene en el país para explotar sus recursos, ¿ustedes les apoyarán, sí o no? Yo les digo la respuesta que todos pensamos, todos los españoles: sí, porque no tienen ustedes autonomía, están en manos del señor Bush.*
- Pero mire, señor Rajoy, ¿sabe lo que es más grave con independencia de que haya guerra o no? Los daños que ya se están produciendo. Se están produciendo daños morales, daños éticos, políticos y económicos para España y eso es responsabilidad de su Gobierno.*

Por favor, conteste, porque si no vamos a tener que aplicarle aquel refrán que dice que con arte y engaño vive usted la mitad del año y con engaño y arte la otra parte. Conteste de una vez. (Aplausos.—Rumores.— Varios señores diputados: ¡Vaya cara!)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Gracias, señor Caldera.

Señorías, guarden silencio. Señor Isasi, guarde silencio.

Señor vicepresidente.

El señor VICEPRESIDENTE PRIMERO, MINISTRO DE LA PRESIDENCIA Y PORTAVOZ DEL GOBIERNO (Rajoy Brey): Muchas gracias, señora presidenta.

Como muy bien ha dicho el señor Caldera, el señor Saddam Hussein ha adoptado algunas decisiones y, por tanto, ha dado algunos pasos para desarmarse. Lo que no ha dicho el señor Caldera es que esos muy pocos pasos que ha dado el señor Saddam Hussein para desarmarse han sido como consecuencia de la presión internacional, en ningún caso como consecuencia de la presión del Grupo Socialista en esta Cámara, que ha dicho que suceda lo que suceda ellos votarían en contra de

una resolución de Naciones Unidas produciendo una intervención en Irak. Por tanto, la actitud que está teniendo el Grupo Socialista sólo puede tener como consecuencia que Saddam Hussein no se desarme, que siga siendo un peligro y que las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas no puedan cumplirse en ningún caso.

Como ya he dicho en el debate de ayer y vuelvo a reiterar ahora, no estamos ante un problema de plazos, estamos ante un problema de actitudes. Lo dije ayer y hoy lo vuelvo a reiterar: tanto Kazajstán, como Bielorrusia, como Sudáfrica se desarmaron en 48 horas. Si no seguimos presionando al régimen de Saddam Hussein —y qué duda cabe de que la propuesta de resolución que hemos presentado junto con Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido va en esa dirección— no conseguiremos otra cosa distinta a que Saddam Hussein siga siendo un peligro, insisto, para la humanidad y un peligro para los nacionales de su propio país que, por lo visto, no parece que sea algo que preocupe —y lo lamento mucho— al señor Caldera. (Aplausos.)

La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor vicepresidente.

Translation:

Mr. Caldera Sánchez Capitán: Thanks Ms. Speaker.

As you can see, big questions remain sadly unanswered. The interpretation we make of the debate which has taken place this afternoon is that Mr. Aznar has clearly said: On the one hand we mustn't give more time to the inspectors, it would be a poor favour; and on the other hand the Iraqi regime has broken the international legality. So, the only way out is the resolution you passed yesterday, you were very satisfied with it, but that is a resolution which open the doors to war.

Mr. Rajoy, if you had been in La Puerta del Sol today, where students and important cultural figures demonstrated in favour of peace, you would have seen that spring has arrived to Madrid and that people want that spring ends in peace. That is why I ask you the big question: If U.S. attack Iraq, will you support it?

Ms. Speaker: Thanks, Mr. Caldera.

Mr. Vice President, as in previous cases, in order to answer the question included in the agenda, which the regulations forsee.

(Murmurs)

Mr. Vice President, Minister of the Presidency and the Government's Spokesman (Rajoy Brey): Many thanks, Ms. Speaker.

We are going to go on working in order to make Iraq fulfil the law and fulfil the Resolution 1441, so that Iraq destroys the weapons of mass destruction and stops

collaborating with terrorism and we will try that all this is carried out peacefully, and there is one way out: that Iraq fulfil the Resolutions of the Security Council of UN. For that purpose we are working: that Iraq disarms peacefully. Others are not working for anything, which is the same as working for Iraq's armament and failure to comply with Resolutions of UN and so Iraq goes on being a danger for peace, world security and its own inhabitants. (Clappings)

Ms. Speaker: Many thanks, Mr. Vice President

Mr. Caldera.

Mr. Caldera Sánchez-Capitán: Mr. Rajoy, you make it impossible because whenever we take a step forward in favour of the disarmament, you say that it is insufficient. We have just heard that Mr. Blix has said this afternoon that Iraq is fulfilling with its obligations of disarmament. Don't you think that it is sufficient? Mr. Rajoy, if Mr. Blix asks until the summer, what will you say? Yes or no? I return to my previous question, if ignoring Mr. Blix's request and the necessity for a second resolution US attacks, will you support US or not? If US invades Iraq and names a new government and stays in the country making profit of the country's resources, Will you support them or not? I'll tell you the answer we all think, all the Spaniards: yes, because you lack autonomy, and you are in Bush's hands.

But look, Mr. Rajoy, Do you know what is the gravest thing, apart from the war? The damage they are producing. Moral damages and ethical, political and economical damages for Spain and that is the Government's responsibility.

Please, answer, because if you don't we'll have to apply that proverb which says that with art and trick you live half the year and with trick and art the other half. Answer.

(Clappings, murmurs, several MPs: what a cheek!)

Ms. Speaker: Thanks, Mr. Caldera

Your honours, keep quiet. Mr. Isasi, keep quiet.

Mr. Vice President.

Mr. Vice President, Minister of the Presidency and the Government's Spokesman (Rajoy Brey): Many thanks, Ms. Speaker.

As Mr. Caldera has correctly said, Mr. Saddam Hussein has made some decision and so he has taken some steps to disarm. What Mr. Caldera has not said is that those few steps which Mr. Saddam Hussein has taken have been due to international pressure, in no case they have been due to the pressure of the Grupo Socialista of this chamber which has said that whatever it happens they would vote against a resolution of the UN in favour of an intervention in Iraq. So, the Grupo Socialista's behaviour has as its sole consequence that Saddam Hussein does not disarm, that it goes on being a danger and that the resolutions of the Council of Security of the UN cannot be fulfilled in any case.

As I said in the debate which took place yesterday and I reiterate now, we are not facing a problem of periods, we are facing a problem of attitudes. I said yesterday and I reiterate now: As Kazajstán as Bielorrusia as Sudáfrica disarmed in 48 hours. If we do not go on pressing Saddam Hussein's regime -and there is no doubt that the proposal of resolution which we have submitted with US and UK goes in that direction- we will not avoid that Saddam Hussein goes on being a danger, I insist, for the humanity and a danger for the inhabitants of his country that, as far as we can see, it doesn't seem to worry -and I'm afraid- to Mr. Caldera. (Clappings)

Ms. Speaker: Many thanks, Mr. Vice President.

Appendix H

- viii) *El señor LLAMAZARES TRIGO: Señor Aznar, díganos usted por una vez la verdad. ¿Qué va a hacer su Gobierno en relación al conflicto de Irak?*
La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor Llamazares.
Señor presidente del Gobierno.
El señor PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO (Aznar López): Señoría, cumplir con las obligaciones que le corresponden desde el punto de vista internacional y desde el punto de vista nacional, en orden al cumplimiento de las resoluciones que motiven el desarme de Irak.
La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor presidente.
Señor Llamazares.
El señor LLAMAZARES TRIGO: Señor presidente, como sabrá, ya se ha terminado el carnaval y hay que quitarse las máscaras. Ya nadie les cree, señores del Partido Popular, nadie se cree que sean centristas, ni que sean pacíficos. Muy al contrario, ustedes han promovido una resolución que es una declaración de guerra a Irak, y además un chantaje a Naciones Unidas.
En palabras de sus responsables políticos, el secretario general de Naciones Unidas es un gurú. O sea, que ustedes en estos momentos tienen por objetivo debilitar Naciones Unidas y su representación. Como no han tenido suficiente, a pesar de estar en primera división y estar con el principal Gobierno del mundo, el más fuerte económica y militarmente, resulta que ustedes están en minoría en el Consejo de Seguridad. ¡Quién se lo iba a decir! Y como están en minoría quieren ustedes cambiar las reglas de juego a mitad del partido, y ahora dicen que ya la nueva resolución no es necesaria o, en todo caso, no es imprescindible, y que basta la 1441 para legitimar la guerra. Kofi Annan les ha dicho que esa intervención sería ilegal, que sería un crimen contra la humanidad y un crimen contra la paz. Esa es la verdadera finalidad de su intervención.
Señor Aznar, por eso no nos va a meter usted en la historia. Nos va a meter en la historia por la puerta de atrás, nos sacará del rincón y nos meterá finalmente en las cloacas de la historia, que es la historia, según el señor Bush, llena de ruido y de furia. Por eso además, señor Aznar, en su propio grupo van a empezar a aparecer voces, seguramente de sus delfines, que digan que tiene usted que asumir ya la responsabilidad, que no pueden soportar más la actual situación política.
Señor Aznar, finalmente, usted tiene una gran responsabilidad.
Nos da la impresión de que no va a cambiar de posición. No engañe usted a los ciudadanos, dígales
la verdad. Seguramente usted no va a llorar por los ciudadanos iraquíes. Nosotros vamos a llorar por cada una de las víctimas, pero previamente vamos a parar su guerra el próximo día 15 movilizándonos todos, la sociedad española, en las calles de toda España.
Nada más. (Aplausos.—Los señores diputados del Grupo Parlamentario Federal de Izquierda Unida exhiben carteles que dicen: No a la guerra.—Paro 14-M.—Manifestación 15-M.—Rumores.)
La señora PRESIDENTA: Muchas gracias, señor Llamazares.
Señorías, guarden silencio.
Señor Llamazares, señoras y señores diputados del Grupo Parlamentario Federal de Izquierda Unida, su presidente y portavoz ha tenido la oportunidad de expresar su opinión. ¡Señorías, guarden silencio! Permitan que continúe la sesión de control.
Señor presidente.
El señor PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO (Aznar López): Señora presidenta, señorías, ya sabemos lo que S.S. disfruta sacando y paseando todos los viejos

*tópicos a los que nos tiene acostumbrados y habituados. Lo de menos es, naturalmente, lo que pasa con Saddam y con su régimen.
No hable de lágrimas, señoría. Si quiere usted derramar alguna lágrima empiece por derramarlas por los centenares de miles de víctimas de Saddam Hussein durante varias décadas. Derrame lágrimas por ellos, señoría.
Empiece a derramar lágrimas por ellos. (Aplausos.)
El fondo del asunto, señoría, es que yo creo, y toda la comunidad internacional lo cree, que se llevan incumpliendo 12 años resoluciones. Creo que no se tiene derecho con ese régimen a tener armas de destrucción masiva; creo que no se tiene derecho a seguir burlándose de la comunidad internacional ni de la opinión pública mundial; creo que la comunidad internacional tiene todo el derecho a exigir el desarme y la destrucción de armas de destrucción masiva; creo, señoría, que si se tienen esas armas es justamente para utilizarlas, como ya se ha demostrado. Y desde luego creo que los que tenemos la responsabilidad de que la legalidad internacional se cumpla y se respete es en este momento lo que tenemos que poner encima de la mesa. No me resigno, señoría, a que el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas se muestre incapaz de cumplir aquellas resoluciones que es capaz de aprobar por unanimidad, no me resigno a que así sea, y estamos trabajando para que así no sea y para que el Consejo de Seguridad mantenga su respeto, su credibilidad y sea una garantía para la paz y la seguridad del mundo.
Gracias. (Aplausos.)*

Translation:

Mr. Llamazares Trigo: Mr. Aznar, tell us once and for all the truth, What is your Government going to do in relation to Iraq?

Ms. Speaker: Many thanks, Mr. Llamazares.

Mr. Prime Minister

Mr. Prime Minister (Aznar López): Your honour, to fulfil with the obligations which correspond to the government from the international and national point of view, taking into account the fulfilment of the resolutions which will give rise to Iraq's disarmament.

Ms. Speaker: Many thanks, Mr. Prime Minister.

Mr. Llamazares.

Mr. Llamazares Trigo: Mr. Prime Minister, as you will know, the carnival is over and masks must be removed. Nobody believes you, MPs of the Grupo Popular, nobody believes neither that you are a centre wing party nor that you are pacifists. Very differently, you have promoted a resolution which is a declaration of war to Iraq, and a blackmail to UN.

To put it in your political responsibilities' words, the general secretary of the UN is a guru. That means that your goal now is to weaken the UN and its representation. As you have had not enough, even though you are in the first division and you are with the main Government in the world, the strongest one from the economical and military point of view, it seems that you are a minority in the Security Council. Who would say it! And as you are in minority you want to change the rules of the game in the middle of the game, and now you say that the new resolution is not necessary, or, in any case, it is not indispensable, and that 1441 is the only one needed to legitimise the war. Kofi Annan has told you that that intervention would be illegal, that it would be a crime against humanity and a crime against peace. That is the real finality of your intervention.

Mr. Aznar, that's why you are not going to make us be part of history. You are going to introduce us to history through the back door, you will remove us from the corner you will finally introduce us to the sewer of the history, which is a history, according to Mr. Bush, full of noise and fury. That's why, Mr. Aznar, in

your own group, there will be voices, possibly your dolphins' voices, which say that you have to assume your responsibility, that you cannot stand any longer this situation.

Mr. Aznar, finally, you have a huge responsibility.

We feel that you are not going to change your position. Do not deceive people, tell them the truth. Surely, you will not cry for Iraqi people. We are going to cry for every single victim, but previous to that we are going to stop your war next 15th because we all are going to demonstrate, Spanish society is going to demonstrate in all Spanish streets. Nothing else.

(Clappings. The MPs of the Grupo Parlamentario Federal de Izquierda Unida show some posters which say: no to war. Strike 14-M Demonstration 15-M. Murmurs)

Ms. Speaker: Many thanks, Mr. Llamazares.

Your honours, keep quiet.

Mr. Llamazares, MPs of the Grupo Federal de Izquierda Unida, your president and spokesman has had his opportunity to express his opinion. Your honours, keep quiet! Let the session go on.

Mr. Prime Minister.

Mr. Prime Minister (Aznar López): Ms. Speaker, your honours, we all know how your honour enjoys bringing up and showing off old topics we are all used to. The least important matter is Saddam Hussein and his regime.

Don't talk about tears, your honour. If you want to shed tears, you'd better start to shed them for the hundreds of thousands of victims which died during Saddam Hussein's regime. Shed tears for them, your honour.

Start to shed tears for them. (Clappings).

The bottom of the matter, your honour, is that I believe, and the international community believes, that resolutions have been broken for 12 years. I think that with that regime they have no rights to have massive destruction weapons; I think that they have no rights to go on making fun of the international community and the world public opinion; I think that the international community has all the right to demand a disarmament and the destruction of massive destruction weapons; I believe, your honour, that if somebody has those weapons, he will use them, as it has already been shown. And, of course, I believe that those who have the responsibility to make the legality be fulfilled and respected it is now the time to deal with it because it is on the table. I do not resign myself to, your honours, the fact that The Security Council of UN shows unable to make fulfil those resolutions which were previously passed unanimously, I do not resign myself to that, and we are working against it and in favour of the Security Council respect, credibility and that it becomes a guarantee for peace and security in the world.

Thank you (Clappings)

Sequence	Politicians	Date	Appendix
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Andrew Turner: MP in the opposition (Cons. Party). Mrs. Clare Short: Secretary of State for International Development (Lab. Party).	26/03/2003 (Columns 276-7)	Appendix A Extract (i)
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Charles Kennedy: MP in the opposition (Lib. Democrat). Mr. Tony Blair: The Prime Minister (Lab. Party).	02/04/2003 (Column 912)	Appendix B Extract (ii)
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Michael Ancram: MP in the opposition (Cons. Party). Mr. Jack Straw: Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Lab. Party).	25/03/2003 (Column 139)	Appendix C Extract (iii)
question - answer	Mr. Rendel: MP in the opposition (Lib. Democrat). Mr. Tony Blair: Prime Minister (Lab. Party).	19/03/2003 (Column 930)	Appendix D Extract (iv)

Table 1: Extracts chosen for analysis in the House of Commons

Sequence	Politicians	Date	Appendix
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Llamazares Trigo: MP in the opposition (<i>Izquierda Unida</i> , an extreme left party). Mr. Aznar López: Prime Minister (<i>Partido Popular</i> , a right wing party).	26/03/2003 (Pages 12202-03)	Appendix E Extract (v)
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Caldera Sánchez-Capitán: MP in the opposition (<i>Partido Socialista</i> , a left wing party). Ms. Palacio: Minister of Foreign Affairs (<i>Partido Popular</i>)	02/03/2003 (Pages 12333-4)	Appendix F Extract (vi)
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Caldera Sánchez-Capitán: MP in the opposition (<i>Partido Socialista</i>). Mr. Rajoy: Vice President (<i>Partido Popular</i>).	05/03/2003 (Pages 11793-94)	Appendix G Extract (vii)
question - answer - supplementary question - answer	Mr. Llamazares Trigo: MP in the opposition (<i>Partido Socialista</i>). Mr. Aznar López: Prime Minister (<i>Partido Popular</i>).	12/03/2003 (Pages 11939-40)	Appendix H Extract (viii)

Table 2: Extracts chosen for analysis in the *Congreso de los Diputados*

Total number of ECFs	
British MPs	4
Spanish MPs	8

Table 3: Number of ECFs in British and Spanish parliaments

		British MPs
ECFs produced by the Opposition		0%
ECFs produced by the Government	The PM	25%
	Other MP	75%

Table 4: ECFs produced by the Opposition and the Government in the House of Commons

		Spanish MPs
ECFs produced by the Opposition		62'5%
ECFs produced by the Government	The PM	12'5%
	Other MP	25%

Table 5: ECFs produced by the Opposition and the Government in the *Congreso de los D.*